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Bilingualism
and Biculturalism
3 in the Canadian
House of Commons

David Hoffman and Norman Ward

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Since a complete description of this study as planned and executed is contained in Chapter III and a further note on purpose and method is provided in Appendix A, it is not necessary to describe the project in detail here.

Chapters I and II trace the bilingual history of the Canadian House of Commons of the twenty-sixth Parliament in its historical context as a representative body. The remainder of the study—Chapters III to X—consists of an analysis of the survey made by questionnaire of members of Parliament in the House of Commons in 1964 and 1965. This part begins with a detailed account of the methods used and the chief problems encountered (Chapter III); the results of the survey follow in the remaining chapters. When the study was virtually completed, and when it was too late to make fundamental changes, the authors concluded that they should have included a more detailed investigation of the structure of power in the House of Commons, a fact mentioned here to acknowledge the omission.

The division of labour between the co-authors should be indicated in order that proper credit may be given to Professor David Hoffman for his share. Professor Hoffman did the major share of the work in preparing the drafts of the questionnaire used in the survey, in interviewing the members of Parliament, in analyzing and coding the results, and in writing the first draft of Chapters III to X. Professor Norman Ward assisted with the questionnaire and did some interviewing of members, wrote the rest of the study apart from Chapters III to X, and edited the whole.

A number of members of the research staff of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism made material contributions to the study, as acknowledged particularly in Chapters I and III. We should like especially to acknowledge the helpful assistance of Miss Judy Dibben, André Bélanger, and Dr. Jean Fortier. Several members of the faculties of York University and the University of Saskatchewan read

parts of the study and offered helpful suggestions. To all these people the co-authors are grateful. The responsibility for the report of course rests with the co-authors.

David Hoffman

March 1966

Norman Ward

Bilingualism in the House of Commons has two main aspects, each of which has its distinctive history. On the one hand there is the legal and constitutional framework, within which the two languages are given a status apart from all other languages. On the other hand is the vast body of customs and practices that have grown up around the constitutional framework, determining the day-to-day use of the two languages on the floor of the House, in committees, and in all the other relationships that must develop if a legislative assembly is to be viable. The Canadian House of Commons is by no means unique in having more than one official language;¹ English has served with Hindi, for example, as one of two official languages in India, and French has served with German and Italian in Switzerland. What is unique about the Canadian situation is that the languages are French and English, found together in a North American environment, in a historical and sociological context which has no parallel elsewhere.

A. The Legal and Constitutional Framework

Statutory provisions governing the use of language did not appear until relatively late in Canadian history. Nonetheless, problems involving the use of language in the governmental process, when an English-speaking administration was attempting to manage the affairs of a predominantly French-speaking community, inevitably arose early, and caused concern on both sides. The Attorney General and Solicitor General in 1766, reporting perceptively on civil government in Quebec, cited as one of their problems:

The attempt to carry on the Administration of Justice without the aid of the natives, not merely in new forms, but totally in an unknown tongue, by which means the partys Understood Nothing of what was pleaded or determined having neither Canadian Advocates or Solicitors to Conduct their Causes, nor Canadian jurors to give Verdicts, even in Causes between Canadians only,

Nor Judges Conversant in the French Language to declare the Law, and to pronounce Judgment: This must cause the Real Mischiefs of Ignorance, oppression and Corruption, or else what is almost equal in Government to the mischiefs themselves, the suspicion and Imputation of them.²

However neither the Quebec Act of 1774 nor the Constitutional Act of 1791³ says anything about the constitutional status of either English or French, although the latter act permitted legislative councillors and elected assemblymen to take their oath of allegiance in either language.

Despite this, the necessity of using both languages in a legislature composed of members from both English- and French-speaking backgrounds quickly became apparent, and the legal foundations for parliamentary bilingualism were soon laid, though not without friction. The Constitutional Act of 1791 assumed the creation of Upper and Lower Canada and it provided for a legislature in each. In Lower Canada the Legislative Assembly in 1793 first rejected a motion to make English alone the legal language, and then resolved:

That Bills relative to the criminal laws of England in force in this province, and to the rights of the Protestant clergy, as specified in the Act of the 31st year of his Majesty, chap. 31, shall be introduced in the English language; and the Bills relative to the Laws, Customs, usages and civil rights of this Province, shall be introduced in the French language, in order to preserve the unity of the texts.

That such Bills as are presented shall be put into both languages, that those in English be put into French, and those presented in French be put into English by the clerk of the House or his Assistants, according to the directions they may receive, before they be read the first time--and when so put shall also be read each time in both languages--well understood that each Member has a right to bring in any Bill in his own language, but that after the same shall be translated, the text shall be considered to be that of the language of the law to which said Bill hath reference.⁴

It is perhaps not surprising that such resolutions should be passed in Lower Canada, and it is to be noted that texts of bills in both languages were to be considered official in the legislature's view; the British government, while accepting both languages, subsequently "insisted on English as the language of law."⁵ What is striking is a decree of the government of Upper Canada, also issued shortly after the Constitutional Act of 1791: "Such Acts as have already passed or may hereafter pass the Legislature of this Province shall be translated into the French language for the benefit of the inhabitants of the western district of this province and other French settlers who may come to reside within this province."⁶

None of these resolutions had statutory form; but in accordance with ancient parliamentary privilege, and the powers of the colonial governments to issue decrees concerning their domestic affairs, they

presumably had the force of law. The proposed act of union of 1822, which was dropped in the face of opposition from both Upper and Lower Canada, included a clause on language which anticipated a unilingual assembly to govern both parts of the reunited Canadas: "And be it further Enacted, That from and after the passing of this Act, all written proceedings of what nature soever of the said Legislative Council and Assembly, or either of them, shall be in the English language and none other; and that at the end of the space of fifteen years from and after the passing of this Act, all debates in the said Legislative Council or in the said Assembly shall be carried on in the English language and none other."⁷ This clause, which was not proceeded with, represents the only serious attempt to impose English as a language of debate on the French Canadians.

The Act of Union of 1840, in keeping with Lord Durham's expectation that Canadians of French origin could be assimilated into a larger English-speaking community, enacted as follows:

And be it enacted that from and after the said reunion of the said two Provinces, all writs, proclamations, instruments for summoning and calling together the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada and for proroguing and dissolving the same, and all writs of summons and election, and all writs and public instruments whatsoever relating to the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly or either of them, and all returns to such writs and instruments, and all journals, entries and written or printed proceedings of what nature soever of the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly and each of them respectively, and all written or printed proceedings and reports of committees of the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly respectively, shall be in the English language only: Provided always, that this enactment shall not be construed to prevent translated copies of any such documents being made, but no such copy shall be kept among the records of the Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly, or be deemed in any case to have the force of an original record.⁸

This clause, comprehensive though it was, was not intended to prohibit the use of the French language in debate; nor did it, and French was used from the first union Parliament, the rules of procedure in the assembly specifically providing for the translation of papers into French, and the reading of motions in both languages.⁹

Even so, the use of English alone as the language of original record proved to be not merely a source of great aggravation to the French-speaking members, but actually unworkable in an elected body whose members spoke in two tongues. The clause making English only the official language of record was repealed *in toto* in 1848, by an amending statute which itself said that the repeal was enacted "in order that the Legislature of the Province of Canada, or the said Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly respectively, may have power to make such regulations herein as to them may seem advisable."¹⁰

Thus from 1848 French and English enjoyed equal official status in the Province of Canada.

The act of 1848 really settled the question of parliamentary bilingualism in Canada, and the Confederation negotiations simply assumed that both languages would be necessary in any national legislative body established under a new constitution. Number 46 of the Quebec Resolutions reads: "Both the English and French languages may be employed in the General Parliament and in its proceedings, and in the Local Legislature of Lower Canada, and also in the Federal Courts and in the Courts of Lower Canada." Debate on the resolutions in the Canadian legislature resulted in no change in the clause, and revealed no disagreement about the equal status that should be given to English and French; on the contrary, the most explicit assurances were given to a few French Canadians who were concerned about the permissive "may" in the resolution.¹¹ The man who gave the assurances, John A. Macdonald, was the only English Canadian who spoke on Resolution 46. Not a single voice was raised in opposition to the intent of the resolution.

The statutory terms of the enactment which resulted from the Quebec Resolutions were actually more explicit than the resolutions in regard to language: "Either the English or the French Language may be used by any Person in the Debates of the Houses of the Parliament of Canada and of the Houses of the Legislature of Quebec; and both those Languages shall be used in the respective Records and Journals of those Houses; and either of the Languages may be used by any Person or in any Pleading or Process in or issuing from any Court of Canada established under this Act, and in or from all or any of the Courts of Quebec. The Acts of the Parliament of Canada and of the Legislature of Quebec shall be printed and published in both those Languages."¹²

This section of the British North America Act, it is to be noted, draws no distinctions whatever between English and French, and puts no limits on the use of either. The section has not been altered since 1867, and when in 1949 the Parliament of Canada assumed the right to amend parts of the act, the use of the English or French language was expressly omitted from the amending power.¹³ The statutory terms of the constitutional act have been supplemented by several House rules, all of which preserve the equality of the languages.

B. The Use of the Language Provisions

Except on the condition that all members are fluently bilingual, the use of two languages in a legislature inevitably involves translation, and on two distinct levels: the translation of the spoken word, as uttered on the floor of the House of Commons and in its committees, and the translation of the written word, as needed in parliamentary proceedings, annual reports for the information of members and the public, and in motions, bills, and statutes. The two are of

course inextricably mingled (before modern technology made simultaneous translation possible, for example, rendering the spoken word into the other language always required a written transcript that could be translated), but they have nonetheless some separate problems.

The history of the spoken languages in the House of Commons since 1867 has followed a relatively simple pattern. The first House of Commons was in many important respects the legislature of the old Province of Canada writ large, with new members added for Ontario, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia. The 65 members from Quebec, almost all of whom spoke French, were more than balanced by 116 members from elsewhere, almost all of whom were English-speaking; and the imbalance grew as new English-speaking provinces were added. English, as a matter of course, became the day-to-day working language of Parliament, and French the language of translation.

Apart from sheer numbers, there was another reason for this development. From the beginning, it was common for French-speaking members to be bilingual, and much less common for the English-speaking. The result was a paradox which lasted until the installation of simultaneous translation in 1959, during the twenty-fourth Parliament: "The doughtiest champion of the French language, if he wishes to make any immediate impression on his listeners, must make his plea in English. Even some of his contemporaries may turn a deaf ear to any remarks he makes in French, suspecting that since he is not trying to reach the English-speaking members he may be speaking for some local purpose that is no concern of theirs."¹⁴ The simultaneous translation system, by which a member speaking in either language can be almost instantly understood in the other, has changed this, and more French is spoken in the contemporary House of Commons than in any previous period.

The trend to a more widespread use of French, however, antedates the recently established translation service for the spoken word, and is of particular interest because the use of French in modern times has involved an appreciable number of English Canadians, whereas in the early decades French was spoken almost exclusively by French Canadians. A statistical sampling of the use of French in the House of Commons for selected years may be seen in Table I.1.

Unqualified statistics can be misleading, but there can be no doubting the altered status of spoken French in the House of Commons in the past decade, not all of which is attributable to the simultaneous translation introduced in 1959. That system nonetheless, combined with a growing disposition on the part of French-speaking members to use it, has confirmed the substantial use now of both languages in the House of Commons. The only serious complaint to be heard about simultaneous translation is that it works too well, and reduces the need for members from either English- or French-speaking backgrounds to learn the other language.

Table I.1

Use of French in the House of Commons for selected years, 1880-1963

Year	Percentage of debates in French	
	General debates	Debates on Speech from Throne
1880	.1	-
1890	1.8	-
1900	2.0	3.7
1910	4.4	6.5
1920	2.6	9.1
1930	1.8	5.1
1940	1.7	6.2
1950	2.1	6.8
1955	3.6	8.8
1957	4.1	9.9
1958	8.6	25.0
1959	10.6	23.0
1960	13.0	26.4
1962	13.2	25.6
1962-3	17.9	20.4
1963	20.5	22.6

Source: Elizabeth Bird, "The Use of French in the House of Commons" (unpublished research paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).

The history of the translation of written languages in the House (which, it must be remembered, was also involved in the translation of spoken languages before 1959) is a more complex and troubled one. If a bilingual Parliament is to operate efficiently, not just as a bilingual Parliament but as a Parliament at all, an elaborate programme of translation is necessary: of executive instruments which must be understood by M.P.s; of committee reports on every aspect of legislation and parliamentary inquiry; of all motions and bills presented; and of course of debates. The development of this programme was complicated by two extraneous factors. English was so overwhelmingly the working language of the House of Commons until modern times that the initiative for securing adequate translations not only from English into French, but also from French into English, was for decades left to French-speaking members, who were always a minority of the House.¹⁵ Even in 1920 and 1921, when what was sought was a more rapid translation into English of speeches made in the House in French, it was a group of French-speaking members who, moved by the not unreasonable proposition that "every member sitting in this House has the right, when rising to speak, to be understood," made the necessary motions.¹⁶

Until 1934, when the government introduced a bill to establish the Bureau for Translations, translation matters were held generally to

concern the internal privileges of the House rather than governmental policy. Thus in 1907 Sir Wilfrid Laurier, during a lively debate on the status of the French language in and out of Parliament, said: "Now with regard to the printing of the Votes and Proceedings and the debates of the House, that is a matter with which the government has nothing to do. I know that there has been constant complaint about the debates, every session, but that is a matter for the Debates Committee to look after, and I believe that committee is endeavouring to meet the wishes and the convenience of members in that respect. If they do not do so, they ought to be taken to task and brought to a proper sense of their duty."¹⁷ In 1934, one of the House of Commons' veteran bilingual members, Henri Bourassa, hailed the government's bill to establish the Bureau for Translations in revealing words: "What I find in this case--that is why I approve of this bill--is that, for the first time, in legislation introduced by the government, bearing the seal of the government responsibility, and adopted by the House, the French language, both in fact and right, in law as well as in the spirit of the constitution, shall in the future be on an equal footing in the administration of all departments. . . . It is with both hands that I welcome this bill, as a crowning event of forty years of conflict carried on in defence of the French language."¹⁸

The conflict to which Bourassa referred was as evident in Parliament as in the administrative departments. It had its roots, not in any conscious opposition by English-speaking M.P.s to the equal status of French, but in the assumption that English was the working language of Parliament and the civil service, together with the inevitable mechanical problems involved in rendering bulky documents from one language to another under the pressure of time. The translation of debates and committee reports obviously requires competent translators. It also requires an edited copy of each document in the original language, the preparation of which takes time; and then the actual translation into the other language, followed by typesetting, proof-reading, and printing, which takes still more time. The result was that from the beginning printed translations of even major public documents were chronically late; and since French was the language of translation, it was commonly the French editions of everything, including the parliamentary debates, which were late.

Instances of delay, and of complaints about the delay, are so commonplace in the debates of the House of Commons before the creation of the Bureau for Translations as to need no chronicling. "Until 1918, when the English and French editions of the [Auditor General's] report were published bound within the same covers, the French translation of the report followed the English original by several weeks, so it was physically impossible in most sessions for members familiar only with French, whatever their personal desires, to perform their duties in regard to the Auditor General's report."¹⁹ The Solicitor General, speaking in support of the Bureau for Translations in 1934, gave some impressive examples of late translations:

. . . This year, only 12 French reports compared to 29 English reports are at the disposal of the House, and in previous years the situation was worse. . . . The annual report of the Pensions and National Health department for the year 1928-29, was issued in English in February, 1930, and in French in July, 1931 . . . the report of the Secretary of State for the year 1929-30, was issued in English in March, 1931, and in French in January, 1932. . . . I have here a list of 15 reports the French version of which was only issued long after the English one, and the delay varies from 17 months to 12, 9, 7 and 6 months.²⁰

In the same debate another member dug deeply into Hansard to produce examples of other delays from the parliamentary sessions of 1889, 1902, and 1906, making the point that late translations were a handicap to a member not only in Ottawa, but in his service to his electors: "We receive letters almost every day from our constituents asking us when they can get a certain document in French. The French version[s] of the debates are often from two to three weeks behind, and those of bills and other public documents are often a month or more. I have known of a delay of six months before we could get the French translations of certain public documents. Almost every year there is an extraordinary case."²¹

Nor was delay the sole cause of dissatisfaction. The quality of translation, though not nearly so fruitful a source of complaint as was tardiness, was nonetheless commonly mentioned. The Secretary of State showed the House of Commons in 1934, for example, a proof of a French text in which the corrections "necessitated practically a complete re-printing of the entire text,"²² with a consequent substantial increase in cost. The minister used this fact as part of the justification for centralizing the translation services in a bureau under the direct jurisdiction of a minister, instead of leaving them, as they had been until 1934, scattered haphazardly throughout the parliamentary staff and some of the departments. The bluebook branch of the House of Commons staff, the minister said in 1934, "was organized as a temporary expedient in 1913 with a view to abolish, or at least curtail, the practice of sending departmental reports for translation outside of Ottawa to political friends as a means of political patronage."²³ It is hardly surprising that a translation system which included such devices should have been on occasion unsatisfactory, particularly since "by the 1930's several important departments were still without translators, and relying on the spare-time work of the parliamentary staff. A long document might thus be broken up and worked on by several individuals, to the consequent detriment of the quality and consistency of translation."²⁴

The history of the attempts to cope with the problems of parliamentary translation is a complex one, but one which can be summarized briefly. For several decades after Confederation, as has been noted, successive governments took the view that translation was an internal

domestic matter affecting the House of Commons, as distinct from the executive, and the result was that the translation system, pushed one way by members desiring improved service, and another by members desirous of exploiting the patronage available, became a hodge-podge that continued from session to session, under continual criticism, but with no one actually responsible for it on a continuing basis. As late as 1909, over four decades after Confederation, only two executive departments appear to have had their own translators; the others either relied on the parliamentary staff or, more simply, confined their output to English. Sometimes the translators were desperately overworked; at other times they were idle for prolonged periods. Those specializing in rendering English into French usually had vastly more to do than those doing the reverse, thus raising vexing problems of the proper salary scale to be employed for translators. It was for long a system pleasing only to those who were indifferent to it, or unaware of what bilingualism in a Parliament truly meant.

In 1910 an experienced translator was sent out to study bilingualism in Belgium and Switzerland, but no drastic reorganization appears to have followed his visit. The parliamentary staff was somewhat rationalized in 1913 by the creation of a clear-cut division between translators of debates and translators of bluebooks, the whole remaining under the Speaker of the House. In 1934, when arguing for the establishment of the Bureau for Translations, the Secretary of State accurately advised the House of Commons that "the inefficiency of the translation service is due largely to the fact that it has developed in a haphazard way and has never been organized with a view to distributing the work, so that no translator would be idle, apart from a reasonably long holiday for rest and recreation during the summer months, and that no translator should be underworked or overworked, underpaid or overpaid."²⁵

The Bureau for Translations, which since 1934 has unobtrusively been in charge of translation for both Parliament and the executive branches of the government, had its immediate origins in a House of Commons committee, and a second committee composed of leading civil servants, both of which in the early 1930's came to the conclusion that something had to be done. The government accepted this conclusion by creating the Bureau, whose statutory duties could hardly be more specific: ". . . to collaborate with and act for all departments of the Public Service, and both Houses of Parliament of Canada, and all bureaus, branches, commissions and agencies created or appointed by Act of Parliament, or by the Governor in Council, in making and revising all translations from one language into another of all departmental and other reports, documents, debates, bills, acts, proceedings and correspondence."²⁶

The Bureau for Translations' internal organization need not concern us here. What is significant is that the Bureau, with an establishment now approaching 300 translators, has succeeded in bringing order

to the chaotic translation system that preceded it. No one claims the Bureau and its allied activities to be perfect. The Royal Commission on Government Organization, (1962) referred to delays caused by the "inadequate coordination of translation work with production" as well as insufficient staff, and pointed out that there would be more and longer delays "were it not for the fact that much of the current information material appears only in English."²⁷ But the House of Commons itself now hears far fewer complaints than formerly regarding parliamentary documents and other materials necessary to a member if he is to perform his functions adequately. The fundamental problems of translating the written word, in short, have been substantially solved, and that fact, combined with a simultaneous translation of the spoken word, and the extension of simultaneous translation to committees of the House of Commons, puts parliamentary bilingualism in Canada on the strongest base it has yet enjoyed.

A discussion of the mechanical and organizational aspects of translating would be incomplete if it did not conclude by emphasizing that parliamentary bilingualism must always involve more than the literal rendering of words from one language into another. In the words of the Royal Commission on Government Organization:

Translation is not and can never be a purely mechanical process which can be undertaken by anyone with a working knowledge of both languages. It must, if it is to be effective, be a paraphrase which takes account of idiom as well as syntax. . . . In Canada, translation between English and French presents peculiar problems. In each language many words have acquired connotations unknown in the country of origin. French in Canada has absorbed different anglicisms from those adopted in France, as well as many American words and terms, and no good French-American dictionary is available. English usage in Canada has accepted American meanings of some words but adheres to the British meanings of others.²⁸

The relevance of those observations to a House of Commons that talks most of the year is obvious.

Quite apart from translation as such, the implications of parliamentary bilingualism in Canada have often reached beyond language alone into the less easily charted waters of partisanship, prejudice, and emotion. D'Alton McCarthy's well-known bill of 1890, intended to abolish the use of French as an official language in the Northwest Territories in the interests of a "community of language," precipitated a long debate which ended in a momentary defeat for McCarthy's proposition, but not before the House had been sharply and, in some individual instances, bitterly divided.²⁹ Laurier quoted one of McCarthy's speeches in which the latter referred to the French Canadians as a "bastard nationality . . . which begins and ends with the French race -- which begins and ends with those who profess the Roman Catholic faith, and which now threatens the dismemberment of Canada."³⁰ Laurier's speech evoked a sympathetic reply from Sir John A. Macdonald, who in his opening paragraph uttered one of his most

famous statements:

I have no accord with the desire expressed in some quarters that by any mode whatever there should be an attempt made to oppress the one language or to render it inferior to the other; I believe that would be impossible if it were tried, and it would be foolish and wicked if it were possible. The statement that has been made so often that this is a conquered country is *à propos de rien*. Whether it was conquered or ceded, we have a constitution now under which all British subjects are in a position of absolute equality, have equal rights of every kind — of language, of religion, of property and of person. There is no paramount race in this country; there is no conquered race in this country.³¹

The House of Commons during the debate in 1890 specifically rejected, by a vote of 149-50, the doctrine of a "community of language" in Canada, and affirmed its "adherence to the said covenants" of the British North America Act.³² The debate is significant not only for that, but as an example of the House being used as a forum for the discussion of bilingualism, with both languages being freely employed, and French- and English-speaking members combining on a common stand. A handful of French-speaking members, it is interesting to note, voted against the relevant motions because they included an additional clause unacceptable to them.

Quite different alignments developed in 1907 when Armand Lavergne moved "That it is in the interest and for the well-being of the Dominion, and in accord with the Confederation agreement of 1867, that the French language, which in virtue of the constitution is official, be placed on a footing of equality with the English language in all public matters -- for instance in the coinage of moneys and in the administration of postal affairs."³³ This motion produced a sharp division between French Canadian M.P.s, for while they were virtually unanimous in their dissatisfaction over the status of French, many of them were loathe to admit, as a matter of principle, that French was not in fact on a basis of absolute equality with English. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, as Prime Minister, chose the second course and moved in amendment that "the French language is in fact, as well as by the constitution, on a footing of equality with the English language."³⁴ This obliged him to place minimal importance on such matters as bilingual bank notes, insistence on which he described as "pedantic." The House of Commons did not divide on the issue, the topic being talked out, but Lavergne received support, and a wealth of pertinent illustrative material, from Henri Bourassa, who was exercised over the small amount of French used on the Intercolonial Railway's Quebec leg, a complaint with which Laurier agreed.

Considerable mention has already been made of the debates in 1934 on the establishment of the Bureau for Translations, and it is not intended to recapitulate those proceedings here. The debate of 1934 revealed yet another implication of parliamentary bilingualism, for it showed members opposing the Bureau because it centralized the

translation services under a minister. This arrangement, several variously argued, would destroy the existing decentralized system (and with that, presumably, some useful patronage in which members had some influence), would derogate from the privileges of the House of Commons, whose Speaker was at that time in charge of translation, and would actually endanger the French language, by relegating it permanently to the status of a language of translation instead of that of an official original text.

As these samplings from the debates suggest, parliamentary bilingualism implies a great deal more than simple translation. Translation of both the spoken and written word has produced many problems, which have been wholly or partially solved by the application of many devices. Not once, interestingly enough, has the House of Commons considered one of the most obvious solutions that occurs to one reading the House of Commons *Debates*: that the most efficient way to minimize many of the multifarious difficulties that can arise in a bilingual Parliament over language would be to have fluently bilingual M.P.s. The solution seems obvious because time and again what has prevented the House of Commons from reaching a complete *impasse* has been the fact that many members, and most notably French Canadian members, have been bilingual. "What would happen in this house," a veteran member and former Speaker asked rhetorically on one occasion, "if French members were to speak nothing but French, if they were to move amendments in French, raise their points of order in French, make their motions in French and ignore the English language completely? Where would we be? Could the business of this house be carried on?" The reverse side of the coin, as seen by an English-speaking member, was revealed in 1955 by Mr. Harold Winch, M.P. Of his French-speaking colleagues Mr. Winch said: "It is their God-given right to use the French tongue but why do they insist on it when they know the majority of the members are English-speaking and can't speak it themselves?"³⁵

C. *Parliamentary Biculturalism*

The institutions of a society are part of its culture. It is necessary, in examining the effect of two languages on the House of Commons, to include a consideration of how the members speaking the separate languages have shared the major duties and offices of the House between the two groups. A completely comprehensive study of such arrangements would probably be impossible, for many of the important relationships between members are exceedingly informal, ranging, for example, from casual to serious discussions in corridors, offices, the barber shop, the cafeteria, and the dining room. The same is true of members' relations with newsmen, and with constituents and other visitors. The major institutions of the House can be studied, however, and it is to them that this section is devoted.

The most conspicuous of these institutions is the cabinet, the majority of whose members have always sat in the House of Commons; nowadays, indeed, the Senate does not always have even one representative in the cabinet. Since the cabinet is the subject of a separate study,³⁶ it is not necessary to comment on it in detail, beyond pointing out that a) every cabinet has reflected the existence of the two main language groups, and no prime minister has attempted to choose his colleagues from just one of them; and b) certain portfolios, of which Finance is the most prominent example, have been monopolized by English-speaking Canadians, while there are no portfolios that have been monopolized by French Canadians. The office of prime minister is not one of the monopolized portfolios, the House of Commons having given its confidence for prolonged periods to two French-speaking Canadians, Laurier and St. Laurent; Laurier, in fact, had the longest unbroken period of office of any prime minister, from 1896 to 1911, and also led his party longer than any other, from 1887 to 1919.

Closely related to the bicultural nature of the cabinet is the House's own chief office, the Speakership. "The fact that the Prime Minister is faced with finding a new Speaker immediately after a general election, when he is usually engaged in forming a new Cabinet or reconstructing an old one, means that the Speakership becomes involved in the process of Cabinet-making. It is normally an alternative to Cabinet office."³⁷ The Speakership is thus an important element in the balancing of representation, and since Confederation some discernible patterns have developed in connection with it.

One of these, interestingly enough, has not involved an insistence on the Speaker's being bilingual. While the House of Commons has had several bilingual Speakers, the great majority of them, as among the members at large, have come from French-speaking backgrounds, although not always from Quebec: two recent incumbents, Speakers Marcel Lambert and Lucien Lamoureux, respectively represented constituencies in Alberta and Ontario, and N. A. Belcourt, Speaker in 1904, was from Ottawa. The Speakership has generally reflected the claims of English and French in two ways other than bilingualism in the Chair: the Speakership is frequently alternated between members of English and French backgrounds; and the Deputy Speaker (an office created in 1885) is required to have a knowledge of the language other than that in which the Speaker is fluent.

The alternation between Speakers from English and French backgrounds has been far from regular, and has been influenced in part by changes in party representation in general elections, accompanied by the vicissitudes already referred to in choosing the cabinet. Of the 27 M.P.s who have held the office, 10 have been from Quebec (one of them Alan Macnaughton) and three other French-speaking Speakers, as noted, came from outside the province. Eleven Speakers have come from Ontario constituencies, almost all of them from that province's southern regions, which points up the fact that the Speakership, perhaps because of the interest in alternating the post between

representatives of the two language groups, is peculiarly associated with central Canada: Manitoba has produced two Speakers, and Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and the Yukon one each; no Speakers have come from British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, or Newfoundland.

A similar pattern can be seen in the office of Deputy Speaker, which has had 32 incumbents. Of these, 16 have been from Quebec, 10 from Ontario, three from Nova Scotia, one each from Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Newfoundland, and none from British Columbia, Alberta, New Brunswick or Prince Edward Island. The practice of supplying an English-speaking Speaker with a French-speaking Deputy has been followed virtually without exception since 1887, although the first appointment of a Deputy in 1885, when Speaker George Airey Kirkpatrick from Ontario was joined by Deputy Speaker Malachy B. Daly from Nova Scotia, and the Prime Minister conceded that Mr. Daly's French was not as good as it might have been, was hardly a promising start. The English-French dichotomy in the House of Commons' chief offices has not always meant an Ontario-Quebec team: thus apart from the Kirkpatrick-Daly combination in 1885, Speaker James Glen (Manitoba) was assisted by G. A. Bradette (Ontario), Speaker Marcel Lambert (Alberta) by Gordon C. Chown (Manitoba); and Speaker Lucien Lamoureux by Herman M. Batten (Newfoundland). There is no instance of the Speakership and Deputy Speakership being held at the same time by two members from Quebec, or by two French Canadians.

Two additional observations about the Speakership are relevant. The Speaker is the government's nominee, and governments have not always been scrupulously careful to select men noted for their conciliatory attitudes where language is concerned. Thomas Sproule, Speaker from 1911 to 1915, was an active Orangeman who in the debate of 1907 on Armand Lavergne's motion for the equality of English and French in all public matters had said: "I disagree with the contention of the hon. gentlemen that the two languages should be on an equal footing."³⁸ Lavergne himself had a considerable reputation as a nationalist, but he became Deputy Speaker in 1930. It seems clear that on occasion at least the attitudes of members towards the Speakerships as such have varied with their backgrounds. The celebrated pipeline debate of 1956 found many English-speaking M.P.s profoundly exercised over the principles involved, and many English Canadian newspapers called for the resignation of Speaker Louis-René Beaudoin. No French Canadian member emerged as a champion of parliamentary principles, and leading Quebec journalists differed sharply with their English-speaking colleagues. "Indeed," a perceptive observer of the Canadian scene has written, "had the crisis over the Speaker's office aroused any considerable excitement at all in Quebec, it most surely would have been interpreted as a racial attack on Mr. Louis-René Beaudoin!"³⁹

To that can be added a final conclusion: the bilingual nature of the Canadian House of Commons is undoubtedly an important factor in the rotation of the Speakership among members, and the rotation

itself, which ordinarily gives each Speaker a short term in office, is hard on the Speakership: "The most obvious and serious disadvantage of the term is that the Speaker, whose function is essentially a judicial one, is not unequivocally put in the position where he has nothing to lose by doing right and nothing to gain by doing wrong. . . . It aggravates the difficulty, already somewhat greater in Canada than in Britain by reason of Canada's smaller House, of getting competence in the Chair; and there is no doubt that the Canadian House of Commons has suffered severely on occasion from incompetence."⁴⁰

The duality that pervades the House of Commons' major offices is found in some form throughout the House's affairs. Interestingly enough, language plays no part in the allocation among members of seats in the chamber, or of offices in the building. However the Speech from the Throne, for example, has been presented in both languages since Confederation (actually since 1848 in the legislature of the Province of Canada), and the prayer with which the House opens its sittings has been read on alternate days in English and French since the practice began in 1878. (The language in which the prayer was to be read initially provoked some discussion, those who believed that one language was surely enough being met with the counter proposition that the deity was presumably bilingual.)⁴¹ The suggestion that the annual budget should be presented in both languages was made at least as early as 1932,⁴² but it was not until 1958 that a Minister of Finance used both languages on a budget night. "It is surprising to me," he said on that occasion, "that in a parliament with two official languages enjoying complete equality every part of the budget speech has always been delivered in English."⁴³ In part, of course, this phenomenon represented the monopolization of the Finance portfolio by English Canadians, but it is also true that another of the differences between English- and French-speaking members in the House of Commons is that the latter, with few exceptions, have not played an active role in parliamentary finance generally. At one point in the history of the House the Public Accounts Committee virtually died, partly because it had been primarily the Opposition's forum and in 1917 a turn of the electoral wheel produced an Opposition in which 62 of 82 members were from Quebec.⁴⁴

Not every aspect of the House of Commons reveals that sharp differentiation between members from the two backgrounds. A study of formal divisions in the first and second sessions of the twenty-sixth Parliament led to the discovery that "there is no significant difference between the average absentee rate of French- and English-speaking members."⁴⁵ The real distinctions in regard to absenteeism at divisions bore no discernible relation to the English-French dichotomy; rather, the Prairie members tended to have the highest absentee rate, and representatives from the Atlantic provinces the lowest. Many factors influence attendance at divisions (a government with a very small majority, for example, would have to insist on a higher rate of attendance from its supporters than would one with a large majority),

and it would be dangerous to try to read into attendance figures conclusions that the evidence does not support. The study does suggest that the subject matter of individual divisions affects attendance, as does the day of the week, the most heavily attended divisions generally being on Tuesdays and Wednesdays; even so, an important division on a Monday or Friday would still be well attended. A few divisions, such as those in the flag debate, are clearly capable of causing members to vote contrary to the majority of their party, for Quebec Conservative members supported the Liberal government on this issue, either by voting with it, or abstaining from voting against it. Analysis of the divisions suggested that French-speaking members were slightly more inclined to vote independently of their party than were English-speaking, though in both groups cohesion was strong.

A similar study of questions asked during the first two sessions of the twenty-sixth Parliament revealed, as might be expected, that the real differentiations in activity were between Government and Opposition members, rather than between English and French.⁴⁶ A Government supporter is not ordinarily anxious to embarrass his leaders, and his questions tend to be limited to requests for information. An Opposition member has a variety of additional reasons for asking questions, including the possible embarrassment of the government, and is therefore much more inclined to be an active questioner, as Table I.2 shows.

Table I.2

Average number of questions asked by M.P.s in the first two sessions of the twenty-sixth Parliament, by party and language group

Party	Number of questions	
	French	English
Liberal	0.9	2.3
Progressive Conservative	30.9	16.3
New Democratic	—	54.9
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	36.2	—
Social Credit	17.1	9.5
All parties	11.8	9.4

Again, as with divisions, the bald statistics do not reveal a number of significant facts, such as the quality of questions asked, and the uses to which M.P.s put the answers; but it is again significant that the figures reveal no major differences between English- and French-speaking members as such.

Much clearer distinctions between the activities of the two groups emerge when one turns to the committee system of the House of Commons. The committees are an integral part of the machinery of the House, for they are widely used to conduct inquiries, to examine legislation, and to study departmental estimates. Since a member's participation in the work of committees reflects to a large extent his own

choice of interests in parliamentary affairs, the committees are a sensitive indicator of the activities of both individual members and groups of members. It has already been remarked by an experienced M.P., comparing the performance of English- and French-speaking members on committees, that "a more pertinent explanation of the poor Liberal show is the noticeable failure of French Canadian members, as a whole, to attend committee meetings. . . . French Canadians have a markedly different attitude to parliamentary responsibilities. Somehow they seem alien to the routine. It is a much larger issue than one of attendance. They seem to have more prestige among their constituents than have English-speaking members, and they tend to get more constituency work of all kinds."⁴⁷

The evidence adduced above suggests that "parliamentary disinterest" is too sweeping a term for a set of attitudes that may well be different, but not necessarily indicative of disinterest. Nonetheless, the "different" attitudes of French Canadians have often been a source of comment, and a variety of reasons have been offered for them. Thus writers have pointed to the relative absence of a democratic parliamentary tradition in Quebec, the strangeness of both Ottawa and Parliament as peculiarly English Canadian phenomena, the special interests that a minority is bound to have in its own language and traditions, with a consequent reliance on executive rather than parliamentary action, and the distrust in Quebec that is frequently engendered by men who go to Ottawa and become involved there.⁴⁸ Whatever the reason, it seems clear "that the French Canadians as a group are not fully involved in the committee system."⁴⁹

A number of aspects of participation in committee work lend themselves to statistical measurement, but the statistics must always be considered in the light of the facts that simultaneous translation of committee proceedings has only recently become general, and that French translations of even major documents originally available in English have since Confederation been chronically late. Quite apart from his own motives, in short, a French Canadian member who spoke English badly or not at all has until modern times been enormously handicapped in the affairs of parliamentary committees, and a tradition of active committee participation among French-speaking members could hardly have been expected to develop as a spontaneous growth.

With that in mind, we can turn to an actual record of performance of M.P.s on House of Commons committees. For purposes of comparison, the third session of the twenty-fourth Parliament (1960) and the second session of the twenty-sixth (1964-5) were selected, the former because it was a year of particularly active committees, the latter because it was the most recent year for which a complete set of documents was available. The two Parliaments were themselves markedly different, and the large majority enjoyed by the government in 1960, as compared with the minority government in 1964-5, undoubtedly skewed statistics concerning the composition of committees, the participation of members, and the selection of chairmen and vice-chairmen.

Several generalizations can nevertheless be cautiously made as a result of detailed study of the committees in these two Parliaments:

- 1) No places on committees are specifically reserved for members on the basis of their mother tongue. It was not uncommon, for example, for a French Canadian M.P. on a committee to be replaced by an English Canadian, and *vice versa*. In both parliamentary sessions, nonetheless, the share of committee places allotted to French-speaking members was smaller than their share of back-bench seats in the House of Commons as a whole, while that of English Canadians was larger. French Canadian M.P.s, that is, were measurably underrepresented on committees in both sessions: in 1960 they held 26.9 per cent of the back-bench seats in the House of Commons, and were allotted 21.9 per cent of the committee places; in 1964 the relevant figures were 27 per cent and 24.7 per cent.
- 2) The activity of French-speaking members in committees is increasing, in terms of actual membership, attendance, and share of committee chairmanships. The chief factor in this change appears to be the number of vigorous M.P.s from Quebec who include among their duties the protection of the "rights" of French Canadians.
- 3) Despite this change, English Canadian members remain demonstrably more active on committees. In both sessions studied not one of the 20 top attenders at committee meetings was French-speaking; on the other hand, French Canadian members were overrepresented among the poorer attenders at committees. Although their performance was stronger in 1964-5 than in 1960, one third of their number were still in the bottom 20 per cent of committee attenders.
- 4) Proportionate to their strength in the House of Commons, French-speaking members received less than their share of committee chairmanships and vice-chairmanships in 1960, but more in 1964-5. The total figures obscure the fact that English Canadians get more than their share of chairmanships, and French Canadians more than their share of vice-chairmanships, while English Canadians dominate the chairs of those committees which have no vice-chairman. The statistics are tabulated in Table I.3

Table I.3

Chairmanships and vice-chairmanships of committees for selected sessions, House of Commons, by mother tongue

Mother tongue	1960			1964-5		
	Chairman	Vice chairman	Chairman only	Chairman	Vice chairman	Chairman only
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
English	85.7	64.3	100.0	76.9	38.5	100.0
French	14.3	35.7		23.1	61.5	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Judy Dibben, "The Committee System of the House of Commons."

- 5) A clear pattern concerning the sharing of committee chairmanships and vice-chairmanships has emerged. In 1960, only seven of 14 committees having both a chairman and a vice-chairman had a "team" consisting of one English-speaking and one French-speaking M.P. In 1964-5, 11 of 12 committees had a bilingual combination in the chair.
- 6) Between 1960 and 1964 the clerks whose chief duties in the House of Commons committees to which they were assigned included arranging meetings, taking attendance, advising on procedure, preparing transcripts of proceedings for printing, and other purely routine matters,⁵⁰ changed from a predominantly English-speaking to a predominantly French-speaking group. In 1960 one clerk in six was French-speaking; in 1964 four in six were French-speaking. The change appears to reflect in part a more aggressive policy in connection with a bilingual parliamentary staff, in part the use of more translation in the committees themselves.
- 7) There is no discernible correlation between the mother tongue of the committee clerks and the committees to which they were assigned. Committees with the largest number of French-speaking M.P.s or having the highest attendance of French-speaking members, in both sessions had English-speaking clerks. French-speaking committee chairmen were not necessarily assigned French-speaking clerks, or *vice versa*.

The clerkships of the committees, a relatively insignificant part of the parliamentary machinery, and the vice-chairmanships, which are of course all subordinate to chairmanships, together comprise the only aspects of the parliamentary committee system currently dominated by French Canadians. These facts, when set in the historical context of bilingualism in the House of Commons, must be taken as typical of the real nature of parliamentary bilingualism in Canada. Just as the prime minister, who is theoretically the constitutional equal of his cabinet colleagues is *de facto* the first among them, so is English the first among the two equal languages prescribed by the British North America Act. Members of Parliament are also theoretically equal, but no English-speaking member has ever had to concern himself with making sure that English versions of bills, debates, resolutions, motions, committee proceedings and annual departmental reports were available when he needed them. The French-speaking members, by contrast, have had to exercise continuing vigilance to ensure that they could serve both themselves in their duties at Ottawa and their constituents at home with materials in a wholly familiar tongue. Nor can they relax in 1966 merely because conditions have been improving. On January 28, 1966, Gérard Laprise, M.P., rose in his place to say: "In view of the fact that the Translation Division of the Department of Agriculture has succeeded in publishing in both languages at the same time the department's annual report, for which it deserves high praise, could the Prime Minister not ask them for help so that we might get the French copies of public bills at the same time as the English copies?"⁵¹ The Prime Minister promised to do what he could.

A complete profile of the membership of the twenty-sixth Parliament, elected in 1963, is not strictly relevant to the purposes of this study, and we intend here to present only those aspects of it which relate particularly to the material that follows. The twenty-sixth Parliament was chosen for the obvious reason that it included the only House of Commons available, and the statistics derived from previous Parliaments are added to help put the study in historical context.

It has been known for some time that the process by which candidates are nominated and elected to the House of Commons, though legally available to practically everybody, is highly selective, putting particular emphasis repeatedly on some groups in the population, while all but ignoring others. Thus the members have never been a representative cross-section of the adult population in terms of sex or age, being drawn overwhelmingly from the male segment, and predominantly from ages forty to sixty. A distinct preference for native-born candidates as compared with immigrants has been a characteristic of representation in the House of Commons since roughly the turn of the century, although before that the contrary was true. Particular occupations, notably law and business, have regularly been represented in Parliament in numbers in excess of their proportionate position in the population at large.¹

It is not the purpose of this chapter either to explain or defend such phenomena but merely to describe relevant aspects of the House of Commons in the twenty-sixth Parliament as they concern the objects of this study. Ethnic origin is of course a primary consideration.

The figures in Table II.1, which suggest a substantial "overrepresentation" in the House of Commons of citizens of British origin and an equally substantial underrepresentation of the non-British and non-French, may be complemented and set in a historical context by another statistical distribution found in Table II.2.

Table II.1

Membership in the House of Commons compared with the total population, by ethnic origin, 1963

Ethnic origin	House of Commons	Total population
	(%)	(%)
British	52	44
French	31	30
Other	11	26
Not known	6	-

Sources: a) Caroline Andrew, "The Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons" (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1964), 14. (These figures are derived from data collected by mailed questionnaires sent to each member of the House of Commons in May 1963, at the beginning of the first session of Parliament following the general election of April 1963. Replies were received from 60 per cent of the total membership. Checks on the validity of the resulting "sample" reveal that, at least with respect to the major variables—party, linguistic group, region, and religion—the respondents are highly representative of the entire group); b) *Canada Year Book* (Ottawa, 1965).

Table II.2

Composition of the House of Commons, by birthplace, for Parliaments elected in selected years

Birthplace	1867	1882	1900	1921	1940	1963
British Columbia	-	-	-	2	1	7
Alberta	-	-	-	-	3	15
Saskatchewan	-	-	-	-	3	22
Manitoba	1	-	-	1	11	10
Ontario	39	65	91	105	99	80
Quebec	58	83	77	74	67	73
New Brunswick	10	20	12	15	10	7
Nova Scotia	17	20	23	19	16	10
P.E.I.	-	8	7	5	6	4
Newfoundland	-	-	-	-	-	6
England	18	6	6	9	7	6
Scotland	18	13	8	5	6	3
Ireland	24	12	3	5	3	-
Wales	-	1	-	1	-	-
U.S.A.	6	5	5	3	13	9
Other	6	2	1	1	5	6
Not known	19	2	8	7	3	8

Source: Norman Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 127; *Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Ottawa, 1965).

The tables confirm both the bias in favour of native-born candidates already referred to, and that against those of non-British non-French origins. Within the British and French as a group, furthermore, the bias is clearly in favour of those of British and English-speaking origin. Even if one were to assume that all members of Parliament born in Quebec were French-speaking, Quebec has not in modern times provided the birthplace for many more M.P.s than the province's own share of seats in the House of Commons, while the members born outside Canada come predominantly from English-speaking countries. The statistics do not reveal how many French-speaking members have been born outside Quebec, but in any one Parliament the number is not large.

A final relevant table (Table II.3), comparing the language group to which M.P.s appear to belong (admittedly a rather arbitrary classification) with the mother tongues of the population at large, provides further confirmation of the tendencies already shown. Using quite different statistics, a Canadian sociologist has concluded: "The Canadian political elite has scarcely been representative of Canada's ethnic composition."²

Table II.3
Composition of the House of Commons compared with the total population, by language group,* 1963

Language Group	House of Commons	Mother tongue of total population
	(%)	(%)
English	70	58
French	30	28
Other	-	13

Sources: C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 8; *Canada Year Book* (1965).
* Criterion used is mother tongue.

Ethnic origin and mother tongue apart, the religious composition of the House of Commons as shown in Table II.4 reveals some interesting variations in the membership of the House and the population. The underrepresentation of the Roman Catholics and the overrepresentation of the chief Protestant denominations are noteworthy.

Classifying members of Parliament according to the amount of formal education they have received is at best an arbitrary procedure, for provincial educational systems, and the degrees and certificates they offer, vary to such an extent that statistical identification of, for example, a bachelor's degree, does not necessarily mean the same thing across the country. The same is true of other apparently simple categories: a high school graduate with one year of teacher training and a university graduate with a bachelor's degree in arts

Table II.4

Composition of the House of Commons and the total population, by religious affiliation, 1963

Religion	House of Commons	Total population
	(%)	(%)
Roman Catholic	36	46
United Church	25	20
Anglican	15	13
Presbyterian	8	5
Baptist	3	3
Lutheran	3	4
Other and not known	10	10

Sources: C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 10; *Canada Year Book* (1965).

and education are both qualified as professional teachers; but should they be counted as having equivalent professional training? In Table II.5 an attempt has been made to show the composition of the House of Commons stratified by educational attainment, and it must be emphasized that both the categories used, and the allocation of members to the categories, are based on fairly arbitrary decisions.

Table II.5

Composition of the House of Commons, by members' educational status, 1963

Education	House of Commons
	(%)
Public school only	4
Secondary school only	23
University training, including bachelor's degree	16
Professional or graduate degree or professional qualification	49
Not known	7

Source: *Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (1965).

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the table is that members of Parliament are, as a group, highly educated as compared with the general population. (For example, only 2 per cent of the total population five years of age and over not attending school in 1961 had university degrees.)³ Further, the high degree of education attained by M.P.s includes within itself a disproportionately high number of members with professional qualifications. Not all of these have advanced university degrees, for the training of chartered accountants,

for example, has not in the past required a university degree, and a number of the lawyers and professional agriculturalists in the House of Commons have bachelor's degrees in their respective subjects. The fact remains that the professional group in the House, composed in the main of lawyers, doctors, accountants, and agriculturalists, is a very large one.

The age composition of the House of Commons (Table II.6), as might be expected, shows very marked departures not only from the age composition of the total population but from that of the adult segment of the population. Considerably more than half the population of Canada is under 35, and the composition of the House of Commons elected in 1963 does not come close to reflecting this fact. That

Table II.6
Composition of the House of Commons and total population, by age, 1963

Age group	House of Commons	Total population
	(%)	(%)
26-30	3	7
31-35	8	7
36-40	15	7
41-45	18	6
46-50	16	5
51-55	16	4
56-60	9	4
61-65	7	3
66-70	5	3
71-75	2	2

Sources: C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 11; D.B.S., *Census of Canada, 1961*, I, pt.2, Bull.1.2-3.

the House of Commons has always had a membership heavily concentrated in a small number of age groups can be demonstrated historically; although Table II.7 is based on slightly different age groupings, the results are the same. The median age of members, which rose gradually from 1867 to the 1940's, dropped back into the 46-50 bracket for 1963. A drop in either the median or average age of members of Parliament commonly reflects a large turnover in the membership of the House which brings in an unusually large number of younger members. Such a turnover occurred in 1958. The subsequent turnover in the election was close to normal, but the turnover in 1962 and 1963 was relatively small as is shown in Table II.8. A small turnover means a higher percentage of members with parliamentary experience, and this too can be shown statistically. The composition of the House classified according to members' experience is shown historically in Table II.9.

Table II.7

Composition of the House of Commons, by age, for Parliaments elected in selected years

Age	1867	1882	1900	1921	1940
20-24	1	-	2	-	-
25-29	3	4	3	-	4
30-34	21	21	14	10	13
35-39	24	36	13	22	15
40-44	42	45	34	41	29
45-49	34	44	44	46	51
50-54	35	34	32	41	43
55-59	13	27	38	37	39
60-64	7	14	25	25	34
65-69	2	5	12	14	16
70-74	-	3	5	6	5
75-79	-	-	2	-	1
80-84	-	-	-	-	-
Median age	44.9	46.2	50.3	50.2	51.5

Source: N. Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 129.

Table II.8

New members in the House of Commons for Parliaments elected in selected years

Year	New members
	(%)
1882	48
1900	48
1921	59
1940	37
1963	20

Sources: N. Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 116; C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 12.

By comparison, the House of Commons elected in 1963 had the pattern of experience shown in Table II.10. The large turnover in the House of Commons in 1958, followed by the results of 1962 and the small turnover in 1963, contributed to the small number of inexperienced members in 1963, but it also meant a sharp decline in the number of members with unusually long experience.

Table II.9

Composition of the House of Commons, by years of service, at the end of selected Parliaments

Years of service	1882	1900	1921	1940
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
0-5	41.8	46.4	57.0	35.6
6-10	27.4	27.5	23.1	37.5
11-15	17.9	13.9	5.0	12.7
Over 15	12.9	12.2	14.9	14.2

Source: N. Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 138.

Table II.10

Composition of the House of Commons, by years of service, 1963

Years of service	House of Commons
	(%)
None	20
1-5	51
6-10	19
Over 10	11

Source: C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 11.

Table II.11

Composition of the House of Commons, on the Blischen groupings, 1963

Category	House of Commons
	(%)
1. Upper professionals	33
2. Professionals and upper white collar workers	41
3. White collar and upper blue collar workers	7
4. Lower white collar workers and blue collar workers	1
5. Blue collar workers	16
6. Less skilled blue collar workers	0
7. Lower blue collar workers and unskilled	*
Unclassified	2

Source: C. Andrew, "Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 9.

* Less than 1%.

Finally, the point has been made above that the House of Commons has characteristically been drawn from a relatively small number of occupations. An analysis of the House of Commons elected in 1963, based on the Blisshen scale,⁴ is shown in Table II.11. The concentration of House of Commons membership in the upper employment strata hardly needs comment.

There is little in any of these statistics to suggest that the twenty-sixth Parliament was markedly untypical in its composition. As has been noted, the pattern of experience of the House elected in 1963 was unusual, largely because of the unprecedentedly high turnover of members in 1958 and the results of subsequent elections. But apart from that the House of Commons of 1963, like its predecessors, showed the usual pattern of disparities as a cross-section of the Canadian population. The disparities themselves vary from Parliament to Parliament, but the fact of the disparities remains a constant.

A. Purposes and Problems

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism commissioned a study of the House of Commons to examine how Canadians from different cultures and language groups work together in an environment which depends on co-operation, and in particular to assess the possible effects of differing attitudes within the two principal linguistic groups of the country. The purpose of the project was to study the role of the Canadian M.P., and to determine if possible whether the role is affected by Canada's bilingual and bicultural character and by the presence of other cultural groups. The study thus sought to discover the role perceptions of M.P.s, and to determine how members go about performing their roles as they perceive them; to examine the relation between certain structural features of Parliament (such as the House as a whole as compared with its committees) and a member's performance of his role, with special reference to the use of language; and to examine the channels of communication of ideas and influence between and within the political parties, and especially between English-speaking and French-speaking members and their constituents.

A study of these proportions suffered from two difficulties from the beginning. In the first place, the paucity of monographs and articles on the subjects under consideration made it necessary to create a large body of original descriptive material before the task of interpretation could proceed; and secondly, few political scientists in Canada had much experience of the techniques necessary to the acquisition of the essential data. Studies of the role perception and behaviour of legislators have been conducted by American political scientists, but even here a relatively small amount of literature was available to guide the researchers.¹ Because of the novelty of this type of study in Canada, and the particular problems encountered in producing a study of this complexity in a relatively short period of

time, it seems worth while to indicate as clearly as possible not merely the results of the study, but the steps taken to attain them.

B. The Course of the Research

1. The preliminary stage: defining the project (June 1 - July 20, 1964)²

Working from a general outline of the "Members of Parliament Study" produced by the Director of Research of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism we set about to develop concrete proposals in terms of the division of responsibility of the major researchers. A crucial decision in the early stage was to rely on the use of a structured interview as the source of a great deal of primary data on the subject. The interviewing of every M.P. was seriously considered. The researchers were aware of the difficulties of generalizing from material so exclusively derived from the members of the twenty-sixth Parliament, however, and resolved to give the study as much historical depth as possible.

2. The preliminary interviews (July 20 - August 31, 1964)

The first concrete step was to engage in a series of interviews with M.P.s over the summer of 1964. The purpose of these interviews, which were conducted by Professor Hoffman, was threefold: a) to test the reaction of M.P.s to the kinds of questions we proposed to ask in the major study; b) to experiment, through the use of unstructured, free-flowing interviews, with the variety of questions and approaches which could be applied to the eliciting of information; and c) to provide the basis for one external check against the reliability of the data acquired through the later structured interviews.³ As the result of a dozen interviews ranging from one hour to three hours with members from all political parties except the Cr ditistes (with whom it did not prove possible to arrange a convenient time), we were convinced of the receptiveness of members to the project and were able to acquire information that permitted us to frame our questions in a more incisive manner.

3. The drafting of the interview schedule (September 1, 1964 - February 15, 1965)

The character and content of the interview schedule were influenced by at least five different sources: the Wahlke and Eulau study, the Kornberg interview schedule, and the interview schedule of the Dartmouth College study of Congress, referred to above; Charles Clapp's *The Congressman*;⁴ and in particular the interviews conducted by Professor Hoffman during the summer of 1964 with Canadian M.P.s.

A first draft of the interview schedule was produced in English by Professor Hoffman, considered by Professor Meisel (supervisor of behavioural studies for the Commission) and Professor Ward, and then

after revision turned over to Alfrédo Levesque, who helped create a French version. There were great difficulties involved in the latter task, but the need to assure that the precise meaning of a phrase or a question was appropriately translated into another language served the useful purpose of forcing the designers of the questionnaire to reflect again on the original meaning of their questions. An intermediate draft of the English questionnaire was seen by Professor John Johnstone of the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago and approved with amendments. During the first weeks of February final English and French versions were produced, checked for the strict comparability of meaning from one questionnaire to the other, and printed.

One of the persistent difficulties encountered in creating the interview schedule, apart from the problem of translation, was the conflict between the need to acquire *extensive* information, especially when fundamental data on our political process were lacking (for example on the operations of provincial and regional caucus systems), and the need to permit *intensive* treatment of basic concepts by the use of an appropriate number of probing questions. In order to pursue basic questions of interest a number of other interesting possibilities had to be omitted.⁵

The optimum length of an interview was taken to be about two hours. In order to obtain all the information that was thought desirable a decision of some consequence had to be taken at an early stage. It was decided to divide the questionnaire into three parts. The first part (Part A) was a structured interview to be conducted by a qualified interviewer and was assumed to take roughly the whole of the two hours allotted; interviewers were asked to concentrate on the goal of completing, without undue irritation to the respondent, the whole of Part A. If the respondent was pressed for time, Parts B and C were then to be left for completion at the respondent's convenience. Part B consisted of 30 statements to which the respondent was invited to indicate his agreement or disagreement by ticking off the appropriate column. Part C consisted of 17 questions designed to supplement the biographical data on each respondent.⁶ In practice a great many interviews took longer than the expected two hours, and in the majority of them the alternative plan was pursued: the interview was completed in one session, and Parts B and C were then left to be picked up later.

This particular approach was not without risks. On the one hand if we asked a respondent to complete Parts B and C of the questionnaire after a lengthy interview, we ran the risk of having him refuse to do so, thus perhaps destroying the opportunities for a completed interview schedule. On the other hand we ran the risk that a respondent, although otherwise well disposed towards the study, would not find time to complete Parts B and C, leaving us in roughly the same position. Finally there was the risk of a respondent's becoming hostile to being interviewed and refusing to return Parts B and C. Proof of this risk is to be found in the refusal rate of those who completed

the first part of the interview but who did not return either Part B or Part C.⁷

4. Training the interviewers (February 16 - March 4, 1965)

The task of interviewing a large number of members of the House of Commons was beyond the capacity of the two authors alone; it was therefore necessary to supplement their interviewing with the best available resources. The quality of the interviewing is often the weak link in studies of this kind; it is at this stage that the pressures of inadequate time and money come most notably to bear. The problem in this case was more acute since it was necessary to recruit and train both English-speaking and French-speaking interviewers. Moreover the relative novelty of research by survey in this country meant that there was no pool of experienced interviewers from which to draw.

As a first step Miss Judy Dibben, an M.A. student in political science, was recruited as a field supervisor for the interviewers. It proved possible to involve Miss Dibben first in the creation of the interview schedule itself, thus allowing her to become as familiar with the purposes of the study as the authors themselves. Fourteen student interviewers were then recruited and trained: eight English-speaking students and one French-speaking student from Carleton University, and five French-speaking students from the University of Ottawa. Nearly all the interviewers, many of them graduate students, were studying in the social sciences; all had previous experience in interviewing. Nearly everyone had taken a course in research methods in the social sciences.

5. Drawing the sample (March 1-2, 1965)

When the interviewing began early in March 1965 it was still the intention of the authors to attempt to complete interviews with every member of the House of Commons. It was on this basis that a public statement to this effect was made later.⁸ Because of the uncertainty of the venture, and particularly because of the possibility of an early dissolution of Parliament, a "hedge" was made against the possibility of being caught with a sample of completed interviews bearing no relationship to the composition of the House: we decided to proceed on the basis of a "systematic sample"⁹ of 50 per cent of the members of the House of Commons. M.P.s were assigned to appropriate party lists, members being listed alphabetically within each. A sample of 50 per cent of the total number of M.P.s was then drawn starting with the first name on the Liberal list, and taking every other name thereafter in the Liberal, Social Credit, New Democratic, Social Credit Rally, and Progressive Conservative lists (in that order). The rationale for this operation was that the first list, based on a systematic sample of M.P.s, would be completed before going on to the second list (the remaining 50 per cent); should a dissolution of Parliament prevent a full survey of the House of

Commons, then at least a systematic sample of half the membership would have been achieved.

6. *Interviewing the M.P.s (March 8 - April 9, 1965)*

During the first weeks of interviewing, there were seventeen interviewers in the field; the 15 student interviewers, Miss Dibben and Professor Hoffman. Each interviewer was assigned three names, beginning at the top of the first list. Interviewers were responsible for making arrangements for their own interviews. The normal procedure was to telephone a member at his office and through conversation with him or his secretary make arrangements for an interview at a specified time and place in the M.P.'s office. Normally interviewers tried to arrange interviews with each of the three M.P.s who had been assigned to them, but interviewers were required to return to the office for appraisal of their schedules before receiving the name of a new interviewee. Thus, at any one time an interviewer was never responsible for more than three potential respondents. In this manner it was possible to keep a close check on the activities of the interviewers, and an accurate record of the progress of the interviewing through the first list. All interviewers were provided with a letter, either in English or French, signed by Professor Meisel. Interviewers were advised to show this letter upon entry into a respondent's office. They were also asked to assure respondents of their anonymity in the study, confirming the assurance contained in the letter that no statements would be attributed to specific members.

The researchers were pleased with the early reaction to the survey. Some of the early interviews took a good deal longer than anticipated (two early interviews in French lasted six hours), but members did not appear to object much to the length of the session.¹⁰ Moreover, although the return of Parts B and C of the questionnaire was somewhat slower than anticipated, follow-up by the supervisor permitted their orderly collection. Only one set of Parts B and C was not returned during the first phase of the interviewing (that is, up to April 2, 1965) and this was deliberately retained by the respondent.

Not all questions in Part A of the questionnaire were equally successful.¹¹ It was quickly clear that some M.P.s objected to question 28(a): "Who are some of your closest friends in the House of Commons--I mean the members you most often see outside the chamber, at lunch or dinner, or at parties or social gatherings?" While some M.P.s could be pressed easily to name as many as six friends (the number which interviewers had been instructed to try to get), others took offence at the question, often repeating quizzically after the question was put, "You mean you want me to name my *friends*?" Often the best that could be obtained from a respondent was some indication of whether his friends came from his own region or his own party, or whether his friendships knew no geographical or party limitations. While this kind of hit-and-miss experience with the responses to question 28(a) meant that the use of sociometric techniques of

analysis was not possible, we still got enough from the question to allow us to draw tentative conclusions about the friendship links in the House of Commons.

One further series of questions proved not so much offensive as ineffective. Question 31, with its several subsections, sought to discover a member's appraisal of the party leaders in the House of Commons and to explore his personal contacts with the leadership of the party. The results were unsatisfactory because it was clear, upon consideration of the interview protocols, that members interpreted "party leaders" and "the leadership of [his] party" in different ways. It might have been interesting to analyze the different ways in which members chose to interpret these words, but even this venture is fraught with interpretative difficulties. One part of the question—"Are there any particular ministers in the government to whom you naturally turn for information, advice and assistance?"—was a good deal more successful, and respondents' replies to this were coded and analyzed.

Apart from these two minor problems, the survey had proceeded at least as well as expected until the morning of April 2, 1965. It is true that not every interviewer had been able to report a completely friendly reception and interview: one interviewer reported early in the survey that her respondent had been quite co-operative at first but had become increasingly hostile during the three-hour interview; another reported that she thought that her respondent continued with the interview out of a sense of duty, "especially as it was going to be asked of all M.P.s"; yet another found her respondent reluctant to grant an interview at first, but reported that the interview itself went very well thereafter, allowing a completed questionnaire in 90 minutes.

Nor had every attempt to secure an interview succeeded. As of the morning of April 2, 1965, eight attempts to interview members had failed: six members refused outright to participate in an interview; one member refused to continue the interview after the opening stages; one member was not available because of a continuing illness. It is important to note, however, in view of the events which followed, that 61 successful interviews had been completed at this point, 42 with English-speaking M.P.s and 19 with French-speaking ones. Although refusals were certainly concentrated within the English-speaking membership of the Conservative party (one French-speaking M.P. had also refused at this point) there was no indication of a sharp intensification of the refusal rate as the interviewing proceeded.

The experience of the first three weeks of interviewing thus revealed a mixed reaction to the survey; the vast majority of M.P.s approached for interviews co-operated well; a minority refused to participate, and a still smaller minority participated but revealed some hostility to our efforts. That the vast majority did indeed co-operate with the survey is revealed by the statistics in Table III.1

drawn from interviewers' assessments of the degree of respondents' co-operation and frankness. Even if one does not wish to make much of interviewers' assessments of the respondents' frankness, it is nevertheless clear that interviewers considered themselves well received by their respondents.¹²

Table III.1

Interviewers' ratings of respondents, March 8 - April 2, 1965

Rating	English M.P.s	French M.P.s	Total
Co-operation			
Very co-operative	24	11	35
Co-operative	14	6	20
Not very co-operative	2	1	3
Openly hostile	1*	1†	2
No answer	1**	-	1
Total	42	19	61
Frankness			
Very frank	19	11	30
Frank	16	7	23
Not very frank	6	-	6
No answer	1	1	2
Total	42	19	61

* Only on some questions. **Incomplete interview. † "Aggressive."

It remains, however, to explore as far as we can the feelings of those who refused interviews. The following extract from a report by one of the interviewers on the interview which was broken off almost before it began (counted here as a refusal) may be useful as an indication of the reasons which may have led some members to refuse an interview and others to become hostile.

On 19th March I telephoned Mr. X to ask for an interview. He said he didn't know if he would be much help. I explained that the interview was being given by all M.P.s and it was not a case of some being more helpful than others. He said he would have to see the interview first so that he could ascertain if he would be "useful." He asked me to call back the following week to make an appointment.

On 22nd March I telephoned Mr. X. He said "alright" to the interview--no mention of wanting to see it first. Appointment made for 23rd March.

On 23rd March went for interview--handed Mr. X the letter establishing my identity and he said he was wondering when I would do that. Appeared fairly satisfied; said I could start questions.

At first question on how he entered public life he became agitated, saying that that was no question for the B. & B. Commission to be asking, and said it did not come within its terms of reference. He went on to say that I was subjecting him to a "package deal", i.e. that he was being asked to commit himself to answer questions without knowing their content and demanded to see the interview schedule. I tried to assure him of anonymity, and of the fact that background data was being collected on all M.P.s to facilitate comparisons between them, particularly between English and French-speaking M.P.s. He found this "explanation" quite untenable.

(Interviewer then gave Mr. X a copy of the interview schedule which X read out aloud to himself). Having done this he told me that there was "nothing" in it about bilingualism and biculturalism and he completely refused to answer the other questions which were quite beyond the scope of the B. & B. Commission.¹³

His sole comment on the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism: there was no problem; M.P.s all got on together. They did not come to Parliament as provincial spokesmen.

7. *The "crisis" (April 2 - April 15, 1965)*

On April 2 the survey of attitudes of members of the House of Commons became both the subject of questions in the House and the object of a good deal of national publicity. The following is the text of the questions posed in the House of Commons by Nicholas Mandziuk, M.P. for Marquette, and S. J. Korchinski, M.P. for Mackenzie.

Mr. Nicholas Mandziuk (Marquette): I wish to address my question to the Prime Minister and ask him whether he is aware that the commission on biculturalism and bilingualism, through its representatives is making a psychoanalytical survey of certain members of parliament.

An Hon. Member: What a task.

Mr. Knowles: Somebody should.

Right Hon. L. B. Pearson (Prime Minister): This very important matter has not yet been brought to my attention. I would hope that if the commission feels inclined to do this it would not make any exceptions.

Some Hon. Members: Oh, oh.

Mr. Mandziuk: In order to arouse the curiosity of the right hon. gentleman I would ask him, as a supplementary question, to tell us of what benefit it would be to the B. & B. Commission in carrying out its terms of reference to receive answers from members to questions or statements such as "politics is a dirty game." Members are asked to comment on questions such as that. Is this within the terms of reference of the commission?

Mr. S. J. Korchinski (Mackenzie): A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker: I do not see how any supplementary could arise from the original question, which was more in the nature of a statement, or allegation.

Mr. Korchinski: If it is not a supplementary, Mr. Speaker, it is a related matter. I want to ask the Prime Minister whether he would not put a stop to the questioning of members by the B. and B. Commission on political matters; such statements as "the local party organization has had very little to do with getting me elected." This is in no way connected, even remotely, with the subject matter under study and is a burden on the taxpayer, though it may be of assistance to Liberal headquarters.

Mr. Harold E. Winch (Vancouver East): In view of these questions and answers may I ask the Prime Minister for the name of the psychiatrist on the B. and B. Commission.¹⁴

It is clear from this exchange that the objection to the study (that is the irrelevance of a good deal of the questionnaire to the terms of reference of the Commission) which we had noted from the interviewer's report of an earlier refusal, was shared by others. Far more serious from our point of view in many ways was the suggestion of which we were aware, but which was not recorded in print, that the anonymity of the interviews was open to question, and in particular that the subject-matter under study might be of special assistance to the Liberal party.

To the researchers, concerned as they were that unfavourable publicity might damage the project irreparably, it seemed that the news media devoted a great deal of attention to the story. In the first wave of news stories, it is true, the majority of the English-language press and all of the French-language press contented themselves with carrying the Canadian Press dispatch; none of the major dailies in the Atlantic provinces carried the story. The C.P. dispatch made three main points. It suggested that M.P.s were critical of the Royal Commission's over-stepping its bounds by "grilling" many members on issues which were "purely political" and outside the Commission's terms of reference; it reprinted a number of the specific statements of Part B of the questionnaire, giving pride of place to the quotation, "politics is a dirty game"; and it linked M.P.s' critical comments on our survey with William Skoreyeko's observation in the House of Commons that lower ranks in the armed forces were being told that they would not be promoted unless they were bilingual. The major differences between the C.P. dispatch and later independent reports were that the latter tended to reprint more (often all) of the 30 statements from Part B of the questionnaire, but did not link the criticism of the survey with questions relating to bilingualism in the armed forces. One report also stated that "Lately, it is said many have been refusing to talk at all."¹⁵

Mr. Mandziuk and Mr. Korchinski had asked their questions in the House of Commons on a Friday morning. A small number of interviews had been scheduled for the following week; we were therefore anxious to learn what effect the publicity would have on our potential respondents. To this end interviewers were asked to record all reactions, and especially to watch for indications of the M.P.s' prior knowledge of the questionnaire or even the existence of more-or-less

set responses to some of the questions. During the next week there were only six completed interviews, five with English-speaking M.P.s and one with a French-speaking M.P. There were no new refusals to permit interviews, but few new approaches were made during this week. One member who had permitted an interview now refused to return Parts B and C of the questionnaire.

The interviewers' reports and ratings on five¹⁶ of the six completed interviews are interesting:

1. April 5: 3½ hours; frank and very co-operative; [no indication of prior knowledge of questionnaire].
2. April 5; 1 hour; not very frank, co-operative. Don't think he had seen Part A or B before. Had talked about it--said on phone that he didn't want to be psychoanalyzed. When he finished Part A he asked where the question "Politics is a dirty game" came in. Didn't want to answer Part B, said we could get it from Part A. . . but did do Part C.
3. April 7, 2¾ hours; very frank; very co-operative. Didn't let on he knew anything about schedule.
4. April 7, 2½ hours; very frank; very co-operative. Very fleeting impression that he had seen questionnaire before and thought about answers--e.g. question 25, re House of Commons and limitation of debates. [Parts B and C later refused.]
5. April 9, 1¾ hours (but at least ¼ hour taken up with views on B/B Commission and questionnaire); not very frank; not very co-operative. General note: interview was difficult (getting some answers was like pulling teeth!) because (a) Respondent was hostile (b) suspect he was slightly deaf--or perhaps found my accent difficult [interviewer was British], 2) had never thought in general philosophical terms. Had not seen questionnaire before.

Although the notoriety achieved by the study had obviously affected the interviews a little, the evidence of the six successful interviews at least held out the hope that the project was not yet ruined. Meanwhile, however, new developments were taking place.

On April 9, 1965, a full week after the matter was first raised in question period, the Prime Minister replied to Opposition criticism of the survey. Following closely the argument prepared with the assistance of the Commission, Mr. Pearson justified the questionnaire in the following terms:

In order to understand better how Canadians of different cultures and language groups work together, and in particular to study the possible effects of differing attitudes within the two principal linguistic groups of the country, the Commission has undertaken a number of studies of major Canadian institutions. It was felt by the Commission that no such study could be complete if it ignored Parliament, the pre-eminent political body in the country.

The purpose of this research project is to try to understand in what ways the role of the Canadian Member of Parliament and Senator is affected by Canada's bilingual and bicultural character and the presence of other cultural groups. . . .

The individual replies will be used to build up statistics and non-attributable statements, and only these results will be available to the Commissioners. Approaches to this end are being made to Members individually. It is hoped by the Commission to interview all of them, but it is clearly understood that any Member may not wish to be interviewed and has no obligation to receive any representative of the Commission and answer any questions. If a Member agrees to be interviewed on this subject, he may decline to answer any specific questions.¹⁷

Mr. Diefenbaker was unsatisfied with the Prime Minister's answer. Labelling the questionnaire "insulting to Members of Parliament and to the voters who elect them,"¹⁸ he begged Mr. Pearson to review the questions being asked of M.P.s. This the Prime Minister agreed to do.

When he returned to the matter the following Monday, Mr. Pearson disregarded his previous explanation of the purpose and nature of the questionnaire: he admitted being reluctant to tell the Commission how to follow up its terms of reference, but he confessed that in his opinion "many of the questions [were] irrelevant and some highly inappropriate."¹⁹ If he were asked to answer the questionnaire in its existing form, he would not. By implication, at least, Mr. Pearson went even further; in answer to Mr. Mandziuk's query as to whether the survey would be continued, the Prime Minister replied in terms that were interpreted as negative²⁰: "Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to interfere improperly with the business of a Royal Commission, but I would think, after reviewing what was said earlier this morning in the House of Commons, that the Royal Commission might wish to have another look at this questionnaire."²¹

The press, which had all but ignored the Prime Minister's statement on the previous Friday,²² responded with greater interest to his fresh observations on the subject of the questionnaire, but it was the Commissioners' press release the next day which attracted the most attention from the press, even drawing editorials from many newspapers.

The Commission, having decided to allow the study of M.P.s to proceed, defended it against criticism, which it stated arose "from a misunderstanding of the nature of the survey."²³ After explaining the purposes of the questionnaire, the statement noted the confidential character of the replies and emphasized the right of any member interviewed to refuse to answer any particular question. The Commissioners asserted their intention to allow the study to continue, unless the refusal rate became too high, and urged that the Commission "should not be hampered or blocked as it endeavours to fulfill the purpose for which it was established." The strength of the Commission's statement, coming so hard on the heels of the Prime Minister's statement, provoked hostile comments from many newspapers,

several of which seemed pleased to have another reason for criticizing the Royal Commission. The majority of the hostile editorials focussed on the "impertinence" and "irrelevance" of the questionnaire (usually referring only to Part B, without acknowledging its proper context) and mentioned at some point the great cost to the Canadian taxpayer of the money already spent by the Commission.

Typically, among hostile editorials, there was no appreciation of the fact that the study attempted to discover the attitudes²⁴ of Canadian M.P.s on a number of matters related to their jobs; the apparent failure to understand that the analysis of differences in attitudes was indeed relevant to the purposes of the Commission led many editorialists into gross distortion of the nature and purpose of the study. In all this there was at least variety: to the editorial writer of the *Hamilton Spectator* Messrs. Laurendeau and Dunton personally were "authors of an irrelevant and silly list of questions;"²⁵ to his counterpart on the *Leduc Representative* the questionnaire appeared "to have been drawn up by beatniks for the interrogation of morons."²⁶

Implicit in many editorials was the suggestion that to ask M.P.s about their job, to question them on their attitudes on public issues, was somehow a violation of the privileges and prerogatives of members of Parliament. This line of argument was put most explicitly in the *Peterborough Examiner*: "The Members of Parliament are right to be jealous of their prerogatives. The House of Commons is the supreme legislative body in the Dominion (save for the British North America Act) and cannot be subject to the scrutiny of any but its members and the electorate itself. Once permit these privileges to be diluted by a Royal Commission . . . and a significant constitutional shift has been undertaken."²⁷ The *Nanaimo Free Press* took the last point to its *reductio ad absurdum*: "The House of Commons should be careful to maintain its position. It would be startling if a second interim report of the Bi-Bi Commission recommended that the country get along without the lower branch of parliament. After all, Charles the First governed without parliament before he lost his head altogether."²⁸

Editorial comments critical of the survey outnumbered those supporting the research into the attitudes of members of Parliament; but it is not without some significance that the critical comment came, by and large, from the smaller circulation newspapers of the country.²⁹ *The Gazette* (Montreal), *The Globe and Mail*, the *Toronto Telegram*, the *Toronto Daily Star*, *Le Devoir*, *La Presse*, *The Ottawa Citizen*, and the *Winnipeg Free Press* generally showed a good understanding of the nature and purposes of the study and offered qualified (sometimes unqualified) support for the project.

Desmond Sparham, in an "opinion" column in the *Toronto Daily Star*, showed a clear grasp of our rationale of the questionnaire: "How can the commission fulfil its prescribed duty to recommend measures 'to develop the Canadian Confederation' unless it conducts the most

searching inquiries into the political outlook of the people and into their attitudes towards all the major institutions of society? And are not our M.P.s the very people whose attitudes matter most? Are they not the very people who will have to implement or reject the commission's findings?"³⁰

An editorial in *La Presse* took a similar line: "Le problème du bilinguisme n'est pas seulement le problème de l'homme de la rue que la télévision interroge. C'est aussi, et principalement, celui des Canadiens qui siègent au parlement du Canada."³¹

The Globe and Mail's editorial, which sharply criticized the Prime Minister's "dangerous invasion" of the integrity of the Commission, ended with: "Opposition Leader John Diefenbaker calls it snooping. If it is, then Parliament must simply face the truth that it has given the commission a general license to snoop. And having done so, parliamentarians, least of all those in the Government, have no right to claim special immunity. They must either call the whole thing off, or submit to examination with the rest of the country."³²

Mr. Pearson's only public comment on the Commission's press release was interpreted by Arthur Blakely as "a backing away from an open clash with the co-chairmen." "'The Commission, like any other royal commission, is the judge of its procedure within the terms of reference,' the Prime Minister's statement said. 'I have made known in the Commons . . . my own views on the point at issue.'"³³

Although the Commission had affirmed that "as long as a high response rate continues, the interviews will go on unchanged," it clearly became necessary to make a careful reappraisal of the survey. Many newspapers called for an end to the project (or even the Commission); but even if the project were not cancelled by a formal act, there was still a very good possibility that the project might be finished. The Prime Minister's assertion that some questions in the interview schedule were irrelevant and inappropriate certainly raised the prospect of a good deal of resistance by members to further interviewing, especially within the Liberal party, which up to this point had not been reluctant to co-operate with the survey. It appeared that steps had to be taken to maximize the chances of completing the study.

8. *Reappraising the project (April 15, 1965)*

At a meeting on April 15, 1965, it was decided that the student interviewers would be removed from the job and that henceforth only Professors Hoffman and Ward would interview M.P.s until such time as it was deemed appropriate for a few of the most experienced interviewers to return. There was no evidence that the hostility to the survey could justifiably be traced to the actions of the student interviewers, but in the new circumstances it seemed essential to make every effort to ensure the seriousness and the secrecy of the project in the eyes of the members of Parliament. As a result of this decision another important one followed. When it was clear that the rest

of the interviewing would have to be done by a limited team of interviewers, the decision was made to proceed on the basis of a stratified sample of the back-bench membership of the House of Commons.

It must be recalled that this important decision was taken after the Commons' session of Monday, April 12, 1965, at which the Prime Minister's statement criticizing the questionnaire was made, and before the House of Commons reassembled after the Easter recess. Everyone present at the meeting was concerned that the refusal rate of the remaining members might rise after the vacation in some kind of cumulative reaction to the study.³⁴ There was also the prospect of an early dissolution of Parliament, which had been talked about incessantly, and which would have brought the study to a premature end. Speed was essential; and if only the senior interviewers were to conduct the interviews (at least long enough to judge reactions) they would have to set themselves a target more realistic than the entire House of Commons.

Why, it might be asked, a stratified sample of back-bench M.P.s? Let us take first the decision not to interview, at least for a while, the front-benchers and party leaders. Although it was always thought that there were many respects in which it would be appropriate to interview party leaders and front-benchers specifically with regard to their role as M.P.s, it was also taken for granted that there were some questions which were put to back-benchers which would not be appropriate for front-benchers, especially members of the Cabinet.³⁵ At this time, however, an amended interview schedule, suitable for front-benchers, had not yet been created. Moreover, since it was assumed that interviews with front-benchers should properly be conducted only by Professors Ward and Hoffman, and since the senior interviewers were also committed to interviewing back-benchers after their return from the Easter vacation, it was evident that the latter task was as much as could be managed in the short run. Besides, it was not unreasonable to assume that if a choice had to be made between interviewing front-benchers or back-benchers, the prospect of arranging interviews with front-benchers (especially cabinet ministers) after the recess or dissolution of Parliament seemed the more likely.

The idea of using a stratified sample of the back-bench M.P.s followed from the realization that it would probably prove extremely unlikely that the entire membership of the House could be interviewed in the remaining time. The 50 per cent "systematic sample" had been chosen originally as the simplest means of insuring against a badly balanced result caused by incomplete interviewing of the entire list of M.P.s. However this sample was now of little use in one important respect: it included the names of front-benchers as well as back-benchers, and front-benchers were now to be excluded. If a new sample was to be drawn, then it seemed worthwhile to assure that with regard to the four major variables which we wanted to use in our analysis (urban/rural location of the M.P.'s constituency, party,

language, and region) the back-bench M.P.s selected for interviewing should represent as closely as possible their appropriate share of the entire back-bench membership.

9. Drawing a stratified sample (April 19-24, 1965)

As a first step in drawing our sample the back-bench membership of the House was defined by removing from the list of 265 members 42 M.P.s who for our purposes were designated "front-bench." These included the Prime Minister and cabinet ministers (24), the chief Liberal and Conservative whips (2), the four Opposition leaders, the Conservative front bench, and the Speaker.³⁶

A figure representing roughly two thirds of the remaining 223 back-benchers was taken as the basis for the stratified sample. Any back-bench M.P. who had been selected by the previous process of systematic sampling and who had already been interviewed or had been approached for an interview (refusals included) became the "core" for the new sample list. New names were then added to the sample list in such a way as to assure that within each of the four major variables the appropriate weighting was achieved. New names were selected randomly within the strata. Thus, for example, if the result of placing the "core" within the new requirements were to produce a result in which the number of rural members was already almost equivalent to two thirds of the entire back-bench membership, then the bulk of the additional names added to the list had to be drawn at random proportionately from the urban members in the remaining list, always having regard of course to the other variables as well.

Because there were four major variables to consider, it did not prove possible to select a sample which gave absolute equality to every major variable. In order to counteract the slight overrepresentation of rural, French-speaking M.P.s from Quebec when the "core" was taken as the basis on which to build the stratified sample, it would have been necessary to increase somewhat the appropriate proportion of urban French-speaking M.P.s from Quebec, thus setting off a new round of inequalities between Quebec and the other regions. The problem was also acute when attempting to obtain rough equality, at two thirds of the total number between the minor parties. The general effect has been slightly to underrepresent the minor parties. The process of adding names to the list was stopped once rough equality was reached within each major "cell." The end result was a sample of 143 names, constituting 64 per cent of the total back-bench membership (see Table III.2).

10. Completing interviews with back-benchers (April 26 - June 30, 1965)

When the M.P.s returned to Ottawa on April 26, 1965, to resume the third session of the twenty-sixth Parliament, 67 respondents remained to be interviewed from the new sample.³⁷ Professors Ward and Hoffman set about immediately to interview as many M.P.s as possible, anxious

to discover post-holiday reactions to the project. Essentially the reception was little different from the days before the controversy had arisen. A few Liberals and one Cr ditiste now joined the Conservatives among the ranks of the "refusals," but the rate at which refusals were received was not much higher than before.

Table III.2

Stratified sample of back-benchers analyzed by region, language, party, and urban/rural location of M.P.'s constituency

Region	Total N of back-benchers	Total N of sample	Sample as % of total (horizontal)
B.C. and Yukon	20	13	65
Prairies and N.W.T.	41	25	60
Ontario	72	47	65
Quebec	64	40	63
Atlantic provinces	26	18	69
Total	223	143	64
Language group			
English-speaking	161	104	65
French-speaking	62	39	64
Total	223	143	64
Party			
Liberal	103	69	67
Progressive Conservative	81	52	64
New Democratic	17	9	53
Social Credit	8	5	63
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	12	7	58
Independents	2	1	50
Total	223	143	64
Location of Constituency			
Rural (less than 25% urban)	81	50	62
Mixed urban/rural (25-75% urban)	69	46	67
Urban (75-100% urban)	73	47	64
Total	223	143	64

One Liberal M.P. approached for an interview stated that he granted the interview quickly because of the Tory Opposition, which he thought was "stupid"; he also said that he could not understand why the Prime Minister made "that statement." Another confided that he had found "no interest in or reaction to the questionnaire in his riding"—"the people didn't really know about it." Another Liberal revealed that he had completed Parts B and C of the questionnaire when we had called for it before the recess; but after the Prime Minister's statement had decided to hold on to it. After thinking about it, however, the respondent had decided to return his questionnaire—"it doesn't bother me a bit," he said. As was the case before the questions had been asked in the House, some of the M.P.s interviewed after the recess were opposed to the work of the Commission, but nevertheless agreed to co-operate fully with the survey (often using some of the questions as a means of indicating the source of their irritation with the entire bilingual-bicultural question under study).

Both senior interviewers agreed that there was no indication that M.P.s were aware of the contents of Part A of the questionnaire: there was no evidence of anticipation or of the offering of set responses. Moreover, M.P.s who granted interviews seemed just as frank and co-operative as those who had participated before the "crisis," and appeared just as prepared to grant a lengthy interview.³⁸

Because M.P.s' reactions were not notably more hostile to the study than earlier and because the early dissolution of the House loomed as a daily threat to the successful completion of our project, we decided to put three of the earlier interviewers, Miss Dibben, Mrs. White, and M. Raymond, back on the job within the first week. Unfortunately, we were now understaffed with French-speaking interviewers, and additional interviewers had to be recruited. This problem was solved by bringing in one interviewer drawn from the Commission staff and another, André Bélanger, a lecturer at Laval University, who was to obtain some experience in interviewing back-benchers before going on to assist with front-bench interviews.

As the bulk of the remaining respondents were approached refusals were, of course, received. Some of the "refusals" after the recess were simply never available for an interview: rather than refuse to participate they always found good reasons for not being available, even when as many as five return calls were made. Others made their refusals quite explicit: one French-speaking Quebec M.P. refused an interview rather abruptly with the comment that he could "do a better job in the House than he could in an interview"; another refusal, by a Conservative, called the Commission a "terrific waste of time" and indicated firmly that he wanted "no part of it"; still another M.P. refused to be interviewed because he thought that "it would not accomplish very much."

Unfortunately, we also encountered an additional form of refusal to co-operate with the survey. It may be recalled that before the

recess one M.P. who had completed an interview with us had refused to complete Parts B and C of the questionnaire. During the second phase of the interviewing this practice was intensified somewhat, with the result that 10 further refusals of this kind were recorded; two of the "refusals" were not outright statements of unwillingness to return Parts B and C, but rather took the form of the respondents' apparent inability to find sufficient time to complete the questionnaires.

We continued to try to arrange interviews with the few who were "not available" right up to the summer recess on June 30. By this time we had managed to approach for an interview every one of the 143 M.P.s appearing in the stratified sample and had succeeded in interviewing 85 per cent of this total. Table III.3 summarizes the results for the entire back-bench sample.

Table III.3

Completed, incompleted, and refused interviews with back-bench M.P.s in stratified sample (Part A only)

	N	% of sample	% of total back-benchers
Interviews completed	120	84	85
Interviews not completed	2	1	1
Interviews refused	17	12	15
Not available	4	3	
Total	143	100	

The bulk of the data which we wished to analyze concerning M.P.s' perceptions of their roles and the ways in which they go about performing their roles, as well as the major part of material relating to their reactions to the bilingual-bicultural phenomena of federal politics are contained in Part A of the questionnaire. Just under 15 per cent of the sample refused to provide us with information of this kind. However, with regard to Part B of the questionnaire,³⁹ where further attitudes were sought, additional refusals must be taken into account (*see* Table III.4).

When evaluating the results of the analysis drawn from Part B of the questionnaire it will have to be remembered that we are dealing with responses from just over 75 per cent of the stratified sample, representing just under half the total number of back-bench M.P.s.

Compared with the refusal rate in the Wahlke and Eulau study and the Kornberg study, our refusal rate is rather high.⁴⁰ What is more serious, however, is that the refusal rate in our study (and this applies to the refusal rate for Part A as well as Part B) is not spread evenly throughout the sample. Unfortunately it is rather heavily concentrated within the Conservative party, particularly within

the rural Prairie membership of the party. The English-speaking membership of the House of Commons is therefore underrepresented as compared with the French-speaking membership.

Table III.4
Completed and refused responses to Part B of the questionnaire
(stratified sample of back-benchers)

		N	% of sample	% of total back-benchers
Completed Part B		109	76	49
Incompleted Part B				
Refused or not available for interview	21	34	24	
Refused to complete Part B	11			
Partially completed Parts A and B	2			

In order to indicate as fully as possible the effect of the differential refusal rate, we have set out the following information in Tables III.5 and III.6: first the effect of the refusals on the data drawn from Part A and secondly the effect of the refusals on data drawn from Part B.

Because of the high proportion of refusals to complete Part B of the questionnaire among Prairie Conservatives, caution must be employed in interpreting the results. The typical problem with refusals (which applies as much to total enumerations as it does to sample surveys) is to know whether those who refused to answer are more or less similar in views to those who co-operated. If the "refusals" are more or less identical with the respondents no harm is done; but if those who refused to answer questions are in fact quite different, an important set of attitudes are simply not represented in the observed group.

In this study it is reasonable to assume that, at least on matters of English-French relations, those who refused to answer are *not* identical in attitude with those who co-operated.

It will be noted that we do not report statistical tests of significance for our bivariate tables. This decision takes a stand on one side of a controversial issue among social scientists. Wahlke and Eulau wrote in their study, *The Legislative System*, justifying the omission of tests of statistical significance:

Table III.5

M.P.s refusing or not available to answer Part A, by region, language, party, and location of constituency

	N in sample	N of refusals	% of sample interviewed (horizontal)
Region			
B.C. and Yukon	13	2	85
Prairies and N.W.T.	25	6	76
Ontario	47	7	85
Quebec	40	4	90
Atlantic provinces	18	2	89
Total	143	21	85
Language group			
English-speaking	104	18	83
French-speaking	39	3	92
Total	143	21	85
Party			
Liberal	69	6	91
Progressive Conservative	52	14	73
New Democratic	9	0	100
Social Credit	5	0	100
Ralliement des Créditistes	7	1	86
Independents	1	0	100
Total	143	21	85
Location of constituency			
Rural (less than 25% urban)	50	8	84
Mixed urban/rural (25-75% urban)	46	4	91
Urban (75-100% urban)	47	9	81
Total	143	21	85

Table III.6

M.P.s refusing to answer Part B, by region, language, party, and location of Constituency

	N in sample	N of refusals	% of sample interviewed (horizontal)
Region			
B.C. and Yukon	13	2	85
Prairies and N.W.T.	25	12	52
Ontario	47	11	77
Quebec	40	6	85
Atlantic provinces	18	3	83
Total	143	34	76
Language group			
English-speaking	104	29	72
French-speaking	39	5	87
Total	143	34	76
Party			
Liberal	69	10	86
Progressive Conservative	52	23	56
New Democratic	9	0	100
Social Credit	5	0	100
Ralliement des Créditistes	7	1	86
Independents	1	0	100
Total	143	34	76
Location of constituency			
Rural (less than 25% urban)	50	15	60
Mixed urban/rural (25-75% urban)	46	7	85
Urban (75-100% urban)	47	12	74
Total	143	34	76

Tests of statistical significance are based on the assumption that the data come from a random sample of the population which is analyzed. The initial decision to interview the entire memberships of the four legislatures was taken precisely to avoid the familiar sampling worries of the survey researcher. If all legislators were interviewed, the problem of making statistical inferences from a sample to a population would not arise. There would be no reason, then, to make any statistical tests of significance. Although we did not succeed in interviewing our entire populations, we did come close enough to the 100 per cent mark in order not to worry about a sampling problem on that score.⁴¹

It must be admitted that we did not even attempt to interview the entire population, but instead we aimed at obtaining a two-thirds sample of the universe. Nevertheless, it seems to us that our research has more in common with the "entire-universe study" than with the typical survey research project for which assumptions of a random sample of a population more appropriately apply. We would like to draw attention to this fact in the light of a further consideration:

Statistical significance does not necessarily mean substantive importance. A very large sample may generate a high level of significance but the difference between the proportions being compared may be very small from a substantive point of view, and of little interest to political scientists.⁴²

The decision not to report statistical tests of significance, like the decision to report such tests, does not avoid the problem of making inferences from the data. In just the same way this difficulty faces the analyst of a "universe-based" study: small differences of proportions may be taken as equivalent to statistically significant differences in survey-based data, but their substantive importance remains to be shown. Quantitative specification of the strength of association between two variables—using measures such as phi or gamma—might have been useful in a very few places where the variables can be appropriately dichotomized or where they may be treated as "ordinal" in nature, but we do not report such statistical measures in this study. In the vast majority of our tables they are not appropriate and, even if they were, they could not take into account the unknown effects of the response bias. There is no easy rule of thumb for determining where relationships are of substantive importance in a study of this kind. Cumulative evidence of a pattern of relationship strengthens one's confidence. Ultimately, there is no substitute for common sense.

11. Interviewing the front-benchers (June 1 - September 3, 1965)

Once the authors had tested the reactions of M.P.s and had judged that some of our original interviewers could return to the job, the possibility presented itself of completing interviews with the front-bench M.P.s we had earlier removed to a separate list. It was decided not to try for interviews with the five party leaders, thus leaving 37 M.P.s for the "senior interviewers."⁴³ Part A of the new interview schedule was created,⁴⁴ mainly by the omission of questions deemed unsuitable for front-benchers; but the same Parts B and C were used for front-benchers as had been used for back-benchers.

In order to establish an interview with the 36 front-benchers and the Speaker, the interviewer responsible sent letters to his respondents, acquainting them with the purposes of the study and assuring cabinet ministers that "the focus of attention would be on [their] role as an M.P. rather than as a cabinet minister."⁴⁵ The letters also suggested that interviewers would telephone the M.P.s' secretaries within a few days to fix a suitable time and date. Letters were sent out roughly weekly in waves of five to attempt to assure an appropriate spacing of appointments.

Spacing appointments, as it turned out, proved a minor problem; securing appointments was considerably more difficult. Although we continued to try to arrange for interviews up to the dissolution of Parliament in September we succeeded in interviewing only 19 of the 37 respondents sought.

The reaction of the Conservative front-benchers was interesting. This time we had somewhat better success than we had had with the back-benchers; at least the proportion of Conservative front-benchers interviewed was slightly larger than the proportion of Liberals interviewed. But a number of interviews with Liberal front-benchers were unobtainable quite clearly because of the unavailability of the busy minister concerned.⁴⁶ Others, we are certain, used prior commitments as a means of polite refusal. Except where we received outright refusals from Liberal front-benchers, however, we cannot say with absolute certainty that our failure to interview constituted a refusal on the part of the minister. With Conservatives the reaction was different: Conservative front-benchers on the whole either agreed quickly to be interviewed or refused just as quickly in no uncertain terms.

One Conservative front-bencher used the attempt to arrange an interview as an opportunity to scold us and the Commission for the work we were doing: "I suppose that you are just working under orders, but I am sorry that you are wasting your time like this. This was not what was expected when the Commission was set up. I don't think this type of investigation serves any useful purpose whatsoever. I want no part of it." Interestingly enough, this position was little different from that expressed by a Liberal cabinet minister, who invited one of the senior interviewers to visit his office, and then refused to begin the interview. In his opinion there had been no

problem of bilingualism and biculturalism before the Commission began its work; it was merely "stirring up trouble where none had been before"; he therefore wanted no part in its investigations.

The extent of the refusals and the failure to arrange interviews with several more front-benchers were disappointing (*see* Table III.7). Although comparisons are made in the appropriate places with the views expressed by front-benchers, not much should be made of these results, except perhaps with regard to the views of French-speaking front-benchers, with whom we enjoyed greater success. The views of too many important front-benchers on both sides of the House are excluded from the results to warrant anything more than the most tentative conclusions from the figures.

Table III.7

Front-benchers completing, refusing, or not available for interviews, by party and language

	Completed interview	Refused or not avail- able for interview	Total
Number	19	18	37
Percentage	51	49	100
Party			
Liberal*			
Number	12	13	25
Percentage	48	52	100
Progressive Conservative			
Number	7	5	12
Percentage	58	42	100
Language group			
French-speaking			
Number	8	2	10
Percentage	80	20	100
English-speaking			
Number	11	16	27
Percentage	41	59	100

* The Speaker is included here among the Liberals. Unfortunately it was not possible to interview him.

12. Coding the data (June 21 - September 3, 1965)

During the early weeks of June, while interviewers were finishing off the remaining appointments, we began to develop our code book in preparation for the analysis of the data. The task was not an easy one. Because so many of the questions had been "open-ended" (that is, we had not tried to force the respondent into a dichotomous or

multiple choice but had allowed him a "free reply"), we now had to try to impose some order on the variety of responses and, by establishing the relevant categories, to place each of the respondent's answers in the appropriate slot.

Miss Dibben and Professor Hoffman, who were familiar with the range of responses, set up the code book and began coding the English-speaking responses. Our procedure was the same throughout: except where it was simply a case of recording objective data—the member's age, experience in the House of Commons, and so on — coding was always the result of joint agreement over the appropriate category. When there was a difference of opinion, an impartial view was sought from others. It would have been better, of course, had all the open-ended questions been coded by a team of at least three, but it was impossible to obtain further assistance for the great length of time involved.

As a check upon our own coding, after the last back-bench protocol had been coded, we selected every tenth protocol and recoded the open-ended questions in order to compare these results with the codes we had originally assigned. The result of the experiment was gratifying: a certain amount of bias cannot be denied, but at least we appear to have been consistent in our biases throughout! The one weakness revealed by the experiment was the case in which, although the respondent may have mentioned say three reasons for a phenomenon, only two reasons were being recorded in our card columns; in these cases we discovered that we did not always select the same "second reason." There seems to be no way around this problem in coding open-ended responses, except, perhaps, the multiple-punching technique, which we wanted to avoid. In any case since most respondents gave fewer than the maximum answers we were prepared to record, the effect of this distortion is not very great.

During the first week of September, still hopeful that other interviews with front-benchers might be obtained, we coded the 19 front-bench interviews. Dissolution of Parliament took place within a few days, however, and the prospect of further interviewing was ended. We then turned to the analysis of data.

13. Analyzing the data

For the first computer run of the data we used only two independent variables (the English- or French-language group of the respondent) in the analysis. The result was 200 tables in computer-printout form (horizontal percentages only), which provided the basis for a much more refined second analysis.

Three major steps were taken between the two runs: the elimination for further analysis of items in which "no answers" were particularly prominent; the combination of categories, on the basis of logic and numbers involved, in order to focus on the major categories of responses; and the specification of the many variables to be analyzed. The second and third operations deserve further comment.

The problem of "small cells" is vital. Especially when one is dealing with coded responses to open-ended questions, the number of categories in any item may be quite large. Analysis of the distribution of responses may show that, for any one item, although responses are distributed throughout all codes, some codes have received only a few responses each. The problem is then to combine categories (codes) into more general categories, so that the numbers in each cell will be large enough to permit comparison with other categories. When categories are combined, of course, they must not be mutually exclusive. The following serves as a good example of the kind of combining operation we carried out.

In recording responses to the question "What, if anything is being done to solve [the problem of communication between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s]?" we had allowed for 10 possible codes, including the "no answer" code. The "no answer" code was expected to show a much larger than normal number of "responses" since this question was, of course, not asked of respondents who had indicated in answer to the previous question that they did not think there was any problem of communication. The distribution of responses to this question as produced on the first computer run is found in Table III.8.

Table III.8

Distribution of responses to question dealing with solutions to the problem of communication between English- and French-speaking M.P.s

Code	Response	Percentage
1	Nothing	13.1
2	"Quiet Revolution" of Quebec working toward solution	1.2
3	Language lessons	23.8
4	Extra effort to read about and understand Quebec affairs	5.0
5	Efforts to mix with other language groups	23.7
6	Discussion of subject helping	8.2
7	Technical devices (simultaneous translation)	13.1
8	French Canadians should assimilate	0.8
9	Other	6.6
10	No answer	4.5

Only four categories seem worth using independently in any further analysis—codes 1, 3, 5, and 7. The rest could be conveniently combined into the category "Other." The question did arise, however, as to whether responses coded as "discussion of subject helping" might not sensibly be combined with "efforts to mix with other language groups," but since there was no clear indication that the discussion took place between M.P.s of different language groups, it seemed best to keep the two categories separate. For the second computer run,

then, the categories analyzed were as follows: (I) Nothing; (II) Language lessons; (III) Efforts to mix; (IV) Technical devices; (V) Other; and, (VI) No answer.

Finally there was the problem of specifying the many variables to be analyzed in the second computer analysis. Party, language, region and urban/rural locale of a respondent's constituency were taken as the basic independent variables for our purposes; it was then necessary to impose sufficient "controls" on each variable to sort out the influence of the various factors involved. When it came to analyzing the data through the use of other independent variables, we had to be very selective indeed. With more than 200 columns of data on the I.B.M. cards the number of tables that might have been produced by various combinations of interchanged variables is staggering. We simply selected those variables which intuition suggested were most relevant. There are, undoubtedly, a vast number of interesting relationships and useful insights remaining to be drawn from the raw data with which we worked. We did the best with the time and responses available to us, however, and the results we have produced are without doubt important.

The central theme of this chapter is the examination of the ways in which Canadian M.P.s think of their roles. The main concern of the next chapter will be to elucidate the manner in which M.P.s perform their roles as they see them. Before turning to these matters, however, it is necessary to pay some attention to the political background of the members, concentrating particularly on the ways in which they became involved in politics and the different experiences they bring to bear on the job.

A. Political Involvement

In recent years political scientists have come to recognize that while an individual's early experience in the family exerts an important influence upon his later political attitudes and participation, many later experiences may be equally important.¹ It appears that "the more stimuli about politics that a person receives, the greater the likelihood that he will participate in politics, and the greater the depth of his participation,"² and that "children growing up in a home with a high incidence of political discussion and a high intake level for political stimuli are more likely to maintain a high level of exposure to stimuli about politics when adults."³ Given that M.P.s are untypical of a cross-section of the general public in their great interest and participation in political activity, we might expect to find that family influence has a considerable part to play in their involvement. This conclusion would indeed be expected from the results of two existing studies on the political socialization of Canadian M.P.s.

Kornberg and Thomas asked a selected leadership group of Canadian M.P.s, "How did you first become interested in politics?" They analyzed the replies in terms of a "political socialization continuum": Early-Family; Adolescent-Self-Starter; Adult-External. They found that 54 per cent were involved in the first manner, 11 per cent in

the second, and 35 per cent in the third.⁴ Moreover, they concluded that family influence was more important in the political socialization of Canadian legislative elites than of comparable elites in the United States and that "among those socialized early by the family, the responses of the Canadian leaders reveal a much more conscious effort on the part of the family to indoctrinate."⁵

In her study of the twenty-sixth Parliament, Miss Caroline Andrew, using a mailed questionnaire and data not wholly comparable with ours, asked respondents, "When did you first become interested in politics? High school? University? Could you specify please?" By structuring the responses she lessened the possibilities of respondents' mentioning their early childhood involvements, but even so the results broadly support the other findings: 52 per cent of the respondents mentioned an interest in politics by the end of high school.⁶ Her results are also important in confirming the notion that the children of politically active parents are most likely to be socialized early to political roles. Having established that Conservative M.P.s were more inclined than any others to have politically active parents, she shows that Conservatives (67 per cent) are the most inclined to say that their interest in politics springs from a time before the end of high school.⁷ Her study also reveals the converse relationship: Liberals, who were found to be those with the weakest political family ties, are the most inclined of all to report recent interest in politics and the most inclined to the Adult-External end of the Kornberg-Thomas socialization continuum. The Andrew study also reveals an interesting regional variation in the pattern of political socialization:

The Maritimes have the highest percentage of Members who listed their interest as starting before the end of high school. This is not surprising in view of the long tradition of politics in the Maritimes. The traditional two party system has been established there longer than it has in other parts of the country and it is the only region in which a two party system is still firmly in control. These factors tend to make politics very much part of the traditional environment and therefore likely to have interested people at an early age. In keeping with this argument, British Columbia has the lowest percentage of Members becoming interested before the end of high school. This illustrates the fluidity of British Columbian politics. Quebec has also a low percentage of members with early interest, one almost identical to that of British Columbia.⁸

Our data, while affirming the importance of the influence of the family (particularly of a politically active father) also lend support to the idea, developed by Wahlke and Eulau, that political socialization "could occur at almost any phase of a person's development."⁹ When M.P.s were asked how they first became interested in politics (Appendix B, Part A, question 1, 240), their answers referred to a number of influences, of which the following may be taken as typical:

J'ai toujours fait partie d'organisations politiques et sociales dans ma paroisse ; également des organisations de loisirs ; en conséquence j'ai été en contact avec le public ; de plus, mon père fait de la politique, ayant été élu conseiller municipal . . . en 1947. Un groupe d'amis fit pression sur moi pour que je présente ma candidature comme conseiller municipal . . . ; j'ai été élu à ce poste. . . . L'ambition aidant, j'ai regardé plus haut et c'est comme cela que j'ai décidé de me lancer dans la politique fédérale. (Liberal)

I first became interested in politics through a mutual friend after the war. I looked after his election campaign and one thing led to another. Before long I became interested in politics. My family had always been pretty active, my mother's family being active Liberals and my father's active Conservatives. In 1956 the association asked me to stand. Up to that point I'd not thought of the possibility. At first I refused, but they came back again. I discussed it with my father and mother. The association was having trouble getting a candidate. I didn't anticipate being elected and was actually defeated in 1957. But I was elected in 1958. (Conservative)

I developed an interest early in life, influenced by my home environment. My participation was minimal until 1961—sometimes I only voted and did nothing else active. Up to that time I was preoccupied [in my business]. I had a healthy interest in economics and politics. The Diefenbaker era provoked concern with me. I felt that somebody had to do something. (Liberal)

Alors que j'étais étudiant à Laval, je suis entré dans l'Association des étudiants libéraux universitaires. J'ai été encouragé à participer à la politique active par un individu et également par contre-réaction à Duplessis. (Liberal)

I can't remember when I wasn't interested, even as a student. My father was secretary of the School Board and a member of the Liberal Party. There was always plenty of discussion of political matters in the home. At university I met Dr. Woodsworth and was affected by the idealism of the veterans of the First World War with whom I was associated at the university. (New Democrat)

In order to take account of the multiplicity of influences we coded up to three influences on political involvement for each respondent. Unfortunately, although this approach had the advantage of capturing the complexity of influences on an M.P.'s political socialization, it also led to analytical problems which the pressures of time did not permit us to solve adequately for this study. Had the elucidation of the patterns of political socialization been vital to the main theme of our study, we should have recoded and reworked the computer analysis of the data to bring out more substantial conclusions from the material collected, but since it is not central to our argument we present now only the following partial results.

Essentially our data, in their present form, fail to distinguish between the *time* of first interest in politics and the *agents* vital in awakening that interest. Our results indicate, for example, that nearly 40 per cent of our sample of back-bench M.P.s referred to the influence on their political involvement of politically active relatives, a figure somewhat lower than indicated by the two other studies mentioned. However our data also show that 33 per cent mentioned friends as being influential and that 24 per cent mentioned that school experience had been influential.¹⁰ Our difficulties arise from the fact that we collected together all the references to a particular influence without sorting out the order of influence: if we had merely focussed on the primary influence on political involvement we would, by drawing from a combination of "relatives active" and "early school influences," have obtained results more comparable to previous studies. However, our results are most useful in indicating what influences other than the early family and school experiences either sustain political interest for those who have already been motivated, or awaken interest and involvement in politics for others in later life.

Friends were mentioned as an influence on political involvement by 33 per cent of the respondents, with French-speaking M.P.s being considerably more inclined to mention this influence than were English-speaking M.P.s. Local government experience, as an *entrée* into an active political role was mentioned by 12 per cent of the respondents; it was mentioned in roughly equal proportions by the two language groups, but rather more frequently among Conservatives within the English-speaking group. Devotion to the leader, as a reason for involvement in politics later in life, was mentioned by about a tenth of the respondents, the vast majority of these being English-speaking Conservatives. Disgust with the existing government, either at the provincial or federal level, was mentioned by nearly 15 per cent of the respondents, with both English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals particularly inclined to this reply. Finally, a number of respondents mentioned other "external influences" on their political involvement: three specifically referred to the trade union movement as having quickened their interest in politics; two said that the local party situation provoked it (in the sense that the respondent reacted to the "need to get rid of the incumbent"); and two referred to the influence of professional associations and interest groups in awakening their interest. The over-all results indicate few differences in the patterns of political socialization of the two principal language groups.

There is a difference between political interest and political participation: the interested (and, as often seems to be the case in Canada, the only slightly interested) must still be recruited to political roles. Normally this is the task of the political party. In countries such as Britain, where the competition among potential recruits for the opportunity of serving in the House of Commons is keen,¹¹ it is the task of the party machinery to allocate recruits to

the areas of demand and to carry out the formal selection procedures. In Canada, where the keenness of intra-party competition for political office seems to be generally less, the party must play the role of recruiter in a rather different sense: where local interest is low, parties become virtual press gangs, attempting to persuade one respected citizen or another to take a turn at national political office.

It is appreciated that potential candidates to political office rarely seek candidacy entirely on their own; they must seek the support and assistance of others in the process. Nevertheless in examining the process of recruitment to politics in Canada we may distinguish between those who themselves take the initiative in recruitment and those who appear to respond, perhaps reluctantly, to the initiatives of others. Following Lester Seligman we distinguished between three fundamentally different modes of political recruitment: *self-recruitment* (the initiative springing from the respondent); *co-optation* (the recruitment of an eminent candidate who comes from outside the party organization altogether and who has been persuaded to run to enhance support of the party); and *conscription* (the recruitment of a loyal riding association official or member to contest an often hopeless seat for the good of the party).¹² We classified our respondents in terms of the three modes of recruitment on the basis of information drawn from the following questions (Appendix B, 240):

2. Did any particular person or group encourage you to enter active politics? (*Probe circumstances*)
3. (*If not already mentioned*) How did you come to run as a candidate for the . . . party?

For 9 per cent of the respondents interviewed there was not enough information to classify them definitely within one of the three categories: there was sufficient information to be sure that they were not self-recruited, but we could not decide whether they were conscripted or co-opted. These appear as "uncertain" in Table IV.1 and should not be taken as possible additions to the ranks of the self-recruited.

Just 25 per cent of the respondents interviewed in our survey were classified as self-recruited; 38 per cent were conscripted; and 28 per cent were co-opted. Interestingly enough there are no significant differences between French- and English-speaking M.P.s or between M.P.s from urban constituencies and those from rural constituencies, and even the differences between the parties are slight.¹³ English-speaking Conservatives and Liberals are almost identical in their mode of recruitment, with the difference between English-speaking Liberals and French-speaking Liberals being actually greater (although still slight) than the difference between the two major parties over all. However, there are differences between the pattern of recruitment to the major parties and the pattern of recruitment to the minor parties in the House of Commons: no Social Credit M.P.s were self-recruited; two-thirds of the Cr ditistes were co-opted; and the majority of New Democrats were conscripted.

Table IV.1

Recruitment of English- and French-speaking back-bench M.P.s, by language group (horizontal percentages)

Language group	Method of recruitment			
	Self-recruited	Conscripted	Co-opted	Uncertain
English	26	39	26	9
French	24	35	33	8
N	31	46	34	11

The regional differences, while not especially great, do suggest different patterns of recruitment: Ontario supplied more M.P.s (particularly Conservative M.P.s) who are self-recruited than any other region, and the Atlantic provinces conscripted more M.P.s (again particularly Conservative M.P.s) than any other region. No single region appears to be especially disposed to the co-optation of candidates: in the Prairies and Quebec roughly 36 per cent were so recruited; in British Columbia the proportion of co-opted candidates was less than one-fifth.¹⁴

Undoubtedly the most interesting feature of recruitment to Canadian politics is the low level of self-commitment to a political career even among people who are otherwise interested in politics. The point is especially well illustrated by looking at the position of M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces. They were most disposed to say that their interest in politics began at an early age: reared in an atmosphere in which party affiliation and party competition are more clearly at the surface of daily life than they are perhaps anywhere else in Canada, M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces develop early in life an interest in politics in general and, more particularly, a commitment to one or another of the two older political parties. Despite this, they are apparently reluctant to pursue the candidature of a political party on their own initiative: in our figures M.P.s (particularly Conservatives) from the Atlantic provinces are the least inclined of all to be self-recruiters. It is this reluctance to pursue a political career on their own initiative, and the corresponding necessity for political parties to persuade people to run as candidates, that result in a number of M.P.s prepared to admit that they got into federal politics "accidentally."

B. Pre-Parliamentary Political Experience

In the light of what we have discovered about patterns of recruitment to federal politics, it is necessary now to look briefly at the political experience of our respondents prior to their entry into the House of Commons as back-benchers. Our knowledge of the patterns of

representation in Canada since Confederation would not lead us to expect that as much as half the total membership of the House of Commons would have prior governmental experience at either the municipal or provincial level. In the early days of Confederation, roughly to the beginning of this century, prior experience, particularly at the provincial level, was more commonplace; now it is much less so.¹⁵ In order to take account of previous political experience of non-governmental variety as well, we included the following question in Part C:

10(a). What *governmental* or *party* position—local, provincial or federal—had you held before becoming an M.P.? (*List all please*)

The results substantiate the notion that municipal and provincial political experience is a good deal less prevalent than it once was: our figures for back-benchers indicate that only 25 per cent of the respondents had previous municipal government experience and only 4 per cent had experience at the provincial level.¹⁶ Indeed, the most striking conclusion to emerge from our data on this point is the relatively insignificant previous political experience of our respondents in general: 30 per cent of the back-benchers interviewed said that they had no previous political experience either in government or the party; 26 per cent had been members of their local party executive at one time or another; another 24 per cent had been members of their party's provincial or federal executive; and 30 per cent had received other previous political experience as constituency organizers, youth organizers, or within university political groups. The figures as we present them of course allow for some double counting: some members may have been local party executive members *and* active in youth organizations; some might have been municipal councillors and members of their provincial executives; some, in fact, mentioned holding more than two previous offices. The point is that almost a *third* of our respondents had no previous political experience whatsoever; and among those who had been active a surprisingly small number had ever been politically active within the executive of their local or provincial party organizations.¹⁷

Further evidence for the rather casual political involvement of Canadian M.P.s prior to election is offered by the results of Miss Andrew's study. She invited respondents to reply to the question "were you active in the party before running for Parliament" by ticking one of four possible answers: "very active," "moderately active," "occasionally active," and "not active." Her results are a valuable supplement to ours because, by inquiring into political activity "*in the party*" without specifying office-holding, she maximized the number of respondents likely to indicate some level of activity at least, since the criterion of participation was so minimal. Even so, 16 per cent of her respondents said that they had not been active and a further 9 per cent said they had been only occasionally active. Only 56 per cent of her respondents said that they had been "very active."

While the pattern of previous political experience is not uniform throughout Canada or throughout the political parties, it is interesting that we found no evidence to suggest fundamental differences between the two principal language groups. English-speaking M.P.s are a little more inclined to have been active on the provincial or federal executives of their parties, and French-speaking M.P.s are slightly more inclined to have been active on the executives of their local party associations, but otherwise there are no differences. Both groups of M.P.s are equally disposed to say that they have had no previous political experience.

The differences are most acute between the parties. Social Credit and Cr ditiste M.P.s have the least previous political experience of any of the parties, but English-speaking Liberals have proportionately as many inexperienced M.P.s, as have the Cr ditistes. The New Democratic party has the fewest inexperienced M.P.s, the bulk of them having gained either local government experience or experience on the federal or provincial party executive. Conservatives are a little more experienced than Liberals, with municipal experience (especially for Prairie Conservatives) appearing important. Regional differences are present, but they are not as marked as those of party: Quebec M.P.s (nearly 40 per cent) are the least experienced before going to Ottawa, but no other region's M.P.s stand out clearly as being especially experienced. Experience in municipal government ranks lowest in the Atlantic provinces and highest in the Prairies; experience on a local party executive ranks lowest in the Prairies and highest in the Atlantic provinces; membership on the federal or provincial executive of a party ranks highest in British Columbia (the effect of the New Democrats) and lowest in Quebec.

In one sense the most significant finding to emerge thus far is the appreciation of our respondents' low level of self-generated involvement in a political career, and their relatively low level of active participation in politics prior to their becoming M.P.s. In another sense (and from the viewpoint of this study the most important) there is the awareness of how little difference there really is in the patterns of socialization and involvement between members of the two principal language groups. French-speaking M.P.s in general were no more inexperienced, and no more co-opted or conscripted to politics, than English-speaking M.P.s. French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined to be influenced by friends in taking up an active interest in politics, and a little more inclined to mention school days' experience as influential, but these differences are slight. Particular French-speaking M.P.s, notably the Cr ditistes, stood out from the rest in their lower level of prior political experience and their tendency to be co-opted into party candidature, but these differences were counterbalanced by equally distinctive features within other parties or regions represented in the House. What gives a general uniformity to the results, however, is not just the high degree of similarity of experience of English- and French-speaking respondents, but also the great deal of similarity, generally speaking,

between the two major parties. The variations which occur in the results presented thus far are to some extent accounted for by variations within the minor parties of the House. The fact that representation in the House of Commons from the minor parties is unevenly distributed among the regions is often sufficient to cause what appear to be regional variations.

C. M.P.s' Perceptions of Their Roles

We have been discussing thus far the patterns of involvement and recruitment (the *facts* of our respondents' experience) and have found few startling differences, at least between French and English Canadians. Can we therefore expect to find a similar uniformity in their perceptions and attitudes? To this we now turn our attention.

The most important questions which we had in mind when we began this study were these: How do Canadian M.P.s regard the job of M.P.? What do they think is his proper role? Are there any fundamental differences in the way in which M.P.s see their roles and are there clear differences here between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s? In simplest terms we were concerned to discover how Canadian M.P.s align themselves with two conflicting theories of "representation." On the one hand is the "trustee" notion, given its classic formulation by Edmund Burke in his speech to the electors of Bristol: "The member is chosen to represent the nation as well as the local area, and he is expected to use his talents and make his decisions largely by the exercise of his own personal judgment."¹⁸ On the other is the delegate theory of representation: "The member is the mouthpiece of his constituency, the necessary human agent through which the voters continually register their will."¹⁹ The relation between a member and his constituency and, perhaps more crucially, between a member and his party in practice does not often confront the individual with a clear-cut choice between these alternative notions. "For a Member is bound by many obligations, pledges, and loyalties; and any decision will incline one way or another in accordance with the relative strength of the many complex forces which are operating at that time and on that issue."²⁰

Still, it should be possible to decide which orientation on balance will be selected by a member most of the time; in other words, it should be possible to discover an M.P.'s general perception of his representational role. Professor Dawson expressed the view that, "So far as any generalization on such a matter is possible, the bulk of the Canadian constituencies and of the members who sit for them, favour the representative rather than the delegate idea, although in most cases a substantial dependence on the constituency is apparent."²¹ This opinion was at variance with that of another observer of Canadian politics writing at roughly the same time as the first edition of Dr. Dawson's book. To the journalist Austin Cross, "In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the member goes to Ottawa to

speak for his own constituency and no other. That is what the member thinks he is sent to Ottawa to do; and that is what the electors think he is sent to do."²² Neither observer stresses party loyalty and the impressively high degree of party cohesion in House of Commons divisions which appear to transcend the pressures of either constituency or personal judgement.

From the results of our survey of members of the House of Commons we are able to add to the impressions of earlier observers. Indeed we can go beyond their notions of M.P.s' perceptions of their roles to consider what may be called their "areal" and "purposive" as well as their "representational" roles. We are not in a position to assess the perceptions of the role of M.P.s as held by constituents. (It would be a worth while subject of research to pursue this matter further, attempting to establish the degree of "fit" between an M.P.'s perception of his role and his constituents' perception of his role, and even between his role perception and their notions of his perception of the role.)²³ But we were able to ask our respondents what they considered their own roles to be, and also whether they thought that their constituents' view of that role differs from theirs. The results of our enquiries are of considerable importance.

D. Representational Roles

Before presenting the evidence it is necessary to develop a slightly more complex theory of the "representational role" than can be embodied within the dichotomy of the "trustee" and "delegate" theories of representation. Fundamentally we must take into account the relatively high degree of party cohesiveness as an integral part of a Canadian M.P.'s political life.²⁴ It is inadequate for our purposes to treat as a simple "delegate" both the M.P. who takes instructions from his constituents and the M.P. who takes his instructions from his party. "Other direction" may, as Robert Lane argues, be functional in a pluralist society,²⁵ but it surely is crucial for any theory of representation to distinguish between "other direction" by constituents or constituency pressure groups and "other direction" by a political party. What then is the *delegate* in Canadian terms?

There are two different types. The first is the M.P. who acts on the basis of instructions or orders from his constituents, or from pressure groups within his constituency; when interests conflict, he is prepared to vote for the interests of his constituents against his own inclination or against the wishes of his party. Such an M.P. we might call the "pure constituency delegate." He represents one extreme of "other directedness": for him neither personal belief and judgement nor party loyalty are sufficient to intervene between the instructions he receives from his constituents and his actions in the parliamentary arena. It is unlikely that this so-called pure constituency delegate exists in Canada. Few Canadian M.P.s can be said to receive orders or instructions from their constituents, certainly

not on a regular basis. Indeed, M.P.s occasionally complain about the difficulties of finding out what their constituents think. But, are those M.P.s who act according to what they think are the wishes of their constituents to be considered any less delegates in any meaningful sense? We should argue that they are not. True, they often exercise personal judgement in assessing the wishes of their constituents (and this may often permit a rationalization of constituency interests in terms of personal or party wishes), but if they are prepared to vote against their own personal wishes or, more often, against the wishes of their party in response to their perceived notion of the wishes of their constituents, they are no less "other-directed" than the pure constituency delegate. The commands in this case are simply less defined. The "constituency delegate" (our term for this role type) acts to the best of his ability for his constituency; neither personal belief and judgement nor his party's wishes deflect his commitment to express as faithfully as he can the wishes of his constituents.

The other type of delegate, the "party delegate," is equally other-directed: in this case his "commands" come from his party. The M.P. may entertain certain vague notions of general compatibility between his own and his party's views or between his constituents' views and those of his party, but for him such considerations are irrelevant. The party determines a position; he follows that line. There is no exercise of independent judgement or action (except perhaps in the formulation of the original party line).²⁶

At the other end of the spectrum, at the extreme of "inner directness," is the "trustee." He is either unaware of or indifferent to the demands of his constituency and party; the trustee emphasizes acting on the basis of conscience or individual judgement, and when interests conflict he is prepared to vote contrary to the wishes of his constituents and/or his party if necessary.

Between these extremes is another type, the "mixed type." This type cannot be easily categorized as bound to constituents or party or personal views, but varies in his behaviour depending on the issue. Sometimes he will be prepared to vote against the party, but on minor issues only. He is also inclined to say that normally he will vote according to his own views, but then will say that considerations of either party or constituency will intervene to affect his attitude. In short, the mixed type has no fixed representational role in mind for himself; depending on the issue he will act just like a party delegate, a constituency delegate, or even a trustee.

The information from which the representational role classifications were decided was drawn from the following questions (see Appendix B, Part A, 241):

8. First, how would you describe the job of being an M.P.?
What are the most important things you should do as an M.P.?
12. Are there any differences between the way you *now* think of the job of M.P. and the way you thought of it before you came to Ottawa?

13. Do you think there are any important differences between what you think your job is and what your constituents think it is?
17. We know that an M.P.'s personal views and those of his party will not always be in line. Supposing you wished to take a stand on an issue which you knew was different from the majority view of your party, what would you probably do?
- 18.(a) Suppose that you wanted to take a certain stand on an issue before the House, but you knew that a majority of the people in your constituency would want you to take another stand, what would you probably do then?
- 19.(a) If an issue ever arose in which your party's position was at odds with the wishes of most of your constituents, would you be more likely to go along with the party, or more likely to go along with your constituents?
 - (b) In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to his party's position?
 - (c) In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to the views of his constituents?

It cannot be denied that our coding of respondents in terms of one of the four representational role types involved the most subjective decisions in the entire coding procedure. There was no way around it. We could not simply ask M.P.s if they thought of themselves as trustees, etc. All we could do was confront them with a number of opportunities in which to disclose their role perceptions and, by weighing up all the responses they made to our questions, categorize them as best we could.

It might be thought that the mixed type of representational role, being vaguer than the rest and permitting of the greatest degree of inconsistency from one answer to another, would have received, as a kind of residual category, the bulk of the respondents. However, although it turned out to be the largest single category, it represented only 36 per cent of the total; 33 per cent were classified as trustees, 18 per cent as party delegates and 12 per cent as constituency delegates.

The following are selected from the responses of each type.
Constituency delegate

The job is public relations almost exclusively. I'm a constituency man. I try to participate in other things, but I have no choice: there is no democracy in the party so I look after my constituents. I'm here to represent the people of. . . . (Liberal)

I look on this as a servant of the people. In addition to individual problems there is the over-all well-being of your constituents, which is usually reflected in the well-being of Canada generally.

One's first commitment is to the people you represent; this is the first. If you overlook this you're a dead duck politically

and maybe you should be. Basically an M.P. is a representative of the people and his job is to represent their views and their aspirations and where they happen to be different from your own you should consider the majority of people. (Liberal)

Les vues de mes électeurs l'emportent, mais je leur expliquerais néanmoins mon point de vue. Un député peut voter en sens contraire du parti lorsqu'il a fait une promesse devant ses électeurs et le parti prend une position contraire à cette promesse. (Créditiste)

Party delegate

[In the situation in which I wished to take a stand on an issue different from the majority of my party] I would see my leader first before I spoke in caucus on it. This is the most helpful thing to do I have discovered over the years. He will explain the party's position to me. His explanation is often the right one. I might express my opinion in caucus and give examples of why it might not be advantageous but I would follow the caucus decision.

[In a clash between party's position and constituents] I would go with the party. I presented myself as a Conservative; they knew I was a Conservative when they elected me. (Conservative)

I'd stand behind the party so long as I remained a member of the party. The party has more objectivity than constituents. (Liberal)

Le député n'est pas justifié de voter en sens contraire du parti sur une question ayant trait au programme du parti et qui entraînerait la chute du parti; le député doit d'abord démissionner du parti, puis voter contre; autrement, il trahit et son parti et ses électeurs. (Liberal)

Trustee

How do you know the views of your constituents? I had to make up my own mind on the flag on what I thought was right and take that position. On the Canada Pension Plan, which I think is good, I got a number of letters from people who didn't like it. I had no hesitation to explain my position in a letter. I won some over, some not. I'd take the position more readily than when I first came. I'm more secure, older, and now have a reputation for being a certain kind of person. (New Democrat)

Je n'hésiterais pas [d'adopter une position contraire à celle de mes électeurs] et je prendrais la mienne, car le député n'est pas le messager de ses électeurs. (Liberal)

I'd probably abstain from voting first, though I'd express my opinion in caucus. If it were a matter of principle I'd vote against my party. There should be a free vote on every issue:

the party line way of voting is wrong. It's one of the big flaws in our system. [And in reply to the question, "In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to the views of his constituents"] . . . on a matter of principle. A man has the right to vote against his constituents if he feels they are wrong. (Conservative)

Mixed type

My first obligation is to my constituency. [If an issue ever arose in which my party's position was at odds with the wishes of most of my constituents] I would go along with my constituents; but on the other hand, a member has a job to more or less control the thinking of his people by telling them what he thinks. I had definite views on the flag. I talked to people on the flag. They sent me down to make a decision right or wrong. [However, in answer to the question: "In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to his party's position?" he replied] I don't know. On major issues there is not much justification. I believe in majority rule unless there is a pertinent local issue. (Conservative)

Je l'exprimerais [mon opinion] d'abord au sein du caucus, puis à la Chambre des Communes; s'il s'agit d'une question sans grande importance, je serais prêt à renoncer à mon opinion personnelle car je fais partie d'une équipe.

. . . je ne crois pas que le député est nécessairement le porte-parole des opinions de ses électeurs, car une fois qu'ils l'ont élu, ils doivent faire confiance à son intelligence et à sa compréhension. (Liberal)

Interestingly enough, there were no significant differences in the proportion of English- and French-speaking M.P.s in each of the four role types, nor were there any significant variations depending on the urban/rural location of the M.P.s' constituencies. However, there were significant differences between the parties (Table IV.2), between the regions, and also between M.P.s in the different age groups. On the whole, the differences between Liberal and Conservative M.P.s, with regard to representational roles, were less than the differences between the major and minor parties in the House of Commons. Roughly the same proportions of Liberals and Conservatives were classified as constituency delegates and mixed types, approximately 10 per cent and 40 per cent respectively. The only distinction between the two older parties was that the Liberals were relatively more inclined to the party delegate role, and Conservatives were relatively more inclined than were Liberals to the trustee role, but even here the differences are not great. Over-all, New Democratic M.P.s were most inclined to the trustee role.

There were not, as already noted, any significant differences in the way English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s saw their representational role. We should not, therefore, expect any really sharp

differences in this area between English-speaking and French-speaking members of the Liberal Party, and there are none. The only point worth noting from this comparison is the tendency for French-speaking Liberals to group themselves rather more in the mixed type of role, at the expense of trustee and party delegate roles. Fifty-two per cent of the French-speaking Liberals as compared to only 34 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals are so classified. Reasons for this difference will be suggested later.

Table IV.2

How back-bench M.P.s see their representational role, by party*
(horizontal percentages)

Party	Constituency delegate	Party delegate	Trustee	Mixed type
Liberal	10	24	25	41
Progressive Conservative	13	12	34	41
New Democratic	0	11	78	11
Social Credit	20	20	40	20
Ralliement des Créditistes	50	0	33	17
N	14	21	38	42

* The one Independent respondent is omitted from the table.

Among the regions there are not many apparent differences (Table IV.3). The only exceptions worth noting are these: M.P.s from British Columbia and Yukon are more inclined than M.P.s from any other region to regard themselves as trustees; on the other hand not one M.P. from these areas regarded himself as a constituency delegate. This is not simply accounted for by one particular party (especially, one might think, the N.D.P. members from British Columbia) but is general throughout the other parties as well. We may also note that while no M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces regarded themselves as party delegates, the vast majority, particularly the Liberals, were classified as mixed types.

We may also compare the influence of previous political experience on the representational roles adopted by members. Generally speaking, there is little variation as a result of differing political backgrounds, but a few interesting facts stand out. M.P.s with a background in municipal politics are a little more inclined to the constituency delegate role; those with no previous political experience are noticeably more inclined to the trustee role (52 per cent); and those with previous political experience in university political associations, as constituency organizers or youth group organizers, are much more disposed than any others to the mixed type role.

Table IV.3

How back-bench M.P.s see their representational role, by region
(horizontal percentages)

Region	Constituency delegate	Party delegate	Trustee	Mixed type
B.C. and Yukon	0	27	64	9
Prairies and N.W.T.	12	23	24	41
Ontario	16	24	30	30
Quebec	12	14	37	37
Atlantic provinces	13	0	25	62
N	14	21	38	42

Although the differences are not great, age does produce variations in the way members see their role. What stands out is that those over 60 are more inclined to the party delegate role and those under 34 are most inclined to either the trustee or mixed type role. No member under 34 saw himself as a party delegate, and only one saw himself as a constituency delegate. Liberals, it should be noted, account for all but two of the members under 34 years of age in the House of Commons in our sample. In terms of absolute numbers, the largest number of trustees came from the 35-44 age group and the largest number of party delegates came from the 45-59 age group.

We can go some way towards explaining the variations in perception of representational roles, and also add greater depth to our understanding of the different perceptions, by examining separately some of the responses to the questions which were used in classifying the types of role. In particular, by exploring reactions to several postulated conflicts—between the M.P.'s own views and those of his party, between those of his party and those of his constituents, and between his own views and those of his constituents—we may be able to sort out the major considerations which M.P.s have in mind with regard to their representational roles.

Taking first the results over all, we find that two thirds of the M.P.s are prepared to stick to their own views even though they know that their constituents would want them to take another stand. In this respect there is no difference between English- and French-speaking M.P.s: only 17 per cent of the former and 20 per cent of the latter said that they definitely would go with their constituents even against their own personal judgement of a situation. Nor are the differences between the parties great: there is hardly any difference in the responses of Liberals and Conservatives; there is also no difference between English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals. The only differences worth mentioning (and these too are not great) are the tendency for New Democrats to be a little more disposed than the others to stick to their own views (note their high trustee ranking), and the clear tendency of Cr ditistes (100 per cent) to be

inclined to side with their constituents.²⁷ The only variation from a common pattern worth noting when the responses are examined in regional terms is this: M.P.s (and particularly Liberals) from the Atlantic provinces are least inclined to stick to their own views against the wishes of their constituents. Only 47 per cent said that they would stick with their own views, 27 per cent said that they might go with their constituents, and a further 27 per cent said that they would side with their constituents against their own personal views.

It is only when the responses are compared with the urban or rural location of an M.P.'s constituency that really significant differences occur (Table IV.4). M.P.s from the urban constituencies are most inclined to stick to their own views; M.P.s from the mixed urban and rural ridings are least inclined to stick to their own views. M.P.s from the most rural constituencies are a little more inclined than M.P.s from the mixed constituencies, but are not as inclined as those from the cities, to stick to their own views.

Table IV.4
Disposition of respondents to stick to their own views in conflict with those of their constituents, by urban or rural location of the M.P.'s constituency (horizontal percentages)

Location of constituency	Would stick to own views	Might go with constituents	Would go with constituents every time
Rural	64	28	8
Rural/urban	55	15	30
Urban	81	5	14*
N	75	18	20

* These were all Liberals.

If the majority of Canadian M.P.s are inclined to follow their own judgement against the wishes of their constituents, they are considerably less inclined to display the same independence when their personal views are in conflict with those of their party (Table IV.5); in this situation 57 per cent of the respondents who answered the question²⁸ said that they would go with their party. Once more there are no significant differences between the responses of English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s. Nor are there more significant differences between the rural and urban M.P.s. The most significant differences in this case are between the parties. It will be recalled that Liberals were no less inclined than others to stick to their own views against the wishes of their constituents, but they admit to being far less willing to stick to their own views against the wishes of a majority of their party. French-speaking Liberals are just a little more inclined than are English-speaking Liberals to

go with the party in this case, but the substantial difference is between the Liberal party and the others. Regionally, it appears that Western M.P.s are a little more inclined than are those from Quebec and Ontario to stick to their own views, but the important difference to be noticed is the very considerable disposition of M.P.s, especially Liberals from the Atlantic provinces to go along with their party at the expense of their personal views (Table IV.6). Only 19 per cent of the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces said that they would stick to their own views against the wishes of their parties.

Table IV.5

Disposition of respondents to stick to their own views in conflict with those of their party,* by party (horizontal percentages)

Party	Would stick to own views	Would go with party	No answer
Liberal	26	71	3
Progressive Conservative	49	39	14
New Democratic	78	22	0
Social Credit	80	20	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	50	50	0
N	49	66	7

* Independent omitted.

Table IV.6

Disposition of respondents to stick to their own views in conflict with those of their party, by region (horizontal percentages)

Region	Would stick to own views	Would go with party	No answer
B.C. and Yukon	54	37	9
Prairies and N.W.T.	52	32	16
Ontario	40	58	2
Quebec	39	55	6
Atlantic provinces	19	81	0
N	50	66	7

If their personal views were in conflict with either their parties or their constituents, our respondents were clearly more inclined to go along with their parties than they were inclined to go along with their constituents. In other words the trusteeship content of our respondents' view of their role showed up more clearly vis- -vis constituents than it did vis- -vis parties. This was especially noticeable with Liberals. However, in the situation where the constituents' wishes were known to be in conflict with the views of the

majority in their parties the choice was a tougher one. In this case M.P.s were not so clearly prepared to go along with their parties; displaying traces of a constituency delegate and a trustee role they tended to answer that they would use their own judgement depending on the circumstances. Some 31 per cent said that they would be more likely to go along with their constituents, 28 per cent said they would definitely go along with their parties, and 41 per cent said that they would use their own judgement depending on the issues involved.

Responses to this situation brought out differences between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s (Table IV.7). The latter were more inclined to go along with their parties in the case of a conflict between their *own personal views* and their parties, but in the case of conflict with their *constituents'* views they were more inclined to go along with their constituents.

Table IV.7
Self-attributed behaviour of respondents confronted by an issue in which their party's position was at odds with the wishes of most of their constituents, by language group (horizontal percentages)

	Would go with constituents	Would go with party	Would use own judgement
English	25	33	42
French	47	15	38
N	35	31	46

Although French-speaking Cr ditistes and Social Crediters were a little more inclined than French-speaking Liberals to go along with their constituents, the differences between the two language groups are not simply accounted for in party terms. English-speaking Conservatives were more inclined to go with their constituents than were English-speaking Liberals, but French-speaking Liberals were more inclined than either to go along with their constituents: 39 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals, as compared with only 19 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals, were inclined to go along with their constituents; only 13 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals, compared with 32 per cent of their English-speaking colleagues, would have definitely gone along with the party. There was no difference between the English-speaking Liberals and Conservatives on this matter: a little more than 30 per cent in both parties were inclined to the party delegate role.

By and large the regional comparison follows the lines that would be expected from the apparent differences between the two principal language groups; the only point worth noting here is the very clear tendency of M.P.s, especially Liberals from the Atlantic provinces, to say that they would use their own judgement. Conservatives from

the Atlantic provinces were inclined to follow their party in a conflict between party and constituents, but the Liberals were not: 70 per cent of them replied that they would use their own judgement depending on the circumstances.

When account is taken of the ages of respondents, a few interesting differences emerge. The youngest M.P.s (who are mainly Liberals) are least inclined to say categorically that they will go with their party: 67 per cent said they would use their own judgement and only one said he would go with his party. The most inclined to go with party were, as might be expected from the results presented earlier, those over 60. They were the least inclined to go with their constituencies and the least inclined to say they would "use their own judgement." There are no differences among the bulk of the members who fall in the 35-59 age group.

We are now in a position to attempt to explain the major differences which were noted earlier in M.P.s' perceptions of their representational role. French-speaking Liberals, we then saw, tended to be classified as mixed types. These M.P.s, many of them below the age of 34, are characterized by a perception of their role which cannot simply be categorized as being bound to their individual views or to the views of their constituents or party. Further analysis has shown that they are much inclined to go along with their party at the expense of their personal views (thus becoming, in a sense, less of a trustee), but they are generally speaking less inclined than are their English-speaking colleagues to go along with their party in a clash with the interests of their constituents (thus becoming less of a party delegate). Generally speaking French-speaking Liberals are inclined to go along with their party, especially after trying to influence the party's position either in caucus or elsewhere, but when they feel that the interests of their constituents are greatly affected by a position adopted by their party with which they do not agree, then they tend to see their role as that of a trustee or constituency delegate rather than a party delegate.

We can also throw further light on the relatively clear disposition of M.P.s, particularly Liberals, from the Atlantic provinces to fall within the mixed type role classification. It must be recalled that no M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were categorized as party delegates. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were, compared with all others, far less inclined to stick to their own views against those of their constituents and were also far less inclined to stick to their own views against their party views. Clearly, the trusteeship orientation is weakest among them, particularly among the Liberals, but their orientation as a party delegate is mixed up with that of a constituency delegate as well. This fact was clearly revealed when they, and particularly Liberals, were confronted with the hypothetical situation in which their party's position was in conflict with their constituents. In this case they were less inclined than were others to opt for either the constituency or the party but plumped heavily (again this is particularly true of the Liberals) for the

response that they would use their own judgement depending on the issues and the circumstances. As a result of this ambivalence it is not surprising that a great many M.P.s, especially Liberals, from the Atlantic provinces were classified as mixed types in their representational role perceptions.

Further evidence of the way French-speaking Liberals and Liberals from the Atlantic provinces see their representational role is provided by answers to question 19(b): "In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to his party's position?"²⁹ In this case there were hardly any significant differences between the language groups, the parties, or the regions. The only points worth noting relate directly to the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and to French-speaking Liberals. The former, more than any other group, single out "matters of conscience" as occasions on which one is justified in voting against party. We might have expected that "clashes with the interest of constituents" might have rated a little higher with them as an answer, as it did for M.P.s from the Prairies, Ontario, and Quebec, but it did not. We can only surmise that a clash with the constituents' interests is not for an M.P. from the Atlantic provinces sufficient to overcome the pull of party loyalty; it requires also the additional support of his own conviction before the drastic step will be taken. On the other hand, French-speaking M.P.s (Liberals as well as the others) were far more inclined to mention a "clash with the interests of constituents" or "a combination of a clash with constituents' interests and conflict with one's conscience" as justifications for voting against party. In addition, a few French-speaking Liberals mentioned the following extreme situation as justifying their defiance of their party: in cases of grave national issues, such as their party's resistance to the opting out clause for Quebec, or the abolition of the use of the French language in the House of Commons, they felt justified in voting against their party.

E. Areal Roles

Thus far we have been concerned exclusively with what we have called the M.P.'s representational role. We have discussed, in other words, different *styles* of representation. However we may also distinguish, even if theorists like Burke did not,³⁰ between the *style* of representation and the *focus* of representation. As the authors of an important study of American state legislators have argued: "Today, many 'publics' constitute significant foci of orientation for the representative as he approaches his legislative task. Under the conditions of a plural political and social order, these foci of representation may be other than geographical interests, be they electoral districts or the large commonwealth."³¹ The legislator's focus of representation may be closely related to his style of representation, but there is no necessity that it be:

. . . the fact that a representative sees himself as reaching a decision by following his own convictions or judgment does not mean that the content of his decisions is necessarily oriented towards a general rather than a particular interest, just as his acceptance of instructions from a clientele group does not necessarily mean that he is oriented towards a special rather than a public interest. A representative may base his decisions on his own conscience or judgment, but the cause he promotes may be parochial. Or he may follow instructions, but the mandate may be directed toward the realization of the general welfare.³²

While we should be unwise to pursue too strictly in a study of Canadian M.P.s a research design that had its rationale in a political system in which the institutions of government, including the parties, are so different, the main point (that one can usefully distinguish between styles of representation and foci of representation) is valid and will be followed here.

The data from which "areal roles" were inferred were the responses to the questions we may have already indicated above as useful in determining representational roles. One further question was asked, however, in order to focus on one particular variant of the areal role (see Appendix A, Part B, 241):

11. (If after probing for a full description [of the role of M.P.] the respondent has not mentioned "provincial spokesmen," ask)

Some members sometimes mention the job of acting as a provincial spokesman as part of their role as M.P.

(a) Do you think this is properly the job of an M.P.?

(b) Do you regard this as part of *your* job?

As might be expected, many M.P.s were unable or unwilling to suggest that the focus of their representation was limited to any one geographical area. When we coded the responses we therefore classified respondents in terms of their dominant, dominant and secondary, and shared foci, when it turned out that M.P.s had more than one focus of representation. The task of classification was made easier by the careful probing of most interviewers to obtain from a respondent some ranking of the foci when he mentioned more than one.

Our original distribution of responses using the multiple categories employed in coding the data yielded the results shown in Table IV.8. Clearly this distribution of responses was too varied for further analysis, and yet it was evident that responses could be grouped around a basic focus at the national, provincial, or constituency level. We therefore decided to analyze responses in terms of the *dominant* representational focus: "nation-dominant," "province-dominant," "constituency dominant," and "shared focus"—between constituency and province equally, constituency and nation equally, or between constituency, nation and province equally.

Table IV.8

Distribution of back-bench M.P.s' responses to questions concerning their perception of their areal role, by language group

Category of response	English-speaking	French-speaking
	(%)	(%)
Constituency only	12	8
Constituency dominant, province/region secondary	6	11
Constituency dominant, province and nation secondary	17	8
Constituency dominant, nation secondary	18	16
Constituency and province equally important	1	8
Constituency and nation equally important	17	8
Province dominant, constituency secondary	0	6
Nation dominant, constituency secondary	15	11
Nation dominant, constituency, province equally secondary	12	11
Nation dominant, constituency and province almost equal	2	5
Constituency, province, nation almost equal	0	3
Nation dominant, province secondary	0	5

When the respondents' views of their areal role are treated in this way no significant differences appear between M.P.s from the two principal language groups. However there are significant variations between rural and urban M.P.s, between the parties, and between the regions. The differences in terms of the urban or rural location of the constituency are not great, but there is a tendency, not accounted for simply by party differences, for the rural M.P.s to be the most dominantly constituency-oriented; the urban M.P.s on the other hand tend to be more dominantly national in the way they see their areal role. The differences between the parties are more interesting (Table IV.9). The Ralliement des Cr ditistes is the only party with members whose areal role is dominantly provincial. The New Democratic party has proportionately the most members with the nation-dominant focus of representation, and the Conservatives have proportionately the most members with a constituency-dominant focus. Generally speaking, the main differences are between the Liberals and Conservatives together compared with the others, for between them the two major parties account for 90 per cent of the back-bench M.P.s in the House with the constituency-dominant focus of representation. As might be expected from the absence of significant differences between the two language groups, there are no significant differences in the role perception of English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals.

To some extent the regional variations (*see* Table IV.10) are accounted for by differences between the parties. M.P.s from British Columbia are by far the most inclined to the nation-dominant focus,

but this fact is to a great extent accounted for by the position of the New Democratic members from British Columbia. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces are least given to the nation-dominant areal role perception, and favour more than do M.P.s from any other province the constituency-dominant focus.

Table IV.9

Back-bench M.P.s' perceptions of their areal role, by party
(horizontal percentages)

Party	Nation-dominant	Constituency-dominant	Shared focus	Province-dominant
Liberal	24	54	22	0
Progressive Conservative	26	66	8	0
New Democratic	56	11	33	0
Social Credit	40	40	20	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	17	33	17	33
All M.P.s	27	53	18	2
N	31	61	21	2

Table IV.10

Back-bench M.P.s' perceptions of their areal role, by region
(horizontal percentages)

Region	Nation-dominant	Constituency-dominant	Shared focus	Province-dominant
B.C. and Yukon	64	36	0	0
Prairies and N.W.T.	28	67	5	0
Ontario	20	52	28	0
Quebec	28	44	22	6
Atlantic provinces	14	72	14	0
N	31	61	21	2

It is mainly the M.P.s from Ontario and Quebec who are disposed to a focus of representation which we have termed here the shared focus; the numbers in these categories are not great, but there are slight differences among them. The shared focus for Quebec M.P.s tended to be more a sharing of focus between constituency and province, whereas with Ontario M.P.s it tended to be a sharing of focus between constituency and nation. When these facts are kept in mind the apparent difference between M.P.s from the two provinces, in terms of the constituency-dominant and nation-dominant orientations, breaks down.

In addition, it is necessary to take into account a feature of the M.P.s' views of their areal role which has been somewhat lost in the analysis thus far. We had not expected to find many back-bench M.P.s for whom the province was the dominant focus of his representational orientation (at the expense of, say, even his constituency); but preliminary interviews with M.P.s had led us to expect that a considerable number of both language groups would mention at least a secondary concern for representing the interests of their province or region. This secondary focus, or even tertiary focus, of respondents has been lost in an analysis which had concentrated on the *dominant* focus of representation of M.P.s who may have mentioned other foci as secondary. To take account of this we may now look at the distribution of respondents, analyzed here only in terms of English-speaking and French-speaking, who mentioned their province or region as playing at least some part in their areal role perception. When this is done, differences do appear in the way English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s see their areal roles: only 39 per cent of the former mentioned their province (or occasionally region) in their role perceptions, whereas 57 per cent of the latter did so.

Although a considerable number of both English- and French-speaking M.P.s regard representation at Ottawa of the province (or region) as a legitimate facet of their role as M.P., a few M.P.s, when asked specifically whether they thought the role of "provincial spokesman" is properly the job of an M.P.,³³ vigorously denied this areal role as appropriate to a federal M.P.:

No I don't. The House of Commons is balkanizing itself. The Cr ditistes are only seeking re-election. This depends on the degree to which they can defend the rights of French Canada. It frightens me that they will defend this right against Canadian unity. I also find this present in Western members.
(Quebec Liberal)

I have no ambitions to take over the role of Premier Robarts. I think he is doing a wonderful job. I came here to represent [my constituency] in Canada; if I wanted to represent [my constituency] in the province I would have gone to Queen's Park. We have enough provincial members acting as spokesmen as it is.
(Ontario Conservative)

Le d put  ne peut pas  tre le porte-parole d'une province; il est d'abord le porte-parole du Canada. Les provinces ont assez de moyens pour faire valoir leurs points de vue. (Quebec Liberal)

I think it's a very dangerous thing to do. You're here as a federal member, not as a representative of a province. I'm a Western member, but I think that it is balkanizing the country even to think of oneself as a regional member. (Prairie Conservative)

Je pense que le député est élu pour représenter un comté du Canada non une province. Il y a des caucus pour s'expliquer. (Quebec Liberal)

On the other hand, there were a considerable number of M.P.s who, while not taking the role of provincial spokesman themselves, could easily appreciate why others did. Many noted the great problem, depending on the region, of separating the provincial or regional aspects from one's role as spokesman for a constituency. Two Liberal M.P.s, one from Quebec, the other from Ontario, reflected aloud on the geographical and political considerations that influence the adopting of a provincial spokesman role:

I don't think the Members from Ontario reflect an exclusively Ontario approach, and this may, of course, be arrogance: what's right for Ontario is right for the rest of the country. As an Ontario member, I believe that all Ontario members look on relatively strong central government as being in the interests of our province. Therefore, the bias in favour of strong central government may actually be provincial but *sounds* federal. Ontario has an interest in maintaining a strong and centralized nation because we've been one of the beneficiaries of Confederation. I'm essentially being a provincial spokesman when I defend a strong central government.

Je veux faire une distinction entre géographie et politique. Géographiquement, le Canada est une synthèse de régions et si le député ne s'identifie pas à une région ou à une province, son efficacité est réduite. Si un député veut être efficace au fédéral, il faut qu'il soit accepté par les politiciens provinciaux qui sont du même parti, sans tout de même être leur porte-parole. Tous les hommes politiques qui ont réussi sur le plan canadien, étaient ainsi identifiés: exception, C.D. Howe.

Finally, we must consider another feature of the perceptions of the areal role which might have been obscured by our method of comparing respondents in terms of the dominant focus of representation. We suggested earlier that when Quebec M.P.s were coded as "shared focus" this meant that they tended to share a focus between constituency and province, whereas Ontario M.P.s tended to share their focus between nation and constituency. However we seem to have permitted the constituency focus of Quebec M.P.s to receive too little weight. In terms of the constituency-dominant focus, as a result of our coding, Quebec M.P.s appear to be actually less constituency-oriented than are English-speaking M.P.s, but this characterization is in sharp contrast to Quebec M.P.s' self-description in another part of our questionnaire. In Part B of the questionnaire M.P.s were invited to agree or disagree with statement 14: "The Quebec M.P. tends to be more concerned with looking after his constituents than with national policies." The results show that nearly 70 per cent of the Quebec M.P.s agree! English-speaking M.P.s are not nearly so inclined to agree with the proposition.³⁴

The constituency-dominant focus has been presented earlier as the primary areal perception of Quebec M.P.s. What must be acknowledged is that it has not apparently been accorded the importance which Quebec M.P.s think it has. The fact that the percentage of Quebec M.P.s disagreeing with the proposition (30 per cent), is almost exactly the same as the percentage recorded as "nation-dominant" in their areal focus (28 per cent), lends support to our analysis. It suggests that the extent to which the constituency focus has been obscured may to some extent be accounted for by the tendency of some Quebec M.P.s not to distinguish closely between the provincial focus and the constituency focus in their areal role perceptions. Further confirmation of this hypothesis is offered later when we consider what roles French-speaking M.P.s attribute to themselves as French Canadian M.P.s.

F. Purposive Roles

An M.P.'s perceptions of his role are not limited to those of style and focus; we may also inquire into his further notions of the role in the sense of his characterization of the job. We might discover, for example, that an M.P. regards himself as essentially a party delegate with a dominantly national focus of representation, but we should still not know anything about what he thinks his role is within the parliamentary setting. The same general question ("How would you describe the job of an M.P.?"), along with the supplementary questions from which we have been able to derive the representational and areal role perceptions, yielded information from which we were able to analyze M.P.s in terms of their characterization of the job of M.P.

Several M.P.s mentioned more than one characterization of the job. Rather than set up our analysis in terms of a multitude of combinations of purposive role perceptions, with one feature dominant in one case and secondary in another, we coded as many as three "characterizations" of the job for each M.P., and then compared the number of times each characterization is mentioned by M.P.s within certain definable groups. One particular characterization of the job, the so-called "liaison officer,"³⁵ was mentioned by nearly 80 per cent of the M.P.s; all this means is that for the vast majority of M.P.s at least one facet of their notion of the job of M.P. is the task of acting as a liaison between the constituency and the national government. Since so many M.P.s mentioned this particular purposive role, attention inevitably centres on those M.P.s who *also* (or in a few cases exclusively) referred to other notions of the job.

After the very popular liaison officer role, the next most frequently mentioned was what we have called the "lawmaker" role.³⁶ "Lawmakers" were distinguished from "ritualists," another evident type, by mentioning as part of their job the notion of actually influencing the making and amending of legislation. Ritualists, on the

other hand, tended to make vague references to Parliament's law-making function, but without emphasizing their own active participation. Ritualists appear to regard themselves as ciphers in the legislative process. Another role mentioned by 25 per cent of all M.P.s was what we have called the "ombudsman."³⁷ M.P.s with this orientation went beyond the general remarks of a liaison officer to stress the part they play in handling the grievances of their constituents. A few M.P.s characterized their job as fighting elections for their party; a few others characterized it as getting themselves re-elected. A more substantial purposive role, mentioned by a little over 13 per cent of the respondents, was that of "propagandist": helping to get public and/or government ready for advances in social and other legislation.

Many M.P.s, as we have already indicated, characterized their job in terms of more than one of the types; the following are typical of the responses received and show the variety of combinations which exist.

I would first describe the job of an M.P. as a legislator: he studies the need for laws and participates in committee work. Second, the job of representing his constituency. There are problems which arise concerning government policy on the area requiring a relationship with government departments. In the constituency there is the problem of communication between industry and government concerning the allocation of contracts: expansion of dock facilities; liaison work with employees associations. It's a job of frustrations. You must constantly fight the bureaucracy of the civil service. There are limitations on what the individual can achieve. (Lawmaker/Liaison Officer/Ombudsman)

The most important thing you should do as an M.P. is to answer all correspondence received. The public deserves a reply. I endeavour to help, and even when I can't I go through the first stage to show that I tried. (Liaison Officer only)

It is a question of where the stress lies. The first job is to be an "ombudsman" for your constituents as their M.P. I agree that I should be concerned with national affairs, but it's my interpretation that gets me re-elected. (Ombudsman only)

Un député doit représenter le comté; mais il ne doit pas être un bureau de placement. Il étudie des projets de loi, participe réellement aux comités d'études, car chaque député doit connaître les problèmes à fond et doit avoir la liberté de faire connaître son point de vue en Chambre. (Lawmaker/Liaison Officer)

I don't know how to answer that. Everyone asks it. The most important thing an M.P. should do is be well informed. (Ritualist only)

Avant d'être un back-bencher il est un législateur, et un administrateur même. C'est un gars qui essaie de comprendre le mouvement du pays et il essaie de canaliser ce mouvement. C'est un éducateur, un professeur qui enseigne à la nation. (Lawmaker/ Propagandist)

From my own standpoint an M.P.'s first job is to be *au fait* with and have some influence on a number of areas of national policy; one has to be prepared to express one's own views on these matters.

Constituents think that it is more important that I should be an ombudsman, in legal and welfare matters as a complaints bureau. I think it important, but I think this aspect is overstressed. A member should not spend all his time on this. A member should certainly keep his ear to the ground on riding matters in order to ascertain the real problems, but it does compete occasionally too much with the time devoted to wider issues. I don't regard it as my function to express my point of view on every issue in the House. I don't regard it as a function to find out the views of constituents and support them whether I agree or not. If unpopular I'm prepared to take the consequences--though in practice it is nothing as forthright nor as courageous as that. I agree with Burke--although you have to bear in mind that Burke never stood for Bristol after that address: he stood for a pocket borough! (Lawmaker/Ombudsman)

Generally speaking, the differences in the way M.P.s of the two principal language groups see their purposive roles are not great (Table IV.11). The only slight differences worth noting are the tendency for French-speaking M.P.s to mention lawmaking roles (both the lawmaker and ritualist roles) rather more often than did English-speaking M.P.s and for English-speaking M.P.s to be somewhat more inclined to the ombudsman role.

Table IV.11
Back-bench M.P.s' perceptions of their purposive role, by language group

Purposive role	English	French	N
	(%)*	(%)	
Liaison officer	74	83	94
Ombudsman	29	16	31
Lawmaker	51	65	67
Ritualist	17	30	25
Opportunist	1	3	2
Election fighter	6	0	5
Propagandist	12	19	17

* Percentages total more than 100 because most respondents mentioned more than one role.

When the responses are examined by party, previous political experiences, age of the member, extent of experience in the House of Commons, and urban or rural location of constituencies, no significant differences appear. The only points worth mentioning are that, as might be expected, urban M.P.s are the most inclined to mention the ombudsman role and that Liberals and Cr ditistes are most inclined to mention the lawmaker role, which might not have been expected.

The differences between the regions are not very great, certainly not as great as we have encountered elsewhere; but there are a few things worth noting (Table IV.12). M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, as might be expected, are thoroughly "liaison officers" in the way they see their role: every single one mentioned at least this role for himself. On the other hand, they do not incline much to either the lawmaker or, even more noticeably, the ombudsman notions of the job of M.P. Quebec M.P.s, thanks in part to the Cr ditistes, seem inclined to the lawmaker role, but not quite as much as M.P.s from British Columbia. Clearly it is the urban M.P.s from Ontario, particularly the Liberals, who see their job as that of ombudsman.

Table IV.12

Back-bench M.P.s' perceptions of their purposive role, by region (horizontal percentages)*

Region	Liaison officer	Ombudsman	Lawmaker
B.C. and Yukon	64	27	73
Prairies and N.W.T.	78	22	33
Ontario	73	40	55
Quebec	80	20	67
Atlantic provinces	100	6	44

* Percentages total more than 100 because M.P.s mentioned more than one role.

G. *The Perception of Differences in Choice of Roles*

In order to try to discover to what extent M.P.s were aware of the different ways their parliamentary colleagues saw their role we asked all respondents, after inviting them to describe their own notions of the job of an M.P., the following questions (see Appendix B, Part A, 241):

9. Do you think most M.P.s from other *parties* would describe the job in much the same way as you have? (If not) How would they differ?
10. Do you think most M.P.s from other *provinces* would describe the job in much the same way as you have? (If not) How would they differ?

The results are interesting indeed.

With regard to certain roles (for example, the liaison officer) there is no difference among the parties; it is not surprising then that M.P.s did not recognize a difference in this sense. But with regard to the representational and areal roles there were clear differences among the parties. It might reasonably have been expected that these would be recognized. We therefore decided to code a response as "respondent thinks that role perception varies between parties" if differences were noted in any one of the three facets of the role perception that we have been using in our analysis. Even when this step is taken, thus loading the situation in favour of a recognition of differences among the parties, *the number of M.P.s who see such differences is very low*. Only 17 per cent of the respondents stated that there are differences in role perception attributable to party; 23 per cent stated that there are differences in perception which are not related to party;³⁸ and 14 per cent stated that they did not know whether such differences existed. The remainder saw no differences at all.

There were no significant differences in the responses on the basis of the urban or rural location of a respondent's constituency or region; there appears to be a significant difference on the basis of the mother tongue of respondents, but these differences are better explained by party differences (Table IV.13) than by language differences.

The point was not stressed in the analysis above, but it may be recalled that the differences between Liberals and Conservatives in all three facets of role perception examined were slight. It is perhaps not so surprising, therefore, that Liberals and Conservatives tend to agree that there are no differences in role perception; conversely they are the least inclined to state that differences based on party exist. New Democratic and Cr ditiste M.P.s, whose perceptions did differ rather more from the others, are most inclined to recognize that differences in role perception exist among the parties.

However, there are differences between English-speaking and French-speaking members of the Liberal and Conservative parties that are worth mentioning. French-speaking Liberals were no more inclined than were English-speaking Liberals to recognize differences in perception based on party, but they were more inclined than were English-speaking M.P.s to state that there were no differences whatever among M.P.s' perceptions of their roles. The situation within the Conservative party was different: whereas only three of the 35 English-speaking respondents said that perceptions differ, both the French-speaking respondents interviewed stated that perceptions did vary by party.

What were some of the differences between the parties mentioned by the few who observed such differences? The dominant theme was the recognition of the differences in behaviour and attitude of M.P.s from the Government party as compared with those from the Opposition, but a wide variety of views was expressed, of which the following are typical.

Table IV.13

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the question of whether M.P.s from other parties would describe the job of M.P. in much the same way as they have, by party (horizontal percentages)

Party	No differences	Description of job varies, but not according to party	Description does differ by party	Don't know
Liberal	52	24	13	11
Progressive Conservative	43	22	13	22
New Democratic	22	34	22	22
Social Credit	60	20	20	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	33	0	67	0
N	56	28	20	17

La majorit  ne s'occupe pas du tout de la l gislation; la majorit  ne s'occupe pas du tout de rencontrer leurs organisations.
(Cr ditiste)

C'est le r le de l'opposition de critiquer, mais j'ai l'impression que chez eux on veut davantage se faire r  lire que de l giferer pour le bien du Canada. (Liberal)

M.P.s from the more doctrinaire parties take a different approach: Liberals' and Socialists' directions are derived from doctrine; Conservatives get it from the people; they are more pragmatic. (Conservative)

Over-all, M.P.s were only a little more inclined to recognize differences in role perception based on province: 41 per cent stated that there were no differences in perception, 18 per cent stated that there were differences which were not based on province, 29 per cent stated that there were differences in perception, and 12 per cent stated that they did not know whether perceptions differed.³⁹ Once more there are no really clear differences between M.P.s from the two principal language groups. French-speaking M.P.s are more definite that there are no differences in perception based on province; but English-speaking M.P.s are not, on the other hand, more inclined to say that perceptions vary by province. The difference is accounted for by a slightly larger proportion of English-speaking M.P.s who either do not know or think that the differences which exist are not based on the M.P.'s province.

Once more there are no significant differences between Conservatives and Liberals; nor are there, this time, any differences between the two language groups within the two major parties. New Democratic

members (56 per cent) were most inclined to state that differences in perception exist based on province, and Créditistes (83 per cent) were most inclined to state that there were no differences in perception based on province. The majority of the latter were clearly convinced that they perceive their role differently from the *Liberals* in Quebec but were not inclined to think that this perception was substantially different from that of M.P.s from other provinces.

The following are representative of a variety of reasons given by the minority of M.P.s who recognized differences in perception of the role based on province (or perhaps region).

In certain constituencies in Eastern Canada the M.P.s are most interested in their constituencies. In the West we take a broader outlook; we are not so traditional. They are more volatile in the East; the M.P. therefore has to pay more attention to his constituents. (Prairie M.P.)

I can hardly see the average Westerner, based on his remarks in the House, showing any concern for national unity when they know so little of the problem. I never cease to be amazed by the well-intentioned ignorance of some members. Western members, at least among the Tories, are twenty years older in age and ideas than other members. (British Columbia M.P.)

Look at the headings under Quebec in Hansard. I don't agree that Quebec M.P.s are members of Parliament; they expound their views for purely political reasons. (Social Credit M.P.)

Le député d'expression anglaise n'a pas à faire face à la même cuisine politique. (Quebec M.P.)

Certaines provinces considèrent leurs députés comme étant des législateurs (par exemple, en Ontario, plus qu'au Québec). (Quebec M.P.)

M.P.s from Ontario and Quebec have a different approach. It is difficult to describe, but they are a little more aggressive: they stress the political side more than in the West. Their organization is also much stronger. (Prairie M.P.)

D'après moi les députés du Québec ont un rôle plus particulier. Ainsi ils doivent continuellement se battre pour le bilinguisme. De plus nous devons toujours songer à ce que sera la réaction québécoise à certaines lois fédérales, favorable ou non. (Quebec M.P.)

We also asked all M.P.s question 12: "Are there any differences between the way you *now* think of the job of M.P. and the way you thought of it before you came to Ottawa?" Not only was this question useful in clarifying respondents' present view of their role, but it was the source of additional interesting information on their orientation to federal politics.

For 46 per cent of our respondents there were no differences between their earlier notions of the job and their perceptions at the

time of our interviews, 23 per cent said they had thought they could do more in the House of Commons, 12 per cent stated frankly they had simply not known the implications of the job before they reached Ottawa, and about 6 per cent said that the job was more time-consuming than they had imagined. Generally speaking, the variations between their earlier conception of the job and their present ideas on it (for those who did see a difference) were limited to the two or three factors mentioned (or a combination of them), but a number of respondents mentioned additional observations (also classed as "other" in Table IV.14) which may be worth noting. Six M.P.s, English- and French-speaking, said that their interest in national affairs had increased since going to Ottawa: two French-speaking M.P.s thought that they had more power than they thought they would enjoy; but two English-speaking M.P.s said that they enjoyed less prestige than they had expected; one English-speaking M.P. found that there was less patronage to go around than anticipated, and one French-speaking M.P. admitted that he now appreciates that it is party discipline which stifles the French Canadians in Parliament.

It is interesting that there are no significant variations in the responses of M.P.s when analyzed in terms of their view of their representational role, their previous political experience, or any but one of the four major independent variables which we have been using throughout. French-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say there were no differences between their earlier views and their present perceptions (this was especially noticeable with Cr  ditistes), and English-speaking M.P.s (especially Ontario Liberals) were a little more inclined to say that they thought they would be able to do more in the House of Commons (Table IV.14), but these differences are at least as attributable to party as to bilingual-bicultural orientation. As far as the different types of representational role were concerned, only slight differences were revealed among those who saw no difference between their present perception of their roles and their previous notions: trustees were just a little more inclined than the others to say that they saw no differences.

We also asked M.P.s whether there are any important differences between what they think their job is and what their constituents think it is (question 13, 241). Here significant differences are apparent. According to 30 per cent of the respondents there are no differences between their own views of the job and those of their constituents; 14 per cent thought that their constituents considered their positions to be more powerful than they really are, that is their constituents think that the M.P. is able to do more for them than he really can; another 15 per cent stated that their constituents simply have no conception of the scope of the job; and a further 12 per cent said that their constituents have no interest at all in the legislative aspects of the job of M.P. A number of M.P.s gave responses (classified as "other" in Table IV.15) indicating, usually, some combination of the differences already listed. A few respondents mentioned still other ways in which their own views and those of their constituents

Table IV.14
Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the question of whether there are any differences between their present views and the ideas they had of the role of the M.P. before going to Ottawa, by language group (horizontal percentages)*

	No differences in views	Thought he could do more as M.P.	Didn't know job's implications before going	Other (mainly combinations)
English	42	26	14	27
French	56	15	9	23
N	54	27	14	32

* Percentages total more than 100 because respondents occasionally mentioned more than one change in point of view.

differed: three M.P.s said that their constituents think of them as mere delegates; one M.P. complained that his constituents did not appreciate his unwillingness to speak *for* English Canadians as such, thus rendering the respondent "a traitor to Anglo-Saxons"; another stated that "my constituents expect me to be a local functionary in striped trousers, and I'm not"; and yet another said that his constituents think that being an M.P. is a full-time job, whereas he does not think that it is.

French-speaking M.P.s were a little less inclined than were English-speaking M.P.s to say that there are no differences between their own views and those of their constituents. Among those who did point to differences, English-speaking respondents were a little more inclined to mention their constituents' ignorance of the job, either in the sense of not knowing its scope, or in thinking that the M.P. is able to do more for them than he really can. The major difference as far as French-speaking M.P.s (more precisely, French-speaking Liberals) were concerned was their constituents' disposition to show no interest whatever in the M.P.'s own legislative activities.

When responses are compared with M.P.s' perceptions of their representational role, and with their party and region a few interesting differences appear. Perhaps not surprisingly, constituency delegates are most inclined to say there is no difference between their view and that of their constituents, but there are no significant differences between the other role types on this matter. When constituency delegates *do* notice a difference in perception they are more inclined than the others to say that their constituents think that they have more power than they really have. Party delegates are most inclined to say that their constituents do not understand the job of M.P. There is no relation between the way an M.P. sees his representational role and the feeling that constituents are uninterested in his legislative activity, other than the fact that not one constituency

Table IV.15

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the question of whether there are any differences between their own views on the role of the M.P. and those of their constituents, by language group (horizontal percentages)

	No differences between own views and constituents	Constituents don't understand the job or the ex- tent of my power	Constituents uninterested in legisla- tive activity	Other
English	36	33	6	25
French	22	22	25	31
N	38	35	14	32

delegate mentioned this point. Liberals and Social Crediters are less inclined than the rest to say that there are no differences between their own views and those of their constituents. Social Credit M.P.s pointed to their constituents' tendency to be unaware of the scope and power of their job; Liberals (especially French-speaking) were inclined to say that their constituents were uninterested in their legislative activities. Conservatives, New Democrats, and Cr ditistes were very similar in their responses to this question. Liberals from the Atlantic provinces in particular, were most disposed to say that their constituents think that an M.P. has more power to do things for them than he really has.

One of the interesting points to emerge from this analysis is the way in which there appear to be regional or perhaps regional and cultural differences in the attitudes of constituents in different parts of the country towards the job of M.P. M.P.s from the newer regions of Canada were less inclined than were their colleagues from pre-Confederation regions of Canada to say that there are differences between their own perceptions of the job of M.P. and those of their constituents. On the other hand, M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and Quebec, and to a lesser extent from Ontario, are inclined to feel that such differences exist—either in the sense that M.P.s are expected to be able to do more for their constituents than they are actually able to do or in the sense that constituents tend to be uninterested in the legislative aspects of their job. Further confirmation of this phenomenon was supplied by responses to two statements in Part B of the questionnaire. There M.P.s were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the following proposition:

30. Constituents are always asking M.P.s to do something which has nothing to do with their jobs in Ottawa; more often than not it turns out to be a provincial or even a municipal matter.

The most striking difference in the responses is on the basis of the respondents' mother tongue (Table IV.16): both language groups

agree with the statement, but French-speaking M.P.s are far more inclined to agree than are English-speaking M.P.s. As a matter of fact only 9 per cent of the French-speaking respondents disagree with the suggestion, whereas nearly 40 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s disagree.⁴⁰

Table IV.16
Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Constituents are always asking M.P.s to do something which has nothing to do with their jobs in Ottawa," by language group (horizontal percentages)

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	60	39	1
French	91	9*	0
N	75	32	1

* All are Liberals.

There is no obvious reason to expect that responses should differ between M.P.s from different parties, and generally speaking they do not. The only exception is that New Democrats, in contrast to all others, were far more inclined to disagree with the suggestion, but this difference may have little to do with party. By and large it can be accounted for by differences in the responses of M.P.s from urban as compared with rural constituencies. M.P.s from urban constituencies were more inclined to disagree with the statement than M.P.s from the more rural ridings⁴¹ and, of course, New Democrats tend to come primarily from the urban ridings of the country.

The regional variation follows the pattern of responses to the earlier question (Table IV.17). Quebec M.P.s are most inclined to agree that constituents confuse provincial and municipal affairs with the job of the federal M.P.; M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces are next most inclined to agree, followed closely by those from Ontario. It is only among the M.P.s from the West that a majority disagree with the statement.

In Part B of the questionnaire we also asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement:

18. Most constituents are more interested in the services an M.P. can perform for them than in his views on legislation before the House.

The pattern of responses follows almost exactly those given to the previous statement. French-speaking respondents are far more inclined to agree than English-speaking M.P.s (although the latter do agree by a slight majority with the statement); rural M.P.s are more inclined to agree than urban M.P.s; and M.P.s from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces are far more inclined to agree than are M.P.s from the West. Once again Ontario M.P.s are in a half-way position on the matter. There are no real differences between English-speaking

Liberals and Conservatives, except that English-speaking Conservatives are a little more inclined to be unsure. The differences are actually greater between French-speaking Liberals (77 per cent of whom agree with the statement) and English-speaking Liberals than they are between the two major parties. New Democrats (63 per cent) disagree most with the suggestion and Social Crediters (100 per cent) agree most with it (*see* Table IV.18).

Table IV.17

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Constituents are always asking M.P.s to do something which has nothing to do with their jobs in Ottawa," by region (horizontal percentages)

Region	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
B.C. and Yukon	36	64	0
Prairies and N.W.T.	46	54	0
Ontario	67	30	3
Quebec	91	9	0
Atlantic provinces	71	29	0
N	75	32	1

Table IV.18

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Most constituents are more interested in the services an M.P. can perform than in his views on legislation," by language group and region (horizontal percentages)

Language group	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	52	39	9
French	79	15	6
Region			
B.C. and Yukon	46	54	0
Prairies and N.W.T.	39	46	15
Ontario	55	39	6
Quebec	79	15	6
Atlantic provinces	67	20	13
N	64	33	8

We have encountered here a feature of the Canadian political process which clearly deserves further examination, but for which our material offers little more than is offered here. There seem to be three aspects of the perception of the job of M.P. among constituents which can be distinguished. The first is the tendency for

constituents to be ignorant of the scope of the job of the Canadian M.P., that is the tendency to press upon the M.P. tasks which are more properly those of municipal or provincial representatives (a fact especially apparent to French Canadian M.P.s). The second is the assumption on the part of some constituents that M.P.s have access to a great deal more patronage than they actually control (a matter mentioned especially by M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and Quebec M.P.s). The third is the indifference of constituents to the legislative aspects of the job of M.P. It was this latter complaint that ranked especially high with French-speaking Liberals, and also with M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces.

To what extent is the phenomenon to be accounted for in terms of the degree of urbanization and how much is it to be accounted for by cultural facts broadly related to the traditions of a region? To what extent is the phenomenon a generational matter, more closely related to the age of constituents than to any other factor we have mentioned? Our data do not permit us to decide on these questions, but we can make a few observations based on the specific comments of our respondents.

Although some are no doubt aware of its wider significance, several French-speaking M.P.s (especially those from rural constituencies who complain of their constituents' lack of interest in their legislative activities) appear to believe that the problem of "cognitive dissonance" between the views of the M.P. and those of his constituents is peculiar to Quebec. One such M.P. commented ruefully that constituents of English-speaking M.P.s bring up questions of national importance with their M.P.s, whereas his are solely concerned with personal questions such as jobs and patronage. On the face of it, it seems he is right: analysis of the subject-matter of letters received by M.P.s (the details of which are presented in the next chapter) shows that Quebec M.P.s are overwhelmingly confronted with job-seeking letters while letters of disinterested opinion are relatively light. However the emphasis of constituents seeking patronage is not exclusively a problem for Quebec M.P.s. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces in particular encounter the same kind of attitude. As one Liberal put it, "I have a hard time convincing my older constituents that the Civil Service is not political, that I cannot just snap my fingers and patronage is mine." Another Liberal noted that "my constituents don't understand that I'm not an employment agency." By the same token M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, like Quebec M.P.s, receive relatively few "opinion letters." The data also show that they believe that their constituents have little interest in their legislative activities.

A few M.P.s feel that firmness and the frank admission to constituents that there is no patronage to dispense will be accepted. Another, a very experienced French-speaking member, feels that the electorate is becoming more educated, is coming to appreciate better what an M.P. can really do for them. In some parts of the country, however, transformation of attitudes is slow. Nevertheless, several

French-speaking M.P.s, who are clearly frustrated by the gap between their own more substantial conception of the role of M.P. and the "bureau de placement" expectations of their constituents, hope that a more vigorous programme of public education will achieve positive results.

H. Summary

The most striking conclusion to emerge, especially in the light of what will later be revealed about the attitudes of M.P.s from the two principal language groups, is that by and large the differences in role perceptions between English- and French-speaking M.P.s are not very great. This was especially notable with regard to their views of their representational role. Nor were there striking differences between the two groups in their political socialization, mode of recruitment, or previous political experience. Although differences in previous political experience did not appear to account for many differences in perceptions of the representational role, those M.P.s with previous experience in local government were more inclined to see their role as being that of a constituency delegate, and those with no previous political experience were a little more inclined to see their role as that of trustee. A relation between age and notions of the representational role was shown in the tendency for those under 34 not to describe the role as that of constituency or party delegate, and to prefer slightly the roles of trustee and mixed type. The oldest members clearly saw their role as that of party delegate. Moderate variations due to party or region were also revealed. But the main point is that differences in language apparently counted for little.

The differences between the two principal language groups in respect to areal roles were not great either: we did note, however, the marked tendency for French-speaking M.P.s, at least as compared with English-speaking M.P.s, to consider the "provincial spokesman" function as part of their areal role; but even here the differences are not enormous. We tried to explain the apparent conflict between 1) the fact that, in response to the open-ended question about the job of M.P., French-speaking respondents did not place an inordinately heavy emphasis on the constituency focus of representation, and 2) the fact that later in the questionnaire they indicated in no uncertain terms that they believed that the "Quebec M.P. tends to be more concerned with looking after his constituents than with national policies." We suggested then that the constituency focus may have been obscured by the tendency not to distinguish closely between the provincial and constituency focus of representation. In the light of later analysis, a further explanation is possible. We noted that for several French-speaking M.P.s (and particularly Quebec Liberals) it was a matter of regret that their constituents placed so much importance on the "préfet d'administration" aspect of the M.P.'s job. It may be then that these same M.P.s could not help but agree that in

fact the Quebec M.P. does tend to be more concerned with his constituents than with national policies, but this does not mean that they think he ought to be so disposed. For such M.P.s the Quebec M.P. is simply reacting to the exigencies of this situation. He does not have to, and indeed appears not to, agree with this perception of the M.P.'s role.

With regard to purposive roles we noted slightly more substantial differences in the perceptions of M.P.s from the two principal language groups: French-speaking M.P.s appeared to be a little more inclined to the lawmaker and ritualist characterizations of the job, just as English-speaking M.P.s were a little more disposed to mention the ombudsman role. In no cases, however, were the differences really marked. It is interesting to recall, moreover, that neither age nor previous political experience appeared to have a bearing on the adoption of purposive roles.

If we were to construct a "typical Canadian M.P.," that is the M.P. who best represents the *dominant* role perceptions of our respondents, he would see his job as involving a mixed type representational role, a constituency-dominant areal role, and a liaison officer purposive role. Clearly, the three analytically distinguishable features of role perception are closely related, and nowhere is this better seen than with the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, the vast majority of whom fit the type we have just described.

Variations from the "ideal type" are observable: Liberals and Conservatives were more inclined than others to the mixed type of representational role and the constituency-dominant areal role; Créditistes were more inclined than others to the constituency delegate representational role and the province-dominant areal role; and Ontario M.P.s were more inclined than others towards the constituency delegate representational role and the ombudsman purposive role. No other party or regional differences offer as clear a contrast, however, as the comparison between M.P.s from British Columbia and the Yukon and those from the Atlantic provinces: the dominant type among the former appears to adopt the trustee, nation-dominant and lawmaker roles, whereas the latter are fundamentally constituency-oriented in their views of their areal and purposive roles and torn between constituency and party in their view of their representational role.

Generally speaking, these variations in role perception are not observed by many of our respondents, who appear to be at least as inclined to think that differences in perception are based on matters other than the party or province from which an M.P. happens to come. The reluctance to note differences in perception based on either party or province was especially noticeable among members of the two major parties, although, over-all, members were a little more inclined to see differences in perception based on a member's province than on his party. Once more there were no clear differences between English- and French-speaking members. Nor were there clearly important differences in the disposition of respondents to admit to

differences in their notion of the role of an M.P. as compared with their ideas on the subject before they went to Ottawa. It was only when we reached the question of whether or not there were any significant differences between an M.P.'s perception of his role and that of his constituents that really interesting variations were observed. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces especially encounter the problem of constituents who appear to confuse the member of Parliament's responsibilities with those of elected officials at lower levels of government, and who also seem to think that the federal representatives can provide more patronage than they in fact actually can. Quebec M.P.s, we also saw, experience the problem of their constituents' ignorance of the implications and possibilities of their job, and, in addition, find constituents indifferent to the legislative aspects of the position. These differences in constituents' attitudes have direct consequences for an M.P.'s general orientation to federal politics, and the manner in which he plays his roles.

In the previous chapter it was shown that the typical Canadian M.P. is especially concerned with serving as a link between his constituency and the federal government. Many M.P.s are also interested in attempting to influence national legislation. In this chapter we examine the manner in which Canadian M.P.s attempt to perform the first of these basic functions. In the following chapter we take up the legislative aspects of the members' role and consider the difficulties encountered, as they see it, in trying to do their job.

A. The Flow of Information from Constituency to M.P.

There are two basic aspects to the matter of the M.P.'s link with his constituency: the mechanisms by which ideas and information flow *in* from the constituency to the M.P.; and how and to what extent information flows *out* from the M.P. to his constituents.

In order to examine the first aspect we asked all respondents from what sources they get "the most accurate and useful information about the feelings of [their] constituents on political issues" (Appendix B, Part A, question 14(a) 241). Several members mentioned more than one useful source. By far the most popular means of finding out what constituents think is simply the *conversation* between a member and his constituents, or between a member and people such as barbers and taxi drivers, who meet the general public: 58 per cent of our back-bench respondents mentioned this particular source of useful information.¹ Thirty-five per cent of the respondents referred to their party organizers and constituency association members as useful informants; 6 per cent mentioned using polls (or questionnaires) in their constituencies; and 8 per cent referred to letters (and telephone calls) which they received from their constituents. There were other answers as well: for example, four respondents singled out pressure groups as useful; one referred to his habit of putting an advertisement in the paper asking for ideas; and another referred to the

valuable information he received from other parties' organizers in his constituency. Only 7 per cent of our respondents indicated that there were no specific sources of information, suggesting that they relied on their own hunches as to the views of their constituents.

When respondents' answers are analyzed by their language group, party, and region, few differences are apparent. French-speaking respondents appear to be a little more inclined to the party organization as a source. Between the English-speaking Liberals and French-speaking Liberals there are no differences whatever; Liberals, in general, are a little more inclined than Conservatives to mention their party organizations as a source, but this emphasis is no greater than that given by New Democrats. Liberals were the most inclined to say that they relied only on their own assessments without approaching constituents or party organizations. Regionally the only point worth noting is that M.P.s (especially Conservatives) from the Atlantic provinces are most inclined to rely on conversations with constituents, and the least inclined to depend on their party associations.

However, there are differences worth noting between M.P.s from urban and rural ridings (Table V.1). M.P.s from the rural areas are most inclined to rely on personal conversations with their constituents for information and least inclined to rely on party organizations. M.P.s from the urban areas are least inclined to resort to personal conversations and most inclined to rely on the party organization and party workers. Such a situation appears reasonable, given the greater anonymity of city life. Urban and rural differences also help to account for the differences between Liberals and Conservatives.

Table V.1

Back-bench M.P.s mentioning conversations with constituents, and party organizations as sources of constituents' feelings, by location of constituency

Location	Mentioning conversations with constituents	Mentioning party workers and organizations
	(%)	(%)
Rural	72	17
Urban/rural	60	38
Urban	39	49
N	69	42

Differences in sources of information were also related to M.P.s' different perceptions of their representational roles (Table V.2). Party delegates are considerably more inclined to rely on their party organizations for information and considerably less inclined than the others to rely on conversations with their constituents. Mixed types are a little more inclined than others to depend on conversations

Table V.2

Back-bench M.P.s mentioning conversations with constituents, party organizations, and letters as sources of constituents' feelings, by representational role

Representa- tional role	Mentioning conversations with constituents	Mentioning party workers and organizations	Mentioning letters
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Constituency delegate	50	29	0
Party delegate	33	52	0
Trustee	56	31	8
Mixed type	69	31	14
N	69	42	9

with their constituents, although they, along with the trustees, also mentioned letters as a source of information. Not one constituency delegate or party delegate mentioned letters. When it is recalled that there were slight differences among our respondents on the basis of party or language group, the significance of the position of party delegates and mixed types is noteworthy.

We were also interested in finding out what groups within a constituency are important, as far as M.P.s are concerned, in providing good information and advice on political issues. It is clear from the data already presented that, apart from the constituents themselves, only party organizations appeared to come to the respondents' minds with any frequency when they were asked for sources of useful information about their constituents' feelings. It is therefore significant that party organizations were easily the most important source mentioned when we handed respondents a card bearing the names of nine different possible sources of information and advice on political issues, and asked them to rank them in terms of their usefulness (Appendix B, Part A, question 14(b), 241). The suggested sources were:

- editorials in local newspapers;
- letters to the editor in local newspapers;
- party leaders and workers in your constituency;
- business leaders;
- local government officials;
- union leaders;
- church leaders;
- leaders of ethnic associations;
- personal friends and acquaintances.

Because a great many respondents were reluctant to rank all nine suggestions, or if they did rank them were often unable to distinguish between several groups of them, we were unable to analyze our

data with sufficient refinement to warrant making detailed comparisons between language groups, parties, regions, and the urban or rural location of constituencies. The reasons why almost all respondents found it difficult to rank all nine suggestions are not hard to discover. One or two might be singled out immediately as always being most important, but then the respondent would often indicate that the relative usefulness of the other "sources" suggested depended on the issue in question. Thus, for example, on a matter concerning trade unions, the opinion of trade union leaders might be of special importance, while the opinion of party leaders and workers, normally more useful, would on that topic appear relatively unimportant.

Some members also expressed the opinion that they never felt sufficient confidence in any of the suggested "sources" to warrant accepting them unhesitatingly. Many gave the impression that all were pressure groups of one sort or another: "They all have an axe to grind," as one respondent put it. According to another, he heard from them only when they were promoting an idea favourable to their special interests, and this, to be sure, is what one might expect. Several respondents stressed the necessity of maintaining their independence of thought and judgement when dealing with groups who had special interests and they expressed the need to know, in any case, whether the leaders of these groups were really representing the wishes of their followers (if any) and whether there was any substance to their arguments.

Even though many members did not think they could always get "good information and advice on political issues" from many of the "sources" because of their built-in biases, respondents did realize that they could not discard outright any expression of opinion. Four or five sources might be used to build up a composite picture in a respondent's mind of how his constituents felt on a particular issue. Further, even though they might suspect that their informants were biased, members recognized the need to maintain friendly relations with them, not just because of electoral considerations, but also because they might prove a valuable source of information on matters related to their special interest.

Despite the limitations noted we may nevertheless indicate the relative importance of these sources (Table V.3). Following after party leaders and constituency workers (overwhelmingly the most highly ranked source) came personal friends and acquaintances; then (with little distinction between them) business leaders, local government officials, and editorials in local newspapers; and finally (all relatively insignificant) union leaders, church leaders,² letters to the editor in local newspapers, and leaders of ethnic associations.

Some differences in emphasis were revealed in the answers of English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s. The latter were a little more inclined to rank local government officials higher on the list than were English-speaking M.P.s, who were, on the other hand, more

Table V.3

Ranking of sources of good information and advice on political issues, based on percentage of ratings in top three choices

Rank	Source of Information	Times chosen
		%
1	Party leaders and workers in constituency	85
2	Personal friends and acquaintances	63
3	Business leaders	46
4	Local government officials	42
5	Editorials in local newspapers	42
6	Union leaders	15
7	Church leaders	13
8	Letters to the editor in local newspapers	11
9	Leaders of ethnic associations	9

inclined to say that business leaders were important sources of information. French-speaking M.P.s were also a little more inclined to value their friends and acquaintances as sources of useful information and advice on political issues.

The comparison of the answers to the two questions (one open-ended, the other structured) is a good object lesson in the distortions that may arise from too much reliance on structured questionnaires. From the "source-ranking question" alone we might have concluded that business leaders, local government officials, and editorials in local newspapers are reasonably important sources of information and advice for the average M.P. When we take into account, however, that in the open-ended question these sources were *volunteered* by only a tiny fraction of the respondents, we are able to put the matter in better perspective. Generally we may conclude that the party organization is indeed important as a source of information and advice for an M.P., but conversations with constituents are even more important (although the high ranking of personal friends and acquaintances suggests that the constituents with whom the M.P.s talk are not necessarily unknown to the M.P.). For the average M.P., union leaders, letters to the editor in local newspapers, church leaders, and leaders of ethnic associations are of little importance at all.³

Answers to the open-ended question revealed that letters (and for a few, telephone calls) are relatively unimportant as a source of useful information about the feelings of constituents on political issues. Yet many M.P.s receive a considerable number of letters in a normal week. In order to find out more about this side of the

communication process between constituents and M.P.s we asked all respondents to tell us how much mail they received in an average week, and what subjects tend to predominate (Appendix B, Part A, questions 14(e) and (f) 241).

To facilitate the analysis we set up four classifications, each containing a roughly equal number of respondents: members receiving "light mail" (1 to 20 letters a week), 20 per cent; members receiving "moderately heavy mail" (20 to 40 letters a week), 29 per cent; members receiving "heavy mail" (40 to 80 letters a week), 26 per cent; and members receiving "very heavy mail" (more than 80 letters a week), 25 per cent. Clearly the range here is considerable, and it is interesting to see whether the results follow any particular pattern.

Generally speaking the difference between English-speaking M.P.s and French-speaking M.P.s is not great (Table V.4). It is true that more French-speaking M.P.s than English-speaking M.P.s received what has been termed "light mail," but this is explained by a larger proportion of English-speaking M.P.s who receive "moderate mail." Within the "heavy" and "very heavy" mail categories there are no differences between the two principal language groups.

Table V.4

Amount of mail received by back-bench M.P.s in an average week, by language group, horizontal percentages

	1-20 letters	20-40 letters	40-80 letters	More than 80 letters
English	16	35	26	23
French	30	19	24	25
N	24	35	30	29

Differences are even more insignificant when examined by the urban or rural location of constituencies: the only point to stand out is one that might be expected; namely, that urban M.P.s are most prominent among those who receive a very heavy weekly mail. Even so, urban M.P.s are not by any means overwhelmingly barraged with letters as compared with their rural colleagues. Differences are also trivial between the parties: in the middle range of numbers of letters received weekly there are absolutely no differences whatever. The only slight distinctions worth noting are: a) *all* those who mentioned receiving the very lightest weekly mail (that is, only 1-10 letters a week) were Liberals;⁴ and b) more Cr ditistes and New Democrats than others appear to receive "very heavy" mail. From a regional point of view the results show only minor differences: as might be expected, M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and British Columbia—furthest away from Ottawa—are least inclined to receive only "light" weekly mail. Not one respondent from British Columbia

mentioned receiving fewer than 20 letters a week. On the other hand, no region's M.P.s were especially confronted with "very heavy" weekly mail, although it must be said that M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces tended to have heavier mail in general.

When we examine the responses according to the M.P.'s representational role perception some interesting points emerge. Not one constituency delegate reported receiving what we have termed "light mail," and 50 per cent reported receiving "very heavy" mail. Within the three other role types the pattern seems to be very much the same, except for the fact that party delegates seem to receive, more than the others, what we have termed "moderate mail," and do not seem to be especially affected by heavy mail: only three of the party delegates reported receiving more than 60 letters in a week (Table V.5). It is tantalizing evidence like this which suggests the value of a systematic analysis of the relations between constituents' attitudes and M.P.s' attitudes and perceptions.

Table V.5

Amount of mail received by back-bench M.P.s in an average week, by representational role, horizontal percentages

Representational role	1-20 letters	20-40 letters	40-80 letters	More than 80 letters
Constituency delegate	0	36	14	50
Party delegate	25	40	20	15
Trustee	22	31	27	19
Mixed type	21	24	26	29
N	24	35	30	29

What is the subject-matter of the letters received, and does the subject-matter vary in any significant way depending on the member's party, region, or language group? Members often mentioned more than one subject, and we were able to code up to five separate subjects on which letters might be received. It may be assumed that all members receive letters at some time on the full range of subjects, but we asked them what subjects predominate. Clearly the most important subject, over all, was social welfare (requests for information about pensions, family allowances, and so on): 77 per cent of our respondents mentioned receiving letters of this kind.⁵ Next most important was the letter outlining some kind of request or seeking some kind of information on what may broadly be called constituency matters (new wharves, airport construction projects, roads, dams, and so on). Also important were letters seeking employment and letters which simply conveyed the opinion of the constituent (or constituents) on specific or general matters of national, provincial, or local policy. Twenty per cent of the respondents also mentioned receiving letters on immigration matters, and a few received letters on income tax

matters. In addition, several M.P.s mention receiving, regularly, requests to attend local functions, to open fairs, schools, and so on (Table V.6).

Table V.6

Subject of letters received by back-bench M.P.s

Subject of letter	M.P.s mentioning receiving letters
	%
Social welfare	77
Constituency matters	38
Job requests	37
Opinion	32
Immigration matters	20
Income tax matters	8
Other matters (invitations to openings, anniversaries, etc.)	22

However, the over-all distribution of the predominant subject-matter of M.P.s' letters is misleading. Although letters on social welfare matters and constituency matters are about equally important for both English- and French-speaking M.P.s, there is a great difference in the other letters received by M.P.s of the two principal language groups (Table V.7). Sixty-four per cent of French-speaking M.P.s as compared with only 25 per cent of English-speaking M.P.s mentioned receiving letters seeking jobs; 40 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s mentioned receiving "opinion letters" from their constituents, but only 14 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s did so. Finally, there was a great difference in the letters each received on the subject of immigration; only one French-speaking M.P. mentioned the matter, whereas 26 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s mentioned receiving letters on immigration.

Table V.7

Predominant subject-matter of letters received by back-bench M.P.s, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	Social welfare	Job requests	Constituency matters	Opinion	Immigra- tion
English	72	25	40	41	26
French	89	64	36	14	3
N	90	43	45	38	23

* Percentages total more than 100 because most M.P.s mentioned more than one predominant subject.

As far as party variations are concerned, these are not as striking as those based on the language orientation of respondents. New Democrats were more inclined to receive letters of opinion from their constituents, whereas no Cr ditiste and only one Social Credit member mentioned this type of letter. Letters requesting jobs and letters dealing with immigration were, not surprisingly, most often directed to Liberal M.P.s, with the English Liberals accounting for the bulk of the immigration letters, and the French-speaking Liberals accounting for the bulk of the requests for jobs. Of all the members who mentioned receiving letters requesting some kind of employment, Liberals accounted for two thirds; among these, French-speaking Liberals mentioned 42 per cent of all the references to letters requesting jobs. Or, putting the same fact in a slightly different way, 80 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals mentioned that they frequently received letters requesting jobs. When this fact is taken along with another, namely, that only 14 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals mentioned receiving letters of opinion, we have plenty of evidence to substantiate the complaint of many Quebec M.P.s that their French-speaking constituents saw the M.P.'s role as that of *commis-voyageur*.

There are also variations between urban and rural constituencies worth mentioning. Letters asking for jobs are a little more common from constituents in urban ridings; letters dealing with constituency matters, such as roads, dams, and so on, are a little more common from rural constituencies; and letters of opinion and letters dealing with immigration are a little more common from urban ridings. These results are, however, much what would be expected, given the different needs and interests of urban and rural constituents.

In addition, there are variations in the kinds of letters received which are not simply explained by the differences already noted in terms of language group and urban or rural location of constituencies. Given the higher incidence of letters on constituency matters from rural M.P.s, we might expect Prairie M.P.s to be especially affected by this kind of letter, as they are. Similarly since French-speaking M.P.s receive many letters requesting jobs, we should also expect that Quebec M.P.s would receive a great many requests for jobs, as they do. But there are other interesting facts worth noting. Not one British Columbia member mentioned receiving letters requesting jobs, and only two British Columbia members mentioned receiving letters dealing with constituency matters. M.P.s from British Columbia receive their fair share of letters concerning social welfare, as do all other M.P.s, but they are particularly noteworthy for the high number of letters of opinion which they receive: 82 per cent mentioned receiving letters of this kind. Ontario M.P.s, as might be expected, receive the lion's share of the letters dealing with immigration matters: nearly 75 per cent of all the references to letters concerning immigration came from Ontario M.P.s. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces come closest to Quebec M.P.s in the kind of letters they receive. We have already noticed the extent to which M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces referred to the fact that many of their

constituents think they are able to do more for them in the way of providing patronage than M.P.s are in fact able to do. It was therefore no surprise to learn that 63 per cent of them mentioned frequently receiving letters requesting jobs, and 63 per cent mentioned receiving letters on constituency matters. Letters of this kind were more common for Liberals than for Conservatives, but we have already noticed that letters requesting jobs were more commonly sent to Liberals. Not one M.P. from an Atlantic province mentioned receiving letters dealing with immigration, and only one mentioned receiving letters of opinion.

The analysis presented earlier in this chapter pointed to the fact that personal contact between an M.P. and his constituents, and in particular the M.P.'s own conversations with his constituents, are the most important means of his acquiring a feeling for, or confirmation of, the ideas of his constituents on political matters. Feedback from the party organization appeared to be the next most important mechanism of transferring opinions from constituency to M.P. Yet, judging from replies to another question put to all respondents, Canadian M.P.s in general are by no means sanguine about their ability to keep in touch with constituents. In response to statement 21 (Appendix B, Part B, 250) that "Often M.P.s get so involved in affairs in Ottawa that they lose touch with their constituents" 70 per cent of the respondents agreed.⁶ However, responses were not uniform.⁷ French-speaking M.P.s (and this was true of French-speaking M.P.s of all parties) were considerably more inclined to say that they lose touch with their constituents. Rural M.P.s were a little more inclined than were urban ones to agree that they lose touch with their constituents, but the major distinguishing factor in the responses was the mother tongue of the respondents (Table V.8). The proof of this is revealed by a comparison of the responses of English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals: 82 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals agreed with the proposition, as compared with only 60 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals. All the French-speaking Social Crediters, and all but one of the Cr ditistes, agreed with the proposition.

Table V.8

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement, "Often M.P.s get so involved in affairs in Ottawa that they lose touch with their constituents," by language group, horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	63	33	4
French	85	15	0
N	74	29	3

When the responses are examined by other independent variables a few interesting facts emerge. There seems to be no clear relation between the number of letters an M.P. receives and his agreement or disagreement with the proposition: those who received the fewest letters were only marginally more inclined to agree than were those who received more than 80 letters a week. Trustees were most inclined to agree that the M.P. often loses touch, whereas party delegates, who were most inclined to rely on their party organization for the feelings of their constituents, were most inclined to disagree with the suggestion that M.P.s get out of touch with their constituents. Of the "purposive role" types, ombudsmen were most inclined to disagree with the notion that M.P.s lose touch with their constituents.

B. Keeping in Touch with Constituents

We have examined the flow of information in to the M.P.s; it is appropriate now to see what initiatives are taken by the M.P.s. Before doing this, however, it is useful to try to discover what opportunities there may be for personal contact between an M.P. and his constituents or party organization. This was done by inquiring how much time, during the parliamentary session, M.P.s spend in their constituencies (Appendix B, Part A, question 16(c), 242), and whether or not they live in their constituencies during the parliamentary session (question 42(a) and (b), 247; and Part C, question 3, 251).

Among Canadian back-bench M.P.s, at least, there are not many who do not have a residence in, or take up some kind of residence in, the constituencies they represent: only eight M.P.s interviewed fell into this category, five English-speaking and three French-speaking. The only matter of interest to arise from our question asking M.P.s how long they lived in the constituency they represent was the clear implication that English-speaking M.P.s tend to be more mobile than are French-speaking M.P.s, that is they are less inclined to have deep roots in the constituencies which they represent. Whereas nearly 15 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s had lived in their constituencies less than 10 years, only one French-speaking M.P. had lived in his constituency that briefly. Even when we take a longer view of "establishment in one's constituency" (habitation in the constituency from one to 20 years) the same pattern emerged: 33 per cent of the English-speaking respondents were so classified as compared with only 16 per cent of the French-speaking respondents. In general, we may say that French-speaking M.P.s tend to be more rooted in the constituencies which they come to represent in Ottawa.

There is a difference between having lived for many years in a constituency that one represents and actually residing in that constituency while the parliamentary session is in progress. Only those M.P.s who live within convenient driving distance of the national capital can actually live in their constituencies during the entire parliamentary session: others either live in hotels or apartments in

Ottawa during the weekdays or during the session, or take up residence with their families in Ottawa for the duration of the session. Nine of the respondents interviewed in our survey live in Ottawa throughout the entire year, that is they have taken up permanent residence in Ottawa despite the fact that their constituencies are elsewhere.⁸ Essentially our interest focuses on three different patterns of handling the problem of residing in Ottawa for the weekly parliamentary business, and maintaining connections with one's family. The first method, used by 57 per cent of the respondents with families, is to reside in Ottawa during the week, returning every weekend or two to one's home in the constituency one represents; another solution, adopted by less than 10 per cent of the respondents, is to live in Ottawa during the session, leaving one's family at home; and the third is to bring one's family to Ottawa to take up residence there, returning at regular intervals to one's constituency for visits. The latter solution was adopted by 27 per cent of the respondents interviewed. In the classification "other" in Table V.9 below are a few unusual cases: two English-speaking M.P.s live with their families in Ottawa during the week, returning to their constituencies every weekend; one English-speaking M.P. without a family lives in Ottawa during the week, but returns to his constituency normally on weekends; four English-speaking M.P.s without families live in Ottawa during the session; and one English-speaking M.P. with no family lives in Ottawa full time.

The most significant point to emerge from our analysis of the manner in which M.P.s handle the problem of living in Ottawa while maintaining connections with their family is the apparent reluctance of French-speaking M.P.s to move to Ottawa with their families for the parliamentary session (Table V.9): only six French-speaking M.P.s (all Liberals) lived with their families in Ottawa, three of these during the parliamentary session only, and three on a year-round basis.⁹ More than 30 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s moved their families with them to Ottawa for the session. In addition, there was one French-speaking M.P. who kept his family at home but remained in Ottawa himself during the session, making only occasional trips home to visit his family. The vast majority (81 per cent of the French-speaking respondents in our sample) stay in Ottawa alone during the week, returning to their constituencies on the weekends.

There are no real differences in the habits of rural and urban M.P.s—with the exception that rural M.P.s, especially those from the Prairies, are more inclined to stay for the session, visiting their families at home at specific occasions (such as during the harvest). There are no striking differences in the habits of M.P.s from the different parties: New Democratic members appear to be more inclined to bring their families to Ottawa, but this is largely accounted for by the fact that M.P.s from British Columbia (among whom the New Democrats bulk large) tend to bring their families to Ottawa with them for the session. Apart from the differences in the habits of the M.P.s from the two language groups, the other basic factor

Table V.9
Back-bench M.P.s' habits of residence in Ottawa during the parliamentary session, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Stay in Ottawa during week, returning to constituencies; families at home	Stay in Ottawa during session; families at home	Bring families to Ottawa	Other
English	46	11	31	12
French	80	3	17*	0
N	67	10	32	9

* Only 3 of these were French-speaking Liberals from Quebec.

which distinguishes the practices of M.P.s in this particular regard is the region from which they happen to come (Table V.10). M.P.s from British Columbia and the Yukon, as already noted, are most inclined to bring their families and are least inclined to go home on weekends. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces are more inclined to go home on weekends than are M.P.s from British Columbia and the Yukon, but they are also almost as inclined to bring their families to Ottawa. Among M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces there are also differences in practice between the two major parties: Conservative M.P.s are most inclined to go home for the weekends, while Liberals (especially those from Newfoundland) are most inclined to bring their families with them for the session. Obviously it is the M.P.s from Ontario and Quebec especially who tend to live in Ottawa during the week, returning to their constituencies and families during the weekend.

As might be expected, there is a close relation between the regional variation in habitation patterns and the length of time spent by M.P.s in their constituencies during the parliamentary session.¹⁰ (Table V.11.) M.P.s from Ontario and Quebec are most inclined to spend from five to nine days a month in their constituencies (the length of time which one would expect to find spent by those who tend to return to their constituencies on weekends), while those from the more distant regions tend to spend less time during the average month of a parliamentary session. The vast majority of M.P.s from British Columbia and the Yukon manage no more than four days a month in their constituencies; roughly 50 per cent of the M.P.s from the Prairies and the Atlantic provinces spend up to four days a month in their constituencies, but in the latter case, at least, a considerable number are also able, like Ontario M.P.s, to spend from five to nine days in the constituency. Five Prairie M.P.s, two British Columbia M.P.s, and one Maritime M.P., fall into a category which we have

Table V.10

Back-bench M.P.s' choice of residence in Ottawa during the parliamentary session, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Stay in Ottawa during week, returning to constituencies on weekends; families at home	Stay in Ottawa during session; families at home	Bring families to Ottawa	Other
B.C. and Yukon	9	9	55	27
Prairies and N.W.T.	21	32	37	10
Ontario	65	5	22	8
Quebec	88	3	9	0
Atlantic provinces	44	0	50	6
N	67	10	32	9

called "other," meaning that their trips to their constituencies tend to be more sporadic. When asked how many days in an average month they spend in their constituencies they found it extremely difficult to answer, because some months they do not return to their constituencies at all. But when they do return to their constituencies they tend to stay for a week or more, thus missing several days of the parliamentary session.

Table V.11

Average number of days spent in constituency during the parliamentary session, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	0-4 days	5-9 days (all weekends)	10 or more days	Other (sporadic)
B.C. and Yukon	80	0	0	20
Prairies and N.W.T.	56	17	0	27
Ontario	11	78	11	0
Quebec	11	56	33	0
Atlantic provinces	50	44	0	6
N	34	59	16	8

There is an additional feature concerning the average length of time spent in a constituency each month which is suggested by the regional data, and confirmed by the analysis of M.P.s by principal language group (Table V.12). French-speaking Quebec M.P.s are far more inclined than are others to spend more than weekends in their

constituencies during the parliamentary session: 31 per cent of French-speaking M.P.s spent 10 or more days in their constituencies during the session as compared with only 6 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s. This discrepancy is all the more surprising since, it may be recalled, French-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that they often get so involved in affairs in Ottawa that they lose touch with their constituents.¹¹ Interestingly, the difference between English- and French-speaking M.P.s is accounted for, not by the Cr ditistes (only one of whom said he spent 10 or more days in the constituency) but by the French-speaking Social Crediters (all of whom in our sample stayed 10 or more days) and French-speaking Liberals. The tendency for several French Canadians to stay a longer than average time in their constituencies may be related to the fact, already recognized, that very few French Canadians live with their families in Ottawa during the session, but it may also be related to the fact that French Canadians tend to spend just a little more time than do English Canadians during the parliamentary session involved in commitments other than their parliamentary jobs.

Table V.12

Average number of days spent in constituencies during the parliamentary session, by language group, horizontal percentages

	0-4 days	5-9 days	10 or more days	Other
English	35	49	6	10
French	14	54	32*	0
N	34	59	16	8

* Only one of these was a Cr ditiste.

When the results are analyzed by party, the relation between regional and bicultural factors is revealed: Liberals and Cr ditistes (both coming mainly from provinces near Ottawa) are most inclined to spend 5-9 days in their constituencies, New Democrats (many of them from British Columbia) 0-4 days, and French-speaking Social Crediters 10 or more days. When, however, the data are analyzed in terms of representational and purposive roles, no significant relation emerges. Constituency delegates and liaison officers are no more disposed to spend longer periods in their constituencies during the parliamentary session than are trustees and lawmakers.

Having established the different patterns by which M.P.s maintain connections with their constituencies, we may ask how M.P.s make themselves available to constituents (Appendix B, Part A, question 16(b), 242). Several M.P.s mentioned more than one means, so that in Table V.13 the percentages total more than 100; but the usual combination of answers, especially for the French-speaking M.P.s, indicated that the M.P. had an office in his constituency at which, during

the weekend, he had a regular open day on which constituents might come to see him: 37 per cent of our respondents mentioned maintaining an office, and 38 per cent mentioned holding an open day each weekend. There were some differences in the responses, however, especially related to the language group of a respondent and his region. English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that they did nothing to make themselves available to their constituents: the numbers here are not great, but four English-speaking Liberals, two English-speaking Conservatives, and one French-speaking Social Credit M.P. said that they did nothing. French-speaking M.P.s were far more inclined than were English-speaking M.P.s to say that they maintained an office to which constituents might come to consult with them; English-speaking M.P.s were less inclined to mention having an office, but were equally inclined to say that they had an open day each weekend when the constituents could visit them (often at their home). English-speaking M.P.s (especially rural M.P.s) were more inclined than were French-speaking M.P.s to say that they advertised (usually in the newspapers) when they would be in the constituency, so that constituents could either visit or telephone them. English-speaking M.P.s, especially urban M.P.s, were a little more inclined to say that they maintained a telephone-answering service to receive communications from their constituents during the week, so that M.P.s might attend to their problems when they returned to their constituencies during the weekends. Some M.P.s made visits to different parts of their constituencies at regular intervals, and a few held meetings with local government officers when they were at home. One M.P. mentioned holding a citizens' forum from time to time.

As far as party variations are concerned there is not much of interest: Liberals were less inclined to advertise their return than were the other M.P.s (New Democrats and Social Crediters being especially inclined to this practice), and Cr ditistes were most inclined to maintain an office. The regional variations also followed what one would logically expect from the foregoing: M.P.s from British Columbia and the Yukon and from the Prairies were most inclined to advertise their return (40 per cent of the former and 44 per cent of the latter mentioned employing this technique of making themselves available to constituents); 25 per cent of the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces advertise their return, but this particular method was almost insignificant for M.P.s from central Canada. Newfoundland M.P.s were most disposed to the visit (annual or semi-annual) to their constituents, and Ontario M.P.s were most disposed to the open day each weekend. Ontario M.P.s were also most inclined to use a telephone-answering service.

When the responses are compared between the different types of representational role there are also very few significant differences. Party delegates and mixed types were the only ones to say that they did nothing to make themselves available to their constituents; mixed types were least inclined to advertise, and the most inclined to maintain an office. Constituency delegates were the most inclined to

Table V.13

Methods mentioned by back-bench M.P.s for making themselves available to constituents, by language group*

Method	English	French	All M.P.s
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Do nothing to make self available	7	3	6
Advertise when M.P. will be home	21	6	17
Maintain an office in the constituency	24	67	37
Employ telephone-answering service (including wife)	25	17	23
Reserve an open day each weekend	38	36	38
Make visits to different parts of the constituency	18	14	17
Other	7	0	5

* Percentages total more than 100 per cent because some respondents mentioned more than one method.

maintain an answering service. It must be stressed that these differences are not great. Over all the most distinguishing factors concerning the manner in which M.P.s make themselves available to their constituents are the language group of a respondent and the region from which he happens to come.

When we asked all respondents whether they "regard it as part of their job to inform and educate their constituents about what goes on in Parliament" (Appendix B, Part A, question 15, 242), the vast majority agreed. Only five English-speaking M.P.s and two French-speaking M.P.s disagreed, and two English-speaking M.P.s said that the M.P. should inform but not necessarily try to educate his constituents. The manner in which M.P.s go about communicating with their constituents (thereby informing and educating them) varies considerably, especially between members of the two principal language groups (Appendix B, Part A, question 16(a), 242).

The most popular means of communicating with constituents, mentioned by 57 per cent of all respondents, is radio and television (mainly radio); 46 per cent said that they wrote a column in the local newspaper (or newspapers) in which, by and large, they claimed to provide a dispassionate report of the events of Parliament; 20 per cent said that they sent out a "general-mailer" to all their constituents from time to time, and a further 9 per cent mentioned sending out a circular letter which went to a different list of selected constituents on a monthly or quarterly basis; 37 per cent said that they used public meetings (or social gatherings in the constituency) as a

means of communicating with their constituents. In addition, 20 M.P.s (almost all English-speaking) mentioned using other devices for communicating with their constituents, mainly through sending out copies of Hansard or employing polls within the constituency. Nearly 6 per cent of the respondents said that they did nothing to communicate with their constituents.

As suggested, the means used to communicate with constituents varies considerably between the two principal language groups (Table V.14). French-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that they did nothing to communicate with their constituents (although they were no more inclined than were English-speaking M.P.s to say that an M.P. should not inform and educate his constituents). The public meeting (or the social gathering) was the most popular technique of communication as far as French-speaking M.P.s were concerned, whereas radio and television, the newspaper column, and the mailed communication (taking both the circular and the "general mailer" together) were far more popular with English-speaking M.P.s. When the responses are considered over all it is clear that French-speaking M.P.s employ fewer techniques to communicate with (and therefore inform and educate) their constituents and that the technique which they favour is the traditional personal approach, at public meetings or at social gatherings. The written communication from the M.P. to his constituents appears to be considerably less used by French-speaking M.P.s than by their English-speaking colleagues.

Table V.14

Techniques employed by back-bench M.P.s to communicate with their constituents, by language group*

Technique	English	French	All M.P.s
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Does nothing to communicate	2	14	6
Uses radio/TV	63	43	57
Writes column in newspaper(s)	51	34	46
Mails communication (regular or irregular)	56	29	48
Attends meetings or social gatherings	31	51	37
Other (mainly sending out Hansard)	21	6	17

* Percentages total more than 100 because most M.P.s mentioned more than one technique.

Analysis on the basis of the location of constituency reveals little variation: no urban M.P. mentioned doing nothing to communicate with his constituents, and urban M.P.s were slightly more inclined than others to mention public meetings or social gatherings, but

these differences are really trivial. Nor are there differences between the parties that cannot be explained either in terms of language or the urban or rural predominance of party membership. The same conclusions are also largely true for the analysis in terms of representational roles. Party delegates were least inclined to communicate with their constituents by radio and television, whereas constituency delegates were most inclined to this technique. All were equally disposed to write a column in the local newspaper or newspapers. Once again it is the principal language group of the respondents that accounts for the bulk of the variation in response.

C. Keeping in Touch with the Local Party Organization

The analysis thus far has centred on the links between an M.P. and his constituency through the constituents themselves. Finally, we turn to examine the variety of methods by which M.P.s maintain contact with their local party organizations (Appendix B, Part A, question 14(c), 241). The matter is of importance, since so many M.P.s told us that, apart from their own conversations with constituents, the party organization in their constituency offered the best means of obtaining information and advice on political issues, and gave M.P.s the best indication of the feelings of their constituents.

Once again there were a few M.P.s (seven of the respondents interviewed) who claimed that they do nothing to maintain contact with their constituency associations, that their associations more or less collapse between elections. For the majority (69 per cent), however, the most prominent means of maintaining contact was through attendance at meetings (either general or executive) of their riding association whenever possible. How often they attended such meetings we are not able to say. Letters and telephone calls with the party organizers were mentioned by nearly 50 per cent of the respondents; 36 per cent mentioned (rather vaguely) that they tried to see members of the riding association whenever they went home; 21 per cent said that they sent newsletters to the members of their riding association; seven M.P.s (four English-speaking, three French-speaking) said that they had set up regional or parish groups within their constituencies and tried to see them from time to time; and four French-speaking M.P.s and one English-speaking M.P. mentioned specifically seeing their party organizers at social gatherings.

When the responses are analyzed in terms of any of the four major independent variables we have been employing throughout, not many significant differences are revealed. Notably, French-speaking M.P.s are a little more inclined to attend riding meetings and less inclined to send out newsletters to their riding association members than are English-speaking M.P.s.¹² Urban M.P.s are a little more inclined to mention attending meetings of the riding association than are rural M.P.s; Liberals (both English-speaking and French-speaking) and Cr ditistes were less inclined to send out newsletters than other

M.P.s; M.P.s from British Columbia were least inclined to say that they saw their party organizers when they went home, and most inclined to say that they dealt with them by letter and telephone; Ontario M.P.s were most inclined to say that they attended local party meetings, and members from the Atlantic provinces were least inclined to say this (undoubtedly the effect of the Newfoundland M.P.s, few of whom have local party organizations).

Finally, when responses are examined according to the way a respondent describes his representational role, only a few variations are revealed. Party delegates and constituency delegates were least inclined to say that they sent out newsletters to their party members, but both were more inclined than trustees and mixed types to say that they attended constituency association meetings. Trustees were the most inclined to say that they did nothing to maintain contact with the organizations (because the riding associations virtually collapsed between elections); but they, along with the mixed types, were more inclined to say that they sent out newsletters.

D. Summary

In the conclusion to the previous chapter it was stressed how relatively insignificant language differences seemed to be as far as role perceptions were concerned. Now that we have examined the manner in which M.P.s perform their roles, differences of considerable importance have emerged between M.P.s from the two principal language groups. As far as the flow of information from the constituency to the M.P. is concerned, differences between English- and French-speaking M.P.s were, it is true, relatively slight. Both agreed that conversations with constituents supplemented by advice and information from party organizations were important mechanisms for discovering the feelings of constituents. French-speaking M.P.s tended to stress local government officials as secondary sources of information, however, whereas English-speaking M.P.s tended more to mention business leaders. M.P.s from the two principal language groups were not distinguished markedly, either, by the amount of mail they received in an average week; although we noted that more French-speaking M.P.s tended to get "light mail," they were no less inclined to receive "heavy" and "very heavy" mail than were English-speaking M.P.s. However, the subject-matter of the letters was considerably different; French-speaking M.P.s, much more than English-speaking M.P.s, mentioned the predominance of letters requesting jobs and the paucity of letters of opinion, although it was noted that in this respect (as in other ways) Quebec M.P.s were not so different from M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces.

French-speaking M.P.s were seen to be more deeply rooted in their constituencies than were English-speaking M.P.s in two senses: more than English-speaking M.P.s, they tended to have lived longer in the constituencies which they represented, and also they tended to prefer

much more to return to their constituencies (and stay longer) during the parliamentary session. Far fewer French Canadian M.P.s than English Canadians moved with their families to Ottawa for the session, and far more French Canadians than English Canadians tended to overstay the weekends in their constituencies while the work of Parliament was going on. Despite this, French-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that "Often M.P.s get so involved in affairs in Ottawa that they lose touch with their constituents" (Appendix B, Part B, statement 21, 250).

Fundamentally, the really distinctive differences between a French Canadian M.P.'s performance of his role and that of his English Canadian counterpart are seen in the process of communication from M.P. to constituent. In his relation with his party organization he is not much different from an English-speaking M.P., except that he is less inclined to send out information to members of his riding association in the form of a newsletter. He is more content to rely on attendance at party meetings or social gatherings sponsored by the party as a means of keeping contact with his party organizers. It is essentially in the manner in which he communicates with his constituents that he is different from the English-speaking M.P. Both agree that it is important for the member to attempt to inform and educate his constituents about what goes on in Parliament, but the truth of the matter appears to be that the French Canadian M.P. does less than his English-speaking counterpart. More French-speaking M.P.s were disposed to say that they did nothing to communicate with their constituents, and for those who did attempt to communicate, the traditional public meeting or social gathering still tended to be the dominant mechanism. Compared with English-speaking M.P.s, French-speaking members are less inclined to use the modern devices of communication: newspapers, radio, and television, and especially the mailed communication to the constituent.

Our analysis of the subject-matter of letters received by French Canadian M.P.s confirmed the picture, which so many of them presented, of an electorate largely concerned with obtaining patronage from an M.P. whom they consider a "préfet d'administration." Our analysis of the methods employed by French Canadian M.P.s to communicate with their constituents suggests, also, that not everything is being done that might be done to present an alternative image of the M.P.'s role.

In the previous chapter we were mainly concerned to discover experiential differences among our respondents: we wanted to know, for example, whether French-speaking M.P.s received more or less mail than English-speaking M.P.s. In this chapter we are also interested in experiential differences. We want to know, for example, whether French-speaking M.P.s attend party caucus more frequently than do English-speaking M.P.s or whether French-speaking M.P.s are more inclined to talk to cabinet ministers in pursuit of their political interests. However, we are primarily interested in discovering whether there are differences in attitude, especially with regard to the operation of the party system and the House of Commons. As a preliminary to such an examination, it is useful to explore the orientation of members to the political process generally. What follows must of course be considered along with the analysis of the historical context and role perceptions already presented.

A. Political Orientations

To begin with it is useful to know whether Canadian M.P.s regard the position of member of Parliament as a full-time job (Appendix B, Part A, question 21(a), 243) and whether or not there are variations in the responses on the subject. Briefly put, the answer is that the vast majority of M.P.s (83 per cent) think that the job is a full-time one, and the only variation worth noting in the pattern of responses is that Prairie M.P.s were most inclined to say that it is not a full-time job¹ and M.P.s from British Columbia were unanimously disposed to say that it is. Language,² party, and urban or rural location of an M.P.'s constituency produced no significant variations whatever.

When M.P.s stated that the job is a full-time one, however, they did not necessarily mean that they have no other commitments (question 21(b), 243): while 83 per cent stated that they consider being

an M.P. a full-time job, only 50 per cent stated that they have no other commitments. French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined to say that they have other commitments, although they were as inclined as English-speaking M.P.s to agree that the job requires their full time. Nearly 20 per cent of the respondents said they maintained a law practice; 6 per cent said they still managed farms; less than 5 per cent said they managed insurance businesses; nearly 13 per cent said they continued to manage their own businesses; and nearly 7 per cent mentioned other commitments, such as medical practice, editorial work, and local government service. Farm commitments were mentioned only by English-speaking M.P.s, and insurance businesses were mentioned mainly by French-speaking respondents; otherwise there was no difference in the pattern of responses.

If a respondent mentioned having another commitment, we then asked him question 21(c): "How much time, on the average, do these commitments take during the parliamentary session?" The answers received to this question help us to understand better how members, who admit that being an M.P. is a full-time job, could nevertheless say that they have other commitments as well, for the vast majority of the M.P.s who mentioned other commitments claim that these commitments take, on the average, only one day or less a month during the session. Only 21 per cent stated that their other commitments take *more* than one day a month, and this is roughly the same percentage of respondents who stated that they did not think that being an M.P. is a full-time job in any case.³

We noted above that French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to say that they have other commitments. If we exclude those who refused to answer and compare only those who gave a definite answer as to how much time their other commitments take during a normal month in which Parliament is sitting, we find that French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to spend more than one day at their other commitments: 27 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s mentioned spending two or more days at other commitments as compared with only 21 per cent of English-speaking M.P.s; and it was also clear that (in the very few cases involved) French-speaking M.P.s tended to mention (proportionately) a greater number of days involved in other commitments than English-speaking M.P.s. However, if we regard those who refused to answer the question as in fact spending more than one day at other commitments and compare the results from the point of view of the two principal language groups, French-speaking M.P.s still appear to be slightly more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to spend more time at other commitments, but the difference is even less than the figures given above.

As a further measure of an M.P.'s attitude towards his job and his general involvement in federal politics, we asked all respondents whether they expected to run again for Parliament (question 39(a), 247). We had hoped that if the number of respondents indicating a desire to leave politics was sufficiently large we should be able to

examine in some detail what factors, if any, helped to account for their decision to leave federal politics. However the number who said they definitely would not run again was very low: only five respondents said they would not run for Parliament again, and a further 10 stated that they were not sure. While the number of (possibly) "disenchanted" was too small to justify detailed analysis of factors influencing their decisions, a few observations are worth making. French-speaking M.P.s were far more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to say that they would be running again: no French-speaking M.P. said definitely that he was not running again, and only three said they were not sure. Among English-speaking M.P.s, on the other hand, five said they were leaving federal politics and seven said they did not know whether or not they would run again. Urban M.P.s were less inclined to say they would definitely run, and this difference was not accounted for by differences between the parties: Liberals, more of whom come from the urban areas, were no less inclined than were Conservatives to say they would run again. Only the Cr ditistes were unanimously agreed that they would run again. There is also a regional variation worth noting: M.P.s from British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces were less inclined than the others to say they would run again, with M.P.s from British Columbia being the least inclined to say that they would contest further elections.⁴

To help further our understanding of M.P.s' orientation to federal politics, we asked all respondents who said that they were intending to run again why they were planning to do so (question 39(b), 247). Over all, the most important single explanation of why an M.P. intended to run again (we coded as many as three reasons for each respondent) was the simple statement, "I enjoy the life": 42 per cent of all respondents gave this answer. The next most important reason given was that the M.P. felt that he should carry on and try to finish the job which he began when he decided to enter federal politics. Twenty-five per cent mentioned (often in addition to another explanation) that they wanted to continue serving the public; nearly 15 per cent stated specifically that they thought they could now use their experience to better advantage and wanted a further opportunity to do so. Finally there were a number of additional reasons given (classed in Table VI.1 as "other") which reflect, generally, secondary and tertiary considerations accounting for members' desire to run again for Parliament.

Several M.P.s were remarkably frank in discussing "other reasons" why they would continue to run for Parliament: four admitted that they would be unemployable otherwise; six (five of them English-speaking) said they enjoyed elections and especially defeating their opponents; six said they thought it was expected of them; three said it furthered their personal ambitions; three said they were staying for the pension; one said he was running again through sheer "inertia"; and another said he was running "for family reasons."

Variations in responses were observable on the basis of all four major variables of analysis, but the major distinction was between

M.P.s of the two principal language groups: French-speaking M.P.s were very much more inclined to say that they were running again to "finish the job they began," whereas English-speaking M.P.s were far more inclined to say that they were running again because they "like the life." Apart from these two principal explanations, there were no differences between the two language groups (except the one noted above in the discussion of "other" reasons).

Table VI.1

Reasons for running again for Parliament, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	Want to finish job	Enjoy the life	Wish to use experience to better advantage	To serve the public	Other
English	19	51	15	26	31
French	50	27	12	24	21
All M.P.s	29	42	14	25	27

* Percentages total more than 100 because M.P.s mentioned more than one reason.

Generally speaking, the differences between the parties follow the lines of the dichotomy between the principal language groups. The differences between the English-speaking Conservatives and English-speaking Liberals are less than are the differences within the parties between the M.P.s from the two principal language groups. Even so, English-speaking Liberals were a little more inclined to say that they want to "finish the job" and English-speaking Conservatives were a little more inclined to say that they wish to "continue serving the public." Both were equally inclined to say that they "enjoy the life"; neither was as disposed to mention this reason as were members of the New Democratic party. Cr ditistes were most inclined to say that they want to "finish the job." Finally, when the responses are examined in regional terms, a few interesting facts emerge. Prairie M.P.s, M.P.s from British Columbia, and M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were far less inclined to say that they want to "finish the job." Only among Quebec and Ontario M.P.s was this response significant: 86 per cent of the references to this reason for running again for Parliament came from M.P.s from the two central provinces of Canada, especially, as we noted, from Quebec M.P.s. Ontario M.P.s were also most disposed to say that they wished to use their experience to further advantage.

In order to understand better what is appealing about being an M.P. we asked all respondents question 41(a): "If for some reason you had to give up being an M.P. today, what would you miss the *most*?" Some

respondents mentioned more than one thing they would miss, but the most prominent reply was this: "I would miss the feeling of being at the centre of things." Over all, 37 per cent mentioned this reason, and a further 26 per cent mentioned the closely related reason that they would miss the constantly interesting or exciting life. Some M.P.s linked the two reasons in their replies. Twenty-six per cent of the respondents said they would miss their good friends; and 18 per cent said they would miss the "opportunity to serve in a public capacity." In addition, a few M.P.s mentioned a variety of answers which we have classified as "other things" in Table VI.2. Eight M.P.s said they would miss the House of Commons; four said they would miss the prestige of the job; two said they would regret not having done more; two thought they would miss the intellectual stimulation of discussion with colleagues; two said they would miss the opportunity to influence public affairs; and one said that he would miss being able to travel around the constituency. Finally, nearly 8 per cent of the M.P.s interviewed said that they would not miss anything at all if they left the parliamentary scene immediately.

On this particular question we compared responses only on the basis of language group, and found differences in certain significant areas: French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined to say that there was nothing that they would miss if they left the House of Commons; a little less inclined to say that they enjoyed "being at the centre of things" and would miss the exciting life. Otherwise there were no significant differences in their responses.

Generally, it may be observed that although many Canadian back-bench M.P.s appeared to be somewhat reluctantly recruited to politics in the first place, most of them were able to discover reasons for wanting to stay. Not many M.P.s, at any rate, were thoroughly disenchanted with their lot. On the other hand, it must also be observed that the reasons that many gave for wanting to stay on in their positions, and the aspects of parliamentary life that many said would be missed most, hardly reflect the ideals normally held up by the average newspaper editorial or high school civics text.

How many back-bench M.P.s, we may ask, have aspirations for some higher involvement in Canadian politics? How many in particular would like someday to advance to participation in politics at the cabinet level? Given the low level of self-generated involvement in a political career that seems common among the bulk of our back-bench respondents, we might reasonably expect that not many would be particularly interested in further public office, and this is essentially so. When we asked all our back-bench respondents whether there were "any public offices [they] would like to seek sometime in the future" (question 40) only 24 per cent indicated that they would be interested in a cabinet post at some time in the future; 50 per cent said they had no interest in any public office(s) in future; and 25 per cent said that some other public office would suit them if it came their way. Four back-benchers said they would like to be parliamentary secretaries; two said they would prefer to be in a

Table VI.2

Responses of M.P.s to the question, "If for some reason you had to give up being an M.P. today, what would you miss the most?", by language group*

Response	English	French	N
	(%)	(%)	
Would not miss anything	5	14	9
Would miss feeling of being at the centre of things	40	32	44
Would miss constantly interesting/exciting life	29	22	31
Would miss good friends	26	27	31
Would miss the opportunity to serve in a public capacity	19	19	22
Would miss other things	16	14	18

* Percentages total more than 100 because some M.P.s mentioned more than one factor.

provincial rather than a federal cabinet; six said they would be pleased with a judicial appointment; six stated that elevation to the Senate would be appreciated; two said they would like to be ambassadors; and one said he would be very happy to be an ordinary M.P. in a party in power for a change.⁵

Even if we assume that every respondent who stated that he would be interested in further public office, but who refused to specify what office(s) he meant (10 per cent of the sample), was in fact interested in becoming a cabinet minister someday, we still have a remarkably small number of back-bench M.P.s committed to participation in politics at a high level. Half our respondents stated flatly that they were uninterested in higher public office. On the most generous assumption possible, only about a third of the back-benchers are interested in cabinet office. Is it any wonder that when Canadian prime ministers set about to construct their cabinets they tend to rely so largely on men recruited directly to high political office from either business or the civil service, and without prior experience of Parliament?⁶ Without keen competition for political office among those with experience on the back-benches of the House of Commons, it is only natural for prime ministers to go outside Parliament in the difficult task of cabinet construction in a federal system.⁷

It is tempting to conclude, recalling that the self-recruited back-benchers discussed in an earlier chapter constituted roughly one quarter of the back-bench respondents, that these are the same men who indicated a willingness to serve in a cabinet post. Here, we might conclude, is the essential Canadian political animal, the highly motivated, politically ambitious politician. The statistics do not confirm such a simple theory. "Self-recruiters" were indeed more

inclined than M.P.s recruited by any other method to say that they would like to achieve cabinet office someday, but they were not much more disposed to say so. Self-recruiters represent 25 per cent of the back-bench respondents and 37 per cent of the M.P.s stating that they would like to seek cabinet office; "conscripted" M.P.s represent 38 per cent of the total back-bench respondents, but only 30 per cent of the cabinet seekers; "coopted" M.P.s represent 28 per cent of the total respondents and only 23 per cent of the cabinet seekers. In short, self-recruitment is positively related to an M.P.'s disposition to seek further office in the form of a cabinet post, but self-recruiters are not much more inclined to seek cabinet office than the more "passive" recruits.

When we look at the responses in terms of the respondents' language group and party, we find that these are better indicators of the disposition to seek further public office generally than the method of recruitment. As far as seeking cabinet office is concerned there are no differences over all between the two principal language groups, but English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined than French-speaking M.P.s to say that they sought no public offices whatever: by implication, French-speaking M.P.s were more disposed to say that they would like, someday, to receive further public offices other than a cabinet post (Table VI.3).

Table VI.3

Responses of M.P.s to the question, "Are there any public offices you would like to seek sometime in the future?", by language group, horizontal percentages

	No public offices sought	Would like a cabinet post	Would like some other public office
English	54	25	21
French	39	25	36
N	57	30	29

To a great extent, however, the differences between the two principal language groups are determined by a fundamental difference between English- and French-speaking Liberals. English-speaking Liberals were more inclined than French-speaking Liberals to say that they seek no public offices, but they were slightly more inclined to say that they seek a cabinet post. The major difference between the two groups of Liberals, and this is the difference which reflects itself in the fundamental difference between the two language groups generally (brought out in Table VI.3), is the far greater disposition of French-speaking Liberals to say that they seek further public office (other than a cabinet office). Forty-two per cent of the French-speaking Liberals stated that they would seek such an office, as

compared with only 19 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals. Putting the same facts in a slightly different way, we may say that French-speaking Liberals alone account for 83 per cent of the French-speaking respondents' references to seeking an office other than a cabinet office, and 35 per cent of *all* references to the matter.

When we examine the responses by party we encounter differences in the disposition to mention seeking a cabinet office. Liberals (32 per cent) were the most disposed and Conservatives (only 17 per cent) were the least disposed to mention seeking a cabinet office. Two New Democrats, one Social Crediter, and two Cr ditistes also mentioned seeking cabinet office someday. As far as the disposition to seek other public office is concerned there are no real differences between the parties, apart from the fact that the Liberals (here mainly the French-speaking Liberals) were most disposed to seek such offices. The regional and urban/rural variations are very much tied up with the analysis already presented: Ontario and Quebec M.P.s (from areas of Liberal strength) were most disposed to say they seek a cabinet career; M.P.s from British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces were least inclined to say they seek cabinet office.

Three general conclusions suggest themselves from the foregoing analysis: disposition to seek further public office is closely related to the possession of power by one's party at the moment, but it is also related to self-recruitment in politics (it must be recalled that there were no differences between Conservatives and Liberals in the number of self-recruited M.P.s); French-speaking M.P.s especially, were most disposed to hope that the fruits of victory would end in reward for themselves in some kind of public office other than cabinet; and finally, even within the government party, among M.P.s for whom the prospect of higher public office must certainly be regarded as more concrete, the number of men disposed to seek further public office is surprisingly small.

In order to discover the less congenial aspects of being an M.P. we asked all respondents, immediately after putting the question about what they would miss *most* if they left Parliament immediately, what they would miss *least* (question 41(b), 247). Possibly because the question was put late in the interview, when respondents were beginning to tire, or possibly because they could not think of any response, the number who did not answer was high: nearly 25 per cent made no reply, and a further nearly 5 per cent said that there was nothing they could think of that they would be pleased to have done with. Moreover, among those who did answer there seemed to be few factors which emerge as generally uncongenial. We received such a great variety of responses to this question that it became virtually impossible to analyze the attitudes of respondents in terms of any generalized complaints about parliamentary life. We content ourselves here, therefore, with merely presenting the range of responses received.⁸ The one single advantage foreseen most by respondents (24 M.P.s) as following their sudden departure from federal politics, was the chance to spend more time with their families; 16 M.P.s mentioned

that they would be glad to have done with the endless debates in the House of Commons; 15 also mentioned that they would be pleased not to have to endure the constant travel back and forth from their constituencies to Ottawa; 11 said they would enjoy returning to private life; 11 said they would be glad to have put an end to the "pestering requests" they receive from their constituents and others; nine M.P.s said that they would be glad not to have to stay in Ottawa; five said they would not miss the longer hours; six said they would be pleased to get away from the "politicking and back-biting" that goes on in Parliament; four said they would be relieved to stop losing money; three said they would enjoy an end to the uncertainty of political life; three said they would appreciate an end to the unsettled state of their working conditions (the hours and length of sessions); two said they would be glad to escape the need to fight elections; and one M.P. said that he would enjoy not having to face criticism.

The fact that only four respondents volunteered the response that they would be pleased to put an end to losing money if they departed suddenly from Parliament is significant in the light of answers received to two further questions which we put to all respondents. During the course of the interview we asked all back-bench M.P.s question 38: "Do you think that one loses money in politics, even if one wins the election and gets the indemnity?" In Part B of the questionnaire we invited all respondents to agree or disagree with statement 15: "M.P.s, in view of the demands made upon them, are chronically underpaid."

Although a number of M.P.s admitted that the situation was better as a result of the recent substantial increase in their indemnities, the vast majority of Canadian M.P.s nevertheless expressed the belief that one loses money in politics as an incumbent: 67 per cent stated that M.P.s lose money in politics; 21 per cent said that some do, some do not; and only 12 per cent stated that M.P.s do not lose money. The responses vary between the respondents, especially on the basis of principal language group and region, and within the parties.⁹

French-speaking Liberals and Conservatives were especially inclined to say that they lose money in politics, whereas not one Cr ditiste said that M.P.s definitely lose money (80 per cent of the Cr ditistes replied that some do, some do not). If one compares only the English-speaking respondents, one finds that English-speaking Liberals are a little more inclined than English-speaking Conservatives to think that an M.P. loses money in politics, but both are less inclined than New Democrats (75 per cent) to say that one loses money in politics. Because of the concentration of French-speaking Liberals in Quebec, one would expect a regional variation in the sense that more Quebec M.P.s might be disposed to say that the M.P. loses money in politics. However, this is not the case. The fact that Cr ditistes, also from Quebec, disagreed with the suggestion that M.P.s necessarily lose money in politics, and the fact that M.P.s in Ontario and the Atlantic provinces were very much disposed to say that they lose money in politics, results in the observation that Quebec M.P.s were actually

a little less inclined than M.P.s from either the Atlantic provinces or Ontario to say that an M.P. loses money in politics. Within Ontario, there appears to be no significant difference in the responses of M.P.s from the two major parties on this question, but among M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces there is a sharp difference between the two major parties. Although English-speaking Conservatives generally were a little less disposed than English-speaking Liberals and the New Democrats to say that an M.P. loses money in politics, Conservatives from the Atlantic provinces were unanimous in saying that an M.P. does lose money in politics. In the figures presented in Table VI.5 it must be appreciated, therefore, that it is only Liberals in the Atlantic provinces who were disposed to say either that M.P.s do not lose money or that only some do. There are further regional variations worth noting. If Conservatives from the Atlantic provinces were fully disposed to the notion that M.P.s lose money in politics and Conservatives in Ontario were no less inclined to agree than Liberals in Ontario, from where does the difference between Conservatives and Liberals *over all* spring? The answer is that Prairie Conservatives were considerably less inclined than are all other M.P.s (except Cr ditistes) to say that an M.P. loses money in politics: only 47 per cent of the Prairie Conservatives agreed that M.P.s do lose money; 29 per cent said that they do not; and 24 per cent said that some do and some do not.

Table VI.4

Responses of Liberal and Conservative back-benchers to the question, "Do you think that one loses money in politics. . .?", by language group, horizontal percentages

Party and language group	Loses money	Does not lose money	Some do; some do not	N
Liberal				
English	64	6	30	33
French	92	4	4	24
Progressive Conservative				
English	61	18	21	33
French	100	0	0	2

There are at least three major factors determining an M.P.'s judgement as to whether or not he loses money in politics. The first is the salary which he would have earned in private life: many lawyers, doctors, other professionals, and businessmen take a loss of annual income by becoming M.P.s, especially if they regard the job (as most appear to do) as a full-time occupation.¹⁰

Secondly, it depends on the size of an M.P.'s family, whether or not he has had to try to find a second home for his family in Ottawa, and what implications moving has had for education costs, and so on.

Table VI.5

Responses of back-benchers to the question, "Do you think that one loses money in politics . . .?", by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Loses money	Does not lose money	Some do; some do not
B.C. and Yukon	64	27	9
Prairies and N.W.T.	47	29	24
Ontario	74	3	24
Quebec	71	6	24
Atlantic provinces	74	13*	13*
N	75	13	33

* All Liberals.

Finally, whether or not an M.P. loses money in politics may be related to the kinds of demands which his constituents make on him. The fact that the regional pattern of responses to the question of whether or not an M.P. loses money in politics bears a close relation to the regional pattern discovered earlier in attitudes of constituents in different parts of the country towards the job of M.P. may not be altogether accidental. It does appear (*see* Table VI.6) that M.P.s from the "newer provinces" (the Prairies and British Columbia), where constituents seem less interested in the patronage aspects of the job, are more inclined to say that M.P.s do not lose money in politics.

There is, also, a relation between whether an M.P. thinks that one loses money in politics and whether he thinks that M.P.s are chronically underpaid (Table VI.7), but the relation is not as strong as one might expect: 68 per cent of all respondents stated that one loses money in politics, but of these only 37 per cent said that they agreed that the M.P. is chronically underpaid; 56 per cent of those who apparently feel that the M.P. loses money in politics nevertheless disagreed with the suggestion that he is underpaid, and 7 per cent were not sure. There was, however, a clear relation between thinking that an M.P. does not lose money and disagreeing with the suggestion that an M.P. is chronically underpaid: only one respondent in this position felt that the M.P. was, nevertheless, chronically underpaid. Interestingly, those who said in reply to the earlier question that "some M.P.s lose money, some do not" were as disposed as were those who said that the M.P. definitely loses money to affirm that the M.P. is chronically underpaid.

Because there is no direct relation between thinking that one loses money in politics and thinking that an M.P. is chronically underpaid (even though there is a positive relation between disagreeing with the two propositions), we need not necessarily expect that responses

Table VI.6

Comparison of responses of back-bench M.P.s showing the relation between attitudes of constituents towards the job and the M.P.'s belief that one loses money in politics, by region

Region	M.P.s who agree that constituents are always asking them to do something unrelated to their federal positions	M.P.s who agree that their constituents are more interested in the welfare services they can perform than in legislation	M.P.s who receive letters asking for jobs	M.P.s who say that one does not lose money in politics
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	36	46	0	27
Prairies and N.W.T.	46	39	12	29
Ontario	67	55	21	3
Quebec	91	79	64	6
Atlantic provinces	71	67	63	13

Table VI.7

Comparison of responses to the question of whether or not one loses money in politics with responses to the question of whether or not M.P.s are chronically underpaid (all respondents)

	Respondents who agree that M.P. is chronically underpaid	Respondents who disagree that M.P. is chronically underpaid	Not sure
	(%)	(%)	(%)
Respondents who say that one loses money in politics	37	56	7
Respondents who say that one does not lose money in politics	9	91	0
Respondents who say that some lose, some do not	36	55	9
N	34	60	7

to the question of whether or not M.P.s are underpaid will follow exactly the same patterns as those exhibited in response to the previous question, and indeed they do not. However, the bulk of the dichotomy, between the position of those who said that one loses money in politics but nevertheless disagreed that M.P.s are chronically underpaid, is accounted for by English-speaking M.P.s who agreed with the first proposition but disagreed with the second. Not every French-speaking M.P. who said that one loses money in politics also said that he feels that M.P.s are chronically underpaid, but French-speaking M.P.s, particularly the Liberals, were much more consistent in their answers to the two questions. On the other hand, the Cr ditistes, not one of whom said definitely that M.P.s lose money in politics, were evenly divided between those who said that the M.P. is underpaid and those who said that he is not. (See Tables VI.8 and VI.9.)

Table VI.8

M.P.s' responses to the statement that "M.P.s, in view of the demands made upon them, are chronically underpaid," by language group, horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	22	72	7
French	59	35	6
N	36	65	7

Table VI.9

Comparison of English- and French-speaking Liberals on the question of whether or not one loses money in politics and whether or not M.P.s are chronically underpaid*

	M.P. loses money (%)	M.P. is underpaid (%)	M.P. does not lose money (%)	M.P. is not underpaid (%)
English- speaking Liberals	64	25	6	67
French- speaking Liberals	92	68	4	23

* Those who were "not sure" were omitted.

There was also a measure of consistency in the responses of Prairie M.P.s: they were the most inclined to say that the M.P. does not lose money in politics, and the most inclined to disagree with the

suggestion that M.P.s are chronically underpaid. What of the M.P.s in the other regions? Knowing what we do about the responses of French-speaking M.P.s, we should expect a higher degree of consistency between the responses of Quebec M.P.s on the two questions, and this in fact is the case. It may be recalled that M.P.s from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces (in addition to those from Quebec) had agreed that one loses money in politics. Obviously, the M.P.s from these two regions changed their tune on the question of the M.P.'s being underpaid. The difference in responses between the two questions is particularly striking among Conservatives from the Atlantic provinces: every respondent had earlier said that the M.P. loses money in politics, but in answer to the question about the adequacy of an M.P.'s indemnity, only one said he thought that an M.P. is chronically underpaid (Table VI.10).

Table VI.10

Comparison of M.P.s from the different regions on the question of whether or not one loses money in politics and whether or not M.P.s are chronically underpaid*

Region	M.P. loses money	M.P. is underpaid	M.P. does not lose money	M.P. is not underpaid
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	64	27	27	73
Prairies and N.W.T.	47	7	29	85
Ontario	74	31	3	63
Quebec	71	53	6	38
Atlantic provinces	74	20	13	73

* Those who were "not sure" were omitted.

When we compare the responses of English-speaking M.P.s on the question of whether or not M.P.s are underpaid, we find no difference between Liberals and Conservatives. The two English-speaking Social Crediters whom we interviewed both disagreed with the suggestion that M.P.s are underpaid, and eight of the nine New Democrats interviewed disagreed. When one compares these responses with those on the question of whether or not one loses money in politics, it is obviously the New Democrats whose answers are most widely divergent on the two questions.

Fundamentally, the main point to emerge from this analysis of the cost of a political career and the indemnity that M.P.s should receive is the clear dichotomy between the position of the English- and French-speaking M.P.s. Both groups agree that M.P.s lose money in politics. French-speaking M.P.s take the consistent view that therefore M.P.s are underpaid; the majority of English-speaking M.P.s, on

the other hand, seem to feel that the indemnity is sufficient (for the moment?) and that losing money is one of the consequences of public service in a political career. French-speaking respondents may also have reacted particularly favourably to the suggestion in the proposition that, "in view of the demands made upon them," M.P.s' indemnities are too low. French-speaking M.P.s (particularly, it must be recalled, Quebec Liberals), emphasized on several occasions the patronage-seeking of their constituents; but so did M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces.

Finally we come to the analysis of the question which caused considerable controversy in the course of interviewing members: the point in Part B of the questionnaire at which we invited respondents to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with statement 6 that "Politics is a dirty game." The statement was included in the study, along with a number of others, in order to provide one dimension for judging the orientation of Canadian M.P.s towards the political process. The man-on-the-street comment that politics is a dirty game is familiar enough. We were particularly interested in trying to discover if those M.P.s *who said that they would no longer be running for Parliament* were any more inclined to agree with it than were those who were staying on. We have already seen enough about the recruitment process in Canada to appreciate that there are a number of men attracted into the political process in Ottawa without much prior interest in, or experience of, politics; and it would be interesting to know whether they are at all disillusioned with what they find when they get there. Such was the rationale for the inclusion of the statement in our list of 30 propositions to which M.P.s could indicate their agreement or disagreement. Now that the results of the analysis are available it is easy to conclude that it might have been better to have omitted the question; at least we can say that given the data we have to work with there is not much we can make of the results we received with regard to this particular statement of attitude.

In the first place the number of respondents who indicated that they would not (or might not) be running again for Parliament was small: only 15 respondents fell within this category. In the second place, the number of respondents who agreed that politics is a dirty game was also relatively small: only 21 indicated that they agreed or tended to agree with the statement. Consequently when one comes to distribute this small number of responses among different sets of variables, the number of responses within each category is normally so small that one cannot be confident of the results. Moreover, the matter is slightly complicated further by the fact that 17 of the 122 respondents refused to respond to the statement in question. Nevertheless, because of the controversy surrounding the question in the first place, we feel that it is worth while to present the results as they have emerged, being careful to warn that the numbers involved (despite the large sample from which we are working) make it unwise to attribute too much finality to the results.

First, it is worth emphasizing that there is hardly any difference between the responses of those interviewed before the "crisis" as compared with those afterwards (Table VI.11); in contrast to the reaction to the question of whether or not there is a problem of communication between English and French Canadians (*see* Chapter VII), there seems to have been no particular effort on the part of "post-crisis" respondents to deny that politics is a dirty game. It is true that the percentage of those interviewed after the crisis agreeing that politics is a dirty game is slightly smaller than the percentage agreeing among those interviewed before the crisis; but the difference is not very great.

Table VI.11

Responses of back-bench M.P.s interviewed before the crisis compared with those interviewed after the crisis on the statement, "Politics is a dirty game," horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure	N
M.P.s interviewed before crisis	21	75	4	57
M.P.s interviewed after crisis	13	85	2	48
All respondents	17	80	3	
N	18	84	3	105

Interestingly, there is even less variation between those who said they plan to run again for Parliament and those who do not plan to (or are not sure they will) run again.¹¹ Nor is there any significant relation between the method of recruitment to politics and an M.P.'s position on the statement. Co-opted M.P.s were a little more inclined to agree with the statement than others, but the differences are too small to be called significant.¹² Party, urban or rural location of constituency, language group, and age taken separately do not seem to show any positive relation either, but when these variables are looked at together some differences do emerge. When the responses of the two principal language groups are compared, French-speaking M.P.s were slightly less inclined to say that politics is a dirty game, but the differences between French- and English-speaking M.P.s over all are not great: 22 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s agreed that politics is a dirty game, whereas only 8 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s think so. However these differences are all the more important when one notes that every single Liberal disagreed with the suggestion; two Cr ditistes and one French-speaking Social Credit M.P. account for all the agreement with the proposition among French-speaking M.P.s. On the other hand, there are no significant differences among the English-speaking respondents in terms of party: English-speaking Liberals were slightly more inclined to disagree with the statement, but the differences are too small to make

anything of them. When one puts the English- and French-speaking respondents together and analyzes the results by party, differences do appear (Table VI.12). The Liberals (thanks to the 100 per cent disagreement of the French-speaking M.P.s) were the least inclined to agree with the statement; Conservatives and New Democrats are roughly in the same position as the English-speaking Liberals; and the Cr ditistes and Social Credit M.P.s were more inclined than any others to say that politics is a dirty game.

Table VI.12

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Politics is a dirty game," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	11	89	0
Progressive Conservative	21	76	3
New Democratic	25	75	0
Social Credit	40	40	20
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	33	50	17

* Independent omitted.

Comparison of the responses of all respondents in terms of the urban/rural variable does not reveal any relation between location of constituency and position on this question; but when we look separately at the responses of M.P.s within the two major parties the reason for this fact emerges: within the Conservative party *all* those who agree with the statement come from rural constituencies, whereas within the Liberal party two thirds of those who agree with the statement come from the urban areas. When the parties are combined in one table the differences are cancelled out.

When we analyzed the responses in terms of the ages of the respondents, it was difficult to come to firm conclusions because the numbers of responses in each cell were so small. All we can say with any certainty about the relation of age to attitude is that within the Liberal party not one M.P. under the age of 34 agreed that politics is a dirty game; on the other hand older M.P.s were not notably more inclined to agree than were those in the middle-age groups. Within the Conservative party, where our sample included no one under 34, the same comparison cannot be made. Here, however, those over 45 were more inclined to agree with the statement than were those in the 35-to-44 age group. By and large, regional variations are accounted for by the party and especially language variables already examined. Ontario M.P.s (24 per cent) were the most inclined to agree with the suggestion that politics is a dirty game. Every M.P. from the Atlantic provinces disagreed with the statement.

The best single indicator of agreement with the proposition has been reserved to the last, and the fact that it is the best indicator

helps throw light on why this particular question received so much attention from M.P.s and the press. As will be indicated in the following chapter, at one point in the interview we asked all English-speaking respondents whether their general attitude towards French Canadians had changed since they became M.P.s (question 37(a), 246). We were able to discover in this manner the number of respondents who had become (or always were) unsympathetic towards French Canadians. Significantly, considerably more of those who are (or have always been) unsympathetic towards French Canadians compared with those English-speaking M.P.s who are sympathetic towards French Canadians, think that politics is a dirty game (Table VI.13).

Table VI.13

Responses of English-speaking M.P.s who are sympathetic and unsympathetic towards French Canadians to the statement that "Politics is a dirty game," horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Sympathetic	13	87	0
Unsympathetic	38	56	6
N	13	55	1

The analysis which set out to explore the relation between the M.P.s' general attitudes towards "the game of politics" and the method of recruitment to politics, desire to continue in politics, and other variables such as party, region, and language, clearly did not produce results that one can interpret with any confidence. Although lack of sympathy with French Canadians cannot be made to account for the entire number of respondents who agree that politics is a dirty game, it certainly appears significant among English-speaking respondents. Given that our survey took place at a time when the Dorion Inquiry focused national attention on the political morals of French Canadian M.P.s especially, and given the fact that those who appear unsympathetic towards French Canadians were more disposed to say that politics is a dirty game, we may perhaps assume that in calmer times the number of Canadian M.P.s who would agree that politics is a dirty game would loom less large. Our statement in fact did not bring forth M.P.s' general responses to the question of whether or not politics is a dirty game but rather a reaction to the political events of the moment. The truth of this assertion is confirmed as much by the unanimous disagreement with the proposition on the part of the French-speaking Liberals, as it is by the propensity for those English-speaking M.P.s who are unsympathetic to French Canadians to agree with it.

B. General Attitudes Towards Parliament

Midway through the interview with a respondent we asked him, more as a way of leading into other questions than for the intrinsic value of his answer, question 25(a): "As you see it, what role should the House of Commons play in our governmental system?" Essentially most M.P.s agreed (although they took different routes to say the same thing) that, as L. S. Amery once put it, the task of the House of Commons is to ventilate not to legislate. Members recognized the *formal* legislative aspects of the Commons' work, but they did not, by and large, see the House as a forum for legislative initiative. Not every member put forward this interpretation of the status of the House of Commons, but three quarters of all respondents agreed with statement 26 that "Our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation."

The fact that not all agreed with this obvious circumstance of Canadian parliamentary life makes it worth while to try to discover whether there are significant variations in the pattern of responses. Generally speaking there is only one significant variable—party. When we examined the results by representational role, purposive role, and urban or rural location of constituencies, there were no significant differences. When responses are compared between the two principal language groups, it appears that these differences may be slightly important (French-speaking M.P.s are more inclined to agree), but when one looks at the results by party (controlled for language group) one finds that the differences are really caused by party differences (Table VI.14). There is no difference between English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals, but both groups of Liberals were more inclined to disagree with the proposition than Cr ditistes and Social Crediters. The real differences are between the latter two parties and the Conservatives. Although a bare majority of Conservatives agreed that "our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation," Conservatives were more inclined to disagree with the statement than M.P.s from any other party. What appears to be a slightly greater agreement with the suggestion on the part of French-speaking M.P.s is accounted for by the unanimous agreement of the Cr ditistes. These party differences resulted in a regional variation that was to be expected: Prairie M.P.s were most inclined to disagree with the suggestion, and Quebec M.P.s were most inclined to agree. There was, however, one further regional variation worth mentioning: Ontario Liberals were more inclined than were Liberals from any other region in the country to disagree with the proposition.

We then asked all respondents question 25(b): "How effective is the House of Commons in fulfilling the role you think it should play?" Sixty-two per cent of the M.P.s said that it is effective; 38 per cent said it is not very effective.¹³ It would not be unreasonable to expect that the pattern of responses might follow that indicated above. Surprisingly, however, it did not. Instead of

Table VI.14

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	78	20	2
Progressive Conservative	59	41	0
New Democratic	78	22	0
Social Credit	100	0	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	100	0	0
N	82	26	1

*Independent omitted.

discovering that Conservatives, possibly frustrated by the gap between belief and reality, were predominantly of the opinion that the House of Commons is ineffective in its role, we find that it is predominantly French Canadians, and particularly the Cr ditistes, who felt that the House of Commons is not effective. When the results are analyzed by party (and controlled for language group) we find that there are no differences between the responses of English-speaking Liberals and English-speaking Conservatives. New Democrats were about as inclined to disagree as were French-speaking Liberals (who divide equally on the matter). Essentially, then, there are two factors influencing an M.P.'s feelings about the effectiveness of the House of Commons: minor party M.P.s are more critical than are those from the major parties, and French-speaking M.P.s are more critical than are English-speaking M.P.s (Table VI.15).

Table VI.15

M.P.s' judgement of effectiveness of the House of Commons, by language group, horizontal percentages

	House of Commons is effective	House of Commons is not very effective
English	70	30
French	42	58
N	72	44

The combination of the differences based on principal language group and minor party position confused the regional pattern of variation; but an interesting point is that M.P.s from Ontario were most inclined (80 per cent) to say that the House of Commons is effective.

Finally we may observe the variations when we arrayed the responses in terms of the representational roles of respondents: trustees (drawn almost equally from both principal language groups) and mixed types (rather more predominant among French-speaking Liberals) were a little more inclined than constituency delegates to say that the House of Commons is ineffective. Interestingly, however, party delegates were considerably more inclined than others to say that they thought the House of Commons is effective in fulfilling its role: 80 per cent of the party delegates as compared with only 54 per cent of the mixed types said they thought the Commons is effective.

After respondents were given an opportunity to develop their views on the effectiveness of the House of Commons, we asked those who had not indicated complete conviction in its effectiveness question 25(c): "What are the most pressing problems which prevent the House of Commons from doing what you think it ought to be doing?" Considering the difference between the two principal language groups on the question of the House of Commons' effectiveness, we might have expected more exciting differences in the factors selected as "pressing problems" that prevent the House of Commons from doing its job adequately. However, generally speaking, French-speaking M.P.s had fewer remarks to make about specific problems, and when they did note problems they revealed no great differences from those selected by English-speaking M.P.s (Table VI.16).

English-speaking respondents were more inclined to say that there are no pressing problems (even though they think that there is room for improvement in the effectiveness of the House of Commons): 14 per cent of the English-speaking respondents, as compared with only 3 per cent of the French-speaking respondents, indicated that they could think of nothing that needs improving. French-speaking respondents were also somewhat more anxious than were English-speaking respondents to see procedural changes implemented and to suggest that the personnel of Parliament needs improving. English-speaking M.P.s expressed more interest in having set sessions of the House of Commons established, and were a little more inclined to say that they objected to the time that is wasted in having all the party leaders of the House make speeches on formal occasions. They were also somewhat more inclined to say that the work of the House is impeded by the fact that there are "too many parties." M.P.s from both language groups had "other" suggestions of pressing problems: several mentioned that there was "too much politicking"; two specifically mentioned that dominion-provincial conferences are weakening the position of the House of Commons; one M.P. mentioned the weakness of the Speaker, another the desirability of having a permanent Speaker; a few others raised the problem of the ability of the House of Commons to control delegated legislation and the need to use more experts in their proceedings in committee.

We also noted that the other major factor distinguishing respondents' judgements of the effectiveness of the House of Commons was the status of their party. English-speaking Liberals and

Table VI.16

Pressing problems mentioned by English- and French-speaking respondents who were at all critical of the effectiveness of the House of Commons*

Problem	English-speaking respondents	French-speaking respondents	N
	(%)	(%)	
No pressing problems	14	3	13
Procedural changes are needed	62	84	79
Set sessions should be established	16	3	14
Too many parties	19	13	20
More effective use should be made of committees	24	16	25
Too much time is wasted through having all party leaders speak on formal occasions	8	3	8
Personnel of House of Commons needs improving	6	19	11
Other problems	14	16	17

* Percentages total more than 100 because respondents often mentioned more than one pressing problem.

Conservatives were found to be equally agreed in general on the effectiveness of the House of Commons. When we looked at what M.P.s consider to be the pressing problems of the House of Commons, we found that to some extent the prominent division between the minor and major parties was sustained, but we also discovered fundamental differences in the responses of members of the two major parties (Table VI.17).

Conservatives (19 per cent) and Liberals (9 per cent) were alone in saying they think there are no pressing problems which prevent the House of Commons from doing what in their opinion it ought to be doing; this fact distinguishes the major parties from the minor parties. Beyond this there are no striking differences between the "third parties" and the "old-line parties" as such. New Democrats were unanimous in saying that procedural reforms are necessary, and Social Crediters were more inclined than others to say that committees need to be used more effectively, but when one surveys the responses the clearly significant differences are between the Conservative party and all the others. Conservatives were considerably more inclined than others to say that there are no pressing problems and, if they do mention pressing problems, least inclined to suggest the need for procedural reforms. On the other hand, Conservatives were

far more inclined than were M.P.s from any other party to say that there are too many parties. Because, in our analysis of parties, respondents who said that they object to the speeches of all the party leaders on formal occasions were included in the general category "other," we are not able to say with certainty what percentage of Conservatives mentioned this related factor as a pressing problem, but it is certainly our recollection from the interview protocols that this answer was prominent among Conservatives. Liberals, particularly English-speaking Liberals, were considerably more inclined than were Conservatives to suggest that more efficient use must be made of the committees.

Considering the fact that Conservatives were most inclined to say that the parliamentary system does not assume a minor role for back-benchers in the framing of legislation, and considering that the Conservatives form the major opposition party, it is perhaps not at all surprising that they should have been less anxious for procedural changes and more efficient use of committees. Now that procedural reforms have been implemented to some extent, it would be interesting to know whether French-speaking M.P.s are still as disposed to say that the House of Commons is not effective, given that their major complaint seems to have been the problem of procedural reform.¹⁴

Analysis in terms of the urban or rural location of constituencies revealed no significant variations. Regional patterns follow generally those expected on the basis of language and party variations. It is worth remarking, however, that M.P.s of both parties from the Atlantic provinces were most inclined to say that procedural reforms are necessary, and M.P.s from the Prairies and British Columbia were, not surprisingly, most inclined to say that they thought that set sessions of Parliament would be desirable.

It may be recalled that in the "other responses" to the question of whether "pressing problems" prevented the House of Commons from doing what it ought to be doing, only two respondents mentioned that in their opinion dominion-provincial conferences detract from the importance of Parliament's work. Because this criticism has often been made by others we decided to try to discover the feelings of all respondents on the issue by asking them to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statement 5: "Dominion-provincial conferences detract from the importance of Parliament." One third of the respondents agreed with the statement; 63 per cent disagreed; and 5 per cent were not sure. There are no differences between the two principal language groups on the subject; nor are there any significant differences according to the urban or rural location of constituencies. However, there are differences between the parties (Table VI.18). Liberals were just a little more inclined to disagree with the statement than were Conservatives, but the differences between the two major parties are really insignificant. The major difference is that New Democrat and Social Credit M.P.s were considerably more inclined to agree that the dominion-provincial conferences

Table VI.17
Pressing problems of House of Commons, by party,* horizontal percentages**

Party	No pressing problems	Procedural changes are needed	Set sessions should be established	Too many parties	More effective use should be made of committees	Personnel of House of Commons needs improving
Liberal	9	72	8	11	25	6
Progressive						
Conservative	19	43	8	32	11	3
New Democratic	0	100	44	11	22	11
Social Credit	0	60	20	0	40	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	0	67	17	0	17	0
N	13	79	14	20	25	6

* Independent omitted.

** Percentages total more than 100 because many respondents mentioned more than one pressing problem.

detract from the importance of Parliament. In regional terms the differences are generally slight also. The only point worth mentioning is that M.P.s from British Columbia were most inclined (46 per cent) to agree with the statement, but this fact is to some extent accounted for by the position of New Democrats. Also noteworthy is the fact that there is a slight relation between the feeling that the House of Commons is not very effective and agreement with the statement: 44 per cent of those who think that the House of Commons is not very effective, as compared with only 26 per cent of those who think it is effective, agreed with the statement that dominion-provincial conferences detract from the importance of Parliament.

Table VI.18

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "Dominion-provincial conferences detract from the importance of Parliament," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	26	71	3
Progressive Conservative	32	64	4
New Democratic	56	33	11
Social Credit	60	20	20
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	33	67	0
N	35	68	5

* Independent omitted.

In the next section, when we discuss the M.P.'s performance of his parliamentary role, we shall consider further problems and reforms that have been mentioned by respondents, but before leaving the general subject of Parliament, it is worth while examining the responses to a number of questions designed to elicit M.P.s' reactions to certain suggestions for structural changes which have been made from time to time.

The following suggestion was made in the course of a preliminary interview with an M.P. (during the early summer of 1964) and repeated, in more or less identical terms, by another M.P. later. It therefore seemed reasonable to see how much agreement or disagreement there might be among M.P.s with statement 17: "The Commons would be a more efficient institution if it were cut to, say, 150 members, each with paid assistants."

The responses reveal a considerable difference of opinion based on the respondent's language group: French-speaking M.P.s were much more inclined to agree with the suggestion than were English-speaking M.P.s. Nor can this difference of opinion be explained in terms of the agreement of any one group of French-speaking M.P.s. Among English-speaking M.P.s, New Democrats and Social Crediters were more

inclined to disagree with the suggestion than Liberals and Conservatives, Conservatives being the most inclined to agree with the proposition (*see* Table VI.19).

Table VI.19

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that "The House of Commons would be a more efficient institution if it were cut to, say, 150 members, each with paid assistants," by language group and party, horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Language group			
English	28	69	3
French	47	35	18
Party*			
Liberal	33	59	9
Progressive Conservative	35	62	3
New Democratic	22	78	0
Social Credit	40	60	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	50	17	33
N	37	63	8

* Independent omitted.

There were no significant variations when the results were analyzed by the urban or rural location of constituencies; but there were regional variations worth noting. Ontario M.P.s (77 per cent) were the most inclined to disagree with the suggestion; M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces (67 per cent) were just a little less inclined to disagree than were Ontario members. There were, however, no differences between M.P.s from the other three regions in their disposition to agree with the statement. Quebec M.P.s (largely because of the Cr ditistes) were most inclined to say that they were not sure.¹⁵

On the face of it there is no obvious reason why French-speaking M.P.s should be considerably more in favour of the suggested reform than English-speaking M.P.s. In a sense there are really two propositions to which the M.P. might react contained within statement 17: there is the question of making the House of Commons more efficient by reducing its numbers, and there is the suggestion that the efficiency of the House would be aided through the existence of paid assistants for those who remain. One possible explanation of the reason why French-speaking M.P.s tended to be more favourable to the idea (let it not be forgotten that less than a majority of the French-speaking M.P.s agreed with it) is that they saw immediate benefits to their own performance of the job of being an M.P. in the possibility of employing a paid assistant in the constituency who would look after routine requests. (There is no evidence, as will be seen later, that French-speaking M.P.s are especially anxious to employ the

assistants in research.)¹⁶ On the other hand, it must be noted that M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, who are equally confronted with constituency matters, were notably less inclined to say that they approved of the idea. If we are correct in thinking that it was essentially the notion of having a paid assistant which appealed to some French-speaking M.P.s, then we might be able to explain the difference between their opinions on the statement and those of the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces by recourse to their different views of their role. French-speaking M.P.s confirmed that in practice they spend much time looking after their constituencies, but several suggested that their roles should involve them more in the process of legislation. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, on the other hand, appear to be satisfied with the role of liaison officer with their constituencies and may not feel any particular need to have paid assistants relieve them of this responsibility.

We also invited respondents to react to statement 20, which is by no means novel and has direct implications for the character of the House of Commons and the parties: "The notion of alternating the leadership of political parties from English Canadians to French Canadians is a good one and ought to be followed generally." We should certainly expect a divergence of opinion on this question between M.P.s from the two principal language groups, and also between M.P.s of different parties—and we were not disappointed. French-speaking M.P.s and English-speaking M.P.s over all, were sharply divided on the notion: 79 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s agreed with the idea as compared with only 31 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s. The differences between the parties were also well defined. Among English-speaking M.P.s it was only within the Liberal party that a majority (a bare majority of 51 per cent) agreed with the suggestion; among the other English-speaking M.P.s there was almost complete disagreement: 82 per cent of the English-speaking Conservatives disagreed with the idea of alternating leadership; 79 per cent of the New Democrats disagreed; and both the English-speaking Social Credit M.P.s who were interviewed disagreed with the idea. Among French-speaking M.P.s it was the Liberals, 86 per cent of whom agreed with the suggestion, who were most in favour of alternating the leadership of political parties between English and French Canadians. From the regional point of view, the differences can generally be explained in terms of the language and party differences already noted: the one important point to observe, however, is that not one M.P. from British Columbia agreed with the idea. Clearly, the most significant fact is that within the Liberal party, where the question of alternating leadership between the two principal language groups is most relevant, a majority of M.P.s agree with the proposition.

Finally, among the suggested structural reforms of Parliament, we may examine reactions to a rather extreme idea for Senate reform. We asked all respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with statement 8: "A Senate conceived of as a 'Chamber of Nationalities,' representing English and French in equal proportions, would be a

useful reform to our parliamentary system." By stating that the composition of the chamber would be made up of English and French *in equal proportions* we probably tipped the scales in favour of English-speaking respondents' disagreeing with the idea, as in fact they did: only one English-speaking M.P. said he agreed with the notion; 93 per cent said they disagreed; and 5 per cent said they were not sure. From our point of view, then, it was more interesting to discover how many French-speaking M.P.s would agree with this extreme formulation of a possible reform of the upper chamber. Not quite half the French-speaking M.P.s (49 per cent) agreed with the idea; 42 per cent said they disagreed; and 9 per cent said they were not sure. It is important to know which French-speaking M.P.s were most inclined to agree with the reform idea. Actually there is not much difference between the French-speaking M.P.s of the different parties: 50 per cent of the Liberals agreed with the radical proposition; the two Conservatives we interviewed were divided on the matter; one Social Crediter favoured the idea, two were opposed; two Cr ditistes were in favour, one was opposed and two were not sure. Undoubtedly the most surprising fact to emerge from our consideration of the responses to this statement is the observation that half the French-speaking Liberals were in favour of the idea, whereas not a single English-speaking Liberal agreed.

Some light can be thrown on the attitude of French-speaking M.P.s towards the proposed reform by examining their reactions (earlier in the interview) to the Senate as it now exists. Only 16 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s, as compared with 52 per cent of the English-speaking respondents, stated that the Senate in its present form is effective in fulfilling its role; 31 per cent of the French-speaking respondents, as compared to only 14 per cent of the English-speaking respondents (nearly all New Democrats), favoured abolishing the Senate. What role do French-speaking respondents think the Senate should perform? Twenty-seven per cent thought that the Senate performs no role at all, but among those who thought that it performs a role, several mentioned more than one function: 46 per cent said that it may act as a check upon government or a "sober second thought" on legislation; 21 per cent said that it is a place where useful committee work may be done in specialized areas; 12 per cent said that it may be used to replace some of the work of Royal Commissions; 18 per cent said that it is a place where more legislation may be considered; and 21 per cent mentioned other uses to which the Senate may be put. What is so significant about the answers of French-speaking respondents is the fact that only two French-speaking M.P.s mentioned the role of the Senate as a locus of regional representation.

C. Parliamentary Aspects of the M.P.'s Role

We have already examined in some detail the general orientation of our respondents to the political process. We then explored their general attitudes to the House of Commons (and briefly the Senate)

and considered their reactions to a number of suggested reforms of the parliamentary structure. We now focus particularly on the parliamentary aspects of the M.P.'s role, with the general purpose of discovering (and comparing) the manner in which our respondents go about performing their tasks as they see them. In the course of this analysis we shall consider the different interests which M.P.s have, the problems which they encounter in performing their parliamentary tasks, their general attitudes towards the role which M.P.s can play in the legislative process, and their views on the role of party caucus. Finally we shall consider respondents' views on the "qualities of a good M.P." and attempt to discover whether respondents perceive differences among members in terms of either the party or the province from which an M.P. happens to come. Throughout, differences based on the respondents' principal language group will be the major focus of attention.

1. Political interests

Early in the interview we asked all respondents a number of questions designed to permit us to ascertain their general perceptions of the M.P.'s role. Later in the interview we confronted them with a much more specific question on their "main political interests" (question 32(a), 246). Certain coding problems were presented in handling the responses. We were not concerned with the specific nature of an M.P.'s interest (that is, whether he happened to be concerned mainly with transport as compared with agriculture), but whether his interests were almost exclusively related to his constituency, national causes or problems (such as abolition of capital punishment, constitutional problems, and co-operative federalism), regional causes, or committee work other than that immediately related to his constituency (for example, defence, external affairs, or food and drugs). Inevitably there was a certain arbitrariness in deciding on the main focus of an M.P.'s interests, but we were guided by our knowledge of the character of the respondent's constituency and its problems. Some M.P.s mentioned having more than one main interest, and we allowed for as many as three interests in our coding of responses.

Over all, "national causes" represent the main interests of 54 per cent of our respondents; 40 per cent mentioned a main interest in constituency problems; 17 per cent mentioned a main interest in committee matters; 12 per cent mentioned a main interest in regional causes; 13 per cent mentioned other main interests; and 7 per cent of the respondents admitted having no special interests at all. Some of the responses classed as "other" in Table VI.20 are interesting: three mentioned a specific interest in parliamentary procedure; two said that their main interest is to return to the House of Commons as long as they so desire; two said they are especially interested in international relations; two said their main political interest is to advance personally; and one said that his main political interest is to try to get power for his party.

When the responses are examined according to the M.P.s' views of their representational role, we find a close relation between perception and major political interest. No proponents of a particular representational role were especially disposed to say that they had no special interests, but constituency delegates were most disposed to say that constituency problems were their main interest: 57 per cent of the constituency delegates, as compared with only 26 per cent of the trustees, mentioned this type of major interest. Mixed types (who, as we saw earlier, often displayed a considerable concern for their constituencies) were only a little less disposed than constituency delegates to mention constituency interests. On the other hand, trustees (72 per cent) were most disposed to say that they were interested in national causes, as compared to constituency delegates, only 29 per cent of whom mentioned a main interest in similar matters. No single representational role type appeared to be especially concerned with committee work, although mixed types (among whom French Canadians loom rather large) were the least concerned with committee work.

We have already pointed to the fact that there were relatively few differences among the respondents in their views of their purposive role; it is perhaps not surprising then that there are hardly any clear differences in interest revealed when we analyze the main political interests of respondents in terms of this variable. The only point worth noting is that ombudsmen appear to be a little more interested in committee work than proponents of any of the other purposive roles. When we compare the responses with the method by which respondents were recruited we find differences at least as far as interest in constituency and national causes are concerned: conscripted M.P.s were considerably more inclined than others to say that they have a main political interest in constituency matters, whereas self-recruited M.P.s were most inclined to say that they have an interest in national causes. Interestingly, co-opted M.P.s appeared to be less concerned with constituency matters as major political interests than conscripted M.P.s, but they were as interested as conscripted respondents in national causes. When we compared respondents in terms of their experience in the House of Commons, few differences emerged. Those with less than three years' experience appeared to be slightly more interested in national causes and a little less interested in constituency matters, but the differences between the two groups, it must be emphasized, are slight indeed.

Finally, we come to the major variables employed throughout this analysis: language, party, region, and the urban or rural location of the respondent's constituency. It can be said at once that the last factor appears to be insignificant in distinguishing the responses. The respondent's language group is significant in several important senses (Table VI.20). English-speaking respondents were no more inclined than were French-speaking respondents to point to main political interests in the constituency, region, or other areas. But we found that French-speaking M.P.s were much more inclined to say

that they have no special political interests at all, that they are almost completely unconcerned with committee matters as their main political interest, and that they are somewhat less inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to mention a main interest in national causes.

Table VI.20

Main political interests of back-bench M.P.s by language group, horizontal percentages*

	No main political interest	Consti- tuency matters	Commit- tee work	National causes	Re- gional causes	Other
English	2	40	23	60	11	12
French	17	39	3	42	14	14
N	8	47	20	64	14	15

* Percentages total more than 100 because some respondents mentioned more than one main political interest.

When differences in responses between the parties are examined, it is clear that there are no major differences between the two major parties (especially if one looks only at the English-speaking members). But when one looks at differences within the Liberal party between the two principal language groups these differences are actually a little more sharply revealed than they are when we simply compare English and French responses over all (Table VI.21).

Table VI.21

English- and French-speaking Liberals' main political interests, horizontal percentages*

	No main political interest	Consti- tuency matters	Commit- tee work	National causes	Re- gional causes
English- speaking Liberals	0	43	27	62	14
French- speaking Liberals	13	52	4	39	17

* Percentages total more than 100 because some respondents mentioned more than one main political interest.

When the two major parties are compared with the others further interesting differences emerge: Social Credit M.P.s and New Democrats were much more inclined to say that their main political interest lies in national causes and were correspondingly less inclined to mention constituency interests. No English-speaking M.P.s appear to have the monopoly of interest in committee work. Cr ditistes were relatively the most inclined of any to say that they have no main political interests.

Regional differences in this case appear to be explained in terms of the language and party differences already noted. There are not, in short, many particularly significant differences within the predominantly English-speaking regions of the country. The only points worth noting are that M.P.s from the Maritimes and British Columbia appear to be a little more disposed to say that their main interests are regional causes, while M.P.s from the Prairies were a little more inclined to say that their interests centre on committee work.

Having established the respondent's main political interest(s), we went on to ask question 32(b): "What are the most useful and important things you can do to further these interests?" Since the major distinguishing factor which determines his main political interests seems to be the language group of the respondent, the analysis of the methods of pursuing these interests focuses on the bilingual and bi-cultural variables. Once more, respondents frequently mentioned more than one device for furthering their interests.

Over all the most important single tactic favoured by M.P.s for furthering their interests is the making of public speeches and the attempt to mobilize public opinion through writing for the press, and appearing on radio and television. Nearly 40 per cent of the respondents mentioned this technique. Talking to the minister concerned with a particular policy, doing research on their particular area of interest, and attending the committee dealing with their interest were each mentioned by about 25 per cent of the respondents. Twenty per cent mentioned that they would attempt to further their interest by talking about it in caucus; 11 per cent said they would simply speak about their interest in Parliament; and 7 per cent said they would try to speak to the "policy influentials," who varied with circumstances. In addition to these major tactics for furthering political interests a wide variety of other methods was mentioned, depending on the different interests which a member happened to have. Five mentioned working in *ad hoc* party policy committees; four mentioned making good contacts with the civil service; three mentioned belonging to trade associations; two mentioned getting to know their constituents better; one mentioned waiting for the appropriate moment to try to get rid of an obstructive minister; another mentioned that he would attempt to participate in trade missions; and another mentioned learning the House of Commons rules well so as to be more effective.

Just as there are differences between the two principal language groups in their disposition to mention a main political interest and

in the main political interests which were mentioned, so there are differences in the methods used for furthering their interests (Table VI.22). Both groups were about equally inclined to talk in caucus and to attempt to create a favourable public opinion by a wide variety of propagandist techniques, but beyond this, differences in approach are clear. French-speaking M.P.s were far less inclined to mention conducting research on their particular area of interest; they were also less inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to say they would attend committees. French-speaking M.P.s, on the other hand, were somewhat more inclined to say they would try to talk to the minister concerned.

Table VI.22

Major methods used by back-bench M.P.s to further their main political interests, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	Would speak in caucus	Would talk to minister concerned	Would try to mobilize public opinion	Would do research on major interest	Would attend committee dealing with interest
English	21	23	40	31	30
French	20	32	36	4	16
N	21	26	40	25	27

* Percentages total more than 100 because several members mentioned more than one method.

One of the differences in the method of furthering one's political interests—the tactic of talking with a minister—deserves further attention. Generally speaking, this approach is used basically by members of the Liberal party, although a few Conservatives said they also might approach the minister concerned with their interests. It is also a little more frequently used by French-speaking Liberals than by English-speaking Liberals. But which ministers do they tend to approach? We did not ask this particular question in the context of the general question of the techniques used in furthering one's political interest; but earlier in the interview we did ask all respondents question 31(d): "Are there any particular ministers in the Government to whom you naturally turn for information, advice, and assistance?" The answers to this question are relevant here, and tend to confirm the notion that French-speaking M.P.s prefer to deal with "leurs ministres." Seventy-six per cent of the English-speaking respondents who answered the question (there were a number of English-speaking respondents who said that they never approach a minister) stated that it was not a question of dealing with any particular minister, but rather of dealing with the minister who happened to be in charge of the problem that concerned the respondent; 42 per cent

of the French-speaking M.P.s, as compared with 15 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s, said that they deal only with ministers from their province. The difference between the two language groups is accounted for by nearly 40 per cent of the French-speaking respondents (as compared with only 6 per cent of the English-speaking respondents) who said that they approach ministers from their own province as well as ministers from the other provinces. The replies to this question are less sharply defined than we might like, but the over-all impression is that French-speaking M.P.s were somewhat more disposed to turn to their own ministers rather than to the English-speaking minister who might actually be in charge of the department dealing with their particular problem.

2. Problems of the job

At roughly the midway point in our interviews with respondents we asked them to tell us what they find are the most pressing problems they encounter in trying to do their job (question 24(a), 244). We wanted to know what factors, if any, hinder their task. Handling the wide variety of answers we received proved a difficult problem indeed, for although there were clearly a number of common problems which many respondents shared, the answers to this question, like those to the question requesting suggested reforms to meet their problems, revealed an almost bewildering variety of personal difficulties. Had we forced respondents to try to focus on the one single problem they found the most difficult to handle, we should have made our analysis much simpler, but then we should have sacrificed a great deal in the process. Because so many respondents mentioned more than one problem we coded up to four "problems of the job" for each respondent; and because within the four responses many included answers that were largely personal (not shared by many others) the number of "other problems" is particularly large. Still it must be appreciated that there were also a number of common problems which many M.P.s mentioned, and that the "other" difficulties mentioned often represented the third and/or fourth problems mentioned by respondents.

The most important single problem mentioned by respondents (36 per cent of the total) as hindering their task as an M.P. is the time taken in constituency work. The next most pressing problem as far as the entire group is concerned is the lack of research facilities: 29 per cent of the respondents mentioned this particular problem. Twenty-two per cent mentioned the problem of the time taken in having to appear in Parliament for debates and divisions, 19 per cent mentioned the time taken in committee work, and 18 per cent mentioned the difficulties they encounter with government "red tape." Ten M.P.s (9 per cent of our respondents), however, stated that they experience no pressing problems in trying to do their job as an M.P.

We cannot mention here all the "other difficulties" mentioned by respondents: the following is meant therefore only as a sampling of the many problems referred to. One set of problems relate specifically to the civil service: from a few M.P.s came the complaint that

the civil service is replacing the M.P. as a legislator; others complained of the way in which civil servants frustrate decisions agreeable to an M.P.'s constituents; seven French-speaking M.P.s complained of language difficulties when dealing with the civil service. Another set of problems centre on the facilities provided to back-benchers: some thought the telephone allowance was too small; another thought the members' expense account was too small; and still others complained about the lack of a reference library.

Generally speaking there are few differences between the two language groups. The most striking difference, however, is the fact that not a single French-speaking M.P. mentioned the time taken up in committee work. This is not surprising since, as we have already seen, French-speaking M.P.s are less inclined to think of the committee as a place in which to pursue their political interests, and spend relatively less time in committee work than their English-speaking counterparts. French-speaking respondents were also less inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to mention the time taken up in constituency work and in parliamentary appearances, although the differences between the two groups are not great. Both groups were about equally disposed to mention problems of "red tape," lack of research facilities, and the time spent in travelling to and from constituencies.

One difference between the two groups which has been suggested above in our discussion of "other" problems requires further attention: the problem which a French-speaking M.P. experiences when dealing with English-speaking civil servants. No specific question was placed on the questionnaire dealing with this matter, but interviewers were asked to probe for any difficulties that arise with the civil service, especially over the question of language facility. As we have noted seven (roughly 20 per cent) of the French-speaking respondents mentioned the problem, but we have reason to think that for some reason the French-speaking interviewers may have been lax in probing respondents on the question of their relation with the civil service. In any case there were a great many French-language interview protocols which contained no references at all to relations with civil servants, whereas most English-language protocols did. Because the number of "no answers" among French-speaking respondents is so high, it is difficult to be certain of our results, but it may be significant to note that of those who did answer the probing questions (half the French-speaking respondents) only four said that their relationship with civil servants is always satisfactory; seven mentioned experiencing language difficulties with the civil service and four others made extremely critical remarks about the civil service which went beyond the complaint about its fundamental unilingualism. On the other hand, no English-speaking M.P. mentioned experiencing language difficulties with civil servants (although four were also extremely critical of them in other ways) and nearly 56 per cent said their relations with civil servants are always entirely satisfactory.

When the responses are compared by party only a few noteworthy differences appear: Conservatives (especially those in the older age groups from the Prairies) were most inclined to say that nothing hinders them performing their job; New Democrats were the only English-speaking M.P.s not to complain about the time taken in committee work; and Conservatives were most inclined to complain about the inadequacy of research facilities.¹⁷ Among the regions, the only point that is not explained by differences of language or party is the fact that M.P.s from British Columbia were most disposed to complain about the inadequacy of research facilities. Finally, a comparison of the problems cited with respondents' views of their representational role reveals a few interesting variations: constituency delegates and mixed types were considerably more inclined to mention the problem of the time taken in committee work as one of the factors hindering their task as an M.P.; they were also considerably more inclined than party delegates and trustees to mention the problem of the time taken up in constituency work. Time wasted in travelling appeared to be more important for mixed types than for any other M.P.s, while the lack of research facilities appeared to bother them less.

As soon as respondents had developed their answers to the problems of the job as they saw them, we asked them question 24(b): "What reforms would you make if you could?" As we have already intimated there was a tremendous variety of answers to this question, reflecting a wide range of personal attitudes towards the difficulties of doing one's job as an M.P. Moreover, the number who did not answer this question was very high. Presumably many M.P.s were unable or unwilling to offer many solutions to their difficulties. Twenty-two per cent of the respondents who answered the question thought that no reforms were necessary; since this is a considerably larger percentage of M.P.s than those who said there were no problems at all, we may surmise that many who recognized problems felt they were inevitably part of the facts of parliamentary life and were not susceptible to change. Presumably many who complained about the time taken in constituency work and parliamentary appearances might well have fallen into this category. The most important single reform mentioned by respondents is the suggestion to provide members with a personal research staff: nearly 50 per cent of the respondents who mentioned any reform at all pointed to this possible method of improving the M.P.'s lot. Only three other reforms received mention with any degree of regularity: 14 per cent of the respondents suggested providing more secretarial help; 8 per cent suggested providing M.P.s with a personal staff in the constituencies; and 8 per cent of the respondents mentioned making the civil service and/or all aspects of parliamentary life completely bilingual. In addition to these major reforms there were many other suggestions: three respondents wanted to see the creation of an ombudsman to protect both electors and elected; three mentioned the desirability of a research library; two wanted to see the estimates procedure modernized; two (both French-speaking) wanted to see the electorate educated to appreciate the legislative aspects of the M.P.'s role; several others wanted a

number of civil service reforms to be carried out, ranging from requiring civil servants to consult with M.P.s before taking action to a reduction in the size of the civil service staff.

Because of the large number of "no answers" and the large number of "other" reforms suggested by respondents, it is difficult to make too much of the responses to this question. But when we compare the responses of the two language groups, a few interesting differences emerge. English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that no reforms are necessary: 25 per cent of the English-speaking respondents compared to only 14 per cent of the French-speaking respondents gave this answer. However among those who singled out reforms, there are clear differences between the two language groups. English-speaking M.P.s were most inclined to mention the value of providing a research staff for back-bench M.P.s: 60 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s who answered our question, as compared with only 21 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s, mentioned this idea. Nevertheless this difference in responses is actually misleading. When all respondents were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with statement 25, "The House of Commons should equip itself with a more extensive professional staff in order to have its own sources of technical information," French-speaking M.P.s were actually slightly more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to agree.¹⁸ We may conclude from this that French-speaking M.P.s are not less interested in better research facilities than English-speaking M.P.s but that, given the range of problems confronting M.P.s in the performance of their tasks, there are other reforms which are *relatively more important* to French-speaking M.P.s. This is revealed by the fact that 29 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s (as compared to no English-speaking M.P.s) mentioned the desirability of reforming the civil service to make it truly bilingual. Two French-speaking respondents went further than this and suggested that every aspect of parliamentary life should be completely bilingual. English-speaking and French-speaking respondents were roughly equally disposed to mention the need to provide M.P.s with more secretarial help and a personal staff in the constituency. When we examine the responses of the English- and French-speaking M.P.s to the question involving their relations with the civil service along with the question involving suggested reforms to deal with the problems that M.P.s experience, it is clear that the unique problem is that which French-speaking M.P.s encounter in their relations with a largely English-speaking civil service. It may be that it is this difficulty which helps to account for the fact that French-speaking M.P.s are more disposed to turn to "leurs ministres" in pursuing their political interests.

3. Attitudes towards the back-bencher's place in the legislative process

It has already been observed that three quarters of our respondents agreed with the proposition that our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation. We

also saw that most of the disagreement with this proposition came from Conservatives, Cr ditistes, and Social Crediters—in other words, from M.P.s in the Opposition parties. However, it is not necessary to presume that back-benchers exert no influence whatever on the decision-making process, and those who attempt to establish a place for back-benchers within the legislative process normally point to the *informal* influences on legislation within the processes of party consultation, especially within party caucus.

While we do not suggest that this aspect of the political process has been exhaustively examined in our multi-purpose study, some questions that we asked about general attitudes to the place of back-benchers within the legislative process and about the operations of the party caucuses, throw some fresh light on this important subject. For our purposes the degree of informal influence on party decision-making within the Liberal (Government) party is of greatest concern, the more so because it allows us to compare the attitudes of French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s within the same party.

In order to confront the matter of the respondent's attitude towards his place in the legislative process, we asked all respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statement 1: "Most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-benchers has a chance to exert influence." It is interesting that the numbers prepared to agree with this statement are fewer than those who say that our system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation. Over all, only 56 per cent agreed, 35 per cent disagreed, and 9 per cent were not sure. There is a close relation between an M.P.'s views on the two matters, as might be expected: 87 per cent of those who feel that front-bench policy is already decided agreed that our system assumes a minor role for back-benchers, whereas only 61 per cent of those who disagreed with the suggestion that front-bench policy is already decided agreed with the other proposition. There is also a relation between a respondent's age and his position on the question of his influence on front-bench policy: over all, the youngest members of the House (nearly all Liberals under the age of 34) were the least inclined to agree with the statement, but they were also the most inclined to say they were not sure. Most inclined to agree with the statement were M.P.s aged from 35 to 44, especially within the Liberal party, where no fewer than 70 per cent of the M.P.s in this age group agreed with the statement. Length of experience in the House of Commons and perception of his representational role appear to have no effect on a respondent's attitude towards the question: M.P.s with less than three years' experience in the House were only fractionally more inclined to agree with the statement than those who had been there longer. Trustees *and* party delegates were a little more inclined to disagree with the statement than constituency delegates and mixed types, but the differences are not really significant.

Significant differences between the two principal language groups are also lacking. It may be recalled that on the question of the

role of back-benchers in framing legislation the difference between the two language groups has been slight, and what difference there was we found to be accounted for by the Cr ditistes, who unanimously agreed with the notion that back-benchers are expected to play only a minor role. When we examine the responses to the present proposition by party, to some extent the results are the same (Table VI.23). English- and French-speaking Liberals hold almost precisely the same views on the question, both being more inclined than Conservatives, New Democrats and Cr ditistes to agree with the proposition. Cr ditistes, however, were the least inclined to agree with the statement. Social Credit M.P.s, who were fully in agreement that the system assumes a minor role for back-benchers, were also the most inclined of any M.P.s to say that front-bench policy is determined before M.P.s have a chance to influence it.

Table VI.23

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that, "Most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-bench has a chance to exert influence," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	55	36	9
Progressive Conservative	41	59	0
New Democratic	44	56	0
Social Credit	80	20	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	33	67	0
N	54	49	5

* Independent omitted.

When the results are examined regionally, the most significant point to emerge is the extent to which M.P.s from British Columbia disagreed with the others: only 18 per cent of the M.P.s from this province agreed with the statement; all the rest disagreed. M.P.s from the Prairies and Quebec were a little more inclined to agree with the statement than were those from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces.

Generally speaking, the important difference here is once again between the Government party and the rest (although the Social Credit party for some unaccountable reason offers an exception). Within the Liberal party, let it be emphasized again, there is no difference in attitude between the English- and French-speaking members.

Although a majority of all the M.P.s (largely accounted for by the majority within the Liberal party) agreed that most of the time back-benchers have little opportunity to influence front-bench legislation, not many M.P.s (and this was as true of Liberals as of others) were prepared to agree that the party caucus is useless as a place

for exercising influence on party policy (Table VI.24). One would expect that the party caucus would be more influential in shaping party policy among the Opposition parties, but in fact Liberals were no less inclined than Opposition members to disagree with statement 13: "People continually overrate the importance of the party caucus. It is a place to let off steam, perhaps, but it is not a place for influencing party policy." Over all, only 13 per cent¹⁹ of the respondents agreed with this view; 85 per cent disagreed, and 2 per cent were not sure. No Cr ditiste agreed with the statement. Social Credit M.P.s were the most inclined to agree; there was hardly any difference at all between Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democrats.

Table VI.24

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that, ". . . the party caucus . . . is not a place for influencing party policy," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	14	86	0
Progressive Conservative	11	86	3
New Democratic	11	89	0
Social Credit	40	60	0
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	0	80	20
N	14	91	2

* Independent omitted.

The number of respondents who agreed with the statement denying the effective policy influence of party caucus is so small that it is rather difficult to make much of our analysis of its composition, but it is worth noting that, within the Liberal party, French-speaking respondents were just a little more inclined to agree with the statement than English-speaking M.P.s: only 11 per cent of the English-speaking respondents, as compared with 18 per cent of the French-speaking respondents agreed. The regional analysis and the analysis in terms of urban or rural location of constituencies reveal no pattern whatever. When the responses are examined from the point of view of the respondent's view of his representational role, we find that mixed types constitute 60 per cent of all those who agreed with the statement, but we must be careful not to read too much into this fact since French-speaking Liberals also tended to appear prominently within this group. All but one of the respondents who agreed that party caucus is overrated also agreed that our parliamentary system assumes a minor role for back-benchers, whereas only 73 per cent of those who disagreed with this evaluation of caucus agreed that our system assumes a minor role for back-benchers.

There is, clearly, a contradiction between the position of respondents (and particularly Liberal respondents) on the matter of the

degree of their influence on party policy. On the one hand, they agreed (more than any other party except the Social Credit Party) that most of the time back-benchers have little opportunity to influence front-bench legislation, but at the same time they appeared to be saying that the party caucus serves a more useful function than that of merely "letting off steam"; they implied that it actually is a place where party policy may be influenced. While French-speaking M.P.s were a little less inclined to say this than English-speaking M.P.s, the general impression is that the vast majority of both principal language groups within the Liberal party agreed with this position. Certainly, according to the older back-bench Liberals, there has been a very great change in the character of the Liberal caucus since the days of Louis St. Laurent. At that time, continuing in the tradition of Mackenzie King, party caucus appeared to exist for the sole purpose of providing an opportunity for the party leadership to inform the back-bench members in general terms of the legislation the Government proposed to introduce.²⁰ There was apparently little discussion of party policy by back-benchers and no influence on the content of legislation. Yet, if Liberal caucus has really become a forum for policy deliberation, why did so many agree that "most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-bencher has a chance to exert influence?" Perhaps we can throw some light on this question by examining in a little greater detail respondents' answers to a number of questions specifically concerning the party caucus.

4. *The party caucus: general, provincial, and regional*

Each of the five parties in the House of Commons holds regular general caucuses at least once a week during the parliamentary session. Attendance at party caucus, according to our respondents, is normally very good: a little more than two thirds said that they always attend; a quarter said they "usually" attend. Only four English-speaking respondents said that they "sometimes attend" and only one English-speaking respondent said that he "rarely attends." Apart from the fact that no French-speaking respondents fell within the latter two categories there were no differences between English- and French-speaking respondents. There was actually a greater variation between the parties than between the two language groups. Cr ditistes were alone in saying unanimously that they always attend party caucus; New Democrats were the least inclined to say that they always attend; Conservatives were more inclined than others to say that they only sometimes (or rarely) attend party caucus. Next to the Cr ditistes, Liberals were the most inclined (71 per cent) to say that they always attend party caucus.

In order to discover M.P.s' perceptions of the functions of the general party caucus we asked all respondents question 22(c): "What do you see as the two main functions of your party caucus?" When Allan Kornberg tried to get at the same subject-matter in his interviews with M.P.s in the 1962 Parliament, using the question "What do

you think are the two or three most important functions a caucus performs?", he found that "virtually all the respondents structured their responses in terms of 'caucus ought' rather than 'does.'"²¹ Having this in mind we were careful to check whether our slightly different form of questioning led to the same result. It is our clear impression, however, that respondents in our interviews framed their responses in terms of what functions they think caucus actually performs. As mentioned above we asked all respondents to indicate the *two* most important functions of party caucus, and only 16 respondents failed to include two responses to the question.

The most important single function reported by all respondents is that of communicating information either from back-bench to front-bench or vice versa: nearly 60 per cent mentioned this function of caucus. That this function is not exactly the same as policy-making is indicated by the fact that only 40 per cent mentioned this second function for the party caucus. Thirty-nine per cent noted that party caucus serves the function of allowing members to "let off steam" (Kornberg's "catharsis" function), and 34 per cent referred to party caucus as a place in which party strategy is devised. Seven other respondents mentioned the specific function of "trying to reach a majority decision," three suggested that its function is to convey ideas from the grass roots to the party leadership, and one referred to it as an opportunity to activate political issues. There is, however, not much point in looking at the responses over all; nor are there significant differences between M.P.s of the two principal language groups generally (Table VI.25).

Table VI.25

Major functions of party caucus, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	To "let off steam"	To communicate information	To devise party strategy	To devise party policy	Other
English	39	61	31	43	17
French	39	53	39	33	11
N	46	70	40	48	18

* Percentages total more than 100 because more than one function was mentioned.

Party differences, however, are so important as to be the major factor in responses (Table VI.26). The fundamental differences in describing the function of the party caucus are between the Government party (the Liberals) and the others. For the Liberals the cathartic function of caucus ("letting off steam," in the words of most respondents) is clearly more important than for any other party.

However the most important function of the caucus for the Liberals is to inform: 87 per cent of the Liberals mentioned this function, with English-speaking Liberals (95 per cent) being somewhat more inclined to mention this function than French-speaking Liberals (75 per cent). On the other hand, M.P.s in the Opposition parties were far more inclined to see the function of party caucus as that of making policy and devising strategy. They were less disposed to mention the "catharsis" and information functions. Interestingly, however, the Progressive Conservative M.P.s were somewhat closer to the Liberals in their perception of the role of caucus than members of the three other Opposition parties. Conservatives were more inclined than other Opposition M.P.s to mention the cathartic function of caucus, and less inclined to mention the function of devising strategy. What we observe here is possibly the consequence of two differences between the Conservatives and the rest of the Opposition. First there is the fact that the Conservative party has formed the Government in the past: traditions of front-bench leadership in making policy and devising strategy undoubtedly carry over into the Opposition. Secondly there is the question of the size of the party's representation within the House: group formulation of party policy and strategy is undoubtedly easier within the smaller Opposition parties than it is within the Conservative party. Finally we may note that within the Liberal party there are few differences between the views of English- and French-speaking M.P.s on this question. We have already noted that English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to mention the informational function of caucus, but there are no differences between the two groups in their perception of party caucus as serving the functions of catharsis and policy-making. However, French-speaking M.P.s (25 per cent) were more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s (only 13 per cent) to mention the strategy-devising function of party caucus.

Table VI.26

Major functions of party caucus, by party,* horizontal percentages**

Party	To "let off steam"	To communicate information	To devise party strategy	To devise party policy
Liberal	57	87	13	21
Progressive Conservative	27	32	43	56
New Democratic	0	22	78	89
Social Credit	0	20	100	60
Ralliement des Créditistes	17	17	67	50

* Independent omitted.

** Percentages total more than 100 since M.P.s mentioned more than one function.

When the responses are examined in terms of region and urban or rural location of constituencies no significant differences emerge, but when we array the responses in terms of representational roles some differences in the perceptions of caucus function do appear. Constituency delegates were most inclined to say that the function of the party caucus is to "let off steam," and were least inclined to mention policy-making. Party delegates, on the other hand, were most disposed to say that the function of party caucus is to communicate information, and the least inclined to say that caucus devises party strategy. Trustees were most inclined to say that caucus makes party policy.

Finally, when we compare perceptions of the caucus function with agreement or disagreement with the statement that "most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-bencher has a chance to exert influence," we find that those who mentioned the cathartic function of caucus were most inclined to agree; least inclined to agree were those who mentioned the function of devising strategy or those functions coded as "other" (for example, "trying to reach majority decisions"). The differences are not great and are less useful as an indicator of a respondent's perception of the function of party caucus than is the party he belongs to. This factor has emerged as clearly distinguishing the perceptions of our respondents.

From the analysis presented thus far it is quite apparent why members of the Opposition parties are able to say that they disagree with the notion that party caucus is not a place to influence policy. Their perceptions of the function of party caucus clearly indicate that for them party caucus is a place where party strategy and party policy are devised; the functions of catharsis and communicating information are evidently less important for Opposition M.P.s. Nevertheless we are still faced with the task of explaining why so many Liberals disagreed with the earlier proposition that party caucus "is not a place for influencing policy."

Obviously, those Liberals who see the party caucus as a place in which party strategy and party policy are devised will reject the statement denigrating the role of party caucus. Yet such M.P.s are too few to account for the entire group of Liberal respondents who disagreed with the statement. Seemingly the answer must be found in the attitudes of many of those who see the function of the party caucus as a medium for exchanging information. Given that the vast majority of Liberal M.P.s accept the fact that our parliamentary system assumes that the back-bencher will play a minor role in framing legislation, the very fact that back-benchers nevertheless have an opportunity to convey their views to (or to be informed of the views of) the party's front-bench is sufficient to persuade many of them that the party caucus as an institution is not overrated, and that to a limited extent they do have an influence on the policy decisions of the party. We have finally to deal with the fact, however, that

whereas 57 per cent of the Liberal respondents stated that one of the functions of the party caucus is "to let off steam," only 14 per cent of the Liberals agreed with the statement that party caucus is a place "to let off steam, perhaps, but it is not a place for influencing policy." Evidently not all those who stated that one of the functions of caucus is to act as a catharsis meant that the party caucus *therefore* serves no useful purpose in influencing party policy. For some, clearly, this *is* the sole function of the party caucus, which must therefore be accounted insignificant as an instrument for influencing party policy, but for others, as Allan Kornberg notes, the party caucus, "in providing an opportunity for the venting of grievances and the release of built-up tensions . . . makes it easier for the members to achieve a consensus on policy issues and to take united action on these issues."²² In so far as this effect is achieved respondents feel that the caucus is serving a useful function.

General party caucuses are not the only institutionalized party groupings within the Canadian parliamentary system. Particularly within the Liberal party there are also provincial and regional caucuses. Liberals from the Atlantic provinces meet about once or twice a month in a regional caucus; Quebec Liberals meet weekly in a provincial (some call it regional) caucus; Ontario Liberals have a weekly province-wide caucus and, as well, a caucus of members from the Toronto area; and British Columbia Liberals hold a weekly caucus over supper. Mr. Diefenbaker and several of his leading Conservative colleagues, we are told, disapprove of the notion of the regional or provincial caucus, but Conservatives from the Atlantic provinces and from Quebec nevertheless continue to meet for all intents and purposes, as regional and provincial caucuses respectively. The former get together for a mainly social event three or four times a session; the Quebec caucus meets monthly to discuss more serious political matters. The minor parties, being small in numbers, do not have regional or provincial caucuses.

We had hoped to find out something about the operations of these provincial and regional caucuses in our interviews but, except for the information obtained on the Quebec Liberal caucus, the responses were rather unsatisfactory. For one reason or another a considerable number of respondents refused to give us much information on this particular aspect of the operations of the Canadian party system. We therefore did not proceed with the analysis of this segment of the questionnaire. We did, however, receive a reasonable response to a general question seeking respondents' reactions to the existence of the provincial caucus as an institution. To the analysis of these results we now turn.

In Part B of the questionnaire we invited all respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statement 10: "The provincial caucus is an unwelcome and disruptive addition to the party system in the House of Commons." Over all, the vast majority of respondents disagreed with the suggestion: 20 per cent agreed, 67 per cent

disagreed, and 13 per cent were not sure. No significant differences are apparent between the two principal language groups. The major differences this time are based on party (Table VI.27), with the fundamental divergence being between the Liberal party and all the others, except that Conservatives (thanks particularly to those from the Atlantic provinces) were somewhat more inclined to disagree with the statement than were others. Cr  ditistes were not so much in disagreement as uncertain on the matter. The regional variation in the

Table VI.27

Responses of back-bench M.P.s to the statement that, "The provincial caucus is an unwelcome . . . addition to the party system in the House of Commons," by party,* horizontal percentages

Party	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberal	5	86	9
Progressive Conservative	30	48	22
New Democratic	62	38	0
Social Credit	60	40	0
Ralliement des Cr��ditistes	40	20	40
N	21	70	13

* Independent omitted.

responses follows very closely the existence of provincial or regional caucuses within the parties and the differences already noted between the parties: M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, Ontario, and Quebec were least inclined to agree, while M.P.s from British Columbia and particularly from the Prairies were most inclined to agree. The most interesting fact in regional terms is that not one M.P. from the Atlantic provinces agreed with the proposition.

5. *The qualities of a "good M.P."*

Finally, we asked all respondents question 33(a): "What in your opinion are the main qualities of a good M.P.?" Because we anticipated the possibility of several responses, we coded as many as four "qualities" for each respondent.

As we expected, a great many respondents mentioned a variety of characteristics such as honesty, sincerity, integrity, patience, and sensitivity, which we have considered together generally under the rubric "desirable personal characteristics": 72 per cent of the respondents mentioned qualities of this kind. But a great many respondents also went on to mention rather more specific qualities of the "good M.P.," and because so many respondents shared an appreciation for the general personal characteristics, our interest inevitably centres on the *other* qualities deemed important by respondents. The next most prominent quality of a good M.P., in our respondents'

opinion, is the "ability to work hard": 41 per cent mentioned this factor. Thereafter no one single quality appears to stand out. Nearly one quarter of the respondents mentioned the quality of putting the interests of one's constituency or country ahead of one's personal interests; 23 per cent mentioned the quality of devotion to and/or liking for the job of M.P.; 16 per cent thought that the good M.P. should be a good speaker; 17 per cent thought that expertise is important for a good M.P.; 11 per cent thought that a pleasing personality (or the ability to project a good image) is important; and nearly 10 per cent thought that a good M.P. should possess a real interest in people. There were, in addition, a number of other qualities mentioned, which have been drawn together under the classification "other" in Table VI.28: four respondents thought that an M.P. should be well educated; two mentioned that he should attend debates regularly; others mentioned such things as patriotism, the ability to keep harmony at party caucus, being well informed on the functions of Parliament, and being persuasive at the level where decisions are made.

When the responses are arrayed in terms of many of the variables we have employed throughout the analysis, no significant differences appear in the results. There are no significant variations when the responses are compared with the urban or rural location of constituencies, region, party, age,²³ experience in the House of Commons, representational roles, or purposive roles.

The only significant variable is the mother tongue of the respondent; any differences between parties are a result of the language variable, and differences in terms of the language variable are not simply accounted for by any one group of M.P.s. Most respondents, as we have noted, mentioned certain generally desirable personal qualities as features of the good M.P. It is worth pointing out, however, that French-speaking respondents were rather more inclined to mention these personal qualities than were English-speaking M.P.s. French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined, on the other hand, to mention specifically the ability to work hard as being a quality of the good M.P. The differences in perception of the qualities of a good M.P. stand out more clearly, however, when we compare some of the other qualities mentioned: English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined than French-speaking M.P.s to mention the value of a pleasing personality (good public image), speaking ability, devotion to the job, expertise, putting one's country and/or constituency ahead of one's personal interests, and being interested in people.

Although we have observed that the only variable of any significance in distinguishing the responses of our respondents is the language variable, it must also be noted that the differences between the two language groups are not very great. Essentially both agree that a cluster of personal characteristics such as honesty, integrity, and so on are important qualities of a good M.P.; both also agree on the importance of an M.P.'s ability to work hard. Where the two groups differ is, first, in the degree to which they mention these

Table VI.28

Qualities of a "good M.P." mentioned by back-bench M.P.s, by language group

Quality	English	French	Total
	(%)*	(%)	N
Desirable personal qualities (honesty, sincerity, etc.)	63	92	83
Good image	15	3	13
Good speaker	19	8	18
Devotion to or liking for job	27	14	26
Expertise	20	8	19
Putting interests of country and/or constituency above personal interests	27	19	28
Ability to work hard	38	47	47
Liking for people	13	3	11
Other	22	8	20

* Percentages total more than 100 because nearly all respondents mentioned more than one quality.

two major features, and, secondly, in the propensity for English-speaking M.P.s to rate a number of additional qualities of an M.P. as important, whereas French-speaking M.P.s are less disposed to mention these same factors.

Given the fact that respondents are generally indistinguishable in their perceptions of the qualities of the good M.P., it is perhaps not surprising that M.P.s are generally agreed that these qualities would be mentioned by most M.P.s from other parties and other provinces.²⁴ Over all, 71 per cent of the respondents said that there is no difference in the perceptions of the qualities of a good M.P. related to the M.P.'s province, and 67 per cent said that there are no differences in perception related to other factors (age, region, experience), but only 6 per cent of the respondents were actually prepared to say that perceptions of the qualities of a good M.P. vary by party, and only 4 per cent were prepared to say that these perceptions vary by province. Generally speaking, there were no significant differences between the respondents in their answers to these two questions, although it appeared that French-speaking respondents were just a little more inclined to say that there are no differences in perception.

D. Summary

In Chapter IV, where we examined the respondents' perceptions of their roles, we noted with what relative infrequency English- and French-speaking M.P.s differed in their responses. When we came to explore the manner in which respondents perform their roles, particularly as this relates to maintaining links with their constituencies, we noted more clearly defined differences on the basis of a respondent's mother tongue. In this chapter we have encountered further evidence of a similar pattern: English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s appear not to differ at all in their perceptions of the place of the back-bencher in the legislative process; but with regard to their general orientations to political life, and their attitudes to Parliament and parliamentary reforms, there are very clear differences between the members of the two language groups. Differences based on a respondent's mother tongue were not the only distinguishing features we encountered. Particularly on matters involving attitudes towards Parliament or the party caucus we found that the major factor distinguishing respondents was their party. In several cases, then, the key distinctions were between Government and Opposition parties, but over all the difference between English- and French-speaking respondents is fundamental.

The basic difference in attitudes between respondents from the two principal language groups was never better revealed than in the responses to the questions dealing with the proposed reforms of Parliament. French-speaking M.P.s were considerably more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to say that the House of Commons is ineffective, but when we pursued their specific complaints with the House of Commons as such, their major reform proposals seemed to amount to only two: procedural changes and improvement of the personnel of Parliament. However, when we sought respondents' reactions to specific proposals for reform, such as reducing the number of M.P.s and providing those remaining with paid assistants, alternating the leadership of political parties between the two principal language groups on a regular basis, and establishing a second chamber equally representative of French- and English-speaking Canadians, French-speaking respondents were considerably more inclined to approve than were their English-speaking colleagues.

The differences in general orientation to politics were neither as sharply defined as those dealing with suggested reforms of Parliament nor as insignificant as those dealing with general perceptions of the place of the back-bencher in making policy. French-speaking M.P.s were just as disposed as English-speaking M.P.s to say that being an M.P. is a full-time job, but French-speaking M.P.s were a little more inclined to spend time in their constituencies while the parliamentary session is in progress. French-speaking M.P.s were also more inclined to say that M.P.s lose money in politics, more inclined to say that M.P.s are underpaid, and more inclined to say that they have an interest in a public office other than a cabinet post sometime in

the future. French-speaking M.P.s were also more inclined to say that their reason for staying on in politics is to try to finish the job they began. English-speaking M.P.s, on the other hand, were more inclined to say simply that they enjoy the life. French-speaking M.P.s were not only less disposed to say that they like the life but, in answer to the question about what they would miss most if they left parliamentary life suddenly, more French-speaking than English-speaking M.P.s said they would miss nothing.

Something of this latter attitude is reflected in the responses of French-speaking M.P.s to questions relating to the performance of their roles as M.P.s. French-speaking respondents were more inclined to say that they have no particular political interests; they were also less inclined to say that they are interested in committee work. Moreover, in pursuit of their particular political interests the styles of M.P.s from the two principal language groups differ: English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined to say that they would do research on the matter and that they would follow up their interest at the committee level; French-speaking M.P.s, on the other hand, were more disposed to try to talk to the minister concerned with the problem. There is at least one good reason why some of these differences should appear between the two groups of respondents. The one problem of performing one's job which is unique for French-speaking M.P.s is the problem of language in dealings with the civil service, and in participating in committees in which the major part of the proceedings and the documents provided are in English. Many French-speaking respondents were anxious to relieve both of these problems by making the civil service fully bilingual and by improving the translation and stenographic facilities provided within committees.²⁵

Finally, we may note that the mother tongue of a respondent was also the most distinguishing factor in the analysis of M.P.'s perceptions of the qualities of a good M.P. Here it was observed that both language groups were agreed in attributing greatest importance to a set of desirable personal characteristics (honesty, patience, and so on) and the ability to work hard. The two groups differed mainly to the extent that English-speaking M.P.s also mentioned other qualities, such as expertise and devotion to the job. These differences in perception, interestingly enough, were not noted by our respondents: the vast majority stated that M.P.s from different parties or different provinces would not differ in their description of the qualities of a good M.P. It is worth keeping this point in mind as we examine further perceptions that M.P.s have of each other.

A. Attitudes

It has already been established that Canadian M.P.s exhibit considerable variety in the perception of their roles as members of Parliament and in the manner in which they go about performing these roles. Differences of perception based on language seem most significant, but often differences of party or region emerge as important too. Surprisingly, the urban or rural location of M.P.s' constituencies rarely appears to account for differences in perception or attitude.

On the whole, the differences that have been observed are related to the member's perception of his role or his own manner of coping with that role as he sees it. Only occasionally have we referred to differences in M.P.s' perception of others. However, a major object of the study was to discover how M.P.s saw other M.P.s, their roles, and the manner in which others performed their roles. To this end a number of questions were designed to focus specifically on differences of perception and performance, and especially on those which were related to difference in language.

Question 37 dealt solely with the attitudes of English-speaking M.P.s towards French Canadians since the former entered Parliament; the comparable question in the French-language questionnaire* sought attitudes towards English Canadians: "37.(a) Has your general attitude towards French Canadians changed since you became an M.P.?; (b) (If so) How has it changed?; (c) What has contributed to the change?" Although the first part of the question did not call for an explanation of a respondent's position if his attitude had not changed, most respondents elaborated sufficiently on their negative replies to allow us to determine whether the attitude was in fact "unchanged-sympathetic" or "unchanged-unsympathetic."

*See Appendix C, 253.

The contrast between French-speaking respondents and English-speaking respondents is striking (Table VII.1). Nearly 25 per cent of the English respondents indicated that they were unsympathetic to French Canadians; only one French-speaking respondent was unsympathetic (he had not changed his attitude towards English Canadians since he became an M.P. but had been unsympathetic before entering Parliament). However, whereas a little more than 20 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s had become less sympathetic to French Canadians since they had entered Parliament, another 30 per cent stated that they had become more sympathetic. The largest group of respondents among the English-speaking M.P.s was unchanged in its sympathies towards French Canadians; the smallest group of English-speaking respondents was unchanged in its unsympathetic attitude towards French Canadians. Lying between these two groups were two others whose attitudes had changed since going to Ottawa, the one having become more sympathetic, the other less.

While the difference between English- and French-speaking respondents is clear enough, there were also clear differences in attitudes within the English-speaking group. The most striking difference was regional (Table VII.2): of the 20 "unsympathetic M.P.s," 14 came from either British Columbia or the Prairies, with the Prairie Conservatives accounting for the bulk of these.

Table VII.1

Attitudes of English-speaking M.P.s towards French Canadians and attitudes of French-speaking M.P.s towards English Canadians after entering Parliament

Attitude	English-speaking M.P.s	French-speaking M.P.s
	(%)	(%)
Unchanged-sympathetic	46	70
Became more sympathetic	30	27
Unchanged-unsympathetic	3	3
Became less sympathetic	21	0
N	83	34

There were also, as implied, differences along party lines. Nearly 90 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals were sympathetic, as compared with 66 per cent of the English-speaking Conservatives and 77 per cent of the New Democrats. Looked at in another way, of the 20 English Canadians who stated they were unsympathetic towards French Canadians, 12 (60 per cent) were Conservatives. While the numbers are admittedly small, if we take into account some of the attitudes expressed by Conservatives who refused to participate in the survey, there is little reason to think that the findings from the sample exaggerate the measure of the unsympathetic attitude towards

Table VII.2

Attitudes of English-speaking respondents towards French Canadians, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Sympathetic	Unsympathetic
B.C. and Yukon	64	36
Prairies and N.W.T.	47	53
Ontario	88	12
Quebec	100	0
Atlantic provinces	87	13
N	63	20

French Canadians among Conservative M.P.s. The third part of the question, seeking information on the causes of change in attitude, did not collect replies from a majority of respondents, since less than a majority of respondents indicated that their opinions had changed, but the results are nevertheless important.

B. Communication

For those whose attitude had changed in the direction of greater sympathy with French Canadians there can be no doubt that personal contact with French Canadians was the most important reason given. A few also mentioned other causes, such as the respondent's greater facility in the French language, or the respondent's greater knowledge of the problems of French Canadians; but in the case of every M.P. at least one explanation of attitude change was similar to that offered by a British Columbia Liberal: "I'd say I have more understanding because of contact with articulate French Canadians. It's much more a matter of discussion since I became an M.P."

For those who became less sympathetic there were two main reasons: reaction to the increasing demands of French Canadians (particularly for greater use of French within the House of Commons) and irritation with the behaviour of certain French Canadian members in the House or committees (Table VII.3). One M.P. explained his unsympathetic attitude towards French Canadians in terms of "the discrimination against English civil servants"; another mentioned his "impatience with the French Canadians who place the blame for their ills on the federal government"; a few others seem to have got off to a bad start in Ottawa when no French Canadians took up their offers to share an office with them. But for most of those who had become unsympathetic the reason was similar to that given by a Social Credit M.P.: "The unreasonable and unrelenting pressure to insist on the French language where it has no practical use." Earlier in the interview the same M.P. had complained that bilingualism was "very expensive, and very time consuming." He added: "It is very frustrating when

members insist on having everything done in both languages simply for that sake. In some committees a French-speaking M.P. who can speak English well, even if he knows there aren't enough translators to go around, will insist on adjourning just to prove his point."

Table VII.3

Reasons offered by English-speaking M.P.s for becoming unsympathetic towards French Canadians

	Number
Increasing demands of French Canada	14
Behaviour of French Canadian members in House or committee	11
Personal contact	2
Other	4

Although personal contact between French- and English-speaking M.P.s did not always lead to greater sympathy on the part of English Canadians, it was an important factor in the warming attitude of the vast majority. The same was true for those French-speaking M.P.s who had become more sympathetic to English Canadians. Not all of the French-speaking M.P.s who have become more sympathetic gave reasons for their change in attitude, but the most important single factor mentioned was personal contact with English-speaking M.P.s.¹

Answers to other questions also bolster the suggestion implicit in the results just given that personal or informal contact with other M.P.s is more important in creating sympathy than in creating antagonism for a point of view. Question 28(b) asked: "Can you give any examples of occasions on which, from your own experience, informal contacts with other M.P.s have - (i) actually made you more sympathetic to a view to which you were originally opposed?; (ii) . . . made you less sympathetic?" While only about one third of the M.P.s (equal proportions from each of the two language groups) gave examples of occasions on which informal contacts led to greater sympathy, and only about one quarter (again roughly equal proportions of the two groups) gave examples of becoming less sympathetic, we obtained enough responses of a less specific nature to compare the disposition of the two groups and to say whether informal contacts do or do not have an effect on their point of view.

The majority of M.P.s agreed that informal contacts make for greater sympathy with the others' points of view—the French-speaking M.P.s being somewhat less inclined than the English-speaking M.P.s to agree (Table VII.4). The M.P.s were rather less inclined to say that informal contacts have the effect of making them less sympathetic. In this instance there seems to be some difference between French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s. Whereas English-speaking M.P.s are almost equally divided between those who state they have become

unsympathetic as the result of informal contacts and those who have not, 63 per cent of the French-speaking say they have not. One should not make too much of the small differences between the English- and French-speaking respondents, especially as a rather large number of the latter did not answer these questions,² but the direction of the difference (that is, in the tendency for French-speaking M.P.s, as compared with English-speaking, to underrate somewhat the importance of informal contacts as a means of changing opinion) is the same for both questions. It remains to be examined whether this tendency is based on the fact that French-speaking M.P.s experience fewer informal contacts or whether, given the same degree of contact, they nevertheless tend to stick more to their original point of view.

Table VII.4

Effects of informal contacts between M.P.s, by language group, horizontal percentages

Effects	Yes	No
Greater sympathy:		
English	71	29
French	61	39
N	80	31
Less sympathy:		
English	51	49
French	37	63
N	77	30

What has clearly been established thus far is this: personal or informal contacts have a part to play in the creation of M.P.s' attitudes towards each other and the ideas that M.P.s support. It is therefore important to examine, especially with regard to the creation of attitudes within the two major language groups, whether M.P.s think there are any problems of communication between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s (question 29(a), 245).

Thirty per cent of the M.P.s believed that there was no problem of communication between French- and English-speaking M.P.s, and that there was no substantial difference in opinion between M.P.s of the two major language groups.³ The only important difference that was found as a result of analysis of the language variable was the tendency of French-speaking M.P.s (22 per cent) to mention lack of contact as hindering communication between the two language groups more often than English-speaking M.P.s (6 per cent). Twenty-eight per cent of the respondents mentioned ignorance of the other language as a factor contributing to the problem of communication, 8 per cent

mentioned cultural differences, and 23 per cent mentioned other factors (usually a combination of language and cultural differences).

It is important to note that while much of the apparent difference between English- and French-speaking M.P.s with regard to lack of contact is accounted for by the considerable disposition of the Cr ditistes (two thirds of the sample of Cr ditistes) to mention lack of contact as a problem, differences are also noticeable within the Liberal party between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s (Table VII.5). French-speaking Liberals were less inclined to see no problem, and more inclined to mention the problem of lack of contact, than their English-speaking cohorts.

Table VII.5

Responses of French-speaking and English-speaking Liberals to question on problems of communication between French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s, horizontal percentages*

	No problem	Language	Cultural differences	Lack of contact	Other	N
English	35	35	0	6	24	37
French	24	28	12	16	20	25

* Responses are derived from the two parts of question 29(a).

When the responses are analyzed by party some interesting differences emerge. There are no significant differences between the two major parties, and the differences are even less when one looks only at the English-speaking members. Liberals were more inclined to mention ignorance of the other language alone as contributing to the problem of communication, whereas Conservatives were more inclined to see the problem as a combination of language and cultural factors, but otherwise the differences are slight. However genuine differences are apparent between M.P.s from the two major parties, on the one hand, and M.P.s from the minor parties on the other. All Social Credit M.P.s felt there was a problem of communication—60 per cent putting the blame on language differences. The Cr ditistes, as already noted, mentioned particularly the problem of lack of contact between English- and French-speaking M.P.s. New Democratic members were not much different in their responses from M.P.s of the two older parties, except that they were somewhat more inclined to mention language problems as the key factor in the problem of communication.

In many ways regional differences in the responses are the most important (*see* Table VII.6). British Columbia members were the most inclined to say that a problem exists, with the language factor being uppermost for the majority. Prairie M.P.s (47 per cent) were most inclined to say that no problem exists. When it is recalled that

there were no significant differences between the Conservatives and Liberal parties (especially between the English-speaking members thereof), the importance of this point of view expressed by many Prairie members (who are predominately Conservative) is reinforced. No fewer than 50 per cent of the Prairie Conservatives thought there was no problem of communication. An attempt is made later to ascertain whether this opinion is based on successfully overcoming the problem of communication which other members found important, or whether it results from not trying to communicate at all.

Finally, the responses of M.P.s from the three other regions are of particular interest. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and Quebec were exactly the same in their disposition to note a problem of communication (one quarter of each group said there was no problem), but they differed in the factors selected as contributing to the problem: M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces tended to emphasize the problem of language, while Quebec M.P.s singled out the problem of lack of contact. Ontario M.P.s (and especially Ontario Liberals) were more inclined than members from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces to feel that there was no problem of communication, but of those who did think there was a problem a great many found the explanation in language and cultural differences between the two groups.

Table VII.6

Responses of M.P.s to question on problem of communication between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	No problem	Language problem	Cultural differences	Lack of contact	Other
B.C. and Yukon	9	64	9	9	9
Prairies and N.W.T.	47	21	16	5	11
Ontario	35	30	0	5	30
Quebec	25	19	11	22	22
Atlantic provinces	25	31	6	6	31
N	36	34	9	13	27*

* Twenty-one of these gave answers pointing to a combination of language and cultural differences as the source of the problem of communication.

M.P.s who stated that there was a problem of communication between English and French Canadians were asked whether they saw any solutions to the problem (question 29(b), 245). As roughly 30 per cent of the respondents did not think there was any problem, the suggested solutions are presented here as percentages of the respondents within a group who *saw* a problem of communication, and not as a percentage of the entire group. Because M.P.s often mentioned more than one solution the total percentage adds up to more than 100.

About 18 per cent of the M.P.s answering the question thought that there was no solution to the problem of communication. This group was composed more or less equally of English- and French-speaking respondents. Yet although there were no significant differences in this respect between the two language groups (just as there had been no difference in their disposition to recognize a problem) there were clear differences in the solutions which they proposed (Table VII.7). French-speaking M.P.s were far more inclined than English-speaking M.P.s to mention "efforts to mix with the other language group" as the solution to the problem; they were relatively less inclined to mention language lessons and the use of translation services. English-speaking respondents who proposed solutions to the problem of communication favoured language lessons, and were considerably less disposed than French-speaking respondents to mention the desirability of greater mixing between the two groups: 63 per cent of the French-speaking respondents offering solutions mentioned the idea; only 20 per cent of the English-speaking respondents did so.⁴

Table VII.7

Proposed solutions to problem of communication mentioned by M.P.s recognizing the problem, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	There is no solution	Language lessons	Mixing with other lan- guage group	Translation devices	Other**
English	20	41	20	24	36
French	15	19	63	7	19
N	16	29	29	16	26

* Percentages total more than 100 since M.P.s mentioned more than one solution.

** Five English-speaking M.P.s mentioned that an extra effort to read about Quebec affairs was a solution; seven English-speaking M.P.s said that discussion of the subject was helpful; only one English-speaking M.P. offered the solution that French Canadians simply assimilate.

No significant differences appeared in responses when analyzed by the urban or rural location of the M.P.'s constituency and, generally speaking, the differences between the parties followed the differences between the two principal language groups. It is worth noting that Conservatives (who were no less inclined than Liberals to recognize a problem of communication) were more inclined to think that there were no solutions to the problem: 32 per cent of the Conservatives and only 14 per cent of the Liberals who were asked for solutions to the problem gave a pessimistic answer. Also, when the proposed solutions of English-speaking Liberals and Conservatives are compared, language lessons emerge as far more important for Liberals

than for Conservatives: 58 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals who were asked mentioned this solution, whereas only 17 per cent of the English-speaking Conservatives who were asked mentioned it.

When the responses are examined regionally (Table VII.8) one further interesting fact emerges: there seems to be a parallel between the disposition of M.P.s from the different regions to recognize a problem of communication and the disposition of M.P.s from the same region to think that a solution to the problem can be found. Prairie M.P.s were most inclined to say that there is no problem of communication, and among those who think that there is a problem of communication Prairie M.P.s are the most inclined to think there is no solution. British Columbia M.P.s, on the other hand, were most disposed to see a problem; they were also the most disposed to think that there were solutions to the problem of communication.

Table VII.8
Comparison of regional respondents thinking there is no problem of communication and respondents who, recognizing there is a problem, feel there is no solution to the problem

Region	Respondents saying there is no problem of communication	Respondents recog- nizing problem of communication but believing there is no solution to the problem
	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	9	0
Prairies and N.W.T.	47	40
Ontario	35	22
Quebec	25	19
Atlantic provinces	25	8
N	36	16

It is not suggested that there is any causal relationship between these two sets of facts: they must be taken merely as adding further descriptive evidence of the attitudes of members from the different regions towards communication between M.P.s of the two principal language groups. It is worth noting that Prairie M.P.s were the least inclined of any from the predominantly English-speaking provinces to think that language lessons had anything to contribute to the solution to the problem of communication.

It has already been established that informal contacts between M.P.s can be important as a mechanism for changing opinions, we also saw that, for most of those whose attitude towards the other language group had become more sympathetic, personal contact loomed as important. Although nearly a third of the French Canadian and English

Canadian M.P.s were agreed that there is no problem of communication, a significant number of French-speaking M.P.s pointed to lack of contact with English-speaking M.P.s as a problem. French Canadians were also much more disposed to see the efforts to mix with the other language group as working towards a solution to the problem, whereas the English-speaking M.P.s tended to mention language lessons and translation facilities as solutions to the problem. The solutions suggested are functional for both groups: for the French-speaking the problem seems to be one of contact; for the English-speaking the problem is seen as one of language, or of language and cultural differences.

In order to pursue further the process by which attitudes are formed or changed it is necessary to examine the pattern of friendship within the House of Commons, as part of the process of informal contact to which we have been referring. We shall also examine the disposition of members to turn to other M.P.s, whether or not they happen to be friends, for a better understanding of the English Canadian or French Canadian point of view.

It must be recalled at this point that we were not as successful as we had hoped in getting members to name their closest parliamentary friends (question 28(a), 244), i.e. the members they most often see outside the chamber, at lunch or dinner, or at parties or social gatherings.⁵ Sixty per cent of the sample did mention the name of at least one friend; still others gave some information about the nature of their parliamentary friendships without revealing names. However, the pattern of refusals was not completely random: there were no significant differences related to language or the urban or rural location of an M.P.'s constituency, but there were differences on the basis of party and region. Liberals (both English- and French-speaking) were more inclined to name friends than were Conservatives (69 per cent as compared to 51 per cent) and Prairie M.P.s (mainly Conservatives) were far more inclined to refuse than M.P.s from any other region.⁶ For this reason it was not possible to set out the friendship links, in terms of named friends, for the entire House of Commons. However, because of the larger number of Liberal respondents to begin with, and because of their better than average cooperation in naming friends, it is possible to say something about the patterns of friendship within the Government party.

Fundamentally, close friendships within the Liberal party follow regional and language lines, moderated only by the presence of a few key personalities who seem to bridge the gap between the two principal language groups as well as the parties. The Quebec caucus seems to be made up of a number of interpenetrating islands of French-speaking friendship groups linked with English-speaking groups of the same party through a very few younger bilingual M.P.s, who not only name English-speaking Liberals as their friends but are in turn named by English-speaking M.P.s as friends. The younger English-speaking M.P.s, who seem to form the other part of the bridge, are themselves most frequently named by English-speaking M.P.s as close friends.

The friendship links between the French-speaking and English-speaking Liberals are few in number: the links consist of a half dozen popular M.P.s of the two language groups whose choice of friends is reciprocated.

It is possible to go a little further with our data on the question of friendship links, although it is unfortunately not possible to say too much more about the tendency of friendships to bridge language group lines. There were only eight M.P.s who refused to give us any information about their friends in the House: most would at least say whether their friends came from the same party or region, or whether they had no friends at all. Such information permitted us to code respondents as having "friends in own party and region," "friends in own party," "no limitations of party or region on friendships," "no friends," and "other." The results, analyzed by language group, are shown in Table VII.9. The figures given suggest one

Table VII.9
Closest friends of respondents, by language group of respondent, horizontal percentages

	In own party and region	In own party	No limitations	No friends	Other
English	8	30	33	9	21
French	36	28	28	3	6
N	19	33	36	8	18

important difference between the English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s: French-speaking M.P.s were far more inclined to choose friends from their own party and region. But we must not make more of this difference than is warranted. While the figures tend to confirm what our analysis of friendships within the Liberal party has already suggested (that a large number of French Canadians have no friends outside their own cultural group), they do not, on the other hand, so clearly affirm the notion that English-speaking M.P.s' friendships are more inclined to cross cultural lines. It is fairly certain that, when French-speaking respondents replied that their friendships are mainly in their own party and region, these friendships are generally with other French-speaking M.P.s. When English-speaking M.P.s say that their friends come from their own region or that they are friends with M.P.s who "share their own interests," it is not so clear that any of these friends are necessarily French-speaking M.P.s; it is precisely this type of answer (classed as "other" in Table VII.9) which makes up the difference between French- and English-speaking respondents. Even when M.P.s say, as did roughly 30 per cent of the M.P.s of both language groups, that their friends come from their own party, it is impossible to assert that

these friends are drawn proportionately from the two language groups within the same party. The only non-parochial respondents were those who stated that their friendships are not bound by party or geographical limitations, and these were only a little more prevalent among the English-speaking M.P.s. Over all, we are entitled to draw only the following conclusions: the data do not permit us to state the measure of the propensity of the different language groups to seek friends outside their own language group, but we can say that French-speaking M.P.s are more inclined to choose friends solely from their own region;⁷ English-speaking M.P.s, while perhaps no more inclined to cross language lines, are less disposed to choose friends only within their own region. The fact that the bulk of the French-speaking M.P.s come from one province, while English-speaking M.P.s are spread through all provinces, accounts for the difference between the two language groups, but it does not dispose of the fact that the friendships of many French-speaking M.P.s have a parochial character: not only do their friends come from the same language group, but from the same province as well.

Friendship offers a means, often most subtle, by which opinions are created; but it is only one means. M.P.s might also rely on informal contact with other M.P.s (not necessarily their closest friends, but people to whom they might be inclined to turn for advice, information, or merely an expression of opinion) in making up their minds on many issues. To explore this relation among M.P.s we asked respondents question 29(d), bearing directly on the particular problem of English-French relations: "What M.P.s do you tend to turn to for a deeper understanding of the French Canadian point of view?" Respondents were urged to mention at least three names or "contacts."

Nearly 60 per cent of the M.P.s were able to name at least one person. Just over 40 per cent refused to answer the question, or stated that there were no such persons to whom they would be likely to turn.⁸ Although French-speaking M.P.s appear to be somewhat more disposed to seek out contacts, the differences between the two language groups are not especially great (*see* Table VII.10). The

Table VII.10

Back-bench M.P.s mentioning useful contact(s) for better understanding of point of view, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Mention	No mention
English	54	46
French	68	32
N	71	51

difference between English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals is even a little sharper. Whereas some 68 per cent of the French-

speaking Liberals were disposed to seek out contacts and named at least one person to whom they turned, only 48 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals did so. The unwillingness (or inability) to mention a contact was especially noticeable among Ontario Liberals, over 50 per cent of whom said they made no contacts.

Differences between the parties were insignificant, except for the fact that all M.P.s in the Social Credit Party mentioned a contact. The regional differences were more noteworthy (Table VII.11): M.P.s from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were most disposed to seek out opinions from other M.P.s; Ontario, Prairie, and British Columbia M.P.s were somewhat less disposed.

Table VII.11
M.P.s mentioning useful contacts for understanding point of view, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Mention	No mention
B.C. and Yukon	45	55
Prairies and N.W.T.	53	47
Ontario	50	50
Quebec	69	31
Atlantic provinces	69	31
N	71	51

Who are the key contacts for M.P.s of the two language groups? Because we are dealing with a sample of the membership in the first place, and because some M.P.s who presumably might have such contacts refused to tell us who they are, it would be wrong to attribute too much quantitative significance to the names mentioned. However, because we are dealing with such a large sample of the membership and because a fairly considerable number of members mentioned at least one contact, it is certainly worth while to present the results of the analysis.

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of useful contacts come from the M.P.s' own parties, and this was true for both French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s. The main exceptions were of course the Ralliement des Cr ditistes and the New Democratic Party, neither of which has members of both language groups within the same party. To whom did these M.P.s tend to turn? The Cr ditistes appeared equally disposed to turn to Liberals and Conservatives, with no single individual in either party being preferred. The New Democrats, on the other hand, turned to French-speaking Liberals and Cr ditistes.

Throughout the analysis of contacts it has been assumed that the disposition of a member to mention at least one other M.P. to whom he turns for "a deeper understanding" of the French Canadian (or English Canadian) point of view, can be taken as a rough measure of his

interest in the matter of relations between the two language groups. This may not always be so: a member may be interested in the matter but nevertheless feel that his own expertise and experience make it unnecessary to seek out further opinions from his colleagues. Such a position is not so likely, however, with regard to the point of view of writers, editorialists, and social scientists. Few interested individuals, even if they have a good deal of personal knowledge, will be indifferent to the opinions expressed by controversial people. In order, then, to find a further measure of interest and concern for the question of relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada among M.P.s and also to find out who in Canada are important in shaping opinion on the subject, we asked all M.P.s question 29(e): "Are there any personalities (writers, editorialists, social scientists, politicians) whose point of view you listen to with respect and interest on the subject of relations between English- and French-speaking Canada?" If the M.P. is at all interested in the problem, there must be some views to which he listens with respect and interest, even if he rejects many others.⁹

Once more, nearly 60 per cent of our sample named at least one person to whose views they listened with interest and respect. Once again there were no significant differences between M.P.s on the basis of the urban or rural location of their constituencies; nor were there any really significant differences between the parties. The New Democrats were least inclined to mention names, but when the New Democratic Party (an all English-speaking party) is compared with the English-speaking M.P.s of the Liberal and Conservative parties, the differences are not important. By implication, the major differences are those of language: French-speaking M.P.s were much more inclined than were English-speaking M.P.s to mention people to whom they listened for their contribution to the discussion of the relations between the two language groups (Table VII.12). These differences on the basis of language are revealed within the same political party. Table VII.13 compares the English- and French-speaking M.P.s of the Conservative and Liberal parties in terms of their disposition to mention specific people.

Table VII.12

Back-bench M.P.s mentioning persons respected for views on relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Mention	No mention
English	51	49
French	81	19
N	73	49

Table VII.13
Liberal and Conservative M.P.s mentioning persons respected for views on relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, by language group

	English			French		
	Mention	No mention	N	Mention	No mention	N
	(%)	(%)		(%)	(%)	
Liberals	51	49	39	80	20	25
Conservatives	54	46	35	100	0	2

Even more interesting than these differences, however, are the variations between M.P.s when looked at by region (Table VII.14). One would expect to find a difference between Quebec, with its large number of French-speaking M.P.s, and the rest of the country, but once more there are also clear differences within the other regions as well. These regional differences which show the apparently high level of interest of M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces and the relatively low interest of Prairie and Ontario M.P.s, exist within both major parties (Table VII.15).

Table VII.14
M.P.s mentioning persons respected for views on relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Mention	No mention
B.C. and Yukon	54	46
Prairies and N.W.T.	37	63
Ontario	38	62
Quebec	86	14
Atlantic provinces	87	13
N	73	49

Finally we may note that there is a relation between sympathy with French Canadians and disposition to mention persons whose views on the question they respect, although the difference between sympathetic and unsympathetic English-speaking M.P.s in this regard is not great: 55 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s who said they were sympathetic to French Canadians mentioned some particular person or persons, whereas only 35 per cent of those who were unsympathetic did so.

Let us now look at the people mentioned by respondents. Seventy-three respondents mentioned at least one person; several M.P.s

Table VII.15

Liberal and Conservative M.P.s mentioning persons respected for views on relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, by region

Region	Liberals	Conservatives
	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	33	100
Prairies and N.W.T.	*	38
Ontario	41	33
Quebec	87	100
Atlantic provinces	80	100
N	64	37

* Only one respondent.

mentioned as many as six. The interesting fact that emerges from the results is, however, that there is only one figure mentioned by anything like a majority of the respondents answering the question: 64 per cent of the respondents (75 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s and 57 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s) mentioned a leading French Canadian journalist as a person respected for his views on the subject of relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada. The next most highly ranked people also included two Quebec journalists, who each received mention from a little more than 12 per cent of the answering respondents. Their clear prominence offers an implicit comment on the status of English-speaking newspapermen and Canadian universities which both would do well to note. Also within the highest-ranked persons, but insignificant by comparison with the most frequently mentioned, were a number of politicians.

The data presented in this chapter seem to suggest that although, as a group, French-speaking M.P.s are no more convinced than are English-speaking M.P.s of a problem of communication between English and French Canadians, those who do see a problem tend to point more often than English-speaking M.P.s to the lack of contact. We noticed earlier that both French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s whose attitudes towards each other had become more sympathetic mentioned personal contact with the other language group as an important explanation. On the other hand we noted that French Canadian M.P.s seemed less open to changes in attitude as a result of informal contact with other M.P.s, and we considered whether this could be explained by their having fewer informal contacts with other M.P.s. Further analysis revealed that the answer was not to be found in the frequency of contacts. Might it be explained by the nature of their contacts? We noticed the tendency for French Canadian M.P.s to have, as their closest friends, M.P.s from their own province, and it may be that these more parochial friendships give rise less often to points of view different from those of the respondents. Not many close

friendships cross the barriers of language in either language group, but English-speaking M.P.s seem more inclined to friendships that at least transcend regional ties.

If disposition to seek out contacts for an English Canadian (or French Canadian) point of view and to name people whose views are regarded with respect and interest on the subject of relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, can be taken as an indicator of general interest in relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada, then there can be no doubt that English-speaking M.P.s are less interested than French-speaking M.P.s. The differences on this matter are even sharper when looked at by the regions (Table VII.16). Clearly on both tests M.P.s from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces are most interested in the matter; Ontario, Prairie, and British Columbia M.P.s rather less so.

Table VII.16
M.P.s mentioning "contacts" and "persons," by region*

Region	Mentioning contacts	Mentioning persons
	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	45	54
Prairies and N.W.T.	53	37
Ontario	50	38
Quebec	69	86
Atlantic provinces	69	87
N	71	73

* Measure of interest in question of relations between English and French Canada.

These facts can also be related to variations noted earlier in attitudes towards French Canadians. M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were very sympathetic; they were also the most inclined to seek out contacts and to refer to people whose points of view they respect in the matter of relations between English- and French-speaking Canada. Prairie M.P.s (47 per cent) were the least sympathetic and the least inclined to mention people whose views they respect (although they were fractionally more inclined than were either British Columbia or Ontario M.P.s to mention contacts within Parliament). British Columbia M.P.s were more sympathetic than Prairie M.P.s, and more disposed to mention people whose views they respect, although least disposed to seek contacts in the House. The position of Ontario M.P.s is in some ways the most interesting: they were just as sympathetic towards French Canadians as were the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces, but they were almost as indifferent to the problem of relations between English-speaking and French-speaking Canada as Prairie M.P.s, and actually somewhat less inclined than Prairie M.P.s to seek out

contacts with French Canadians. The indifference to contacts was particularly noticeable among Ontario Liberals.

How to explain the position of Ontario M.P.s? Probably the explanation has something to do with their feeling of proximity to the matter. Some Ontario M.P.s expressed the view that they had no need to seek out a contact or listen to any "authority": they had enough experience of French Canadians (many of them in their own constituencies) without having to turn to others for advice or point of view. There may be other explanations as well. Ontario M.P.s, while not unsympathetic to French Canadians, may have become bored with the controversy; the mass media had given heavy coverage to the discussion of English-French relations for more than a year; there may be no advantage to be gained in Ontario constituencies from discussion (either pro or con) on the matter of relations between the province of Ontario and Quebec (relations which, at the provincial level, appear to have been very friendly indeed); so the member is not inclined to pay particular attention to the debate elsewhere. Finally, the Ontario M.P.s may feel that they have been aware of the problem of relations between English and French Canada for a very long time: they may think that relations admittedly became heated for a while but that they will tone down once again and that in the meantime there is little point in concerning themselves too much with the problem.

The following responses from a number of Ontario M.P.s underline these generalizations:

[The subject of relations between English- and French-speaking Canada] is not such a big problem to me. Earlier in my life I spent much time throughout Quebec. I had never heard of separatism until a few in Quebec brought it to light. M.P.s do not like this—we all feel it's a small minority getting too much publicity. The press must take great responsibility here; they are not doing as well as they should. (*Liberal*)

I've never really felt I've needed anyone to bolster my opinion. I hope I have an understanding of their problems. My association with them has confirmed my feeling that I've always held that they have a cause we should consider in English Canada. (*Liberal*)

None. Frankly, I'm not interested. (*Liberal*)

No. I can't say that there are. Whilst I consider their views, I think they are taking a hard line. I prefer to get down to the grass roots—to the average fellow. Intellectuals represent what may be sound and right, but not the views of the average fellow. (*Conservative*)

I was brought up as a Quebecker and accordingly prefer to rely on my own views on a subject which is very dear to my heart. I've spoken on it myself, have my own views and don't hunger after others. I think the crisis is over. (*Liberal*)

It is worth noting the relation between the belief that there is or is not a problem of communication between French- and English-speaking M.P.s, and the disposition to attempt such communication. Prairie Conservative M.P.s were the most disposed to deny a problem of communication, but they were not especially disposed to mention French-speaking contacts sought out for a French Canadian point of view. British Columbia M.P.s were most convinced of a problem of communication (one related especially to language differences) and for them the problem seems clearly manifest in the relatively low level of contact with French Canadians. Quebeckers and M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were equally disposed to recognize a problem of communication (more so than were the Prairie M.P.s but not so much as the M.P.s from British Columbia) and were almost equally disposed to seek out contacts. It is fruitful to carry the analysis further to see how the different patterns of contact and the different attitudes (sympathetic or unsympathetic) already observed are revealed in terms of perceptions of the other group.

C. Perceptions of Others

1. Ottawa as seen by members of Parliament

We have already noted in connection with the perception of the M.P.'s role and the description of the "good M.P.," the extent to which M.P.s are inclined to feel that members from other parties or provinces would differ in their perceptions from their own. In every case most M.P.s thought that there would be no difference between their own and others' perceptions. We now examine the responses to a number of questions designed to explore M.P.s' perceptions of others, particularly those of the language group different from their own.

We noted the tendency for French Canadian M.P.s to spend only the week days in Ottawa. In sharp contrast to many English-speaking M.P.s (even those from Ontario, whose homes are probably no more distant from Ottawa) Quebec M.P.s are far less inclined to live in Ottawa with their families during the parliamentary session. Does part of the answer lie in the attitude of French Canadians towards the city of Ottawa? In order to find out, but also to test different perceptions of the other group, we asked both English-speaking and French-speaking members questions 42(c) and (d): "Is Ottawa the kind of place a French Canadian M.P. can feel at home in?" and "Is Ottawa the kind of place an English-Canadian M.P. can feel at home in?" The difference in replies between the two language groups is striking indeed (Table VII.17): exactly half the French-speaking respondents stated that the French Canadians did not feel at home in Ottawa; but only 9 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s thought that French Canadians were not at home there.

Differences occur between the French-speaking M.P.s in the various political parties: the majority of French-speaking Conservatives, French-speaking Social Crediters, and Cr ditistes thought that a

French Canadian does not feel at home in Ottawa; something less than a majority (42 per cent) of the French-speaking Liberals agree.

Table VII.17

Replies of back-bench M.P.s to the question of whether French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Feel at home	Don't feel at home	Don't know
English	71	9	20
French	39	50	11
N	70	25	20

There were also interesting differences related to party, region, and the urban or rural location of constituencies. Rural M.P.s were most inclined to say that French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa, that is they were most inclined to disagree with the majority position of the French Canadians themselves. M.P.s from mixed urban-rural constituencies were somewhat less inclined to think French Canadians are at home in Ottawa, and urban M.P.s (a majority) were still less inclined to think they are at home (Table VII.18). These differences were revealed in both major parties (and cannot therefore be put down simply to party differences, since the Conservatives are a predominantly rural party) although the differences were less distinct within the Liberal party: 90 per cent of the rural Conservatives thought that French Canadians felt at home in Ottawa, 67 per cent of the rural Liberals agreed. Some of the sharpness of the differences revealed in this table is accounted for by the tendency of urban M.P.s to be uncertain as to whether or not French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa, but we can still note the clear difference between them and their rural colleagues who seemed to be so certain that French Canadians do feel at home there.

Table VII.18

M.P.s' replies to the question of whether French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa, by urban or rural location of M.P.s' constituency, horizontal percentages

	Feel at home	Don't feel at home	Don't know	N
Rural	77	15	8	39
Urban-rural	60	24	16	38
Urban	45	26	29	38

Conservatives (79 per cent) were most inclined to think that French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa; Liberals (57 per cent) were less inclined to agree (even when controlled for English Liberals only, although the difference between the two major parties is then not so great). New Democrats (56 per cent) were uncertain about how French Canadians feel in Ottawa.

The regional differences are once more significant (Table VII.19). The number of Quebec M.P.s who thought that French Canadians do not feel at home in Ottawa (56 per cent) is even higher than the number of French-speaking M.P.s who were of this opinion: that is, French-speaking Quebecers are supported in their position by English-speaking Quebecers. British Columbia M.P.s offered the sharpest contrast with Quebec M.P.s: none stated that French Canadians do not feel at home in Ottawa, although a considerable number were not sure. Most inclined to think that French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa were the Prairie M.P.s (89 per cent), followed by the M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces (71 per cent). We have here an excellent example of the way in which English Canadians see a situation in a manner radically out of line with the perceptions of at least a majority of French Canadians. It also adds further weight to the British Columbia M.P.s' conviction that there is a problem of communication between English and French Canadians, and should cause many Prairie Conservatives to re-examine their belief that there is no problem of communication between English and French Canadians.

Table VII.19

M.P.s' replies to question of whether French Canadians feel at home in Ottawa, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Feel at home	Don't feel at home	Don't know
B.C. and Yukon	54	0	46
Prairies and N.W.T.	89	6	5
Ontario	67	8	25*
Quebec	39	56	5
Atlantic provinces	72	7	21
N	70	25	20

* The bulk of these were Liberals.

We also asked English- and French-speaking M.P.s whether they thought that English Canadians feel at home in Ottawa. This time there was no difference in point of view between M.P.s of the two language groups, although it may be worth noting that French Canadians were a little more inclined to say that the English Canadian feels at home in Ottawa than English-speaking M.P.s themselves were prepared to say: 92 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s said that English Canadians feel at home in Ottawa; 83 per cent of the English-

speaking M.P.s agreed with them; only 15 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s said that English Canadians do not feel at home in Ottawa.

For most French-speaking M.P.s there was no doubt that English Canadians feel at home in Ottawa. Why should they not feel at home, some of them asked, when the entire character of the city is English and therefore presumably acceptable to them? For the few English-speaking M.P.s who did not feel at home in Ottawa, however, the city was not English enough; one M.P. admitted that it would be difficult for anyone to feel at home in Ottawa, but a few other English-speaking M.P.s who do not like the city felt that there is now too much French influence in Ottawa for their liking.

Generally speaking, M.P.s of both language groups felt that Ottawa is a suitable national capital.¹⁰ It is true that less than a majority (46 per cent) of the French-speaking M.P.s were prepared to say that it *is* a suitable capital, compared with 64 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s who are satisfied with Ottawa as a national capital. But these differences are counterbalanced by the fact that nearly a third of the French-speaking M.P.s feel that Ottawa can be a suitable capital with appropriate improvements. Only 21 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s and 14 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s feel that Ottawa is not (and apparently, cannot be) a suitable national capital.

No significant differences were apparent in the responses to the question of the suitability of Ottawa as a national capital when respondents were analyzed by party or by the urban or rural location of their constituencies. Nor were the differences significant between the regions. The only point worth noting here is the preference of Prairie M.P.s for the national capital in its present location: 72 per cent of the Prairie M.P.s regard Ottawa as a suitable national capital; only half the British Columbia M.P.s and just over 40 per cent of the Quebec M.P.s think it is suitable at the moment.

What is it about Ottawa that makes so many French-speaking M.P.s feel that French Canadians are not at home in the national capital? Fundamentally it is the absence of bilingualism in the daily life of the city. As one respondent put it: "S'il ne parle pas anglais, il se sent en pays étranger."¹¹ But the answer is also to be found in French-speaking respondents' adverse reaction to the coldness of the city, the lack of "la gaieté," good restaurants, and a cultural and artistic life. A number of French-speaking M.P.s, who are critical of Ottawa as it now is, see hope for it as a national capital provided certain improvements are made. The one solution mentioned by most M.P.s in this position is the idea of a bilingual federal district centred on Ottawa, but one M.P. suggested the idea of "une cité parlementaire." The case for change is pretty well summed up by this mild comment from a Quebec Liberal: "On commence à comprendre que le Canada est hétérogène et qu'il faut qu'Ottawa image ce plan social."

2. *Self-perception and the perception of others*

Part B of the questionnaire includes three fairly provocative statements designed to probe further for differences between one language group's view of itself and how the other group perceives it.¹² One example of this kind is statement 24: "The main concern of the English Canadian M.P. is not to rock the party boat." The quotation had come from one French-speaking Liberal M.P. in the course of the preliminary interviews during the summer of 1964. We were particularly interested to see whether there were other French Canadians with this view of English-speaking M.P.s and also whether English Canadians would agree with this particular characterization of themselves.

The short answer to the second question is that the vast majority do not agree: 78 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s said that they disagree with the statement and only 21 per cent said they agree. On the other hand, the results show that our earlier French-speaking respondent was not alone in his view of English-speaking M.P.s: 43 per cent of his French-speaking colleagues agreed with the statement, and a further 24 per cent were not sure; only 33 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s disagreed with the statement. However the responses are more meaningful when looked at from the point of view of party. The bulk of the French-speaking members agreeing with the statement were from the Opposition parties: not one French-speaking Conservative, Cr ditiste, or Social Cr diter disagreed with the statement. All the French-speaking disagreement with the proposition came from the French-speaking Liberals, 52 per cent of whom disagreed with it, with a further 29 per cent not sure.

Probably because the Liberal M.P.s are the most sensitive to the charge of disciplined voting in the House of Commons, they reacted most strongly against the suggestion of being unwilling to "rock the party boat": in any case the English-speaking Liberals (83 per cent) were the most disposed of English-speaking M.P.s to disagree with the statement, and the French-speaking Liberals were the most disposed of French-speaking M.P.s to agree with them.

Statement 27 allowed us to compare reactions to the suggestion that "English Canadian M.P.s enjoy more freedom from their party organizations than French Canadian M.P.s." Here there are no significant differences over all between M.P.s of the two language groups. Only about 14 per cent of the M.P.s in our sample agree with the suggestion, and there are no differences whatever in the proportions from each of the two language groups. What is most interesting is the very large number of M.P.s, particularly English-speaking Liberals, who are not sure: 56 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s and 43 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s disagree with the proposition, but more than 40 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s and just under 30 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s are not sure.

There are no over-all differences in the responses when examined by region, party or the urban or rural location of constituency, but

when English-speaking Conservatives are compared with English-speaking Liberals, and when the latter are compared in turn with French-speaking Liberals (Table VII.20), some interesting points emerge. Whereas English-speaking Liberals and Conservatives were equally inclined to agree with the proposition that English-speaking M.P.s are freer of their party organizations than are French-speaking M.P.s, English-speaking Liberals were far less inclined than Conservatives to disagree with the statement: 60 per cent of the Conservatives but only 29 per cent of the Liberals disagree with the suggestion. The difference is made up by the very large number of English-speaking Liberals (56 per cent as compared with 28 per cent of the Conservatives) who are not sure. Ontario Liberals, who were the only English-speaking Liberals to agree with the statement, make up half the small number of English-speaking M.P.s who agree that English-speaking M.P.s are freer. Ontario Liberals also represent 46 per cent of the total number of M.P.s who are not sure. Contrast their position with that of French-speaking Liberals: only one French-speaking Liberal agrees with the statement, 64 per cent disagree, and 32 per cent are not sure.

Table VII.20

Replies of Liberals to the statement that "English Canadian M.P.s enjoy more freedom from their party organizations than French Canadian M.P.s," by language group, horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	15	29	56
French	4	64	32
N	6	24	26

The difference on the question of whether or not English Canadian M.P.s enjoy more freedom from their party organizations than do French Canadian M.P.s is greater between English- and French-speaking members of the Liberal party than it is between the two language groups over all: English-speaking Liberals were far less inclined than were their French-speaking colleagues to disagree with the suggestion. This is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that we have encountered clear differences in perception between the English-speaking and French-speaking members of the same political party.

3. *Specific roles of language groups*

Questions 35 and 36 were intended to reveal whether English-speaking M.P.s and French-speaking M.P.s think that they have specific roles to perform within the House of Commons, or within their parties, as members of a language group; and whether the roles the members of one language group might (or might not) see for themselves are attributed to them by members of the other group. All M.P.s were asked:

"Do you think that the French Canadian M.P., as a French Canadian, should play a specific role in the House of Commons and in his party?" (question 35(a)); "What role should he play?" (35(b)); "Does he succeed in practice in playing such a role?" (35(c)). The same questions were then asked with regard to a specific role for English Canadians. Comparable questions were also asked of French Canadian M.P.s.

The differences in perception between M.P.s of the two principal language groups are as clear here as anywhere in the entire study (Table VII.21): 79 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s felt that they have a specific role to perform as French Canadians; only 40 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s were inclined to agree with them. M.P.s of the two groups also differ in their perception of a specific role for English-speaking Canadians: only 19 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s felt that they have a specific role, whereas 51 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s see a specific role for English Canadians. The majority of both language groups take a consistent position: the majority of French-speaking respondents see a specific role for themselves *and* English-speaking M.P.s; the majority of English-speaking M.P.s see no specific role for themselves *or* French Canadians.¹³ It matters less, however, that French-speaking M.P.s were inclined to attribute a role to English-speaking M.P.s which the latter are not particularly inclined to feel they ought to have than that so many French-speaking M.P.s should feel that they have a specific role to play, and that so many English-speaking M.P.s should disagree.

Table VII.21

Respondents attributing a specific role in House of Commons or party to English Canadian and French Canadian M.P.s, by language group

	Attributing specific role to English Canadian M.P.	Attributing specific role to French Canadian M.P.
	(%)	(%)
English	19	40
French	51	79
N	35	59

When M.P.s' views of the specific role of English-speaking M.P.s are related to other variables, the language of respondents remains the only really significant influence. There were no significant differences resulting from the urban or rural location of the M.P.s' constituencies; nor were there significant differences between the parties, apart from the fact that the Cr ditistes (all French-speaking) were most inclined to mention a specific role for English Canadian M.P.s; and regional differences also merely reflected the language differences already noted.

The main point to emerge with regard to M.P.s' attribution of a specific role to French-speaking M.P.s is the sharp difference in outlook between English- and French-speaking M.P.s, the latter being far more inclined than were the former to attribute a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s. In contrast, however, to the situation which we have just observed with regard to the attribution of a specific role to English-speaking M.P.s, there are differences between the regions in attributing a specific role to French Canadians (Table VII.22). We are not referring simply to the differences between Quebec and the other provinces—such differences would naturally be expected to show up when so many French-speaking M.P.s take a position different from English-speaking M.P.s—rather, there are notable differences between the English-speaking regions as well. M.P.s from British Columbia were the least inclined to attribute a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s; Prairie M.P.s were next least inclined; and Ontario M.P.s (45 per cent of them) were the most inclined (apart from Quebec) to attribute a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s.

Table VII.22

Respondents denying a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s, by region

Region	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	82
Prairies and N.W.T.	67
Ontario	55
Quebec	11
Atlantic provinces	63
N	58

There are no significant differences between the parties that are not accounted for by language differences: 59 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals, 56 per cent of the English-speaking Conservatives, and 56 per cent of the New Democrats stated that French Canadian M.P.s, as French Canadians, should not have a specific role within the House of Commons and within their parties.

We have here one of the best examples of clear differences in outlook between M.P.s from the two principal language groups in Canada. That these differences are indeed sharp is revealed by the contrast between the views of English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals in Table VII.23. It may be seen from these figures, compared with those in Tables VII.21 and VII.22, that the proximity of the two language groups within the same political party cannot be said to have had much effect on making the groups' perceptions of themselves or others any different from those of M.P.s who do not have an opportunity for close contact within the same party. The only effect which might be mentioned—not important in itself—is the fact that French-speaking Liberals were a little more inclined than were French-speaking M.P.s

Table VII.23

Liberals denying a specific role to English Canadian and French Canadian M.P.s, by language group

	Denying specific role to English Canadian M.P.s	Denying specific role to French Canadian M.P.s
	(%)	(%)
English	72	59
French	52	25

in general to say that they have no specific role as French Canadians: six of the seven French-speaking M.P.s who denied that there is a specific role for them as French Canadians were Liberals.¹⁴ We might also note that those English Canadians who stated that there is no problem of communication between English- and French-speaking M.P.s were the most inclined to deny a specific role to French Canadians, a role which the majority of them clearly arrogate to themselves.

What roles, in particular, do M.P.s attribute to themselves and what to others? One point, on which many English-speaking M.P.s were in agreement with the French-speaking M.P.s, is the role of French-speaking M.P.s as representatives of their language group's special needs in the federal sphere: the vast majority of English-speaking M.P.s who were prepared to grant a specific role to French-speaking M.P.s (84 per cent of those mentioning a role) referred to a role of this kind. Among other roles mentioned by English-speaking M.P.s as appropriate to French-speaking M.P.s are those of "interpreting Canada to their constituents," "speaking out against Quebec from time to time in the long run interests of Canada," and "preserving the cultural differences."

French-speaking M.P.s also inclined to the role of representative of their cultural group's special needs in the federal sphere (63 per cent of the French-speaking respondents mentioning a role pointed to this one) but they were also inclined to mention a further role—protection of the constitutional rights of French Canadians—which English-speaking respondents all but ignored. Fifty-two per cent of the French-speaking respondents mentioning a role for French Canadian M.P.s singled out "protection of the constitutional rights of French Canadians"; only four English-speaking M.P.s mentioned this role. A few French-speaking respondents mentioned other roles: to neutralize English-speaking influences, to make French Canadians better known to the rest of the country, and "d'amener le gouvernement fédéral à se considérer comme le gouvernement de tous les Canadiens."

Not many English-speaking M.P.s had in mind a specific role for themselves, but those who did seemed to favour no particular role (or roles) as did the French-speaking M.P.s. A few thought they had a role "to make for a stronger Canada" and to "keep the nation together"; another felt that English Canadians had a role in explaining

"Quebec's peculiar differences, but looking for compromises"; still another noted the need for an English-speaking M.P. in a constituency close to Quebec to accent his role as a spokesman for English Canadians in order to be re-elected. French-speaking respondents mentioned roles for English Canadians that are in many ways like their self-ascribed roles: several mentioned the role of "défendeur des intérêts de la partie anglaise"; three mentioned the task of staying Canadian and not becoming American; others mentioned the job of explaining bilingualism to English Canada, carrying on a dialogue, and understanding the French Canadian point of view. Two English-speaking M.P.s and one French-speaking M.P. agreed that the role of the English Canadian M.P. is "to become bilingual and try to understand French Canadian wishes."

Do M.P.s succeed in practice in playing the roles which they think they should play? So few English-speaking M.P.s thought they had a specific role to play that the significance of the answers to the question of their success in playing the selected role must be taken lightly: only three English-speaking M.P.s judged that they are successful; seven said that sometimes they are successful, sometimes not; and six thought that they are not successful.

A bare majority of French Canadian M.P.s, on the other hand, thought that English-speaking M.P.s had a specific role to play, and the majority of these thought that the English Canadian is successful in playing it. Of the 19 French-speaking M.P.s who thought that English-speaking M.P.s had a role 17 commented on the degree of their success: nine thought they are successful; six thought they are sometimes successful, sometimes not; and only two thought they are unsuccessful. By and large then, in the eyes of the French-speaking M.P.s, a great many English-speaking M.P.s are successful in performing a role specifically as an English-speaking M.P., a role which the vast majority of English-speaking M.P.s do not choose to recognize for themselves.

What of the success of French Canadians in playing the role which they choose for themselves? Interestingly enough, there are no significant differences between the estimates of the M.P.s from the two principal language groups on this matter (Table VII.24). English-speaking M.P.s were far less inclined to think that French-speaking M.P.s have a role to play, but those who did see such a role were as disposed as were French Canadians to think that French-speaking M.P.s are successful. Only 12 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s and 20 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s think that French-speaking M.P.s are unsuccessful in their role.

There are no differences in these views on the basis of urban or rural location of constituencies; there are no significant regional variations; but there were rather significant differences between the parties (Table VII.25). Although there were no significant differences on the basis of language, an obvious source of possible difference between Liberals and Conservatives, the latter were far more

Table VII.24

Respondents' estimates of success of French-speaking M.P.s in playing a specific role within the House of Commons and/or their party, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Successful	Sometimes successful, sometimes not	Unsuccessful
English	40	40	20
French	42	46	12
N	21	22	8

inclined than were the members of any other party to say that French Canadians are unsuccessful in playing their role. Conservatives were not less inclined than others to think that French-speaking M.P.s have a specific role, but many of them think that if the French Canadian plays a specific role he is not successful at it. Of the Conservatives who commented on the success of French-speaking M.P.s in their role, 55 per cent said that they were not successful; only one Liberal (French-speaking) thought that they were not successful. All the New Democrats with views on the subject thought that the French-speaking M.P.s are successful.

Table VII.25

Liberal, Conservative, and N.D.P. estimates of the degree of success of French-speaking M.P.s in playing a specific role within the House of Commons or their parties, horizontal percentages

Party	Successful	Sometimes successful, sometimes not	Unsuccessful
Liberal	53	43	4
Conservative	9	36	55
New Democratic	100	0	0
N	20	16	7

Perhaps the most interesting thing to emerge from this analysis is the fact that despite the unwillingness of the vast majority of English-speaking M.P.s to countenance the notion that French Canadian M.P.s have a specific role as French Canadians in the House of Commons and in their parties, most French-speaking M.P.s feel that they are successful, at least some of the time, in playing the specific role that they have created for themselves. Moreover only the Conservatives, among the English M.P.s who see a specific role for French Canadians, disagree with them.

To press our analysis of the perceptions of others a little further we asked all M.P.s the following question: 34(a) "Are there, in your opinion, many occasions on which a French Canadian feels ill at ease and frustrated when seeking to participate in federal politics?" A majority of both English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s agree that a French Canadian is ill at ease in federal politics (Table VII.26); French-speaking M.P.s are more inclined to agree than are English-speaking M.P.s; but 11 per cent of the English M.P.s said that they did not know. The difference between those in both language groups thinking that French Canadians are not ill at ease and frustrated is negligible.

Table VII.26

M.P.s' opinion on whether or not French Canadians are ill at ease in federal politics, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Not ill at ease	Ill at ease	Don't know
English	38	51	11
French	30	67	3
N	42	67	10

Once again there are no significant differences in the responses to this question between M.P.s from rural and urban constituencies. However, there are some interesting differences between the parties, and especially within the parties. New Democrats (44 per cent) were most inclined to say that they do not know whether or not French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics. Cr ditistes were most inclined to say that French Canadians are not ill at ease (the group divided equally on this question). There are no differences whatever between the English-speaking members of the Liberal and Conservative parties.

The bulk of the difference between English- and French-speaking respondents is accounted for by the considerable disposition of French-speaking Liberals (Table VII.27) to say that they feel ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics: 72 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals answered that they felt ill at ease; only 24 per cent said that they did not feel ill at ease; and one (or 4 per cent) said that he did not know. English-speaking Liberals were no more inclined than English-speaking Conservatives to recognize this apparent frustration.

Once more there are interesting regional variations (Table VII.28). Even though Conservatives were generally no different from Liberals (especially English-speaking Liberals) in their disposition to recognize frustration on the part of French Canadians at the level of federal politics, Prairie Conservatives and M.P.s from British Columbia were less willing to agree. The differences are not great and should

Table VII.27

Liberals' opinion on whether or not French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Not ill at ease	Ill at ease	Don't know
English	38*	54	8
French	24	72	4

* The comparable figure for English-speaking Conservatives was also 38 per cent.

not be exaggerated, but they fit the pattern that has already emerged. M.P.s from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces (who, we noticed, are most sympathetic to French Canadians) were most nearly comparable to Quebec M.P.s in their estimation of whether or not French Canadians are ill at ease: a majority from each region agreed that they are. On the other hand, British Columbia and Prairie M.P.s (who are, as we have seen, somewhat less sympathetic) were least inclined to recognize that French Canadians are ill at ease.

Table VII.28

M.P.s' opinion on whether or not French Canadian M.P.s are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics, by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Not ill at ease	Ill at ease	Don't know	N
B.C. and Yukon	36	46	18	11
Prairies and N.W.T.	58	32	10	19
Ontario	30	59*	11	37
Quebec	31	69	0	36
Atlantic provinces	31	56	13	16

* Conservatives were more inclined than Liberals to say that French Canadians are ill at ease.

The most important point to emphasize here is not the differences in perception between regions or even between language groups, but the agreement that exists on the part of all members (but especially among French-speaking Liberals) that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics. Had French Canadians been a good deal more inclined to say that they are unsuccessful in playing the roles as French Canadians which they wish to play within the House of Commons and within their parties, evidence of a considerable measure of frustration might have been expected. However we have noted that most French-speaking M.P.s, and the majority of the English-speaking M.P.s who recognize such a role, believe that French Canadian M.P.s

are successful in performing their role. Wherein lies the source of their frustration then? It might be suggested that it is in part derived from the fact of so much hostility on the part of English-speaking M.P.s to the idea that French Canadian M.P.s should play a specific role at all: even if a French Canadian M.P. feels that he is successful in playing his role, it may be frustrating to know that so many English-speaking M.P.s reject the role he has chosen for himself. The answer may, in part, also lie in the fact that even those English-speaking M.P.s who see a specific role for French Canadians mention roles different from those French Canadians choose for themselves. For instance, only a very few English-speaking M.P.s mentioned the role of "protector of the constitutional rights of French Canadians" which nearly two thirds of the French Canadians selected for themselves. Nevertheless these suggestions do not add up to a satisfactory answer. We would still want to ask why French-speaking Liberals appear more frustrated than Cr ditistes; and to know whether the frustration of which the M.P.s complain is of a similar nature or whether it seems to be related to the individual M.P.'s general orientation to the political process at Ottawa.

These are questions which we shall try to answer in Chapter IX when we focus on the differences between those French-speaking M.P.s who feel that French Canadians are frustrated and those who do not. We shall then look at the examples given by both English- and French-speaking M.P.s of the occasions when frustration is apparent.

D. Summary

We have seen several examples in this chapter of the way in which clear differences emerge between the perceptions of the two language groups. Sometimes, when over-all differences related to language are not apparent, differences among our respondents were revealed to be based on region, party, or even (rarely) the location of the constituency. In general, however, an M.P.'s language group is the most consistent indicator of differences in attitude.

Much of the evidence suggests that there has been a general tendency to underestimate the problem of communication between English- and French-speaking M.P.s, but there is also evidence to suggest that even when the problem is recognized, even when M.P.s are sympathetic towards the M.P.s of other language groups, or when communication between the two principal language groups is facilitated (as it is within the Liberal party), there is no certainty that M.P.s of one language group will appreciate in any substantial way the perceptions of the other.

One further curious fact regarding the problem of communication between English and French Canadians remains to be taken into account. In order to check whether the "crisis" in the survey and the publicity it received had any material effect on the answers of respondents, we analyzed a number of responses to compare the opinions of those

interviewed before and after the crisis. In only one area was there any significant difference. (Even the answers to the controversial statement "Politics is a dirty game" indicated a relative similarity of response.) The difference was in the disposition of respondents to recognize a problem of communication between English- and French-speaking M.P.s. Despite the fact that the two groups of respondents are for all intents and purposes the same in terms of number, party, and region, respondents after the crisis were considerably more inclined to say that there is no problem of communication: only 18 per cent of those interviewed before the crisis thought there was no problem, but after the crisis the proportion of those interviewed who thought there was no problem rose to 45 per cent. Whether or not this difference can be accounted for by an attempt of respondents questioned after the crisis to suggest the lack of any need for a study of the House of Commons by asserting that no problem of communication exists, we cannot say. Suffice it to note that they were unsuccessful in disguising the existence of a serious problem of communication between the two principal language groups.

A. The Translation System

We have already noticed the considerable increase in the use of the French language in debates in the House of Commons during the last decade. Only a small proportion of the total time taken up in French language debate can be accounted for by English Canadians, but that English-speaking M.P.s used the language at all indicates the growing political and economic importance of the French Canadian presence in Canada. That the use of French in debates within the House of Commons was on the increase before the introduction of simultaneous translation facilities suggests that French language debate would likely have emerged as a more prominent feature of House of Commons proceedings in any case, but it cannot be denied that the existence of simultaneous translation facilities has greatly encouraged the growth.

How do M.P.s of both language groups react to this new development? What problems, if any, do they think are created as a result of the bilingual character of the House's membership? How does bilingualism work in committee, general caucus, and provincial (or regional) caucus? Would M.P.s want to see considerable substantive extensions of the bilingual character of federal politics? These are very important questions, to which the responses of M.P.s interviewed in this survey may be expected to offer some answers.

M.P.s from both language groups were asked question 30(a): "What, in your opinion, is the effect of bilingualism upon the operations of Parliament?" Interviewers were instructed to probe for mention of problems in committee and caucus and elsewhere, for example in the parliamentary library. For 43 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s and 47 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s bilingualism had no special effect; that is to say, apart from the obvious effect of making it easier for members of the two groups to speak their own language, nothing was singled out for mention. Typical of this kind of reply

was the following made by a Prairie Conservative: "Prior to 1958 it was very difficult for an English-speaking M.P. who did not speak French to get a true picture of a day's proceedings. Since simultaneous translation has been installed the House of Commons is a beautiful thing to see. I like to see the two languages used extensively; then everybody knows what is going on. I don't agree with some who say that it delays the House; it's a silly view." A Quebec Liberal commented in a similar vein: "Ce n'est que depuis dix ans seulement que les députés canadiens-français s'expriment en français. Aujourd'hui, c'est un procédé admis et tout à fait normal; ça n'affecte pas le système, ça ne ralentit pas les travaux." Another Quebec Liberal believed that, since the formation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the status of bilingualism within the House of Commons had undergone "une grosse amélioration," but he noted also that the situation was still far from perfect: "On n'aura pas la perfection tant qu'on n'aura pas un système d'éducation fédéral bilingue."

Not all the English-speaking M.P.s thought that bilingualism in action in the House of Commons was "a beautiful thing to see," but few were as extreme in their comments as this British Columbia Liberal: "Bilingualism slows down procedure. Too much emphasis is being placed on bilingualism; it's getting to the point where it is more important to speak two languages than it is to express profound wisdom. We have simultaneous translation in most of the committees. Most French can speak and understand English pretty well. All this simultaneous translation is a courtesy which may not be entirely necessary."

The most important single effect of bilingualism for English-speaking M.P.s was the delay which it is said to bring about in the operations of Parliament, particularly at the committee level (Table VIII.1). Of the English-speaking M.P.s who mentioned an effect of bilingualism 64 per cent spoke of delays: in the proceedings of the House of Commons as a result of repetition; in committees as a result of French-speaking M.P.s' insistence on translators or bilingual stenographers; in general as a result of the delay in the publication of English-language reports and documents in order to attempt to provide the two language versions simultaneously. Considering the fact that many of our interviews took place at a time when the delay of the debate on the Canada Pensions bill, because of the unavailability of a French version of the committee proceedings, was at the forefront of many members' minds, it is perhaps not surprising that this effect was given such prominent attention. Indeed, 37 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s who mentioned an effect of bilingualism pointed to delays of this kind as well. For French-speaking M.P.s, however, the most important single effect of bilingualism was the problem it creates at the committee level: 58 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s who saw some effect of bilingualism mentioned the difficulties that are created for them by the lack of simultaneous translation facilities for committees in which the bulk of the work seems

to be conducted in English. More precisely put, the problem for many French Canadians at the committee level is not bilingualism, but unilingualism. With regard to the committees one Quebec Liberal complained: "Il est malheureux qu'à 80 pour cent des sessions publiques tous les rapports sont fournis en anglais. Même nos canadiens-français s'expriment en anglais, par exemple sur le rapport annuel de la C.T.C., Jodoin parle en anglais." Few French Canadians were as pointed in their discussion of the effects of this one-sided use of language in committees as was this Quebec Liberal, but his point of view might well be taken as indicative of several others: "En comité, à cause du manque de traducteurs, ça exemplifie chez nous le sentiment minoritaire; en tant que minoritaires, on pense que l'on fait perdre du temps aux autres, et résultat: complexe d'infériorité." We have already noted above, with regard to the poorer participation of French Canadians on committees, one of the possible consequences of a feeling of inferiority.¹

The problem of bilingualism at the committee level was also, as we have noticed, mentioned by a number of English-speaking M.P.s. For them, however, the problem was the delay that may occur when French-speaking M.P.s insist on obtaining a translator or stenographer for committee proceedings even if they can (as some English-speaking M.P.s complained) understand English well enough. (That it might be an exhausting effort for even a fairly bilingual French Canadian member to have to deal exclusively in English was not mentioned by one English Canadian M.P.) Whatever the cause of the irritation at the committee level, M.P.s of both language groups see a problem and, in response to a later question asking them to evaluate the translation system in the House of Commons, about 30 per cent of each language group complained of the shortage of translators for committees.

English-speaking M.P.s were somewhat more inclined to mention more than one effect of bilingualism, revealing a tendency to mention the additional cost of a bilingual system, along with the delays that it is said to cause. A few M.P.s were given to sweeping commentaries on the effect of bilingualism: one English-speaking M.P. and one French-speaking M.P. pointed to the general inconvenience and confusion resulting from the use of two languages, but both thought it a "necessary evil"; two English-speaking M.P.s said that bilingualism "affects their work adversely"; another claimed that it creates disunity. Two English-speaking M.P.s and one French-speaking M.P. seemed more concerned that the need to have things translated caused the speaker's real meaning and feelings to be missed. Finally, hardly any M.P.s regretted that a simultaneous translation system for the bilingual House had the effect of destroying effectively the necessity to learn both languages.² Such a view had been expressed in debate in the House of Commons in 1959,³ but only two back-benchers and one front-bencher interviewed expressed similar feelings in 1965. Two English-speaking M.P.s actually found that simultaneous translation assists their learning of the French language.

Table VIII.1

Effects of bilingualism on the operations of Parliament, by language group*

Effect	Mention by English-speaking M.P.s	Mention by French-speaking M.P.s
	(%)	(%)
Causes delays	64	40
Expensive	23	11
Causes problems at committee level	49	58
Causes problems at caucus level	6	16
Other effects	21	16

* These results are given as percentages of those mentioning an effect of bilingualism and not of the entire sample, nearly half of whom thought there was no special effect; because several M.P.s mentioned more than one effect the percentages total more than 100.

When M.P.s' responses on the question of the effect of bilingualism on the operations of Parliament are examined from the point of view of the urban or rural location of constituencies no significant differences are revealed; nor are there any significant differences between the parties.⁴ Even the regional variations are not very great, but one or two features are worth comment. M.P.s from British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces were rather less inclined than were M.P.s from the other regions to say that there is no effect from the bilingual phenomenon in Parliament. Those British Columbia M.P.s who noted effects pointed equally to delays and problems at the committee level, but M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces (56 per cent of the total group) were much more disposed than were M.P.s from any other region to mention the delay which bilingualism is said to cause in the operations of Parliament. The expense of the system was not very important for the vast majority of M.P.s, with respondents from the Prairies and Ontario accounting for most of the references to this particular effect.

We mentioned earlier that M.P.s were also asked whether they found "the present translation service fully satisfactory" (question 30(b), 245). We did not distinguish in the question between written translation and the simultaneous interpretation in the House and committees; answers, therefore, were received on both matters.

English-speaking M.P.s were more inclined than French-speaking M.P.s to say that the translation service is fully satisfactory (Table VIII.2). Typical of the replies of nearly half the English-speaking M.P.s was the following by a British Columbia Liberal: "I think I get the gist of what they're saying; I have no complaints

about it though I would have to be completely bilingual to judge the accuracy of the written translation. I have been on committees where there are some difficulties getting translators, but that doesn't impede my participation." French-speaking M.P.s were not quite so satisfied: 38 per cent of them complained about the delay in written translations, whereas only 15 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s mentioned the problem. Taken along with their criticism of the shortage of interpreters for committees, this amounts to a fairly substantial complaint on the part of French-speaking M.P.s over the status of their language in the House of Commons.

Table VIII.2

Evaluation of the translation system, by language group, horizontal percentages*

	Satisfactory in all respects	Poor inter- pretation	Shortage of interpreters for committees unsatisfactory	Delay in written translation unsatisfactory
English	49	11	28	15
French	27	16	30	38
N	52	15	35	27

* Percentages total more than 100 because of plural mentions.

Although about 12 per cent of the M.P.s complained of the quality of the simultaneous interpretation, there were hardly any complaints about the quality of the sound system as such. One M.P. mentioned the occasional difficulty of adjusting to the switching back and forth from a male voice to a female voice over the translation system, and another mentioned the problem of hearing the translation when sitting close to the Speaker, but these were relatively minor and rare criticisms. Most of those who criticized the quality of the interpretation recognized the difficulties of rendering ideas in another language; one M.P. thought that the translation facilities of NATO were no better; another thought that, although a better staff was needed, our system was "vastly improved and improving." "Our facilities," the same M.P. thought, "are not as good as those in the United Nations," however—and for him this was a matter of regret—"this is where we should do bilingualism better than anywhere else in the world." Few were as critical of the service as one Quebec Liberal who was dissatisfied with the system "parce qu'il y a certains traducteurs incompetents: on devrait faire un choix plus rigide des traducteurs; il leur faut une culture plus approfondie afin de traduire la pensée."

Over all a little more than 40 per cent of the M.P.s thought that the translation system was fully satisfactory. Opinions differed

among the parties, but by and large they followed what would be expected from the fundamental difference between English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s on the question. At first glance it appeared that Conservatives are considerably more satisfied with the translation system than the Liberals, but when we looked at the differences between English-speaking Liberals and Conservatives, the differences in opinion were much less acute.

The differences between the regions are interesting (Table VIII.3), and offer a parallel with the regional variations on the question dealing with the effect of the bilingual system on the operations of Parliament. It may be recalled that M.P.s from British Columbia and the Atlantic provinces, compared with M.P.s from the three other regions, were most inclined to mention some effect of bilingualism on the operations of Parliament, particularly delays and problems in committees. These M.P.s (particularly the Conservatives from the Atlantic provinces) were also most disposed to say that they had no complaints with the translation system. As might be expected, Quebec M.P.s were most critical of the translation system, but they were only a little more critical of it than were M.P.s from Ontario. We were not able to prove the point from our analysis of the data, but the difference between Ontario and the other English-speaking provinces in this regard may be largely due to the opinions of French-speaking Ontario M.P.s.

Table VIII.3

Opinions on the effect of bilingualism on the operations of Parliament, and M.P.s' evaluation of the translation system, by region

Region	Bilingualism has no effect	Translation system fully satisfactory
	(%)	(%)
B.C. and Yukon	27	64
Prairies and N.W.T.	53	58
Ontario	50	37
Quebec	43	28
Atlantic provinces	31	56
N	52	51

Since formal responsibility for the operations of a bilingual House of Commons rests with the Speaker, it might be worth while in passing to look at M.P.s' responses to question 30(c): "What part does the Speaker play in operating the bilingual system?" Probably the most significant result is that 27 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s and 10 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s think that he plays no part at all (Table VIII.4). Of those who thought that the Speaker has a role to perform, the majority mentioned his function of speaking in both languages, thus giving formal recognition to the two

official languages. Six M.P.s (five of them English-speaking) felt that the Speaker helps understanding between the two language groups.

Table VIII.4

M.P.s' opinions of the part played by the Speaker in the operation of the bilingual system, by language group, horizontal percentages

	No part	Supervises adminis- tration of bilingual system	Gives formal recognition to two lan- guages	Other
English	27	22	38	13*
French	10	17	52	21**
N	24	22	44	16

* Half said that he helps understanding between the two language groups.

** Almost all mentioned combination of supervising administration of system and giving formal recognition to the two language groups.

Another reason for asking this question, especially in the rather vague manner in which it was put, was to draw out members to make any comments they felt like making about the Speaker and his role in the House of Commons. For a few it was an opportunity to say that in their opinion the current Speaker had been far too lenient with French Canadians. For others it was an occasion to add that in their opinion the former Speaker was not really sufficiently bilingual to do the job properly. Although the criticism was limited to a few, a number of M.P.s mentioned that the then Deputy Speaker was very good at the job. Not every member by any means went out of his way to stress the point, but a considerable number of English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s insisted that the Speaker must be bilingual; French-speaking respondents tended, moreover, to add *perfectly* bilingual.

B. The Use of French by Ministers

Since the introduction of simultaneous translation, most French-speaking members can and do speak in their mother tongue in debates on a far wider range of subjects, and more frequently than ever before, with greater attention from their English-speaking colleagues. There are several English-speaking members, of course, who complain about the expense and/or delay that a bilingual system brings, and a few of these hope for the day (preferably soon) when the problem will be solved by the disappearance of the French language from the House altogether. "The inevitable superiority of English as the universal language of economic development and communication," as

one respondent put it, will apparently see to that. For the rest, however, there seems to be agreement that, despite criticisms, the bilingual parliamentary system will and must be retained.

Nevertheless how willing are English-speaking M.P.s, in particular, to see further concrete extensions of the system? How do they react, for example, to statement 3 that "It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke in French; they would express themselves more satisfactorily?" The notion is not a wild one, by any means: it could be argued that it would be the logical result of the full implications of the asserted status of the French language in Parliament. In any case it would undoubtedly make the lot of a few French-speaking ministers easier, ministers who, whether they admit it or not, get into occasional difficulties in replying, especially to questions in the House, in the English tongue. How do the M.P.s, particularly the English-speaking M.P.s, react?

Once more English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s differ sharply in outlook (Table VIII.5): 85 per cent of the latter agree with the proposition; only 39 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s agree. When we take into account the fact that some who refused to answer, and whose views are therefore excluded from these results, can reasonably be assumed not to be favourably disposed towards the extension of bilingualism and biculturalism, we may safely conclude that, at the very least, our results do not exaggerate the opposition of English-speaking M.P.s to the suggestion.⁵

Table VIII.5

M.P.s' opinion on the statement that "It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke French . . . ," by language group, horizontal percentages

	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
English	38	49	13
French	85	15	0
N	56	39	9

The importance of the attitude of those who refused to answer is even greater when we consider the different *party* responses. The majority of the Liberal party (64 per cent) agreed with the suggestion to extend the use of French by French-speaking ministers, and this majority obtained in both the English- and French-speaking groups within the party; the majority of French-speaking Liberals favouring the proposition (82 per cent) was larger than the majority of English-speaking Liberals (55 per cent). Every French-speaking Conservative M.P., every Social Credit M.P., and all Cr ditistes agreed with the suggestion. Obviously a great many English-speaking Conservatives and New Democrats were opposed (Table VIII.6). Most

opposed to the suggestion, indeed, were the members of the New Democratic Party: only 22 per cent agreed with the idea; 67 per cent were opposed. The English-speaking Conservatives were no more inclined to agree with the statement, but they had a few more members (19 per cent) who were not sure. The majority disagreeing with the idea (58 per cent) was therefore a little smaller than the comparable figure for the New Democratic Party; both were substantially more inclined to disagree than the English-speaking Liberals.

Table VIII.6

English-speaking Liberals', Conservatives', and New Democrats' opinion on the statement that "It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke French . . . ," horizontal percentages

Opinion of:	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Liberals	55	39	6
Conservatives	23	58	19
New Democrats	22	67	11

The regional pattern of responses is also noteworthy (Table VIII.7). Although the contrast between Quebec and the other regions is naturally the most striking difference, it is not the most significant. Once more there seems to be a pattern in the regional responses which we have become accustomed to expect whenever the question of sympathy for or understanding of the wishes of French Canadians is at stake. Although on this question they are considerably out of line with the responses of Quebec M.P.s, M.P.s from Ontario and the Atlantic provinces are a little more in agreement with Quebec M.P.s than are M.P.s from the Prairies and British Columbia. It is only in British Columbia and the Prairies that a majority of M.P.s are actually opposed to the idea of French-speaking ministers always speaking in their mother tongue.

When we compared the responses of English-speaking M.P.s to the question of whether or not there is a problem of communication with those who agree or disagree with the proposition that French-speaking ministers should always speak in their mother tongue, we found that those who see no problem at all, and those who see the problem as based on differences of culture, were most inclined to disagree with the proposition. On the other hand, those who recognize a problem of language were most inclined to agree with the proposition. We also found that those who see the effect of bilingualism as creating delays in Parliament were not inclined to disagree with the proposition that French-speaking ministers should always speak French.

It might be argued that the statement under consideration in Table VIII.7 is sufficiently ambiguous that not too much should be made of the results: it contains two propositions, not one. Although we might hold that the second part of the sentence ("they would express

Table VIII.7

M.P.s' opinions on the statement that "It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke French . . . ," by region, horizontal percentages

Region	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
B.C. and Yukon	30	60	10
Prairies and N.W.T.	31	54	15
Ontario	44	47	9
Quebec	85	15	0
Atlantic provinces	43	36	21
N	56	39	9

themselves more satisfactorily") should merely be seen as offering the rationale for the first part of the sentence ("It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke in French"), it could be argued that respondents might choose to react to *either* part of the statement. Following from this, then, it might be argued that many English-speaking respondents in disagreeing with the statement might in fact be saying "it is not necessary for the minister to speak French in order for him to express himself more satisfactorily; he is doing so well enough now." It would have been better had we offered a less ambiguous statement, but the argument which we have been presenting against our position would be more convincing if other evidence did not also suggest that English-speaking M.P.s are rather less willing than are French Canadians to accept the notion of full commitment to bilingualism in Parliament.

C. The Extension of Translation Facilities

It did not require a survey of M.P.s to know that a great many French Canadians would like to see simultaneous translation facilities extended to all committees; there can be no doubt that it would make their experience of committees a far more gratifying one. In order to compare the attitudes of English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s on this matter we tested their intensity of opinion by inviting M.P.s to agree or disagree with statement 28 that "Translation facilities should be extended to all committee rooms, whatever the cost." It is one thing to give vague approval to improving a service; it is another to accept the implications of an idea whatever its cost.

The results are clear cut (Table VIII.8): almost one quarter of the English-speaking M.P.s appear unprepared to support the idea of extending translation facilities to all committee rooms, whereas every French-speaking M.P. wished to see this action taken.

Table VIII.8

M.P.s' opinion on whether translation facilities should be extended to all committee rooms whatever the cost, by language group, horizontal percentages

	Should be extended	Should not	Not sure
English	72	24	4
French	100	0	0
N	87	18	3

While the majority of all M.P.s who are in favour of extension of the translation facilities are composed of majorities within each party, the Conservative party has more M.P.s (40 per cent of the party) opposed to the idea. Putting it another way, two thirds of all the M.P.s opposed to the extension of translation facilities are Conservatives.⁶ The New Democrats who, judging by the results of the previous analysis, are opposed to the notion of French-speaking ministers always speaking French, are more disposed than English-speaking Liberals to support the idea of extending the translation facilities to all committee rooms (*see* Table VIII.9).

Table VIII.9

English-speaking M.P.s' opinion on whether translation facilities should be extended to all committee rooms whatever the cost, by party, horizontal percentages

Party	Should be extended	Should not be extended	Not sure
Liberal	81	17	3
Progressive Conservative	52	41	7
New Democratic	89	11	0
Social Credit	100	0	0

The regional pattern of responses is in part as might be expected: Quebec M.P.s unanimously agree with the idea; M.P.s from British Columbia disagree most with the idea. Beyond that the pattern disappears: Prairie M.P.s (77 per cent) are more in agreement with the idea of extending the facilities than are M.P.s from Ontario or the Atlantic provinces.

While the evidence must not be taken as conclusive, it certainly agrees sufficiently with the other attitudes we have discovered to suggest a certain basic pattern. Bilingualism in its present form in the House of Commons is resented by some but acceptable to most. Meaningful extensions of it, although obviously desired by nearly all

the French-speaking M.P.s, would not be favoured by a number of English-speaking M.P.s, particularly English-speaking Conservatives.

D. Bilingualism within the Political Parties

Thus far we have been concerned with bilingualism within the House of Commons as such. We now turn our attention to the extent of bilingualism within the parties, as revealed at their general caucus and provincial or regional caucus meetings. Our method of attempting to discover the degree of bilingualism within the parties was to ask all M.P.s of both language groups questions 22(f), (g), (h) and (i): "(f) Do you (personally) speak English at your party caucus meetings?; (g) (*If yes, ask*) Regularly? (*If not regularly*) On what occasions do you speak English?; (h) Do you (personally) speak French at your party caucus meetings?; (i) (*If yes, ask*) Regularly? (*If not regularly, ask*) On what occasions do you speak French."⁷ Responses for members of the New Democratic party and the Ralliement des Cr ditistes, both unilingual parties, are not considered here.⁸

Because of the relatively small number of French-speaking Conservatives, it is not surprising that French is rarely spoken within the party caucus.⁹ One French-speaking Conservative said that he always speaks French at caucus, but then the interviewer noted that "il emploiera cependant un mot fran ais un mot anglais, afin de se faire comprendre." How often he exercises this prerogative we do not know. Another French-speaking Conservative stated that he usually speaks English, reserving French for those occasions on which there is a French-speaking chairman of the caucus meeting. Between 1958 and 1962, of course, the French tongue was more often used within the Conservative caucus; before the installation of simultaneous translation facilities in the committee rooms, apparently two bilingual members translated for the benefit of English-speaking M.P.s who could not understand French.

None of the English-speaking Conservatives interviewed mentioned speaking French themselves on any occasions during caucus. A few Conservatives noted that they used French in greetings to French-speaking members; another, while saying that he never speaks French in caucus, made the point that he can speak French and does so with French-speaking colleagues and very occasionally in speeches in the House of Commons. Yet another Conservative mentioned speaking French occasionally in his election campaigns. One Western Conservative mentioned that he was studying French, but added that he was not yet competent in the language.

The caucus of the Social Credit party appears to be conducted in both English and French; none of the English-speaking members apparently ever speaks in French, but a few French-speaking Social Crediters seem to speak English, at least when replying to an English-speaking colleague. When the Quebec members of the party get together for discussions, of course no English is used.

Without doubt the Liberal party caucus is the most interesting in its use of the two languages. There have always been a great many Quebec M.P.s within the parliamentary party, but rarely has the Quebec group represented proportionally so large a share of the whole. The Liberal party therefore offers a better test case than do the others of the place of the two languages within the proceedings of a party.

Despite the fact that simultaneous translation facilities were used for the first time in party caucus meetings only a few months before the summer recess of 1965, the use of the French language within the caucus seems to have been a common occurrence before that. One French-speaking Liberal back-bencher believes that bilingualism within the Liberal caucus is now a *fait accompli*, but another Liberal interviewed in the preliminary interviews in the summer of 1964 observed a falling off in the use of French at party caucus: "At the beginning of the session the Quebec M.P.s were aggressively French-speaking; now they are still speaking French, but much more often in English."

The results of our questionnaire throw further light on the character of Liberal caucus proceedings. Just over a third of the French-speaking Liberal back-benchers stated that they never, or only very rarely, speak English at party caucus. Just under a quarter said that they always (or usually) speak English, and just over 40 per cent said that they sometimes speak English. One Quebec Liberal who speaks only French at party caucus does so in the conviction that "les députés anglais préfèrent que les députés canadiens français parlent français," but there are others of his own language group who do not follow his course of action. Another Quebec Liberal who said that he mixes his English and French about equally at party caucus replied, when queried on why he speaks English as much as he does, "car souvent les Canadiens anglais portent moins attention à l'interprétation simultanée." A number of other Quebec Liberals made the same point about their feeling that they must speak English if they wish to be better understood; expressing the feeling of others as well as himself one Liberal stated: "Si ce que le député a à dire est important il l'exprime en anglais." Still other French-speaking M.P.s who sometimes use English in caucus do so either out of courtesy in reply to an English-speaking M.P. or in order to speed up the work of the caucus when translators are not available. One Quebec Liberal reserved the right to be flexible in his choice of the appropriate language in which to speak in caucus: "Il dépend des propos: je ne parle pas français par devoir. Si je veux choquer, je m'adresserai à eux en anglais."

When it comes to the English-speaking Liberals it is more relevant to talk about the few who occasionally speak in French at the party caucus rather than about the vast majority who speak only in their mother tongue.¹⁰ But some attempt at bilingualism is not altogether absent from among the English-speaking Liberals, and this may be important in itself. Generally speaking, however, the use of French by

English-speaking M.P.s is reserved for extending courtesy and compliments, and making announcements. The following are representative of the occasions on which French is sometimes used by English-speaking Liberals in caucus:

I sometimes say a few sentences to show respect and courtesy to my French colleagues, but I speak very poor French. (*Ontario Liberal*)

When I have an announcement, I might speak French, partly in fun. (*Ontario Liberal*)

I rarely speak French in the party caucus, but if the discussion has been mainly in French I would. (*Quebec Liberal*)

I very occasionally speak French at party caucus and then only briefly and with quite a bit of preparation. (*Ontario Liberal*)
In addition, a number of English-speaking Liberals, who do not attempt to speak in French at party caucus, will try a few sentences in conversation with their colleagues, in speeches in the House of Commons, or occasionally in public speeches in their constituencies.

Nevertheless, the clear impression is that as far as English-speaking Liberals are concerned, there is no bilingual dialogue; when French is spoken it is by and large for symbolic purposes and comes as the result of careful textual preparation beforehand and not in the course of normal exchanges. That the English language is still, as one Quebec Liberal front-bencher put it "la langue officielle au caucus" is substantiated by the behaviour of two other French-speaking front-benchers. One never spoke in French in caucus before the availability of simultaneous translation; another, who admitted that he spoke in French fairly frequently while still a back-bencher, now hardly speaks in his mother tongue.

The status of the French language within a predominantly English-speaking provincial or regional caucus is even lower, of course. None of the French-speaking Liberals in this position ever speaks French in the course of his provincial caucus proceedings. Within the Liberal party's Quebec caucus, however, where the majority is French-speaking, English is occasionally used, but French is the normal language of discourse. The English-speaking members, not all of whom are perfectly fluent in French, try to converse in the language of the majority. According to one Quebec Liberal: "Les quelques députés anglais qui assistent au caucus (provincial) comprennent le français. Souvent ils parlent en anglais et on leur répond en français." Another member of the caucus who speaks only French was not so sure, however, about the success of the bilingual exchange: "On a l'impression," he said, "qu'on n'est pas compris."

It will be recalled that in an earlier chapter we noted that a majority of both English- and French-speaking back-benchers agreed that French Canadian M.P.s feel ill at ease and frustrated when seeking to participate in federal politics. It is interesting that a majority of the French-speaking front-benchers also agreed that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics (the same was not true for a majority of English-speaking front-benchers according to the small sample that we interviewed).¹ It may also be recalled that we reserved for later consideration some of the reasons for this attitude, particularly since a number of questions were left begging by the analysis up to that point. It is perhaps appropriate to recapitulate the argument as developed thus far, presenting in a slightly different form the data already studied.

It was noted earlier that the responses of English- and French-speaking M.P.s revealed a sharp dichotomy on the question of whether or not French-speaking M.P.s, as French Canadians, should play a specific role within their parties and/or within the House of Commons. We are now concerned only with the differences in responses within the French-speaking group of M.P.s. Here we find that, of the seven French-speaking respondents who indicated they thought that French Canadians should not play a specific role as French Canadians, six were Liberals. No French-speaking Conservatives or Social Credit M.P.s denied a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s. The only other French-speaking M.P. to agree with the six Liberals was a lone Cr ditiste.

When we asked French-speaking respondents whether or not they thought that they are successful in playing such a role, a majority of Liberals were convinced that French Canadians are successful;² French-speaking Social Crediters were disinclined to say whether or not French Canadians are either successful or unsuccessful, but chose to say that they are sometimes successful, sometimes not. One Cr ditiste who thought that French Canadians have a role to play refused

to answer the question of whether or not they are successful in doing so. Of the remaining Cr ditistes, one thought that French Canadians are successful, one said they are unsuccessful, and two said that they are sometimes successful, sometimes not. One Conservative said that they are unsuccessful; another said they are sometimes successful.

All this is essential background to the further question of whether or not French-speaking M.P.s think that French Canadians feel ill at ease and frustrated when seeking to participate in federal politics, for when we analyzed the responses to this question we found that French-speaking Liberals were very much disposed to say that French Canadians *are* ill at ease in federal politics. French-speaking Social Credit M.P.s were unanimous in agreeing that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated, but the Cr ditistes and Conservatives divided evenly on the matter, half of them saying that they are not ill at ease.

Clearly there is no direct relation between the belief that an M.P. is successful in fulfilling his specific role as a French Canadian, and the belief that a French Canadian is not ill at ease or frustrated in federal politics. Had this relation existed we should have found the majority of Liberals disagreeing with the suggestion that French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics. What factors, then, do explain the feelings of many French-speaking M.P.s that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics? Earlier we suggested that the answer might lie in the French Canadians' knowledge of the fundamental hostility on the part of a majority of the English-speaking M.P.s to the French Canadians' assumption of a specific role for themselves; we also suggested that the answer might rest with the different role which even sympathetic English-speaking M.P.s consider appropriate,³ but we were by no means confident that these went far towards a total explanation of the situation. Besides, these explanations were of little value in trying to explain why Cr ditistes should be less inclined to say that they feel frustrated in federal politics than are French-speaking Liberals. On the assumption that the answers to our general questions do not lie in any single factor, we may begin by considering a number of reasonable possibilities.

We noted earlier that English-speaking Liberals were just as prepared as were French-speaking M.P.s to agree that "our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation," and that "most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-bencher has a chance to exert influence"; but we might assume that part of the explanation of the frustration which many French-speaking Liberals admit to rests with the feeling that party discipline is too strict. There is no confirmation for this assumption. When we invited respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with statement 19 that "Party discipline is too strict today," only two French-speaking Liberals (and no English-speaking Liberals) agreed. All five of the French-speaking Liberal

front-benchers who answered the question also disagreed with the statement. Among the other French-speaking M.P.s there was greater agreement with the statement. Although none of the French-speaking Conservative back-benchers agreed with the statement, one of the French-speaking Conservative front-benchers did agree; two of the three French-speaking Social Credit M.P.s agreed, and one said he was not sure; and four of the five Cr ditistes who answered the question agreed that party discipline is too strict today. It is difficult to know whether French-speaking Social Credit M.P.s and Cr ditistes were referring to party discipline being too strict in their own parties, or whether they were thinking of the other parties, and particularly the Liberals, when they gave their answers. Suffice it to say that all Cr ditistes and two of the three French-speaking Social Credit M.P.s said in answer to another of our questions that they think all votes should be free votes.⁴ On the other hand, French-speaking Liberals, like English-speaking Liberals, were far less inclined to say that all votes should be free votes (only three French-speaking Liberals and two English-speaking Liberals gave this reply), but it is interesting that several French-speaking Liberals thought that there should be a free vote whenever there is a regionally divisive issue (such as the Student Loan Bill) and on constitutional matters (such as the Fulton-Favreau formula).

Further and even more dramatic evidence that it is certainly not the strictness of party discipline which is frustrating French-speaking Liberals is provided by respondents' reactions to statement 12, "The way an M.P. votes is always a true indication of the way he feels." Only 20 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals agreed with the notion, whereas nearly 60 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals agreed with it.⁵ Among the other French-speaking M.P.s there was by no means agreement with the statement: one of the two French-speaking Conservatives agreed; none of the French-speaking Social Crediters, and only one of the Cr ditistes, agreed. Some insight into the reasons for the French-speaking Liberals' views, as compared with those of their English-speaking colleagues, was provided by answers to a question relating to the role of the party Whip and the influence he has upon members: only 31 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals said that the Whip has no influence on their actions at all, compared with 91 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s who denied any influence on the part of the Whip. Since French-speaking Liberals are no less cohesive in their voting behaviour than are English-speaking M.P.s, these figures may simply mean that French-speaking Liberals were somewhat more inclined to feel that it is their own feelings of loyalty to the party and their own realistic appreciation of the consequences of failure to support the Government (with or without explicit direction or suggestion from the Whip) which motivates their actions, and that, for this reason, the way an M.P. votes is always a true indication of the way he feels.

It seems quite clear that the reasons why French Canadian M.P.s feel ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics do not lie in

party discipline: Cr ditistes, who were the least inclined to say that French Canadian M.P.s are ill at ease and frustrated, were much more inclined than are French-speaking Liberals to say that party discipline is too strict, and that the way in which an M.P. votes is not a true indication of the way he feels; whereas French-speaking Liberals, who were much more inclined to say that French Canadians are frustrated, were far less inclined to say that party discipline is too strict today (less inclined indeed than are their English-speaking party colleagues).

If the attitudes of French-speaking M.P.s towards party discipline do not provide the answer, might it be that French-speaking M.P.s are frustrated because they feel that their ideas and opinions are not fully attended to (especially by English-speaking M.P.s), or that they are provided with too few opportunities to make their views known? It must be admitted that none of our interview questions got at this subject directly, but we may consider the responses to two separate questions which bear, at least tangentially, on the matter. We invited respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements: (22) "Back-benchers receive far too few invitations to air their views in public;" and (29) "When you come to Ottawa you may have great ideas, but you soon learn that ideas don't get you anywhere."

Taking the reactions to the second statement first, we find that over all just under 30 per cent of the respondents agreed with the suggestion, with French-speaking Liberals being a little more inclined to agree than are English-speaking Liberals. When we examined the responses according to the ages of the French-speaking Liberals, it was clear that the younger M.P.s were more inclined to agree with the suggestion than were the older ones. Of the five French-speaking front-bench Liberals who answered this question two agreed with the statement and three disagreed. In this instance there were no differences between the French-speaking back-bench Liberals and the French-speaking Social Credit and Cr ditiste back-benchers. Neither of the French-speaking Conservative back-benchers agreed with the statement.

With regard to the question of back-bench M.P.s receiving too few opportunities to air their views in public, French-speaking back-benchers were over all a little more inclined to agree than were English-speaking back-benchers, but the difference is not great: 62 per cent of the French-speaking respondents as compared with 46 per cent of the English-speaking respondents agreed with the statement. When the responses are arrayed by party, it is clear that the difference between the two language groups is accounted for by the position of the French-speaking Liberals and Cr ditistes, both of whom were more inclined to agree than any others with the suggestion that back-benchers receive too few opportunities to air their views in public. English-speaking Conservatives were more inclined to agree with the suggestion than English-speaking Liberals, but French-speaking Liberals are more inclined than either to agree with the statement.⁶

Among the front-bench Liberals in our sample no English-speaking M.P.s agreed with the statement, whereas two of the five front-bench French-speaking Liberals agreed and three disagreed.

Taking the responses to the two propositions together, there is slight evidence of a difference in attitude between respondents from the two language groups, although there is hardly enough variation to suggest that much of the explanation of French Canadian M.P.s' frustration can be explained in these terms. However, before leaving this line of argument altogether, we might examine the responses to another question marginally related to the subject at hand. At another point in Part B of the questionnaire we asked all respondents to indicate their reactions to statement 11 that "Most new M.P.s learn more by keeping their mouths shut than by trying to prove how smart they are."

Over all, 60 per cent of the back-bench respondents agreed with this statement. We had expected that M.P.s with greater experience in the House of Commons might be more inclined than the "new boys" to agree with the suggestion, and this is in fact the case; but the interesting point is that those with more than three years' experience were only slightly more inclined to agree with the statement than were those with three years' experience or less: 67 per cent of those with more than three years' experience, compared with 56 per cent of those with three years' experience or less, agreed. Since 80 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s, compared with just a little over 50 per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s, are in the latter category, it is not surprising to find that French-speaking M.P.s were less inclined to agree than English-speaking M.P.s, but the difference is sufficiently great between M.P.s from the two language groups on this matter that it cannot simply be explained in terms of years of experience. Seventy per cent of the English-speaking back-benchers, as compared with only 38 per cent of the French-speaking back-benchers, agreed with the statement. The same general pattern is revealed among the front-bench respondents: no English-speaking front-bencher from either party disagreed with the statement that "Most new M.P.s learn more by keeping their mouths shut than by trying to prove how smart they are," whereas among the French-speaking front-benchers only two agreed, three disagreed, and one was not sure.

Although French-speaking Liberal back-benchers were a little more inclined to agree with the statement than were French-speaking Social Credit and Cr ditiste back-benchers, the differences in viewpoint that are being attributed to differences in attitude between language groups cannot be explained simply in terms of differences between the parties. As Table IX.1 brings out clearly, there is a difference of opinion on this question within all parties between back-bench M.P.s of the two language groups.

In order to discover whether there is any relation between disagreeing with the proposition and feeling ill at ease and frustrated in

Table IX.1

Back-benchers agreeing with the statement that "Most new M.P.s learn more by keeping their mouths shut than by trying to prove how smart they are," by language group and party*

Party	English	French
	(%)	(%)
Liberal	66	41
Progressive Conservative	77	50
New Democratic	75	**
Social Credit	50	33
Ralliement des Cr�ditistes	**	17
N	50	13

* Independent omitted.

** No M.P.s in this category.

federal politics, we arrayed responses to the statement in terms of each respondent's indication of his belief that French Canadians are or are not ill at ease in federal politics. However, no clear pattern emerged, and certainly no clear proof of a direct positive relation is apparent. It is true that French-speaking M.P.s who do *not* feel that French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics were a little more inclined than those who feel that they *are* frustrated to agree with the proposition: 55 per cent of those who say that French Canadians are not ill at ease, compared with only 30 per cent of those who say they are frustrated, agree with the proposition. Yet when one looks at the percentages of those who actually disagree with the statement, there is little difference between the two groups. The difference is accounted for by 17 per cent of the French-speaking back-benchers who feel that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics and who also say that they are not sure about the proposition that "Most new M.P.s learn more by keeping their mouths shut" The general conclusion we may draw is that there is a difference in attitude between English- and French-speaking M.P.s on the question of the opportunities for, and the appropriateness of, back-benchers making their views known at the federal level, but there is no clear evidence that this difference in attitude accounts for the feelings of a large number of French-speaking back-benchers that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics.

It was argued earlier that the explanation for the feeling on the part of the majority of French-speaking M.P.s that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics cannot be explained by their feelings that French Canadians are unsuccessful in fulfilling the specific roles they attribute to themselves as French Canadians: few were prepared to state that French Canadian M.P.s are unsuccessful in fulfilling their roles. We may nevertheless inquire

whether there is any difference between the French-speaking respondents, in terms of the roles they specify as appropriate to French Canadian M.P.s, *qua* French Canadians. When the responses of the two groups of French-speaking back-benchers are arrayed in terms of the specific roles mentioned, we do encounter some differences in the responses. French-speaking M.P.s who say that French Canadians are not ill at ease, were considerably more inclined than were those who feel that they are ill at ease, to say that French Canadian M.P.s ought not to attempt to play a specific role: 40 per cent of those who denied that French Canadians are ill at ease in federal politics also denied that they ought to play a specific role, whereas only 12 per cent of those who feel that French Canadians *are* frustrated denied a specific role to French Canadians.

The latter group of French-speaking back-benchers were also more inclined to mention the role of protecting the constitutional rights of French Canadians than were those who did not feel that French Canadians are frustrated, but the difference is relatively slight. Once again an explanation of the attitude of those who feel that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated has not been clearly offered. Something should undoubtedly be made of the differences between the two groups in terms of their disposition to think that a specific role is appropriate: the fact that many more of those who feel that French Canadians are not ill at ease and frustrated also feel that French Canadians should play no specific role as French Canadians may be significant. But again we would want the differences to be more striking than they are before much could be made of them, and in any case we come back to the finding noted earlier that most of those who think that French Canadians *should* perform a specific role also think that they are successful at it, at least some of the time. All the attempts thus far to explain the attitude of the majority of French-speaking M.P.s who feel that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics have been, by and large, unsuccessful. It is time to consider directly the examples offered by those who said that French Canadians *are* frustrated, for explanations of their attitude.

Not all the French-speaking respondents who said that French Canadians are ill at ease gave examples, but most did. Generally, their frustrations appear to revolve around three main difficulties: the first is the problem of dealing in English either in committees or with a fundamentally unilingual civil service in Ottawa; secondly, there are difficulties of communication with English-speaking M.P.s that spring from a profound difference in outlook; thirdly, and related closely to the second, are the difficulties confronting French-speaking M.P.s (and in particular Quebec M.P.s) when legislative matters involving the specific interests of Quebec are before the House of Commons. These problems were mentioned in roughly equal proportions by French-speaking back-bench respondents, and confirmed by front-benchers' responses. Two respondents gave examples which do not fit this general pattern: one French-speaking Liberal back-

bencher made the point that although he feels no special malaise, *anyone* in a minority position feels ill at ease; another felt that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated "parce que les Canadiens français n'obtiennent quelque chose qu'à force de lutter." This same respondent went further: "Personnellement, je considère que mon nom est un handicap; pour moi, le fait d'être Franco-ontarien, me freine; Québec fait plus de tort dans ce cas que les Anglais; les Canadiens français du Québec sont les plus grands adversaires des Franco-ontariens."

The following are much more representative of the examples offered by French-speaking M.P.s of the frustrating situations that confront them:

Aux Comité des Comptes publiques, le personnel du Département de l'Auditeur Général qui se présente pour répondre aux questions des députés ne parle pas français et nous avons le sentiment que les questionner en français, c'est les insulter.
(*Liberal*)

Si un député ou ministre est unilingue, c'est frustrant, ça crée une certaine crainte. (*Liberal*)

On n'est bienvenue quand on veut parler du Québec aux Anglo-Saxons et on sent cet atmosphère nébuleux qui flotte.
(*Créditiste*)

On commence à habituer les anglophones au phénomène français. Quoique l'on ait des amis canadiens-anglais, ceux-ci oublient d'une façon régulière le fait canadien-français. Il faut toujours être sur un "pied d'alerte." (*Front-bench Liberal*)

Tel fut le cas lors du débat sur la nécessité d'avoir les rapports des comités en français. Les Libéraux français se sentaient gênés de ne pas soutenir une telle motion.
(*Créditiste*)

Generally speaking there were no differences between the parties as far as the kinds of examples that were given, but perhaps merely by dint of numbers it seemed that Liberals were more inclined to mention the embarrassment and frustration associated with the discussion of controversial matters, such as "opting out" legislation, which affect (or appear to affect) only Quebec. One Quebec Liberal mentioned specifically the fear which many French-speaking Liberals have of making the English-speaking M.P.s feel that they are supporting the autonomist ambitions of Quebec, even though they feel that different arrangements could and should be made for Quebec. The same respondents stated that "on ne parle pas toujours franchement." Another noted, along the same lines, that in part the frustration of French Canadians arises from the fundamental difference in outlook which the two language groups entertain: centralization means efficiency to an English-speaking M.P., this respondent explained, whereas for a French Canadian M.P. decentralization means efficiency.

It is interesting that the English-speaking respondents' examples of occasions on which French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated were on the whole similar to those given by the French-speaking M.P.s. None of the English-speaking respondents mentioned the insensitivity of the English-speaking M.P.s to the French Canadians' point of view, a complaint of several French-speaking M.P.s, but they were particularly appreciative of the difficulties created by the predominance of the English language in the committees and the civil service, and also of the problem presented by legislation dealing with Quebec. The following comments are quite typical of a number of examples mentioned by English-speaking M.P.s of occasions on which a French Canadian member of Parliament feels ill at ease and frustrated by federal politics.

When a French-speaking civil servant replies to him in English, and when documents arrive on his desk in English, because the French one is going to be late, he wouldn't feel at home in Ottawa. (*Conservative*)

Some who can't communicate in English must have a complex. They are in a minority and can't communicate. (*Conservative*)

The reason he is frustrated is because he feels obliged to express a Quebec point of view; he's pushed into it because of the stiff opposition. The Ontario M.P. can say what he likes without the provincial government breathing down his neck. The attitude of the French Canadian M.P.s is this: "If I don't, the Cr ditistes will." (*Liberal*)

There are occasions where lack of familiarity in the English language can be a handicap. Technical subject-matter is often in English and translation is cumbersome. Most of them don't do enough work and few want any serious committee assignments involving work. (*Liberal*)

It is clear, now that we have examined the examples of frustrating experiences mentioned by both English- and French-speaking respondents, that no single factor seems to be the cause of the French Canadians' feelings of alienation from the federal political process. If the situation were to be altered it is apparent that, for many, an improvement in attitude towards parliamentary life would follow upon the meaningful extension of bilingualism to all aspects of the operations of Parliament (in committees through the provision of full interpretation and bilingual stenographic services, and within the civil service by the establishment of the French language as a *de facto* means of communication with civil servants), extensions that, as we have indicated in earlier chapters, so many French-speaking M.P.s earnestly desire. Such reforms would still leave untouched two other areas of frustration for many French Canadian M.P.s, but might go some way towards creating an atmosphere in which their problems might permit of some kind of solution.

We have not yet answered the question of why French-speaking Liberals were a little more inclined than were Cr ditistes to say that

French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics. One reason that might be suggested arises from the examples of frustration mentioned above: that is to say that French-speaking Liberals, in contrast to Cr ditistes, have always to think of the reaction of their English-speaking colleagues when dealing with fiscal or constitutional legislation on which the Quebec government's views have already been explicitly stated. Cr ditistes are somewhat freer to manoeuvre on controversial matters than French-speaking Liberals, who are caught between the views of their English-speaking colleagues in Ottawa and the views of a Liberal administration in Quebec. The same problem may also, to a lesser extent, have confronted French-speaking members of the Social Credit party, and may also help to account for the fact that all were agreed that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics.

There is a final factor worth noting. Although it was not mentioned in their examples by any of the respondents who stated that French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated, it appears to be an important feature of the same respondents' orientation to the federal political process. When we reviewed the protocols of French-speaking respondents who agreed that French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics, we were struck by the considerable number who had earlier indicated that their constituents either know nothing of the implications of the job of M.P., or think that an M.P. is more powerful than he really is, or are uninterested in his legislative activities and appeared to the respondents to be solely concerned with the patronage or favours that the M.P. might be able to provide. When we cross-tabulated the responses to question 13 "Do you think there are any important differences between what you think your job is and what your constituents think it is?" with the responses as to whether French Canadians are ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics, we found that *all* the French-speaking respondents who had stated that their constituents are uninterested in their legislative activity appeared among the ranks of those who agreed that French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics. The fact that all the respondents who are of the opinion that their constituents are uninterested in their legislative activities are Liberals, may help to explain why, *ceteris paribus*, French-speaking Liberals were more inclined than were Cr ditistes to say that they feel ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics.

We do not claim that this opinion is the major factor accounting for the French-speaking M.P.s' belief that French Canadians are frustrated in federal politics. It could not be since, among French-speaking M.P.s, only Liberals hold this view. All we are suggesting is that, given the frustrations of federal political life which French-speaking Liberals mentioned explicitly, dissatisfaction especially with the attitude which they feel many of their constituents have towards the "lawmaking" aspects of an M.P.'s role—helps to deepen their frustration with the situation in which they find themselves in Ottawa.

We have now examined from a variety of angles the general attitudes of a large sample of Canadian M.P.s, as well as the ways in which M.P.s see and perform their roles. Although differences based on region, party, and other variables make impossible a characterization of *the* English Canadian M.P. or *the* French Canadian M.P., it should be clear that the most persistently significant distinctions between our respondents appear to be related to the members' principal language group. It has been observed that, in general, perceptions of the *role* of an M.P., and also perceptions of the place of a back-bencher within the legislative process, differ little between members of the two principal language groups. This is not to say that one single notion of a member's representational, areal, and purposive roles dominates all members of the House of Commons; the truth is that a considerable variety of views exist within the group as a whole. What it does mean is that, with a few exceptions, variations in the way M.P.s see their roles are more or less evenly distributed among respondents of the two linguistic groups.

This study has not dealt systematically with the genesis of, or adaptation to, legislative roles. Broadly, we may assume that perception of and adaptation to these roles will be related *inter alia* to the traditions of an M.P.'s constituency, his formative political experiences, his party's position within the House (Government or Opposition), his intra- and extra-legislative experiences and influences, and his personality.¹ It was only at one point in the analysis, where we dealt with respondents' views on whether there are any differences between their own and their constituents' views of the job of M.P., that we received a suggestion of the relation between role perception and the traditions or character of the constituency. Our study did not sort out cause and effect, but it must be noted that the strikingly dissimilar perceptions (and behaviour) of the members from the Atlantic provinces and British Columbia appear to be reflected in (or induced by) equally different perceptions on the part of their constituents. Quebec M.P.s, largely French-speaking

Liberals, appear to be confronted by a situation in which their own perceptions of the role are out of phase with those of their constituents. The gap between the expectations of their constituents for a "préfet d'administration" and their own "lawmaker" perceptions of an M.P.'s role is, as we noted, irritating and perhaps even frustrating. (It will be interesting to see whether traditions will be stronger than the "new men.") In any case, if efforts are to be made to effect a new image of the federal M.P. in the province of Quebec, more Quebec M.P.s will have to take seriously the task which they nearly all agree is desirable, that of informing and educating their constituents about what goes on in Parliament. They must take advantage of the most modern means of communication which are now being more fully used by their English-speaking colleagues.

If French-speaking and English-speaking M.P.s were not clearly distinguishable by the way they saw their roles, there were, on the other hand, clear differences in the manner in which they performed their roles and in the attitudes they held towards many aspects of the parliamentary system. All things considered, French-speaking M.P.s were much more critical of parliamentary life than were their English-speaking colleagues: they were much more disposed to say that the House of Commons and Senate are not effective as institutions; they were more disposed to say that there is nothing they would miss if they suddenly left political life; they did not feel at home in Ottawa as a city; and they were very much inclined to say that a French Canadian feels ill at ease and frustrated in federal politics.

Some of the irritants for French-speaking M.P.s have been or are being removed. French-speaking M.P.s, it may be recalled, were even more convinced than were English-speaking M.P.s that procedural reforms were necessary for the House of Commons, and some procedural reforms have since been implemented. They were also critical of the quality of the personnel in federal politics, but we have no idea whether they think there has been any change in this regard. It is also of great importance to French Canadians that interpretation and bilingual stenographic facilities be extended to serve all committees, and again certain improvements have been made since many respondents were interviewed. Simultaneous interpretation facilities are now available for Liberal party caucuses and several other committee rooms. As of March 1, 1966, there were seven committee rooms intended for use with simultaneous interpretation: five already in service and two in prospect. There were also, as of the same date, twelve interpreters in the civil service on the strength of the Bureau for Translations, which is part of the Department of the Secretary of State. The authorized strength has apparently been raised to 18, and an attempt has been made to fill vacant positions by open competition.

It seems vital that provision be made both for a sufficient number of equipped rooms and personnel to meet the peak demand on committee

rooms. What peak demand will mean under the new provisions governing the use of committees is undoubtedly somewhat difficult to judge, but it can be safely said that more interpreters, to say nothing of bilingual stenographers, will have to be found before anyone can be complacent about the facilities available. At the moment the Speaker is not responsible for the appointment of interpreters; nor is he consulted about the number required. There may be a case for placing responsibility for these matters, apart from the actual function of employing personnel, under the Speaker, who with the help of the chief interpreter and in close liaison with the House leader may be able to work out requirements. The needs in servicing the House of Commons and Senate can reasonably be predicted for any session; the problem will be to achieve maximum flexibility in the use of a relatively small staff of interpreters, and this can hardly be done effectively apart from as full information as possible about the likely scale of committee work within a given period. The aim must be to have sufficient reserves within the system to meet even unusual peak demands on interpreters' time within the committees, for anything less than a fully serviced committee is unsatisfactory, especially to French Canadian M.P.s, many of whom have been discouraged from participating in committee proceedings by conditions as they have existed in the past.

It must be recalled that many M.P.s of both language groups thought that bilingualism causes difficulties in committees. A number of English-speaking M.P.s mentioned, as one reason for having become unsympathetic towards French Canadians, the difficulties that are created when French-speaking M.P.s insist on interpretation or stenographic facilities. The analysis has shown also that, although within the entire sample of English-speaking back-bench respondents only 24 per cent were opposed to the extension of translation facilities to all committee rooms whatever the cost, among those who were unsympathetic 44 per cent were opposed. Even among those sympathetic to French Canadians, nearly 20 per cent were opposed. There were also a considerable number of back-benchers (especially English-speaking) who felt that bilingualism in the House of Commons is expensive and wasteful of time. Among government front-benchers (as far as we can tell) there is a difference of opinion over the effect of bilingualism on the House of Commons: whereas no French-speaking front-benchers mentioned any special effect of bilingualism (apart from the obvious fact that it is easier for an M.P. to speak in his mother tongue), three of the six English-speaking Liberal front-benchers interviewed said that bilingualism causes delays and four said that it is expensive. It should not be thought, therefore, that the provision of facilities permitting full bilingualism in committees will be popular with all M.P.s. But it is worth while recalling the degree of support which such full bilingualism has from both principal language groups: among back-bench respondents French-speaking M.P.s were totally in favour, and over 70 per cent of the English-speaking respondents were also in favour. Among front-bench M.P.s all but two

of the respondents interviewed agreed with the extension of facilities: one Liberal was not sure, and one Conservative was opposed.

An examination of the attitudes of back-bench and front-bench members of the Liberal party in the twenty-sixth Parliament revealed a strong disposition to extend simultaneous interpretation facilities to all committee rooms, whatever the cost. There is no *prima facie* evidence that this position is much altered within the Liberal party today. There is thus a strong case for a Government commitment to provide all committees with fully adequate services for the conduct of proceedings in the two principal languages. Essentially such action would merely carry out the implications of the Government's present policy, but there might well be considerable advantages attendant upon a clear restatement of the principle of full practical equality of French and English within the House of Commons and its committees, especially if such a statement were linked with other reforms designed to assure the equal status of the two languages within the House of Commons. Such a statement might undercut all harassing criticism of the status of the French language within committees (thus lessening further alienation of both English- and French-speaking M.P.s from committee work and from each other) and might go some way towards creating the kind of favourable atmosphere in which French-speaking M.P.s are likely to feel, at least a little more than they now do, at home.

Reforms of this kind must also confront directly the question of bilingualism in the Speakership of the House of Commons. As has already been pointed out, a number of English-speaking and French-speaking M.P.s agree that the Speaker must be bilingual. But if bilingualism is to be a fact, every step must be taken to assure that not only the Speaker but also his deputy and the deputy chairman of committees are fully bilingual. The day is past when we can be satisfied with a system in which the two principal language groups are merely formally represented in the institutions of the House of Commons. If bilingualism is to be a feature of the conduct of business in the House of Commons, then it must be accepted in all of its implications. The pairing in the Speakership of an essentially unilingual English Canadian with a more or less bilingual French Canadian is not good enough. If no member who desires to participate fully in the work of the House of Commons is to be discriminated against, then all members must be served by officials equally capable in either of the two official languages of the country. If this principle were accepted, and if it were thought appropriate that the Speaker should also take on responsibilities for the general supervision of the interpretation facilities for the House and its committees, there would be a strong case for the establishment of a permanent Speakership and Deputy Speakership. Quite apart from other possible justifications of this step, there are distinct advantages as far as the creation of a *de facto* bilingual House of Commons is concerned. With their added duties the Speaker and his assistant should be relieved of all need to perform any of the traditional tasks of an M.P. Since relatively

few men would meet the higher standards imposed by the criterion of full bilingual competence, there may be clear advantages in assuring the continued services of such men as may be recruited to the tasks.

There is also a need to incorporate into any concrete proposals for the creation of *de facto* bilingualism practical improvements in written translation. The analysis that is the basis for this report shows that improvements in the translation system for documents are wanted and, despite the considerable changes that have been effected in recent years, still needed. Late and delayed translations are still the object of complaint, and the quality of translation continues to be a cause of concern on occasion. Here again is a distinction between French and English Canadian M.P.s, for the translation services are the particular preoccupation of the French-speaking, even when what is involved is the translation into English of materials in French. Yet if members from both language groups are to be enabled to discharge their functions adequately, the translation system is clearly the business of the whole House. The costs of bilingualism were referred to frequently by some of our respondents, but an efficiently bilingual House of Commons will have to accept the financial implications of full bilingualism. Since qualified translators are scarce, the implications may include the establishment within the public service of proper training facilities for the kind of translators desired, as well as higher salaries for those who qualify.

There are two further reforms necessary to make French Canadian M.P.s feel more involved in federal politics. The feasibility and the effectiveness of a greater degree of bilingualism in the civil service, especially in Ottawa, depend on the government's actions and this Commission's other studies and recommendations; there can be no doubt, however, that a great many French Canadian M.P.s would benefit from the reform, so that their experience of federal politics would be that much more satisfying. Similar results might also follow from the creation of a bilingual federal district centred on Ottawa and Hull. Many French-speaking M.P.s are not at home in Ottawa as it now is (although a great many English-speaking M.P.s do not seem to appreciate this fact). Any reforms in this direction (which again depend on the conclusions of other Commission studies as to its desirability and feasibility) would help create a more favourable milieu in which to live and work, and thus make involvement in federal politics a more satisfying experience.

The recommendations presented thus far would undoubtedly help develop a setting more congenial to French Canadians, however fluent they may be in the English language. (It is relevant to note again that even fluently bilingual French Canadians often find it a strain to have to speak for a prolonged period in English, so that the observation made by a number of English-speaking respondents, to the effect that the French Canadians ought to speak English just because they can, involves yet another gap in understanding.) The reforms

suggested cannot be guaranteed to improve the communication of ideas between the two principal language groups. We have seen that, despite the fact that nearly a third of the M.P.s in both principal linguistic groups do not think there is a problem of communication between English and French Canadians, much of the evidence we have presented argues the contrary. It may be recalled that we observed that English- and French-speaking M.P.s of the same political party had different, even sharply different, points of view. These differences suggested that the possibilities for closer communication of ideas between the two groups within the same political party do not necessarily guarantee a better understanding of each other's point of view. We also observed that when members agreed that there is a problem of communication between English and French Canadians, respondents did not see the problem in the same way and therefore tended to recommend different solutions.

While the results of this study will provide ample evidence, for those who wish it, that among Canadian M.P.s there are clear differences of views based not on linguistic differences, but on regional, party, and other factors, these differences should not be allowed to obscure the great significance of the differences between members of the two principal language groups. It must be admitted that this study has focused on "perceptions of others" in terms of perceptions of the "other language group." We might have made more than we did of the relation of party or region to the perceptions of others. But it has not been our purpose to suggest that differences of perception are based solely on language differences, nor has it been our purpose to suggest that one's own view of oneself and the view of others of oneself be the same. All we are asserting is that sharp differences of this kind do exist, and that M.P.s would do well to appreciate their extent and importance.

However, we cannot assume that greater appreciation of the differences between the attitudes and perceptions of M.P.s of the two principal language groups will necessarily lead to greater understanding of others, or to an improvement in relations between the two groups. Some of the most perceptive members of the House of Commons will have known intuitively most of the major findings of this report in any case, but we still do not know how they will react to the detailed presentation of these differences, which this study has attempted to carry out with some rigour. For some members, especially those who failed to appreciate the extent of the differences that exist, or the extent to which a problem of communication obtains between M.P.s, their worst repressed suspicions about the other group may be confirmed. Others may take comfort from the many points on which there appears to be general consensus among all groups within the House. The vast majority of M.P.s in the twenty-sixth Parliament, it must be remembered, declared themselves sympathetic to the members of the other principal language group. It is our hope that greater knowledge of the facts will act as a catalyst for the conversion of sympathy into further understanding.

Ultimately, the degree of understanding will depend upon the extent and the quality of personal relations between members of the two principal language groups. Personal contact with M.P.s of the other language group was shown to be an important factor in making respondents more sympathetic to that group; but sympathy based on vague feelings of fondness for a group or individual is no substitute for an intellectual appreciation of the specific content of a group's or individual's attitudes. Every effort should be made to provide facilities in which to maximize the possibilities for informal, social contact between members. Greater social contact between M.P.s, especially between M.P.s of the two principal language groups, is not an end in itself, but must be regarded as a means by which, hopefully, members will communicate informally their values, beliefs, and ideas.

We cannot assume that even if M.P.s manage to arrive at a better intellectual understanding of the variety of opinion which exists between members of the two principal language groups, accommodation of interests will inevitably follow: certain problems may present no acceptable grounds for compromise; events outside the control of the federal government may shape situations more effectively than the intentions of federal politicians. Nevertheless, on the assumption that M.P.s have an interest in retaining (some might say, creating) a viable central government in Canada, there are a number of specific courses of action open to the federal government which at least offer hope of maximizing the chances of success.

The purpose of this study is to examine the way in which the House of Commons reflects Canadian cultural dualism. In particular the study seeks:

1. To discover how M.P.s see their role and to ascertain significant ethnic, regional, party, or urban-rural variations in their views.
2. To ascertain the degree to which M.P.s regard politics as a full-time occupation, and to ascertain the nature of their other commitments, if any.
3. To examine the relation between certain structural features—the caucus, committees, bilingual Speaker—and the M.P.'s performance of his role (with special references to differences between language groups).
4. To ascertain how the bilingual-bicultural phenomenon affects the operations of Parliament.
5. To examine the channels of communication of ideas and influence between and within parties, and especially between English- and French-speaking M.P.s and the public.

A carefully constructed stratified sample, comprising 64 per cent of the back-benchers in the House of Commons, has been interviewed, together with as many of the front-benchers as would consent to be interviewed.

The considerable quantity of material made available in these interviews forms the core of the report in this project. Other studies have been used along with the interviews (for example, surveys of Hansard, unstructured interviews, statistical compilations of biographical data), but the main emphasis is on the results of the interviews. References to the institutional arrangements of Parliament are included in the interviews, and these references are supplemented by additional material from non-interview sources.

Part A: Questions (to be asked by an interviewer)

One of the things we are most interested in is how Canadians get into public life.

- 1.* How did you first become interested in politics? (*Probe for formative influences*)**
- 2.* Did any particular person or group encourage you to enter active politics? (*Probe circumstances*)
- 3.* (*If not already mentioned*) How did you come to run as a candidate for the party?
4. Have you ever been a candidate for another party?
No.....
Yes.....
Which one(s).....
5. Have you ever been a supporter of another political party?
No.....
Yes.....
Which one(s).....
6. How does your local riding association nominate its candidates?
7. Were you opposed at your last nominating meeting?
Yes.....
No.....

*Questions marked with an asterisk were also used in the interviews with front-bench M.P.s.

** Instructions to interviewers.

Now I want to shift to ask you a few questions about the job of being an M.P.

- 8.* First, how would you describe the job of being an M.P.? What are the most important things you should do as a member of Parliament? (*Probe for a full description, attempting to get respondent to rank roles in order of importance. If there is a difference between what he does and what he thinks he ought to do, get both, making sure to distinguish in your notes the actual from the ideal.*)
- 9.* Do you think most M.P.s from other PARTIES would describe the job in much the same way as you have? (*If not*) How would they differ?
- 10.* Do you think most M.P.s from other PROVINCES would describe the job in much the same way as you have? (*If not*) How would they differ?
- 11.* (*If, after probing for a full description in question 8, respondent has not mentioned "provincial spokesman," ask*) Some members sometimes mention the job of acting as a provincial spokesman as part of their role as M.P.
(a) Do you think this is properly the job of an M.P.?
(b) Do you regard this as part of YOUR job?
- 12.* Are there any differences between the way you NOW think of the job of M.P. and the way you thought of it before you came to Ottawa?
- 13.* Do you think there are any important differences between what you think your job is and what your constituents think it is? What are they? (*Probe for respondent's conception of the realism of the demands put upon him*)
14. (a) From what sources do you get the most accurate and useful information about the feelings of your constituents on political issues? (*Record respondent's answer, then ask*)
(b) (*Show card*) How would you rank the following in terms of their usefulness in providing good information and advice on political issues?
Editorials in local newspapers
Letters to the editor in local newspapers
Party leaders and workers in your constituency
Business leaders
Local government officials
Union leaders
Church leaders
Leaders of ethnic associations
Personal friends and acquaintances
(c)* What do you do to maintain contact with your local party organization?

- (d) What do you do to maintain contact with local party notables and followers?
- (e)* How much mail do you get from your constituents in an average week?
- (f)* What subjects predominate?
- (g)* Are there other ways your constituents try to communicate with you? (*Probe for deputations, pressure groups, frequency and approval of same*)
- 15.* Some M.P.s regard it as part of their job to inform and educate their constituents about what goes on in Parliament. How do you feel about this.
- 16. (a)* By what means do you normally communicate with your constituents? (*Probe fully*)
- (b)* By what means do you make yourself available to your constituents?
- (c)* When the House is in session, approximately how many days a MONTH do you spend in your constituency?
- 17. We know that an M.P.'s personal views and those of his party will not always be in line. Supposing you wished to take a certain stand on an issue which you knew was different from the majority view of your party, what would you probably do? (*Probe deeply. If respondent claims he would attempt to influence the party unofficially, explore fully the channels he would probably pursue. If respondent says that it will depend on circumstances, try to discover what these are.*)
- 18. (a) Suppose that you wanted to take a certain stand on an issue before the House, but you knew that a majority of the people in your constituency would want you to take another stand, what would you probably do then?
- (b) (*If respondent would attempt to change his constituents' opinion, ask*) What means would you use to change their views? (*Probe fully*)
- (c) And if you were not able to change the views of many people in your constituency, what would you probably do then?
- 19. (a) If an issue ever arose in which your party's position was at odds with the wishes of most of your constituents, would you be more likely to go along with the party, or more likely to go along with your constituents?
- (b)* In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to his party's position?
- (c)* In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to the views of his constituents?

- (d)* In what circumstances should there be a free vote?
20. How many times in the present Parliament have you voted against your party?
21. (a)* Would you say that being an M.P. is a full-time occupation, or that it is possible to be a good M.P. and have other commitments as well?
- (b)* Besides being an M.P., what other commitments do you have?
- (c)* (*If respondent mentions commitments ask*) How much time, on the average, do these commitments take during the parliamentary session?
22. (a) How frequently does your party caucus meet?
- (b)* How often do you attend your party caucus: always, usually, sometimes, rarely, never?
- (c)* What do you see as the TWO main functions of your party caucus?
- (d)* Is a party caucus decision binding on all members?
- (e)* (*If not*) Under what conditions will it not be binding?
- (f) Do YOU (personally) speak English at your party caucus meetings?
- (g) (*If yes, ask*) Regularly? (*If not regularly*) On what occasions do YOU speak English?
- (h)* Do YOU (personally) speak French at your party caucus meetings?
- (i)* (*If yes, ask*) Regularly? (*If not regularly, ask*) On what occasions do YOU speak French?
23. (a)* Are you a member of a regional or provincial caucus? Which?
- Yes: regional
- Yes: provincial
- No : neither
- (*If respondent is not member of a party with a regional or provincial caucus, go directly to question 24; if he answers yes to (a) ask the following:*)
- (b)* How frequently does it meet?
- (c)* How often do you attend your provincial (regional) caucus: always, usually, sometimes, rarely, never?
- (d)* What are the two main functions of your provincial (regional) caucus?
- (e)* Is a provincial (regional) caucus decision binding on all members of the provincial (regional) caucus?
- (f) (*If not*) Under what conditions will it not be binding?

- (g) Do YOU, personally, speak English at your provincial (regional) caucus?
 - (h) (*If yes*) Regularly? (*If not regularly*) On what occasions do YOU speak English?
 - (i) Do YOU, personally, speak French at your provincial (regional) caucus?
 - (j) (*If yes*) Regularly? (*If not regularly*) On what occasions do you speak French?
24. (a) Coming back again to your job as M.P., what do you find are the most pressing problems in trying to do your job? What are the things which hinder your task? (*Go beyond general statements such as "lack of time": Get specific things which prevent respondent from doing the job the way he would like to. Probe for relations established between civil servants and M.P.s to deal with constituency business, with particular reference to the extent and level of civil service co-operation and their language facility.*)
- (b) What reforms would you make if you could?
- Now let's talk about the role of the House of Commons as a whole and its place in our system of government.
25. (a)* As you see it, what role should the House of Commons play in our governmental system? (*Probe for role of Commons vis-à-vis cabinet.*)
- (b)* How effective is the House of Commons in fulfilling the role you think it should play? (*Probe for specific failures of Commons if respondent has any in mind.*)
- (c)* (*If respondent sees a gap between what Commons does and what it ought to be doing, ask*) What are the most pressing problems which prevent the House of Commons from doing what you think it ought to be doing?
26. (a)* Coming now to the Senate, what role do you think the Senate should play in our system of government?
- (b)* How effective is the Senate in fulfilling this role? (*Probe for specific failures of Senate if respondent has any in mind.*)
27. It is sometimes said that, for all the differences of opinion that may from time to time be revealed across the floor of the House of Commons, the ordinary back-benchers achieve a better understanding of one another's point of view than is often imagined. How do you feel about this view?
28. (a)* Who are some of your closest friends in the House of Commons—I mean the members you most often see outside the chamber, at lunch or dinner, or at parties or social gatherings? (*Try to get six names.*)

- (b)* Can you give any examples of occasions on which, from your own experience, informal contacts with other M.P.s have
- (i) actually made you more sympathetic to a view to which you were originally opposed?
 - (ii) . . . made you less sympathetic?
29. (a)* Do you think there is a problem of communication between French- and English-speaking M.P.s? (*If yes*) What is the problem?
- (b)* (*If problem seen, ask*) What, if anything, is being done to solve this problem?
- (c)* Have you personally done anything to help solve it? (*If so*) What?
- (d) What M.P.s do you tend to turn to for a deeper understanding of the French Canadian point of view? (*Try to get three names.*)
- (e)* Are there any personalities (writers, editorialists, social scientists, politicians) whose point of view you listen to with respect and interest on the subject of relations between English- and French-speaking Canada? (*Try to get six names.*)
30. (a)* What, in your opinion, is the effect of bilingualism upon the operations of Parliament? (*Probe for problems at committee and caucus level, in the library and for personal problems created.*)
- (b)* Do you find the present translation service fully satisfactory? (*Probe for service in the House as well as written translation. Probe for distinctions between its actual operation (in Commons) and its absence (in some committees).*)
- (c) What part does the Speaker play in operating the bilingual system?
31. (a)* How would you describe the role of the party leaders in the House of Commons? (*Probe fully. We are interested, not only in respondent's conception of his leader's role, but also the roles of other party leaders.*)
- (b)* What would you say are the main reasons for the influence your party leaders have over your party?
- (c) (i) Do you have much personal contact with the leadership of your party?
- (ii) Whom do you tend to see most often?
 - (iii) How frequently?
 - (iv) On what sorts of occasions?
 - (v) What influence does your party Whip have on you?
 - (vi) How does he influence your actions?
 - (vii) Is your party Whip's office bilingual?

- (d) Are there any particular ministers in the government to whom you naturally turn for information, advice, and assistance? (*Try to get names.*) How often? On what kinds of occasions?
32. (a) Coming back to your own interests, what would you say are your main political interests?
- (b) What are the most useful and important things you can do to further these interests? (*Probe for the distinction between what he does and what he would like to be able to do.*)
- (c) (*If not already mentioned*) Have you ever found it worth while to form an unofficial group within your party to pursue your common interests? (*Try to discover whether groups are discouraged by party leadership.*)
33. (a)* What in your opinion are the main qualities of a good M.P.?
- (b)* Do you think your opinion about this would be shared by M.P.s from other parties? (*If not*) How would they differ?
- (c)* Do you think your view would be shared by M.P.s from other provinces? (*If not*) How would they differ?
34. (a)* Are there, in your opinion, many occasions when a French Canadian M.P. feels ill at ease and frustrated when seeking to participate in federal politics?
- (b)* Can you give any examples?
35. (a)* Do you think that the French Canadian M.P., as a French Canadian, should play a specific role in the House of Commons and in his party?
- (b)* What role should he play?
- (c)* Does he succeed in practice in playing such a role?
36. (a)* Do you think that the English Canadian M.P., as an English Canadian, should play a specific role in the House of Commons and in his party?
- (b)* What role should he play?
- (c)* Does he succeed in practice in playing such a role?
37. (a)* Has your general attitude towards French Canadians changed since you became an M.P.?
- (b)* (*If so*) How has it changed?
- (c)* What has contributed to the change?
- 38.* Do you think that one loses money in politics, even if one wins the election and gets the indemnity?

39. (a)* Do you expect to run for Parliament again? Yes.....
 No.....
 Don't know.....
- (b)* (*If yes or no*) Why?
40. Are there any public offices you would like to seek sometime in the future? (*If yes*) Which one(s)?
41. (a)* If for some reason you had to give up being an M.P. today, what would you miss the MOST?
- (b)* What would you miss the LEAST?
42. (a)* Do you live in Ottawa?
- (b)* Is your family here?
- (c)* Is Ottawa the kind of place a French Canadian M.P. can feel at home in?
- (d)* Is Ottawa the kind of place an English Canadian M.P. can feel at home in?
- (e)* Is it a suitable capital city for Canada?

Part B: Statements (to be completed by respondent)

We have collected some statements that have been made by M.P.s and others about their life and work. You may well find them oversimplified; but we should like to get your general reaction to each statement. They are, of course, all matters of opinion, so there are no correct or incorrect answers. Would you please check the response which best indicates your agreement or disagreement with the statement.

Statement	Agree	Tend to agree	Not sure	Tend to disagree	Disagree
1. Most of the time front-bench policy is already decided before a back-bencher has a chance to exert influence.					
2. An M.P. can tell most of the time what his constituents will think about an issue before he even asks them.					

Statement (cont'd)	Agree	Tend to agree	Not sure	Tend to disagree	Disagree
3. It would be better if French-speaking ministers always spoke in French; they would express themselves more satisfactorily.					
4. The welfare services an M.P. performs for his constituents are important in getting him re-elected.					
5. Dominion-provincial conferences detract from the importance of Parliament.					
6. Politics is a dirty game.					
7. The local party organization has had very little to do with getting me elected.					
8. A senate conceived of as a "Chamber of Nationalities," representing English and French in equal proportions, would be a useful reform to our parliamentary system.					
9. People tend to judge a party by the quality of its leader.					
10. The provincial caucus is an unwelcome and disruptive addition to the party system in the House of Commons.					
11. Most new M.P.s learn more by keeping their mouths shut than by trying to prove how smart they are.					

Statement (cont'd)	Agree	Tend to agree	Not sure	Tend to disagree	Disagree
12. The way an M.P. votes is always a true indication of the way he feels.					
13. People continually overrate the importance of the party caucus. It is a place to let off steam, perhaps, but it is not a place for influencing policy.					
14. The Quebec M.P. tends to be more concerned with looking after his constituents than with national policies.					
15. M.P.s, in view of the demands made upon them, are chronically underpaid.					
16. Experience on the backbenches is absolutely essential before a man should be given a cabinet post.					
17. The Commons would be a more efficient institution if it were cut to, say, 150 members, each with paid assistants.					
18. Most constituents are more interested in the services an M.P. can perform for them than in his views on legislation before the House.					
19. Party discipline is too strict today.					

Statement (cont'd)	Agree	Tend to agree	Not sure	Tend to disagree	Disagree
20. The notion of alternating the leadership of political parties from English Canadians to French Canadians is a good one and ought to be followed generally.					
21. Often M.P.s get so involved in affairs in Ottawa that they lose touch with their constituents.					
22. Back-benchers receive far too few invitations to air their views in public.					
23. Most constituents will respect you all the more if you stick to your own views in face of their opposition.					
24. The main concern of the English Canadian M.P. is not to rock the party boat.					
25. The House of Commons should equip itself with a more extensive professional staff in order to have its own sources of technical information.					
26. Our parliamentary system assumes that back-benchers will play a minor role in framing legislation.					
27. English Canadian M.P.s enjoy more freedom from their party organizations than French Canadian M.P.s.					

Statement (cont'd)	Agree	Tend to agree	Not sure	Tend to disagree	Disagree
28. Translation facilities should be extended to all committee rooms, whatever the cost.					
29. When you come to Ottawa you may have great ideas, but you soon learn that ideas don't get you anywhere.					
30. Constituents are always asking M.P.s to do something which has nothing to do with their jobs in Ottawa; more often than not it turns out to be a provincial or even a municipal matter.					

Part C: Biographical Data (to be completed by respondent)

1. Where were you born?
2. What is your age?
3. How many years have you lived in the constituency you represent?
If not living in the constituency, where do you live?
4. What was the highest level of education you reached?
5. Do you have any professional degrees? Which ones?
6. (a) What was the original national background of your family on your father's side?
(b) On your mother's side?
7. What was your father's usual occupation while you were growing up?
8. What is your own primary occupation (aside from being an M.P.)?
9. Was this your occupation when you entered politics?
Yes No (If not) What?

10. (a) What GOVERNMENTAL or PARTY positions—local, provincial or federal—had you held before becoming an M.P.? (*List all please.*)
(b) Do you hold any such positions now? What are they?
11. How many years altogether have you been an M.P.?
12. What newspapers and magazines do you regularly read?
13. Are there any books which have made a deep impression on you and have helped shape your political career?

Partie A - Questions (posées par un interviewer)

Nous sommes particulièrement intéressés à savoir comment les Canadiens en arrivent à la vie publique.

- 1.* D'où viennent vos premiers intérêts à la politique? (*Explorez les influences formatrices.*)**
- 2.* Y a-t-il en particulier, un individu ou un groupe qui vous ait encouragé à la politique active? (*Explorez les circonstances.*)
- 3.* (*Si non mentionné*) Comment êtes-vous devenu candidat du parti?
4. Avez-vous déjà été le candidat d'un autre parti?
Non.....
Oui.....
lequel (lesquels).....
5. Avez-vous déjà appuyé un autre parti politique?
Non.....
Oui.....
lequel (lesquels).....
6. Comment votre association de comté procède-t-elle à la nomination de ses candidats?
7. Lors de la dernière séance de nomination, étiez-vous le seul candidat de votre association?
Oui.....
Non.....

*L'astérisque indique que les mêmes questions ont été posées au cours des interviews avec les députés "front-bench."

**Directives s'adressant aux interviewers.

J'aimerais maintenant vous poser quelques questions sur le métier de député.

- 8.* D'abord, pouvez-vous décrire le métier de député? Quelles sont, à votre avis, les fonctions les plus importantes que devrait exercer un membre du Parlement? (*Recherchez une description complète en essayant d'amener le répondant à définir ces rôles par ordre d'importance. S'il y a différence entre ce qu'il fait et ce qu'il pense qu'il devrait faire, obtenez les deux en distinguant bien dans vos notes entre pratique et idéal.*)
- 9.* Pensez-vous que la plupart des députés des autres PARTIS décriraient leurs fonctions de la même façon que vous venez de le faire? (*Si non*) En quoi différeraient-ils?
- 10.* Pensez-vous que la plupart des députés des autres provinces décriraient leurs fonctions de la même façon que vous venez de le faire? (*Si non*) En quoi différeraient-ils?
- 11.* (*Si dans la description complète de son travail à la question 8, le répondant n'a pas mentionné "porte-parole provincial," demandez:*) Quelques députés mentionnent parfois le rôle de porte-parole provincial comme partie intégrante de leur fonction de député.
- (a) Pensez-vous qu'un député devrait exercer ce rôle?
- (b) Considérez-vous ce rôle comme partie intégrante de VOTRE fonction de député?
- 12.* Y a-t-il des différences entre votre conception ACTUELLE de la fonction de député, et celle que vous aviez avant votre venue à Ottawa?
- 13.* Y a-t-il des différences entre votre conception actuelle de la fonction de député et celle de vos électeurs? (*Sondez l'opinion du répondant quant au réalisme des demandes que lui adressent ses électeurs.*)
14. (a) De quelles sources vous parviennent les renseignements les plus exacts et les plus utiles touchant les sentiments politiques de vos électeurs? (*Attendez la réponse, puis demandez:*)
- (b) (*Présentez la carte*) Lesquelles de ces sources d'information vous apparaissent les plus utiles? Pourriez-vous les classifier par ordre d'importance?
- Les éditoriaux des journaux locaux
Les lettres à l'éditeur de ces journaux
Les chefs et militants du parti dans le comté
Les chefs d'entreprises
Les dirigeants municipaux
Les dirigeants syndicaux
Les chefs religieux
Les directeurs des associations ethniques
Des amis personnels et des connaissances

- (c)* Que faites-vous pour garder contact avec l'organisation locale du parti?
 - (d) Que faites-vous pour garder contact avec les partisans et notables locaux du parti?
 - (e)* En temps normal, combien de lettres par semaine recevez-vous de vos électeurs?
 - (f)* Quels sont les sujets qui reviennent le plus souvent dans ces lettres?
 - (g)* Vos électeurs utilisent-ils d'autres moyens pour entrer en communication avec vous? (*Recherchez les députations, groupes de pressions — leur fréquence, leur approbation ou désapprobation.*)
- 15.* Certains députés considèrent qu'il fait partie de leur travail de renseigner et d'éduquer leurs électeurs sur les faits et gestes du Parlement. Que pensez-vous de cette attitude?
16. (a)* Normalement, comment entrez-vous en communication avec vos électeurs? (*Sondez en profondeur.*)
- (b)* De quelles façons vous rendez-vous disponible à vos électeurs?
- (c)* Combien de JOURS PAR MOIS passez-vous dans votre comté?
17. Nous savons qu'un député peut avoir des opinions qui diffèrent de celles du parti. Que feriez-vous probablement dans le cas où vous voudriez exprimer une opinion contraire aux vues majoritaires du parti? (*Sondez en profondeur. Si le répondant prétend pouvoir influencer le parti de façon non officielle, sondez soigneusement les voies qu'il pourrait prendre. S'il avance que tout dépend des circonstances, essayez de savoir quelles sont ces circonstances.*)
18. (a) Vous désirez prendre position sur une question débattue en Chambre. Vous savez par ailleurs qu'une majorité de vos électeurs aimerait vous voir adopter la position contraire. Que feriez-vous, probablement, dans ce cas?
- (b) (*Si le répondant s'efforcerait de changer l'opinion de ses électeurs, demandez:*) Quels moyens utiliseriez-vous pour modifier leur opinion sur le sujet? (*Explorez pleinement.*)
- (c) Si vous ne pouviez pas changer les opinions d'un grand nombre de vos électeurs, que feriez-vous probablement?
19. (a) En toute vraisemblance, que feriez-vous dans le cas où la position du parti sur une question s'opposait à celle de vos électeurs? Iriez-vous dans le sens du parti ou dans le sens de vos électeurs?
- (b)* En quelles circonstances un député est-il justifié de voter en sens contraire du parti?

- (c)* En quelles circonstances un député est-il justifié de voter en sens contraire aux opinions de ses électeurs?
- (d)* En quelles circonstances le vote devrait-il être entièrement libre?
20. Combien de fois avez-vous voté contre le parti depuis l'élection du présent Parlement?
21. (a)* Diriez-vous que la fonction de député exige que l'on s'y engage à plein temps, ou bien, diriez-vous qu'il est possible d'être un bon député tout en ayant d'autres activités?
- (b)* En plus de votre fonction de député, quelles autres activités avez-vous?
- (c)* (*Si le répondant mentionne d'autres activités, demandez*) Combien de temps en moyenne consacrez-vous à ces autres activités durant la session?
22. (a) Quelle est la fréquence de réunion des caucus de votre parti?
- (b)* Assistez-vous souvent aux caucus du parti; toujours, quelquefois, rarement, habituellement, jamais?
- (c)* Quelles sont d'après vous les DEUX principales fonctions d'un caucus général de votre parti?
- (d)* Une décision prise au caucus général oblige-t-elle tous les membres?
- (e)* (*Si non*) Sous quelles conditions n'oblige-t-elle pas?
- (f) Personnellement, parlez-vous français aux caucus du parti?
- (g) (*Si oui demandez:*) Régulièrement? (*Si non régulièrement, demandez:*) À quelles occasions parlez-VOUS français?
- (h)* Personnellement, parlez-VOUS anglais aux caucus du parti?
- (i)* (*Si oui, demandez:*) Régulièrement? (*Si non régulièrement, demandez:*) À quelles occasions parlez-vous anglais?
23. (a)* Êtes-vous membre d'un caucus régional ou provincial? Lequel?
- Oui: régional
- Oui: provincial
- Non: ni l'un ni l'autre.
- (*Si le répondant n'est pas membre d'un parti qui tient des caucus régionaux ou provinciaux, passez à la question 24; si oui à (a), demandez les questions suivantes:*)
- (b)* Quelle est la fréquence des réunions de ces caucus?
- (c)* Assistez-vous souvent aux caucus provinciaux (régionaux); toujours, habituellement, quelquefois, rarement, jamais?

- (d)* Quelles sont les deux principales fonctions de votre caucus provincial (régional)?
 - (e)* Est-ce qu'une décision d'un caucus provincial (régional) oblige tous les membres de ce caucus?
 - (f) (*Si non*) Sous quelles conditions n'oblige-t-elle pas?
 - (g) Personnellement, parlez-vous français au caucus provincial (régional)?
 - (h) (*Si oui*) Régulièrement? (*Si non régulièrement*) À quelles occasions parlez-vous français?
 - (i) Personnellement, parlez-vous anglais au caucus provincial (régional)?
 - (j) (*Si oui*) Régulièrement? (*Si non régulièrement*) À quelles occasions parlez-vous anglais?
24. (a) Revenons encore à votre fonction de député. Quelles sont les difficultés les plus sérieuses dans l'exercice de cette fonction? Qu'est-ce qui entrave votre travail de député? (*Allez au delà d'énoncés vagues tels que: "insuffisance de temps." Obtenez des réponses spécifiques sur ce qui l'empêche d'accomplir son travail comme il aimerait le faire. Explorez les relations entre fonctionnaires et députés touchant les affaires de comté, en regard du degré de coopération des fonctionnaires, du niveau où s'établit cette coopération et en regard de l'aptitude des fonctionnaires à utiliser les deux langues.*)
- (b) Quelles réformes aimeriez-vous opérer si vous le pouviez?
- Considérons maintenant le rôle de la Chambre des Communes dans son ensemble et sa place dans notre système de gouvernement.
25. (a)* En premier lieu, quel rôle la Chambre des Communes devrait-elle exercer dans notre système gouvernemental? (*Sondez le rôle des communes face au Cabinet.*)
- (b)* Dans quelle mesure la Chambre des Communes joue-t-elle efficacement le(s) rôle(s) que vous lui attribuez? (*Cherchez des manquements spécifiques si le répondant en a présents à l'esprit.*)
- (c)* (*S'il y a, selon le répondant, un écart entre ce que fait la Chambre des Communes et ce qu'elle devrait faire, demandez:*) Quelles sont les difficultés les plus sérieuses qui empêchent la Chambre des Communes de faire ce que vous croyez qu'elle devrait faire?
26. (a)* Quel rôle, selon vous, le Sénat devrait-il jouer dans notre système gouvernemental?
- (b)* Dans quelle mesure le Sénat joue-t-il efficacement le(s) rôle(s) que vous lui attribuez? (*Cherchez des manquements spécifiques si le répondant en a présents à l'esprit.*)

27. On dit parfois qu'en dépit de toutes les différences d'opinions qui apparaissent de temps à autre en Chambre, les simples députés en arrivent à une plus grande compréhension mutuelle qu'on ne l'imagine bien souvent. Qu'en pensez-vous?
28. (a)* Qui sont vos amis les plus intimes à la Chambre? Je veux dire les membres que vous voyez le plus souvent en dehors de la Chambre, à l'occasion de repas, rencontres sociales? (*Essayez d'obtenir six noms.*)
(b)* D'après votre expérience, pouvez-vous fournir des cas où des échanges officieux avec d'autres députés
i) vous auraient actuellement rendu plus sympathique à un point de vue auquel vous étiez tout d'abord opposé?
ii) . . . vous auraient rendu moins sympathique?
29. (a)* Pensez-vous qu'il y a un problème de communication entre députés français et anglais? (*Si oui*) Quel est ce problème?
(b)* (*Si problème il y a, demandez:*) Que fait-on, en autant que quelque chose se fasse, pour régler ce problème?
(c)* Avez-vous personnellement travaillé à résoudre ce problème? (*Si oui*) Qu'avez-vous fait?
(d) À quels membres de la Chambre avez-vous tendance à vous réferer, pour obtenir une meilleure compréhension du point de vue canadien-anglais? (*Essayez d'obtenir trois noms.*)
(e)* Y a-t-il des personnalités (écrivains, éditorialistes, spécialistes en sciences sociales, politiciens) dont vous écoutez attentivement et respectez le point de vue sur la question des relations entre Franco- et Anglo-canadiens? (*Essayez d'obtenir six noms.*)
30. (a)* Quels sont, d'après vous, les effets du bilinguisme sur la conduite des activités parlementaires? (*Recherchez les problèmes qui en résultent au plan personnel, au niveau des comités, des caucuses, et à la bibliothèque.*)
(b)* Êtes-vous pleinement satisfait du présent système de traduction? (*Explorez les services de traduction orale et écrite de la Chambre. Recherchez les références à son application réelle (aux Communes) et son absence (au sein des comités).*)
(c) Quel est le rôle de l'Orateur dans la conduite du système bilingue?
31. (a)* Quelle serait votre description du rôle des chefs de parti à la Chambre des Communes? (*Recherchez une réponse complète: nous sommes intéressés à connaître la conception du répondant, non seulement des rôles de son chef, mais aussi des rôles des autres chefs de parti.*)

- (b)* Quelles sont, à votre avis, les raisons principales de l'influence des chefs de votre parti sur votre parti?
- (c) i) Avez-vous beaucoup de rapports personnels avec la direction de votre parti?
ii) Qui tendez-vous à voir le plus souvent?
iii) Bien souvent?
iv) À quelles occasions?
v) Quelle influence le "Whip" du parti exerce-t-il sur vous?
vi) Comment influence-t-il votre comportement politique?
vii) Le "Whip" de votre parti est-il bilingue de par sa fonction?
- (d) Y a-t-il au gouvernement certains ministres à qui vous allez normalement demander renseignements, conseil, et assistance? (*Essayez d'avoir des noms.*) Y allez-vous souvent? À quelles occasions?
32. (a) Revenant de nouveau à ce qui vous touche, quels seraient vos principaux intérêts politiques?
- (b) Quels sont vos moyens les plus utiles et les plus importants de faire avancer ces intérêts? (*Explorez les références à ce qu'il fait et ce qu'il aimerait pouvoir faire.*)
- (c) (*Si non déjà mentionné, demandez:*) Avez-vous déjà trouvé qu'il valait la peine de former un groupe non officiel à l'intérieur du parti en vue de poursuivre des intérêts communs? (*Essayez de découvrir si la direction du parti désapprouve la formation de tels groupes.*)
33. (a)* Quelles sont, d'après vous, les qualités principales d'un bon député?
- (b)* Croyez-vous votre opinion sur ce sujet partagée par les députés des autres partis? (*Si non*) En quoi seraient-ils d'un autre avis?
- (c)* Croyez-vous votre opinion partagée par les députés des autres provinces? (*Si non*) En quoi seraient-ils d'un autre avis?
34. (a)* Y a-t-il souvent des occasions où un député canadien-français peut éprouver des sentiments de malaise et de frustration en cherchant à intégrer son action dans les politiques fédérales?
- (b)* Pouvez-vous donner des exemples?
35. (a)* Estimez-vous que le député canadien-français, en tant que Canadien français, devrait jouer un rôle spécifique à la Chambre et à l'intérieur de son parti?
- (b)* Quel rôle devrait-il jouer?
- (c)* Arrive-t-il en pratique à jouer ce rôle?

36. (a)* Pensez-vous que le député canadien-anglais, en tant que Canadien anglais, devrait jouer un rôle spécifique à la Chambre et au sein de son parti?
(b)* Quel rôle devrait-il jouer?
(c)* Arrive-t-il en pratique à jouer ce rôle?
37. (a)* Votre attitude générale envers les Anglo-canadiens a-t-elle changé depuis votre élection au Parlement?
(b)* (*Si oui*) En quoi a-t-elle changé?
(c)* Quelles sont les causes de ce changement?
- 38.* Pensez-vous que l'on perd de l'argent en politique, même si l'on gagne l'élection et touche l'indemnité parlementaire?
39. (a)* Pensez-vous vous représenter à l'élection du prochain Parlement? Oui.....
Non.....
Incertain.....
(b)* (*Si oui ou non*) Pour quelles raisons?
40. Y a-t-il certaines fonctions publiques que vous aimeriez exercer dans le futur? (*Si oui*) Laquelle? (Lesquelles?)
41. (a)* Si pour une raison quelconque, vous deviez aujourd'hui résigner votre fonction de député, qu'est-ce que vous regretteriez le plus?
(b)* Que regretteriez-vous le moins?
42. (a)* Habitez-vous Ottawa?
(b)* Votre famille est-elle ici?
(c)* La ville d'Ottawa est-elle une ville où un député canadien-français peut se sentir chez lui?
(d)* La ville d'Ottawa est-elle une ville où un député canadien-anglais peut se sentir chez lui?
(e)* La ville d'Ottawa est-elle une capitale qui convienne au Canada?

Partie B - Affirmations (l'interviewé doit compléter)

Nous avons collectionné des affirmations faites par des députés et autres, sur leur vie et leur travail. Vous allez peut-être les trouver trop simplifiées, cependant nous aimerions obtenir votre réaction générale à chacun de ces énoncés. Il n'y a pas de bonnes ou de mauvaises réponses, chaque énoncé étant matière d'opinion. Quand je vous aurai remis cette liste, pourriez-vous lire chaque énoncé et ensuite pointer la réponse qui exprime le mieux votre accord ou désaccord.

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
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1. La plupart du temps la politique officielle du parti est terminée avant que le simple député ait eu la chance d'exercer une influence.
2. La plupart du temps, un député peut dire ce que ses électeurs pensent d'une question, avant même les avoir consultés.
3. Il serait préférable que les ministres français parlent toujours français; ils s'exprimeraient de manière plus satisfaisante.
4. L'assistance sociale qu'un député procure à ses électeurs contribue grandement à sa réélection.
5. Les conférences fédérales-provinciales tendent à diminuer l'importance du Parlement.
6. La politique c'est pourri.

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
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7. L'organisation locale du parti a eu bien peu d'affaire à mon élection.
8. Un sénat conçu comme une "chambre des nationalités," représentant Anglais et Français en proportion égale, serait une réforme utile à notre système parlementaire.
9. Les gens tendent à juger un parti à la valeur de son chef.
10. L'addition du caucus provincial au système des partis, à la Chambre des Communes, est cause de scission et est malvenue.
11. La plupart des nouveaux membres du Parlement apprennent plus "en se la fermant" qu'en essayant de prouver leur habileté.
12. Le vote d'un député est toujours un indice véridique de ses sentiments.

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
-------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------------	---	-----------------

13. Les gens exagèrent
continuellement
l'importance du
caucus du parti.
C'est un lieu pour
échapper de la
vapeur, mais pas
pour influencer
la politique du
parti.
14. Les députés du
Québec ont ten-
dence à s'occuper
davantage des
intérêts de leurs
électeurs que des
politiques
nationales.
15. En rapport avec
les demandes qui
leur sont faites,
les députés sont
chroniquement
sous-rémunérés.
16. Il est absolument
essentiel qu'un
député fasse l'ex-
périence des ban-
quettes arrière de
la Chambre, avant de
se voir confier un
poste au Cabinet.
17. La Chambre des
Communes serait
une institution
beaucoup plus
efficace si elle
était réduite,
disons à 150
membres, chacun
ayant ses adjoints
rémunérés.

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
-------------	----------	--------------------------------	----------------	---	-----------------

18. La plupart des électeurs s'intéressent plus aux services qu'un député peut leur rendre qu'à ses vues sur les projets de loi déposés en Chambre.
19. La discipline de parti est aujourd'hui trop sévère.
20. L'idée de voir alterner Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais à la direction des partis politiques est une bonne idée et devrait être généralement suivie.
21. Souvent les députés sont si accaparés par leurs affaires à Ottawa qu'ils perdent contact avec leurs électeurs.
22. Les simples députés reçoivent trop peu d'invitations à s'exprimer en public.
23. La plupart des électeurs vous respecteront d'autant plus si vous maintenez vos vues face à leur opposition.

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
24. Les députés anglais cherchent avant tout à ne pas ébranler la machine du parti.					
25. La Chambre des Communes devrait s'adjoindre un corps profession- nel plus nombreux, afin d'avoir ses propres sources d'information technique.					
26. Notre système parlementaire prend pour acquit que le simple député jouera un rôle mineur dans l'élaboration des projets de lois.					
27. Les députés cana- diens-anglais sont plus libres face aux organisations du parti que les députés canadiens- français.					
28. Les facilités de traduction devraient s'étendre à toutes les salles de con- férence en comité, peu importe le coût.					
29. Vous pouvez avoir de grandes idées à votre arrivée à Ottawa, mais vous apprenez bien vite que les idées ne vous mèneront nulle part.					

Affirmation	D'accord	Tendance à être d'accord	Incer- tain	Tendance à n'être pas d'accord	Pas d'accord
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30. Les électeurs
demandent toujours
aux députés de
faire quelque
chose qui n'a rien
à voir à leurs
occupations à
Ottawa: plus sou-
vent que pas, il
s'agit d'une
question provin-
ciale, ou même
municipale.

Partie C - Esquisse biographique (l'interviewé doit compléter)

1. Où êtes-vous né?
2. Quel âge avez-vous?
3. Combien d'années avez-vous vécu dans le comté que vous représentez? Si ne vivant pas dans le comté, où vivez-vous?
4. Quel fut le plus haut niveau de scolarité auquel vous êtes parvenu?
5. Avez-vous des degrés professionnels? Lesquels?
6. (a) Quelle était l'origine ethnique de votre famille du côté de votre père?
(b) du côté de votre mère?
7. Quelle était l'occupation habituelle de votre père durant votre période de dépendance familiale?
8. Quelle est votre occupation principale (oubliant pour le moment votre fonction de député)?
9. Était-ce votre occupation quand vous êtes entré en politique?
Oui Non (Si non) Quelle était alors votre occupation?
10. (a) Quelles positions avez-vous occupées au sein d'un gouvernement ou parti (local, provincial, ou fédéral) avant d'être élu député? (*S.V.P. donner la liste complète.*)
(b) Occupez-vous de telles positions maintenant? Quelles sont-elles?

11. Combien d'années en tout êtes-vous membre de la Chambre?
12. Quels journaux et revues lisez-vous régulièrement?
13. Y a-t-il des livres qui vous auraient profondément impressionné et qui auraient contribué à façonner votre carrière politique?

It appears to be generally agreed that the Commission should seek all relevant information on the bilingual and bicultural aspects of the work of Parliament.

Some of the questions in the survey of Members of Parliament have, however, been said to be not relevant. We believe that such criticism arises from a misunderstanding of the nature of the survey.

Taken separately some of the questions may indeed appear irrelevant. But we believe that taken together the responses can be highly relevant in discovering patterns of differences or similarities in attitudes of members of different language groups towards various aspects of the working of the parliamentary system. Some questions, too, are needed to differentiate between possible cultural and regional divergences. A questionnaire is a research tool; it should be assessed in its entirety and not by isolating any of the component parts.

The survey is based on recent but thoroughly tested techniques of social science research. We believe that to carry out its mandate properly the Commission cannot be content with just superficial inquiries, but must endeavour to investigate below the surface using well developed, carefully worked out and appropriate methods.

It should be emphasized that responses of individual members are kept strictly confidential; and also that no member is under any obligation either to be interviewed at all or to answer any particular question. It is not the set of responses of any one individual that counts but rather the tabulation of all responses in an integrated research design.

The study is a serious scientific attempt to add to the body of knowledge about the state of bilingualism and biculturalism in the most important single institution in the country; and at the same

*Statement by A. Davidson Dunton and André Laurendeau, Co-Chairmen of the R.C.B.&B., April 13, 1965.

time to deepen the understanding of the whole parliamentary process as it relates to the development of "the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups. . . ."

We believe, therefore, that the survey should continue on the same voluntary confidential basis as before. If refusals become too high the interviews, of course, will be stopped. Sixty-seven members have already been interviewed and only eight others have refused to date. As long as a high response rate continues, the interviews will go on unchanged.

The Commission has been charged with carrying out an inquiry; and that in fact is precisely what it is trying to do. Surely in all good sense it should not be hampered or blocked as it endeavours to fulfil the purpose for which it was established nor be called on continually to justify the methods which after careful consideration it deems suitable. We believe this would be a dangerous precedent from which the work of this and other royal commissions could suffer.

Average length of interviews, by language group

	Average length before crisis (minutes)	Average length after crisis (minutes)	Average length over all (minutes)
English	131	115	123
French	180	153	167
All M.P.s	145	126	136

Interviewers' ratings of respondents

Cooperation	English Respondents		French Respondents		Total
	Before crisis	After crisis	Before crisis	After crisis	
Very cooperative	24	28	11	9	72
Cooperative	14	9	6	4	33
Not very cooperative	2	4	1	3	10
Openly hostile	1*	-	1†	-	2
No answer	1**	3	-	1	5
Total	42	44	19	17	122

Frankness					
Very frank	19	18	11	7	55
Frank	16	17	7	4	44
Not very frank	6	7	-	5	18
No answer	1	2	1	1	5
Total	42	44	19	17	122

* Only on some questions

** Incomplete interview

† "Aggressive"

Favourable

Le Devoir (Montreal)
Gazette (Montreal)
Globe and Mail (Toronto)
Montréal Matin
Ottawa Citizen

La Presse (Montreal)
Red Deer Advocate
Telegram (Toronto)
Toronto Daily Star
Winnipeg Free Press

Unfavourable

Albertan (Calgary)
Calgary Daily Herald
Charlottetown Patriot
Le Droit (Ottawa)
Guardian (Guelph)
Hamilton Spectator
Kingston Whig-Standard
Mail-Star (Halifax)
Nanaimo Free Press
Peterborough Examiner
Picton Gazette

Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph
Recorder and Times (Brockville)
Representative (Leduc)
St. Thomas Times-Journal
Star-Phoenix (Saskatoon)
Telegraph-Journal (Saint John, N.B.)
Times and Conservator (Brampton)
Vancouver Sun
Vancouver Times
Western Business and Industry

Neutral

Cape Breton Post (Sydney)
Journal (Edmonton)
Ottawa Journal

Dear Sir:

The study of Members of Parliament being conducted for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism has been making good progress, and the senior interviewers associated with the project now hope to begin interviewing Members from the front benches. I am therefore writing you to arrange a time for an interview convenient to you. I will telephone your secretary on the morning of, to try to fix a suitable time and date.

Let me assure you now that all interviews are treated with the utmost confidence. We are interested in your responses to a wide range of questions which we hope will be useful in discovering patterns of differences or similarities in attitudes of members of different language groups towards various aspects of the working of the parliamentary system, but nothing you say will be attributed to you. Throughout the interview the focus of attention will be on your role as an M.P. rather than as a Cabinet Minister. You will, of course, be free to reject any questions which you find inappropriate.

Yours sincerely,

Chapter I

1. See, for example, George A. Coddington Jr., *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (Boston, 1961); Christopher Hughes, *The Parliament of Switzerland* (London, 1962); George McT. Kahin (ed.), *Major Governments of Asia* (Ithaca, 1963). A recent survey of representative institutions in 41 countries found language to be of such minor significance as a parliamentary problem as to be not worth mentioning. See *Parliaments* (London, 1962), published for the Inter-Parliamentary Union by Cassell and Company Ltd.
2. Report of Attorney and Solicitor General Regarding the Civil Government of Quebec, 1766, quoted in W. P. M. Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929* (Oxford, 1930), 65.
3. 14 Geo. III, c.83, and 31 Geo. III, c.31 (U.K.).
4. Rules and Regulations of the House of Assembly, Lower Canada, 1793, quoted in Arthur G. Doughty and Duncan A. McArthur, *Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 1791-1818* (Ottawa, 1914), 105.
5. W. P. M. Kennedy, *The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937* (Oxford, 1938), 90.
6. *Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada for the Years 1792-1804* (Sixth Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario [Toronto, 1911]), 23.
7. Kennedy, *Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1713-1929*, 247.

8. 3-4 Vic., c.35, s.XLI (U.K.).
9. *Standing Rules and Regulations of the Legislative Assembly of Canada* (Kingston, 1841).
10. 11-12 Vic., c.56, s.1 (U.K.).
11. *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces* (Quebec, 1865), 944.
12. British North America Act, 1867, 30-1 Vic., c.3, s.133 (U.K.).
13. British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c.81 (U.K.).
14. Norman Ward, "Parliamentary Bilingualism in Canada," *Parliamentary Affairs*, X, no. 2 (Spring, 1957), 157. For typical comments by French-speaking M.P.s on this phenomenon see Canada, House of Commons, *Debates* (French ed.), 1920, 717; 1921, 552; for comments of English-speaking members see *ibid.* (English ed.), 1927, 819; 1930, 2074; 1955, 869.
15. See Ward, "Parliamentary Bilingualism in Canada," 159.
16. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1920, 697ff.; 1921, 698ff.
17. *Ibid.*, 1906-7, 3656.
18. *Ibid.*, 1934, 1001.
19. Norman Ward, *The Public Purse* (Toronto, 1961), 150.
20. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1934, 1196-7.
21. *Ibid.*, 1906-7, 3664, quoted in *ibid.*, 1934, 1223.
22. *Ibid.*, 1934, 982. See also Royal Commission on Government Organization, *Report* (Ottawa, 1962), III, 104.
23. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1934, 983.
24. Ward, "Parliamentary Bilingualism in Canada," 159.
25. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1934, 982-3.
26. R.S.C. 1952, c.270, s.3(1).
27. Royal Commission on Government Organization, *Report*, II, 285; III, 106-8.
28. *Ibid.*, III, 103-4.

29. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1890, 38 ff., 532 ff., 726 ff.
30. *Ibid.*, 726.
31. *Ibid.*, 745.
32. *Ibid.*, 1017-18.
33. *Ibid.*, 1906-7, 3641.
34. *Ibid.*, 3657.
35. *Ibid.*, 1934, 1226; 1955, 556. The latter quotation is from a newspaper article cited in debate.
36. Richard Van Loon, "The Structure and Membership of the Canadian Cabinet" (unpublished study prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).
37. James H. Aitchison, "The Speakership of the Canadian House of Commons," in Robert M. Clark (ed.), *Canadian Issues: Essays in Honour of Henry F. Angus* (Toronto, 1959), 48.
38. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1906-7, 3668.
39. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," in Mason Wade (ed.), *Canadian Dualism* (Toronto, 1960), 249.
40. Aitchison, "The Speakership of the Canadian House of Commons," 48.
41. Norman Ward, "Prayers in the Commons," in *Mice in the Beer* (Toronto, 1960).
42. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1932, 1989.
43. *Ibid.*, 1958, 3332.
44. See Norman Ward, *The Public Purse*, 155 and *passim*.
45. Judy Dibben, "Divisions" (unpublished research paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).
46. Judy Dibben, "Questions" (unpublished research paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).
47. D. M. Fisher, "Parliamentary Committees in the 24th Parliament," in Paul Fox (ed.), *Politics: Canada* (Toronto, 1962), 209.

48. See, e.g., Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec"; H. F. Quinn, *The Union Nationale* (Toronto, 1963); André Laurendeau in *Nos hommes politiques* (Montreal, 1964); Michael Oliver in *ibid.*; Norman Ward in Mason Wade (ed.), *Canadian Dualism*; Peter Desbarats, *The State of Quebec* (Toronto, 1965).
49. Judy Dibben, "The Committee System of the House of Commons" (unpublished research paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism).
50. See Fisher, "Parliamentary Committees in the 24th Parliament," 212.
51. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1966, 1st session, 375-6.

Chapter II

1. See Norman Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation* (2nd ed., Toronto, 1965), Chap. VII.
2. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic* (Toronto, 1965), 389.
3. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Canada, 1961* (Ottawa, 1962-7), I, pt.2, Bull. 1.2-10.
4. See Bernard R. Blishen, "The Construction and Use of an Occupational Class Scale," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIV (1958), 519ff.

Chapter III

1. The most important American research for our purposes was the study by John Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, *The Legislative System* (New York, 1962), based on an analysis of four state legislatures. Their approach was adapted and developed by Allan Kornberg for his research on Canadian M.P.s. Kornberg's interview schedule was of assistance in the creation of our own interview schedule, although his dissertation was not available at the same time. (See Allan Kornberg, "Some Differences in Role Perceptions among Canadian Legislators," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Michigan, 1964.) Also useful was the interview schedule used by Roger Davidson, David Kovenock and Michael O'Leary for their study, *Congressional Reorganization: Problems and Prospects* (Hanover, N.H., Public Affairs Center, Dartmouth College, 1964).

2. See Appendix A for a final description of the project.
3. Ten of the original dozen participants in interviews reappeared in our sample. Because of the great variety of questions used in the unstructured interviews, it was judged not worth while to check the congruence of answers to the two separate interviews in any rigorous way. We simply read over the notes of the unstructured interviews and compared them, where we could, with the completed interview schedules based on the "formal interviews." The results of this exercise were encouraging: at least one could say that the more formal method had not altered the content of the M.P.s' expressed opinions.
4. Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (Washington, D.C., 1963).
5. Time did not permit the inclusion of questions relating to the M.P.s' awareness of and interest in domestic and foreign issues; nor could we include questions permitting the creation of an attitude scale sufficiently refined to permit us to measure the ideological orientation of members. In the light of subsequent criticism of the irrelevance of many questions, it is probably just as well that we could not find further time or space; but information on these matters would have added greatly to our understanding of the men at the centre of the political process.
6. See Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire.
7. See below for the effect of the refusal rate.
8. See Appendix D for a copy of the press release of April 13, 1965.
9. See F. J. Stephan and P. J. McCarthy, *Sampling Opinions* (New York, 1963), 32-4, for a description of the main features of a "systematic sample."
10. The average length of the interviews was two hours and 16 minutes. See Appendix E for a comparison of the length of interviews of French-speaking and English-speaking respondents.
11. Nor were all questions in Part C successful. The last question, inviting members to indicate any books which had had an influence on their potential careers, was rarely answered.
12. See Appendix F for ratings of "pre-crisis" and "post-crisis" interviews.

13. One French-speaking interviewer made the following comment after her successfully completed interview: "L'interview terminée, il m'a dit qu'il trouve le questionnaire trop long, et s'étend de peu de questions se rapportant selon lui au bilinguisme et au biculturalisme."
14. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1965, 2nd session, XII, 13080-1.
15. "M.P.s Want Off Quiz Kid's Couch," *The London Free Press*, April 3, 1965.
16. Unfortunately no comments were recorded for the one interview with a French-speaking M.P.; apparently there were no difficulties encountered.
17. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1965, 3rd session, I, 167.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, 217.
20. See "Pearson Stops Survey of M.P.s," *The Globe and Mail*, April 13, 1965. The *Kingston Whig-Standard's* editorial, "The Parliamentary Questionnaire," on April 15, 1965, began with the following sentence: "Prime Minister Pearson was probably wise to have requested the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to drop its controversial survey of the Members of Parliament" (our italics). *Le Devoir's* article on April 13, 1965 bore the following title: "Pearson demande à la Commission de retirer son questionnaire destiné aux députés."
21. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1965, 3rd session, I, 217.
22. Only *The Globe and Mail* carried a report on the Prime Minister's statement on the question and his exchange with Mr. Diefenbaker in the House on April 19, 1965. The Toronto newspaper also carried extracts from the question period in its page-seven feature "Parliament."
23. See press release, Appendix D.
24. The repeated characterization of the 30 statements of Part B of the questionnaire, on which respondents had five choices of reply, as *questions* (which were to be answered as "true" or "false") led to very great confusion. The following is perhaps the best example we have: "One so-called question sounds more like a flat statement: 'The way an M.P. votes is always a true indication of the way he feels.' Patently misleading and mischievously ignoring the machinery of voting which involves

- toeing party lines and obeying party whips, the question seems to invite the M.P. to agree only in order to be labelled a liar." "Trick Questions have no place in B and B Inquiry," *Quebec Chronicle-Telegraph*, April 15, 1965.
25. "Simple Courtesy Costs Nothing," *Hamilton Spectator*, April 15, 1965.
26. "Impertinent Questions," *Leduc Representative*, April 29, 1965. The editorial in *The Ottawa Journal*, while somewhat less vigorous in language, was no less striking: "The Commission then let some social scientists draft a gaggle of questions, leaving it to the scientists to judge what was a proper question." "B and B Wrong and Right," *The Ottawa Journal*, April 15, 1965.
27. "A Question of Propriety," *Peterborough Examiner*, April 15, 1965.
28. "Perhaps House of Commons Should Probe B-B Body," *Nanaimo Free Press*, May 20, 1965.
29. See Appendix F for a list of hostile and supporting newspapers.
30. Desmond Sparham, "Why Shouldn't Bi-Bi Ask the M.P.s those 30 Questions"? *Toronto Daily Star*, May 6, 1965.
31. Guy Cormier, "Ces Messieurs Se Rebiffent," *La Presse*, Montréal, April 15, 1965.
32. "A Dangerous Invasion by the Prime Minister," *The Globe and Mail*, April 14, 1965.
33. "Pearson Backs Away From Clash Over B-B Inquiry," *The Gazette*, Montreal, April 15, 1965.
34. In the last minutes of the session on Tuesday, April 13, 1965, just before the recess for the vacation, Mr. Herridge rose on a matter of privilege. Referring to the Commission's press release defending the study against interference, the member stated, with the apparent approval (according to the press) of members on both sides of the House, ". . . I think this is a gross piece of impertinence with regard to the Prime Minister of our country and his efforts to protect the rights of Members of Parliament of all parties, and his efforts to protect their privileges and their privacy." Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1965, 3rd session, I, 383.
35. The questions marked with an asterisk in the questionnaires in Appendices B and C were included in the questionnaire later produced specifically for front-benchers.

36. The membership of the House in April 1965 was taken as the basis of drawing the sample. Former cabinet ministers who returned to the back-benches were not counted as back-benchers.. Subsequent promotions to the front-bench (e.g. cabinet changes made in the summer of 1965) are not, however, taken into account.
37. As of April 13, 1965, the date of the press release, there had been 67 successfully completed interviews and eight refusals. During the holidays one further interview was completed, thus leaving a further 67 M.P.s to be interviewed.
38. See Appendix F for a comparison of the interviewers' ratings of the receptiveness of respondents, before and after the "crisis."
39. The loss of Part C as well (in all but one case) is not so serious, since much of the biographical data sought could be obtained from other sources.
40. Only 6 per cent of the sample in the Wahlke and Eulau study was not interviewed.
41. Wahlke and Eulau, *The Legislative System*, 456.
42. *Ibid.*, 461.
43. The English-speaking front-benchers were interviewed by Professors Ward, Hoffman, and Smith. Dr. David Smith, a colleague of Professor Ward, substituted for the latter in one interview. The French-speaking front-benchers were interviewed by Professor André Bélanger.
44. See Appendix B.
45. See Appendix H for the English version of the letter sent to front-benchers.
46. In one case interviews were arranged with a leading cabinet minister on three separate occasions, and each time the interview had to be cancelled at short notice owing to a sudden new commitment of the minister.

Chapter IV

1. See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963), 323-374; Wahlke and Eulau, *The Legislative System*, 77-95; and Allan Kornberg and Norman Thomas, "The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites in the United States and Canada," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (1965), 761-2.

2. Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago, 1965), 39.
3. *Ibid.*, 43.
4. Kornberg and Thomas, "The Political Socialization of National Legislative Elites," 768. They followed up the quoted question with another: "What is your earliest recollection of being interested in it?" The authors used three "time codes"—childhood or grammar school; adolescence or high school; adult and three "agent codes": family, self, and external events—in their analysis. They found such a high level of correlation between time and agent that they felt justified in collapsing the variables into the three elements of the political socialization continuum.
5. *Ibid.*, 767.
6. Caroline Andrew, "The Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 48-50. Ten per cent of her respondents did not specify a time.
7. *Ibid.*, 47 and 50.
8. *Ibid.*, 51. One Maritime Conservative, referring to his early interest in politics and the environment in which he was brought up told one of our interviewers, "In my neck of the woods a mixed marriage is one between a Liberal and a Conservative."
9. Wahlke and Eulau, *The Legislative System*, 77.
10. French-speaking respondents were a little more inclined to mention school experience than were English-speaking M.P.s.
11. In Britain "in safe or winnable Conservative seats it is not unusual for well over a hundred persons to apply, and even in hopeless seats there are usually at least fifteen to twenty applicants." Austin Ranney, *Pathways to Parliament* (Madison and Milwaukee, 1965), 58. The situation is not quite so competitive in the Labour party, but it is not uncommon apparently for 15 candidates to contest a winnable seat.
12. See Lester G. Seligman, "Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study," *American Political Science Review*, LV (March 1961), 85-6.
13. It should be kept in mind that there is a very slight coding error which affects the results throughout: inadvertently one English-speaking Conservative was coded as a French-speaking Liberal. The number of English-speaking respondents and the number of Conservatives are therefore one less than they ought

- to be. Given that the effect of this error is to *lessen* (very slightly) any differences we should wish to assert exist between the attitudes and dispositions of English- and French-speaking M.P.s or between Liberal and Conservative M.P.s, the error is not serious. The error was discovered only after the computer runs of the data were completed.
14. Our over-all figures for back-bench respondents and the party and regional variations noted fit closely with those obtained by Miss Andrew in her survey of the membership of the House. When she asked M.P.s whether they actively sought the nomination, 68 per cent said they did not. *See* Andrew, "The Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 75-7.
 15. *See* Ward, *The Canadian House of Commons: Representation*, 122.
 16. Miss Andrew's figures for front-bench and back-bench members indicate a little more previous provincial and municipal government experience; 37 per cent of her respondents mentioned previous municipal government experience. Andrew, "The Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," 73.
 17. In this respect our experience is not much different from the British, apart from the fact that municipal experience appears particularly prominent among Labour candidates. *See* Ranney, *Pathways to Parliament*, 107-8, 197, 198.
 18. Quoted in R. MacG. Dawson, *The Government of Canada* (4th ed., revised by Norman Ward; Toronto, 1963), 346. This book uses the term "representative theory" instead of "trustee theory," but we prefer the latter here (used by Wahlke and Eulau in their study of legislators' role perceptions, *The Legislative System*) because it avoids the "representative theory of representation" implicit in the other formulation.
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*, 347.
 21. *Ibid.*, 346.
 22. Austin Cross, *The People's Mouths* (Toronto, 1944), 114.
 23. For an excellent example of the kind of analysis which such data permit, *see* Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, LVII (March, 1965), 45-56.
 24. A study of divisions during the first two sessions of the twenty-sixth Parliament revealed a very high level of cohesion within

the parties. On the vast majority of issues there was no intra-party division at all.

The method used to compare the degrees of party cohesion was to divide the total number of M.P.s voting within one party by the total number voting with the majority. Thus, if 66 M.P.s voted with their party and two voted against, the group of 66 was divided by the total number voting—68—to give a cohesiveness rating of 97.1 per cent. Included in the category of those voting against their parties were the few members who announced that they had abstained from voting, or that, though paired, they would have voted against their parties or abstained. The data we present are based on an analysis of all the divisions and all the parties for the two sessions under review.

In view of the fact that the flag debate, a more than usually divisive issue, was included in the period, the cohesiveness of our parties is remarkably high: the average cohesiveness rate for all parties and all votes was 96.8 per cent. The parties had the following average cohesiveness rates: Ralliement des Cr ditistes, 100 per cent; Liberals, 99.9 per cent; Conservatives, 98.4 per cent; New Democrats, 97 per cent; and Social Credit, 92.9 per cent. (Judy Dibben, "Divisions," unpublished research paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.)

25. Robert Lane, "Political Character and Political Analysis," *Psychiatry*, XVI (1953), 387-98.
26. It should not be thought that personal judgement and constituents' views are of no importance to the party delegate; indeed he may represent these opinions in party caucus or on other occasions; essentially, however, the party delegate perceives his role in terms of supporting his party's policy.
27. In Part B of the questionnaire we asked M.P.s to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statement 23: "Most constituents will respect you all the more if you stick to your own views in face of their opposition." Slightly more than half the respondents agreed with the suggestion, less than 20 per cent disagreed and a little more than 25 per cent were not sure. No differences were revealed here in terms of principal language group of the respondent or the urban/rural location of his constituency. Cr ditistes and M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were most inclined to disagree with the idea.
28. Question 17: "We know that an M.P.'s personal views and those of his party will not always be in line. Supposing you wished to take a stand on an issue which you knew was different from the majority view of your party, what would you probably do?"

29. We also asked M.P.s, "In what circumstances is an M.P. justified in voting contrary to the views of his constituents?" There were no significant differences in responses between English- and French-speaking respondents, and because of the large number of "no answers," "don't know" answers and "other" answers to this question we did not proceed with further analysis of the responses.
30. See Heinz Eulau, John Wahlke, et al., "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (September 1959), 742-44.
31. *Ibid.*, 744.
32. *Ibid.*, 745.
33. One Liberal respondent claimed that he had never heard of federal M.P.s considering themselves as provincial spokesmen.
34. Forty-two per cent of the English-speaking back-bench respondents agreed with the proposition, 41 per cent disagreed with it, and 17 per cent were not sure.
35. We took our "liaison officer" type of role from a description used by many M.P.s themselves in the course of their description of the job of M.P. The French equivalent was often "commis-voyageur" or "préfet d'administration."
36. The concept of the "lawmaker" role type was suggested by J. D. Barber in *The Lawmaker* (New Haven, Conn., 1965). Our lawmaker, however, should not be taken to fit the full range of characteristics employed by Barber.
37. This was a term used by many M.P.s themselves in their own characterizations of the job.
38. For example, one M.P. from an Atlantic province thought that the differences in perception of the role of M.P.s were more clearly related to whether or not the M.P. came from an urban or rural constituency: "Urban M.P.s are more interested in the problems of broader application—for example, bilingualism and constitutional problems—whereas rural M.P.s are more concerned with local affairs." Our data (*see* 79) suggest that the respondent was correct.
39. One French-speaking Liberal back-bencher replied in answer to the question of whether or not M.P.s from other provinces would describe the job in much the same way as he did: "Je ne sais

pas: car depuis que le gouvernement est minoritaire, on ne connaît pas les députés des autres provinces."

40. Although we asked respondents whether they agreed, tended to agree, tended to disagree, disagreed or were not sure, to simplify the analysis we collapsed the "agree" and "tend to agree" categories into one—"agree"—and the "tend to disagree" and "disagree" into another—"disagree."
41. Seventy-nine per cent of the M.P.s from the rural constituencies agree with the statement; 71 per cent of the M.P.s from the mixed-urban-rural constituencies agree; and 58 per cent of the M.P.s from the urban constituencies agree.

Chapter V

1. Nearly 80 per cent of our respondents agreed that "An M.P. can tell most of the time what his constituents will think about an issue even before he asks them" (Appendix B, Part B, statement 2, 247). French-speaking respondents were significantly more inclined to feel such confidence, and M.P.s from Ontario were the least inclined to say they could "second-guess" their constituents. Conservatives were more inclined to disagree with the notion than were any others; M.P.s from British Columbia and Quebec were most inclined to agree with the proposition.
2. It is worth noting that in the open-ended question asking for sources of information on constituents' feelings not a single respondent mentioned church leaders.
3. Although many members claimed that they kept in touch with leaders of ethnic groups, they did not tend to regard them as an important source of information. Some M.P.s pointed out that it was only the older immigrants who clustered together in homogeneous communities: the newer arrivals, they thought, sought to integrate as quickly as possible. Others claimed that the leaders of such groups were out of touch with their memberships.
4. Four of the 25 French-speaking Liberals interviewed said they received from one to 10 letters a week; three English-speaking Liberals made a similar reply. The major explanation for this difference is the fact that M.P.s who live near Ottawa (and these are by and large Liberals) receive telephone calls rather than letters from their constituents.

5. Seventy-five per cent of the respondents indicated that they felt that the "welfare services an M.P. performs for his constituents are important in getting him re-elected" (Appendix B, Part B; statement 4, 248). There were no differences in the replies between English- and French-speaking Liberals or between the Liberal party as a whole and the Conservatives and New Democrats on this matter. Cr ditistes and French-speaking Social Crediters disagreed heavily with the proposition.
6. The results presented in footnote one of this chapter suggest, however, that this loss of touch may not be especially serious.
7. Apart from the differences between Quebec and the other four regions, accounted for by language, regional differences were insignificant.
8. Seven of these respondents lived in Ottawa with their families; two were without families.
9. See 189-92 for French-speaking M.P.s' attitudes towards the city of Ottawa.
10. We asked the question in this way: "When the House is in session, approximately how many days a *month* do you spend in your constituency?" (Appendix B, Part A, question 16(c), 242).
11. Strangely, there is no relationship between the length of time an M.P. spends in the constituency and his disposition to say that M.P.s lose touch with their constituents. Those who go home weekends (5-9 days each month) are more inclined to disagree (33 per cent) than those who spend only 0-4 days in their constituencies (19 per cent), but those who spend 10 or more days each month (predominantly French-speaking) are *not* still *more* inclined to disagree with the proposition. Only 13 per cent of these M.P.s disagree; actually a lower proportion than exists in the group who spend only 0-4 days in their constituencies. Those who make sporadic visits to their constituencies (the very M.P.s one would have thought would feel most out of touch with their constituents) are most disposed to disagree with the suggestion that M.P.s get out of touch with their constituents.
12. Twenty-seven per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s mentioned sending out newsletters to their riding association members, whereas only 9 per cent of the French-speaking respondents mentioned this.

Chapter VI

1. Only 72 per cent of Prairie M.P.s stated that it is a full-time job.
2. Eighty-four per cent of the English-speaking M.P.s compared with 78 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s, said that being an M.P. is a full-time job.
3. Only six M.P.s, five English-speaking and one French-speaking, who stated that they had other commitments refused to tell us how long these commitments take. If we can assume that those who refused to answer the question in fact tend to spend more than one day, on the average, on their other commitments, the total percentage of M.P.s involved in other commitments on more than one day a month during the parliamentary session is still only 27 per cent.
4. Over all, 85 per cent of M.P.s said they would run again; but from British Columbia only 64 per cent said they would run again.
5. Some respondents mentioned more than one public office that they would like to seek some time, but we have counted them only once in the figure of 25 per cent given above, since we are not concerned with how many offices they would like, but whether they would like any at all. In the *enumeration* of the "other public offices" sought, we took account of *all* references to the office.
6. See John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic* (Toronto, 1965), 398-415.
7. We asked respondents about their attitude towards parliamentary experience as a prerequisite to cabinet office by inviting them to agree or disagree with statement 16 (Appendix B, Part B, 248) that "Experience on the back benches is absolutely essential before a man should be given a cabinet post." Seventy-two per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement, 22 per cent disagreed, and 6 per cent were not sure. There was no difference between the responses of English- and French-speaking respondents over all, although French-speaking Liberals were a little more inclined to agree than were English-speaking Liberals. Conservative M.P.s were the most inclined to agree with the statement (only three Prairie Conservatives out of all the Conservatives who responded to the statements disagreed with it). New Democrats (56 per cent) and Cr ditistes (17 per cent) were least inclined to agree. Among the Liberals, M.P.s from Ontario were the least inclined to agree. When compared by regions, M.P.s from the Atlantic provinces were most inclined to agree (not one said he disagreed and only one said he was not sure); among the other regions there were no significant differences at all.

8. Several M.P.s who did reply gave more than one response to the question.
9. There are no significant variations on the basis of the location of the constituency.
10. It might be suggested that, since many Cr ditistes did not come to Parliament from highly paid occupations, this, in part, accounts for their belief that an M.P. does not necessarily lose money in politics.
11. Eighty per cent of those who plan to run again disagree with the proposition, and 81 per cent of those who do not so plan or who don't know whether they will run again disagree.
12. Twenty-four per cent of the coopted M.P.s agree that politics is a dirty game, compared to 14 per cent of the self-recruited M.P.s, 15 per cent of the conscripted M.P.s, and 18 per cent of those whose method of recruitment was uncertain to us (but whom we knew were not self-recruited).
13. Roughly two thirds of those classified here as saying that the House of Commons is *effective* admitted that there is room for improvement.
14. Seventy-six per cent of the French-speaking Liberals mentioned procedural changes as necessary reforms; 69 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals mentioned the same factor. English-speaking Liberals were more inclined than were French-speaking Liberals to mention the need to make more effective use of committees.
15. When we examined the responses by the respondents' purposive roles and the inclination to say that the House of Commons is an effective institution, we found that lawmakers were most inclined to agree with the suggested reform; we also discovered that those who were critical of the effectiveness of the House of Commons were most inclined to agree with the reform. However, since French-speaking M.P.s were significantly prominent among both lawmakers and those who were critical of the effectiveness of the House of Commons, it is quite possible that we have merely discovered substantiating evidence for the differences based on language group which we have already noted.
16. See 157.
17. But see note 18 below.
18. Eighty per cent of all respondents agreed with the suggestion: 85 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s agreed and 77 per cent

of the English-speaking M.P.s agreed. Conservatives, especially those from Ontario were less inclined to agree than M.P.s from any other party. Keeping in mind that earlier we noticed that Conservatives were the most inclined (in an open-ended question) to mention the inadequacy of research facilities, we must appreciate that, as in every party, there is plenty of scope for internal differences of opinion.

19. This is exactly the same percentage of respondents as in Allan Kornberg's study (which included front-benchers) of the 1962 Parliament "who viewed the caucus as a mechanism for facilitating a catharsis of legislators' grievances by providing a forum for their expression." An additional 3 per cent said that caucus has no real function. Allan Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, LX (March 1966), 84.
20. See J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record* (Toronto, 1960), 9.
21. Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion," 84. In his analysis, Kornberg therefore placed more reliance on the answers to another question which he asked: "In general, what do you discuss in caucus?" He notes, however, that "there were substantial similarities in their responses to this and the first question" (that is, there were substantial similarities between the answers to what they discuss and what they think caucus ought to do).
22. *Ibid.*, 85.
23. The only interesting fact about the age variable is that none of the respondents under 34 years of age mentioned expertise as a quality of a good M.P.
24. See Appendix B, questions 33(b) and 33(c) in Part A of the questionnaire, 246.
25. See 205-16.

Chapter VII

1. Two other reasons given were: 1) that the demands of Quebec seemed to be getting through to English-speaking M.P.s, and 2) that the English-speaking M.P.s were trying to learn to speak French. There were only nine French-speaking M.P.s (26 per cent) who stated they had become more sympathetic, the vast majority being "unchanged-sympathetic." Five of the nine respondents

mentioned personal contact as the reason for the change in attitude. Two respondents gave no answer to this question.

2. Five of the "no answers" resulted from one interviewer's refusal to ask respondents the two questions, although in every other respect his interviewing was satisfactory. "No answers" totalled 16 per cent and 19 per cent of the French-speaking sample on the two questions.
3. Younger M.P.s (that is under 34) were more inclined to recognize a problem than were the oldest members: only 17 per cent of the former group, compared with 42 per cent of the latter, said there was no problem.
4. These differences in proposed solutions are clearly seen between English-speaking and French-speaking Liberals. Sixty-three per cent of the French-speaking Liberals replying to the question mentioned mixing with the other language group as a solution; only 12 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals mentioned this solution. Fifty-eight per cent of the English-speaking Liberals mentioned language lessons; only 21 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals put forward the same solution.
5. *See* 33-6.
6. Sixty-three per cent of the Prairie M.P.s refused to name a friend; the refusal rate over the entire sample was only 39 per cent.
7. These differences between English- and French-speaking M.P.s were revealed within the Liberal party: only 8 per cent of the English-speaking Liberals said that their friends come from the same party and region as compared with 40 per cent of the French-speaking Liberals.
8. Thirteen English-speaking M.P.s stated explicitly that there was nobody to whom they would turn for a better understanding of the French Canadian point of view, but further analysis showed that there was no difference in their disposition to mention contacts between those who were sympathetic to French Canadians and those who were unsympathetic.
9. It was not always easy to judge whether, when a respondent merely said, "I read them all," he was particularly interested in the matter. If, at the same time, he was unable to mention a specific person he was coded as "no mention," and was thereby considered to be unconcerned with the subject.
10. All M.P.s were asked question 42(e): "Is it a suitable capital city for Canada?"

11. Another French-speaking respondent complained that, "elle offre une face unilingue alors qu'elle devrait être la ville bilingue par excellence." But yet another respondent noted: "On peut parler français; on le parle plus qu'à Montréal (ouest)."
12. We have already noted the responses to one of these statements on 96.
13. Only one English-speaking M.P. attributed a specific role to himself while denying a specific role to French Canadian M.P.s. Nine French-speaking members denied a specific role to English Canadians while attributing a specific role to themselves.
14. These same French-speaking Liberals also denied a specific role to English Canadians.

Chapter VIII

1. One English-speaking Conservative noted that in his experience French Canadians often withdraw from committees because they cannot follow the discussion. Another English-speaking M.P., a Liberal, commenting on the question of whether bilingualism causes any difficulties in committee said, "On the committees I'm on there is no problem: the French are either bilingual or do not attend, so we don't have to worry about it."
2. We might also note that our probing about problems of bilingualism in the library turned up only two critical comments: one M.P. complained that there are not enough French books in the library and another felt that the library's documentation in French is poor.
3. See, for example, the remarks of M. Ormiston and M. Godin in Canada, *Chambre des Communes, Débats* (1959), I, 121 and III, 2987.
4. Within the Liberal party the younger M.P.s (under 34) were least inclined to say that bilingualism had no effect; 45 per cent specifically mentioned problems in committee.
5. It is important to note, however, that English-speaking M.P.s who are unsympathetic towards French Canadians were found to be no more opposed to the idea than the sympathetic ones.
6. Further analysis revealed that 44 per cent of those who said they were unsympathetic to French Canadians were opposed to the extension of translation facilities. Since the bulk of those unsympathetic to French Canadians are Conservatives, it is not

surprising that this relation should be revealed in analyzing the responses by party. However, 20 per cent of the back-bench respondents who claim to be sympathetic to French Canadians also disagreed with the extension of translation facilities.

7. We did not ask M.P.s whether they regarded themselves as bilingual or not, but we may use the results of another study of the 1963 House for our purposes. This study showed that 83 per cent of the French-speaking members considered themselves bilingual, whereas only 5 per cent of the English-speaking group did so. It was found that it is only in the Liberal party that the percentage who are bilingual is larger than the number of French-speaking members. Caroline Andrew, "The Political Background of Members of the Twenty-Sixth House of Commons," (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of British Columbia, 1964), 30.
8. One Cr ditiste said that party caucuses are conducted entirely in French, "sauf lorsqu'une d l gation en majorit  anglaise assiste au caucus."
9. A French-speaking Conservative front-bencher, in amplifying his reply that he personally did not speak French at the party caucus, added: "Personne ne parle fran ais—malheureusement. Fran ais tr s rare." French is used generally within the Conservative Quebec caucus meetings.
10. There are a few fluently bilingual English Canadians who choose never, or only very rarely, to speak in French at caucus.

Chapter IX

1. We are reasonably confident in presenting our findings as they relate to French-speaking front-benchers since we managed to interview eight of the ten M.P.s so classified; since our rate of interviewing English-speaking front-benchers was so poor, we do not have the same confidence in our findings on them. On the question of whether or not French Canadian M.P.s are ill at ease in federal politics, six of the eight French-speaking front-bench respondents said that they are, and two said that they are not.
2. The same opinion was found among French-speaking front-bench Liberals: four said that French Canadians are successful; one said that they are sometimes successful; and one said that they are not successful.

3. *See* 201-2.
4. *See* question 19(d), 243.
5. It is worth noting, however, that only one of the five French-speaking Liberal front-benchers who answered the question agreed that the way an M.P. votes is always a true indication of the way he feels.
6. Forty-seven per cent of the English-speaking Liberals agreed with the statement, as compared to 64 per cent of the French-speaking M.P.s.

Chapter X

1. On the personality aspects of role adaptation *see* J. D. Barber, *The Lawmakers* (New Haven, 1965), especially 212-58.

Constitutional Adaptation
and Canadian Federalism
Since 1945

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4 Constitutional
Adaptation
and Canadian
Federalism
Since 1945

Donald V. Smiley

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A major difficulty in this investigation was that crucial developments in federal-provincial relations were taking place while it was underway. The study was begun in the summer of 1964 and a first draft completed in October 1965. By the spring of the next year both events and my assessment of the general situation had changed so markedly that a complete revision of the last two chapters was undertaken. The body of the study is substantially the final draft submitted in April 1966. Other commitments have prevented me from making a further revision to take into account the important developments in federal-provincial relations which have occurred since that time. However, I have written a short appendix analyzing these developments up to mid-1967 and this will, I hope, help to make the study more useful than it would otherwise have been.

Donald V. Smiley
Vancouver, July 1967

The major concern of this study is the making and implementing of public policy within the framework of Canadian federal institutions. It is focused primarily on relations between executive officials, both elected and appointed, of federal and provincial governments. Under the circumstances which have developed, each jurisdiction retains responsibilities for broad areas of public functions but there are an increasing number of situations in which the action of each in pursuing its objectives impinges on the activities of the other. The ways by which the central and regional administrations respond to this kind of mutual dependence have been neglected by students of the Canadian and other federal systems.

Traditional discussions of federalism emphasize the co-ordinate and independent powers of federal and regional governments rather than their interdependence. According to the juridical analysis found in the textbooks of law and political science, there are three possible ways of legally organizing a particular territory. The first alternative is unitary—the government whose jurisdiction includes the whole territory is sovereign and whatever other public authorities there may be are legally subordinate to it. At the other end of the spectrum is the confederacy where the powers of the central jurisdiction are held at the discretion of the regional governments. The third alternative is federalism and there would be broad agreement among constitutional scholars that a federal constitution has these characteristics:

1. The totality of governmental powers which can legally be wielded within a territory are divided by a written constitution between a central and two or more regional governments.
2. Those parts of the constitution which delineate governmental powers are not subject to interpretation or amendment by the unilateral action of the executive or legislature of either level of jurisdiction.

3. At least one of the legislative chambers of the federal government is chosen by popular election.

4. Individual residents of the federation are directly subject to the laws of both the central and the regional governments.

The kind of definition given above is static and concerns the formal constitutional features of federal systems regardless of how these systems operate. Using this definition one could read the constitutions of various countries and intergovernmental associations and quickly and mechanically determine which qualified as federations. In most cases, however, the actual workings of political systems diverge widely from what one would expect by a literal reading of their constitutions. K. C. Wheare, whose influential book emphasizes the co-ordinate authority and mutual independence of central and regional governments as the essential features of federalism, recognizes this difficulty and makes an important distinction between "federal constitutions" and "federal governments."¹ According to Wheare's analysis, the Canadian constitution is only "quasi-federal" because of the powers conferred upon the federal executive to disallow provincial legislation and to appoint the provincial lieutenant-governors and judges of the principal provincial courts. Examining the actual practices of Canadian government, however, he concludes that, ". . . although the Canadian constitution is quasi-federal in law, it is predominantly federal in practice. Or to put it another way, although Canada has not a federal constitution, it has a federal government."² This conclusion seems to be deficient because the somewhat facile dichotomy between the law of the constitution and the practices of government allows one to avoid analysis of the intricate relationships between the two kinds of matters when studying particular political systems. Furthermore, the undue emphasis on the co-ordinate and independent relationships of the central and regional governments predisposes the student either to ignore patterns of interactions between the two levels which are so much a part of the workings of established federations or to consider these interactions as somehow a deviation from the federal principle.

Federalism may thus usefully be considered as a continuing process by which governmental powers are exercised. In his recent work Carl J. Friedrich contrasts federalism as "consensual world order" with imperialism as "coercive world order" and he states:

. . . Federalism should not be considered a term for a static pattern, designating a particular and precisely fixed division of powers between governmental levels. Instead, "federalism" seems the most suitable term by which to designate the process of federalizing a political community, that is to say the process by which a number of separate political organizations, be they states or any other kind of association, enter into arrangements for working out solutions, adopting joint policies and making joint decisions on joint problems.

Conversely, federalism is the process by which a hitherto unitary political community, as it becomes differentiated

into a number of separate and distinct political communities, achieves a new organization in which the differentiated communities, now separately organized, become capable of working out separately and on their own problems they no longer have in common. It is not only a matter of decision-making, but of the entire range of power and its exercise. . . . The federalizing process accompanies, so to speak, the communal development as its organizational counterpart. If values, interests and beliefs exhibit a stable and structured pattern in which the commonly shared values, interests and beliefs are counterbalanced by values, interests and beliefs that are not shared, though territorially distributed, then a federal development becomes possible.³

Friedrich regards as an essential element of federalism the constitutional protection of each level of the political order against the other. His definition thus excludes instances of international relations or senior-local authority relations where such legal protection does not exist. A recent book on the American federal union concludes with the most useful definition of federalism from the public-policy-process viewpoint that I have found:

Federalism is a system of government in which central and regional authorities are linked in a mutually interdependent political relationship; in this system a balance is maintained such that neither level of government becomes dominant to the extent that it can dictate the decisions of the other, but each can influence, bargain with, and persuade the other. Usually, but not necessarily, this system will be related to a constitutional structure establishing an independent legal existence for both central and regional governments, and providing that neither shall be legally subordinate to the other. The functions of government will be distributed between these levels (exclusively, competitively, or co-operatively), initially perhaps by a constitutional document, but thereafter by a political process, involving where appropriate the judiciary; in this process the political interdependence of the two levels of government is of the first importance in order to prevent one level absorbing all effective decision-making power.⁴

Established federal systems are characterized by the growing importance of the relations between the executives of the central and regional governments. Several interrelated influences contribute to the development of what might be called "executive federalism."

1. The constitutions of most federations have proved somewhat resistant to evolution through amendment or changing patterns of judicial review. Amending procedures in most established federal systems are inflexible, i.e. small minorities can block attempted changes in the text of the constitution. For several reasons the courts in several federations now play a more restricted role than previously in maintaining the federal balance. Thus political and administrative processes have become the chief instruments of change.

2. The increasing interdependence of modern social and economic life makes it impossible for the regional governments to carry out their responsibilities in the absence of appropriate action by the other regional jurisdictions and the federal authorities. Maurice Lamontagne wrote of Canada a decade ago " . . . l'attribution de responsabilités exclusives aux différents gouvernements n'est pas possible parce que la politique économique et sociale est devenue quasi indivisible."⁵

3. Nationalist and egalitarian sentiments focused on the federations as such have propelled federal governments into collaboration with regional governments to establish minimum country-wide standards in public services regarded as being within the social minimum. Under the constitutions of most federations the regional authorities are assigned the primary responsibilities for health, welfare and education. The only way that this circumstance can be reconciled with the demand for equal services on a national basis is through inter-governmental collaboration.

4. Contemporary rates of taxation and the deliberate use of fiscal policy to provide for economic stability and growth mean that particular tax and spending policies of one level have consequences for the other. The central and regional jurisdictions increasingly compete for tax sources. Federal governments, like other national governments assume responsibility for overall economic direction. This direction will be ineffective if appropriate actions are not taken by regional and local authorities. In Canada, as in other federal systems, the fiscal relations between the central and regional governments have become increasingly complex and increasingly crucial for the stability of the federation.

5. The widening scope of public activity gives rise to an increasing number of situations where federal and regional objectives must be coordinated if intolerable stresses on the system are not to result. The old classical federalism in which each level carried out the functions assigned to it by the constitution in relative isolation from the other had some relevance to a period when governmental responsibilities were limited in scope and importance. It has no relevance today.

The relations between the executives of the federal and regional governments are extraordinarily complex in most federations. Many of these interactions are of an informal and *ad hoc* nature. Furthermore, in many matters the significant decision-making units are not the federal and regional administrations but functional groups constituted across jurisdictional lines. Edward W. Weidner after several intensive studies of federal-state relations in the American system wrote about functionalism in this way:

It is a thesis of the present discussion that in the federal system in the United States there are relatively few direct clashes or compromises between state and national governments on large issues of domestic policy. Furthermore, in the

administrative sphere positive cooperation is the pattern rather than aloofness or conflict. The disagreements and conflicts that do arise and that may be encouraged by federalism's structural features are not basically clashes between state and national governments. Instead, they are clashes between much smaller groups of people and the opposing groups are concentrated within a single governmental level as often as not.⁶

Similarly, in a 1963 study I found that in the administration of federal conditional grants to the Canadian provinces the attitudes and interests of programme specialists and financial officials were very different and that conflicts related to the grant-in-aid arrangements characteristically resulted in divisions along these lines rather than between federal and provincial governments as such.⁷

Although the analysis of public policy processes seems to me a useful focus for studying contemporary federalism, it is a partial approach. It concentrates on a relatively small number of executive officials who devise and implement public policy. However, political scientists increasingly question the validity of studying the law and practices of government in isolation from the attitudes, social groupings, economic structures and so on which condition and are conditioned by governmental activity.⁸ This study examines how policy is made and implemented in the Canadian federal system. Another more difficult kind of investigation would concentrate on the sociology and politics of Canadian federalism. An American scholar has asserted: "The essence of federalism lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the country itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of a society are articulated and protected."⁹ In all developed societies there are groups striving to secure governmental actions that they perceive to be favourable to their aspirations and interests. Federal governments can be sustained only in societies which are themselves federal, that is societies where people believe that their interests in respect to a number of important matters are specific to geographical divisions of the country rather than to the country as a whole. On the other hand, federalism has little relevance if the major incidences of political differentiation relate to class, religious, occupational or other groupings which are not territorially located. In his study of four Latin-American republics with federal constitutions (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela) William S. Stokes concludes that certain economic and cultural features make federalism as government in the usual sense impractical in these countries:

Most Latin Americans are conditioned by their historical traditions and social and economic institutions to understand and accept concentrated, centralized power, usually of a highly personalized sort. The strong, frequently exalted role of the father in the family, the importance of the elite in the class system, the honor, dignity, power and influence of the *doctor* from the *aula* (lecture hall), the significance of centralized leadership in the Church, the paramountcy of the "general" in politics, and the position of the public and private monopolist

in the economic system—these characteristics of Hispanic culture all suggest powerful, centralized government. In addition, the political experience and traditions of hundreds of years were with a powerful monarchy operating by means of a centralized administrative hierarchy. The modern constitutions all provide for "interventionist" states.¹⁰

Federal governmental institutions to be stable must correspond with particular kinds of social structures and cultural predispositions so that regionally-based particularisms can find an outlet while making possible common action in respect to matters where these particularisms are of less importance.

The sociological and governmental aspects of federalism are thus intimately related. When relatively stable federal systems have been established, some groups come to press their claims primarily through the federal government and others through the states or provinces. In the United States, for example, those hostile to the public regulation of business usually favour "states'" rights while those striving for civil rights for the Negro look to action from the federal legislature, executive and courts. If most of the influential groups in any federation came to look exclusively to either one level of government or the other it is not likely that federalism could long survive, although the federal rituals might remain. But once the division of legislative and executive powers between the central and regional governments is established, there are influences at work to sustain the federal quality of the society itself and they create new country-wide and regional centres of influence where none existed before. The Report of the Committee on Manitoba's Future published in 1963 stated:

The Province of Manitoba is more than a political division of the nation. During the more than 90 years since its establishment a distinctive social and economic entity has been developed within the essentially artificial political boundaries. When the Province joined the Canadian Confederation, "Manitoba" was not much more than a block of land surrounded by lines on the map. In the intervening years, however, it has become an organic unit; trading patterns have developed, transportation systems have been established, educational and administrative systems have been organized, and all the other social, economic and political institutions of a modern society have evolved. The people of Manitoba, now, therefore, are responsible for dealing with many of their own problems. . . .¹¹

The establishment of important centres of political power thus provides the setting for the growth of other influences within the same territorial limits and social and governmental federalism reinforce one another. Conversely, a federation under great stress may be expected to feature tensions in both its public and private institutions. The drives for provincial autonomy in contemporary Quebec have corresponded with influences toward a greater measure of

independence for the French Canadian elements in nongovernmental organizations. These influences in some cases (such as those involving university students, the Junior Chambers of Commerce and the municipal associations) have culminated in the withdrawal of the French-speaking members.¹² In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the American Civil War many formerly national organizations such as churches and political parties separated into northern and southern components.

There has been almost no systematic examination of the kinds and distributions of popular attitudes which are compatible with the maintenance of federalism in government. Some years ago J. A. Corry spoke of the "stresses and conflicts" in the Canadian federal system "which need to be negotiated and compromised (by the governments) in *ad hoc* arrangements, particularly where the electorates do not seem disposed to say clearly whether they are federal or unitary in spirit."¹³ Does contemporary cooperative federalism require widespread popular attitudes which are pragmatic and equivocal as to the appropriate level of government for carrying out particular public responsibilities? It seems unlikely that the federation could survive if the prevailing attitudes came to the point of considering one or the other level more legitimate in respect to all public activities believed important. If there were a consensus throughout the country about this matter the system might either disintegrate in a peaceful and orderly way or evolve into a unitary state. It is more likely, however, that no such agreement will be established and if the conflicts about legitimacy are pushed to the limits we have a "recipe for civil war."

It is common to assign the political parties a central role in the maintenance of federal systems. The usual analysis in Canada and the United States has been that these unions can be sustained only if there are country-wide parties drawing strength from all regions.¹⁴ In examining eight established federations the American political scientist William H. Riker addresses himself to the question, "What maintains federalism?" and systematically dismisses the arguments that the crucial elements are the sharing of administrative responsibilities, dual citizen loyalties or the existence of dissident provincial patriotism.¹⁵ He concludes:

Whatever the general social conditions, if any, that sustain the federal bargain, there is one institutional condition that controls the nature of the bargain in all the instances here examined and in all the others with which I am familiar. This is the structure of the party system, which may be regarded as the main variable intervening between the background social conditions and the specific nature of the federal bargain.¹⁶

According to Riker's analysis, a federation is centralized or "peripheralized" to the degree that "the parties organized to operate the central government control the parties organized to operate the constituent governments."¹⁷ Although federal-provincial party relationships have received little systematic attention in Canada,¹⁸ my

tentative conclusion is that executives of the federal and provincial governments, working in isolation or in collaboration, have assumed the crucial role in effecting changes in the political system. On the other hand, the influences pushing these executives towards federal-provincial integration are not reinforced by corresponding pressures on the party organizations. Because of this cooperative federalism may fail.

The preceding brief analysis of the sociology and politics of federalism is meant to suggest only that the public policy approach is a limited one and that executive federalism cannot realistically be considered in isolation from the other influences impinging on the maintenance of federal institutions. The underlying assumptions of this study are, first, that federal systems, like other institutions, must have the capacity to adapt to changing circumstances if they are to survive and, second, that it is more doubtful than most of us would have believed a few years ago that the Canadian federation can develop the necessary resources of adaptability. For analytical purposes, I make a distinction between two kinds of processes of evolution. The first I call "devices of adjustment"—the procedures by which the respective powers, resources and responsibilities assigned to the federal and provincial governments by the original constitution are dynamically redelineated as new circumstances arise. The second category of processes is named "devices of articulation"—the procedures through which the activities of the two levels are related to one another by their respective executives. It seems reasonable to believe that a federal system could not survive under modern circumstances unless it developed resources of flexibility through both kinds of devices. We have only the crudest of measures to determine whether a federation is responding effectively to the demands made upon it. In a negative sense one might judge that the resources of adaptability in a particular federal system were being strained if any or all of the following circumstances existed:

1. If no political party were able to draw significant strength from all regions of the country. In any federation much of the political conflict at the federal level will revolve about divergent regional interests. When at least one of the parties comprehends these interests, however, tolerable compromises can ordinarily be worked out through the procedures of intraparty accommodation. When no such inclusive party exists these procedures cannot be used for this purpose.
2. If there were widespread public attitudes which attribute to the inherent nature of federal institutions those deprivations that people feel strongly about. Federations, like other human institutions, can survive only if people regard them as legitimate.
3. If most of the politically influential elements of the country sought their objectives exclusively or almost exclusively through one or the other level of government. Such a situation attenuates the tension between national and regional interests necessary to the maintenance of federalism.

Between about the middle of 1942 and the end of the war in Europe the Government of Canada devised and committed itself to an interrelated group of programmes and policies for domestic reconstruction in the postwar period. These initiatives were so comprehensive in scope that, taken together, they can reasonably be regarded as a "New National Policy" comparable to the original National Policy of 1878.

By the beginning of the First World War the social and economic objectives of the Confederation settlement and the National Policy of 1878 had in the main been achieved. The West had been acquired by the Dominion and settled; the country had been linked by transcontinental railroads; a thriving and highly protected commercial and manufacturing sector had been established. In spite of the controversies surrounding the Ontario schools and military conscription issues, the war committed most Canadians to an overriding objective. The return of peace, however, left the country without important purposes to be realized through federal leadership and in the 1920s provincial and regional interests were more dominant than at any time since Confederation. The decade of the Great Depression failed to produce a commitment to comprehensive national reforms and in the desperate circumstances of the time the reactions of the Dominion and the provinces were haphazard, hesitant and confused.¹

From the early days of the Second World War until its conclusion, elected and appointed officials of the federal government devoted a considerable amount of time and energy to planning for postwar domestic reconstruction. Those involved were determined that the social and economic conditions of the Depression should not recur. A conjuncture of events and currents of thought and sentiment made it seem both possible and desirable to commit the Canadian people to a set of coordinated national objectives in the postwar period. The experience of the war had revealed the productive potentials of the Canadian economy under federal direction. The perspectives of Keynesian economic analysis suggested to the senior officials of the civil

service that the federal government might move effectively to ensure high and stable levels of employment and income within the framework of the private enterprise system. Humanitarian sentiments fostered by the deprivations of depression and war combined with what seemed to be the economic need of guaranteeing high levels of consumption expenditures in the postwar period made more ambitious schemes of income-maintenance than had previously been seriously considered in Canada appear both feasible and appropriate. The successes of the war against the background of the obvious failures of the Depression made aggressive federal leadership seem the necessary precondition of progress. The balance of bureaucratic vigour and competence was heavily in favour of the federal government as against the provinces. These and other factors were favourable to ambitious federal plans for domestic reform. This planning was intensified as the European conflict reached its conclusion and culminated in several important pieces of legislation enacted in the parliamentary session of 1944: the White Paper on Employment and Income issued by the Minister of Reconstruction in April 1945 and the so-called Green Book proposals presented to the provinces by the federal government at the opening of the Conference on Reconstruction in May 1945.

Federal activities in postwar planning prior to the 1944 session need be mentioned only briefly. On December 9, 1939 a cabinet committee on reestablishment and demobilization was created. Its terms of reference were extended to include all phases of reconstruction by orders-in-council in February and October 1941. A House of Commons Committee on Reconstruction and Re-establishment was set up in 1942 and continued its work through the two subsequent sessions. In 1943 a Senate Committee on Economic Re-establishment and Social Security was set up and there was also a special House of Commons Committee on Social Security in 1943 and 1944. From 1941 onward national health insurance was under discussion by the Dominion Council of Health and in 1944 an advisory committee on this matter which had been set up by the government presented a report including a draft bill for a country-wide plan of health insurance. These and other planning activities began to take more concrete form in several enactments sponsored by the government in the 1944 session of Parliament.

A. The Session of 1944-45

The session of Parliament which began on January 27, 1944 and was prorogued on January 31, 1945 saw the enactment of several important pieces of legislation providing for postwar domestic reconstruction. The Speech from the Throne asserted that "while the post-war objective of our external policy is world security and general prosperity, the post-war objective of our domestic policy is social security and human welfare."² Thus:

. . . plans for the establishment of a national minimum of social security and human welfare should be advanced as rapidly as possible. Such a national minimum contemplates useful

employment for all who are willing to work; standards of nutrition and housing adequate to ensure the health of the whole population; and social insurance against privation resulting from unemployment, from accident, from the death of the bread-winner, from ill-health and from old age.³

The planning for this programme was defined in terms of three inter-related requirements—the rehabilitation into civilian life of former members of the Armed Forces, the reconversion of the economy to peacetime conditions so that there would be employment for all those able and willing to work, and the provision of various kinds of social insurance against major hazards. More specifically, the Speech from the Throne promised federal leadership in establishing first, a comprehensive system of social security and health insurance to be worked out in collaboration with the provinces; second, an integrated system for veterans' rehabilitation; and, third, the extension of housing legislation. The Speech committed the government to creating three new departments to carry out these new federal responsibilities—Departments of Reconstruction, Veterans Affairs, and Health and Welfare.

The major legislation related to postwar domestic reconstruction enacted in the 1944-45 session is outlined briefly below.

1. The National Housing Act provided for federal loans and federal guarantees of other loans for those wishing to build residences for their own use; guaranteed loans for rental housing and for home improvement and extension, grants to municipalities to acquire land for slum clearance and federal initiative in stimulating research in housing and community planning.

2. The Family Allowance Act provided for allowances for the children of residents after July 1, 1945 at rates ranging from \$5 for a child under six years to \$8 for children between their thirteenth and sixteenth birthdays.

3. Under the Agricultural Prices Support Act a federal agency was established with wide powers to determine, with the approval of the governor-in-council, the prices which the government would pay for agricultural products and to dispose of the products so acquired. Other legislation made similar provision for fisheries products.

4. An Industrial Development Bank with an authorized capital of \$25 millions, to be secured by the Bank of Canada, was established for the purpose of providing funds for enterprises that would otherwise have had trouble securing capital.

5. Under the Farm Improvement Loans Act provision was made for federal guarantees of intermediate-period and short-term loans for agricultural improvement.

6. An Air Transport Board was established with regulatory powers over civil aviation.

7. A Department of Reconstruction was established with wide powers of coordination to ensure the smooth transition to peacetime circumstances.

8. A Department of National Health and Welfare was created to discharge the responsibilities of the federal government in these matters.

9. A Department of Veterans Affairs was created.

B. The White Paper on Employment and Income

The White Paper on Employment and Income presented to Parliament by the Minister of Reconstruction in April 1945⁴ is the most coherent and closely reasoned statement of the New National Policy made by the government. The White Paper dealt explicitly with "the initial period of Reconstruction," defined as the time between the ending of the European war and the cessation of hostilities in the Pacific, and much more broadly with the postwar period. These latter perspectives are our concern here.

The White Paper committed the federal government to ensuring a high and stable level of employment and income after the war. This aim was not only to "pervade" all federal economic policies but "must be wholeheartedly accepted by all economic groups and organizations as a great national objective, transcending in importance all sectional and group interests."⁵ The White Paper proceeded straightforwardly in terms of Keynesian analysis, which postulated that remunerative employment and income are generated by the expenditures made on exports, private investment, consumption and public investment. Specific suggestions were made as to how the government would act so as to ensure adequate levels of expenditure in each of these categories after the war in the Pacific ended.

1. Export trade

The White Paper looked to an expansion of world trade so that Canada and other countries might increase their exports. This result would be pursued by the government through international action towards "the reduction and restriction of trade barriers, especially trade barriers of an arbitrary and discriminatory type." The expansion of multilateral trade also required comparative stability of exchange rates and cessation of the competitive depreciation of rates which had so aggravated the world economic situation in the 1930s. The government pledged itself to cooperate with other nations to this end.

2. Private investment

The White Paper committed the government to policies which would encourage a high level of private investment in the postwar period. During the war, taxation had been designed to discourage investment

for other than war purposes. Such taxes were to be reduced. In particular government policy was to "minimize taxation which contributes to a higher level of production costs." Monetary policy was to encourage low interest rates; "the investment of funds in productive capital contributing to employment" was to be undertaken. The Industrial Development Bank created in 1944 would provide credit for the establishment and expansion of enterprises which had previously been unable to get adequate financing from private institutions. Under the Farm Improvement Loans Act government-guaranteed bank loans would be available to meet the needs of farmers for capital. The provisions of the National Housing Act of 1944 would provide for various kinds of federal assistance to stimulate residential construction and slum clearance.

3. Consumption expenditures

The White Paper committed the government to ensuring a high level of expenditures on consumer goods through measures to encourage employment and through various social security plans, some to be undertaken exclusively under federal control and others in collaboration with the provinces.

4. Public investment

Although the White Paper recognized that the "deliberate use of public investment expenditures as a permanent instrument in employment policy" had never been undertaken anywhere in the world, it was suggested that progress might be made along two lines.

First, the federal government would itself undertake to plan in advance a "shelf" of "desirable Dominion projects" which would be undertaken when employment conditions made this desirable. The federal authorities would encourage the provinces and municipalities to participate in similar kinds of advance planning and to cooperate in the counter-cyclical timing of capital expenditures.

Second, the federal government in collaboration with the provinces would implement a new policy of expenditure on the development and conservation of natural resources, with special attention to those expenditures which might be varied in accord with income and employment levels.

In the field of public expenditures, the White Paper also committed the government to the development of the natural resources of the Yukon and the Northwest Territories and to a "planned pattern" for the development of civil aviation.

In lucid language the White Paper explained the general economic rationale of the New National Policy and the kinds of policies the federal government had accepted to attain and ensure high and stable levels of income and employment. Because the end of the war in the Pacific was imminent, the government made its projected policies more detailed and explicit. These were presented to the provincial

leaders at the opening plenary sessions of the Conference on Reconstruction on August 6-7, 1945.

C. The Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction

At the Conference on Reconstruction convened by the federal government in the late summer of 1945 policies outlined in the White Paper on Employment and Income were embodied in a group of interrelated proposals to the provincial authorities.⁶ What came to be called the Green Book proposals looked forward to a more fundamental redelineation of federal and provincial functional responsibilities, revenues and revenue sources than had ever been seriously considered before.

1. Fiscal arrangements

Under the federal plan the provinces would forego levying personal and corporate income taxes and succession duties, apart from taxes on profits from logging and mining operations, and would receive in compensation annual unconditional subsidies from the federal government. These subsidies would be \$12 per capita, decreased or increased in proportion to the value of the gross national product as compared with 1941 but subject to an irreducible minimum equal to \$12 per capita of 1941 population.

2. Public health

The federal government offered to share with the provinces the costs of a comprehensive health insurance plan to be implemented in stages and when fully developed to include general practitioner services, hospital care, nursing care, specialized medical and nursing care, dental services, laboratory and x-ray services and pharmaceutical drugs. The federal government would pay to each participating province a basic grant of one-fifth of the *estimated* costs of each class of service and one-half of the *actual* costs of providing each class of service, with the limit that the total federal contribution should not exceed a schedule for each service adopted by the federal government or a maximum of \$12.96 per capita when the complete plan was developed.

Along with its proposed contributions to health insurance, the federal government offered to give financial assistance to provincial health services in two forms.

1. A group of eight specific health grants for specific purposes would be paid including those relating to professional training, research, mental illness, tuberculosis, venereal disease and crippled children.

2. In those provinces entering the health insurance scheme the federal government would assist in hospital construction by loaning money to the provinces and/or local authorities at a rate "equal to, or only slightly above the costs of such loans to the Dominion." Such

loans would be repaid with interest from the proceeds of the Health Insurance Plan or other specific federal health grants.

3. *Social security*

The federal government made four major proposals in the field of social security.

1. The Dominion would assume the exclusive responsibility of paying a \$30 per month pension to all residents of Canada 70 years of age and over without a means test.

2. The Dominion would pay to the provinces up to 50 per cent of the cost of old age assistance pensions to a maximum of \$30 per month for persons of 65 to 69 years of age who met the requirements of provincially administered means tests.

3. The federal government would assume complete responsibility for unemployment to persons who were employable but who were unable to obtain work and whose benefits under the existing unemployment insurance scheme were exhausted.

4. Eventually, the federal unemployment insurance scheme would be extended to cover all employed persons.

D. *Natural Resources Development and Public Investment*

The Green Book proposals suggested that a large amount of public investment was necessary for the conservation and development of agricultural, forestry, mining and fishing resources. The government would expand its activities in these fields within its own jurisdiction but would also enter into agreements to assist the provinces in such matters as the conservation of agricultural and forestry resources, the construction of a trans-Canada highway and the building of roads and airports facilitating resource development.

The federal government proposed that the provinces and municipalities cooperate in the timing of their public works for counter-cyclical reasons. Under the federal proposal these governments would be given planning grants to survey their needs in this respect and would receive up to 20 per cent of the costs of postponable projects if these were executed in a period designated by the Dominion authority.

Before the conference adjourned on August 10 it was evident that the leaders of the Quebec, Ontario and Alberta governments took issue with the federal vision of the postwar future on grounds of fundamental constitutional principles. Premier Drew of Ontario, speaking before the detailed federal proposals were presented to the conference, spoke of the necessity of provincial fiscal autonomy and of a clear-cut "redefinition and reallocation" of both taxing and administrative powers between the two levels of government. This point of view was quite incompatible with the perspectives of the New National Policy. The later debates of the plenary sessions of the conference on

April 29-May 3, 1946, were almost entirely concerned with payments to be received by the provinces for renting the personal income, corporation tax and succession duty fields to the Dominion rather than with the much broader issues raised by the Green Book proposals. In the meantime the federal government had agreed to modify its preliminary financial offers in several respects, including the following:

1. The tax rental payments for exclusive access to the direct tax fields would be \$15 per capita per year.
2. Provincial taxes on logging or mining operations would be recognized as deductible expenses for federal income tax purposes.
3. The Dominion agreed for the duration of the agreement not to raise its special excise taxes on gasoline, amusements and pari-mutuel betting except in the event of a national emergency.
4. The federal government would refund to the provinces half of the net corporate income tax collected from companies generating or distributing electricity, gas or steam.

At the end of the conference it was apparent that the federal authorities were unwilling to accede to the heavy fiscal demands of Ontario. At no time did the government of Quebec state with any precision the circumstances under which it would be prepared to rent the three tax fields.

E. The Rationale of the New National Policy

The postwar reconstruction policies of the federal government contained four interrelated elements.

First, the federal authorities would assume the primary responsibility of ensuring high and stable levels of employment and income. At the Conference on Reconstruction the Minister of Finance asserted that this responsibility would be discharged:

. . . (1) by achieving the best possible agreements with other United Nations in the field of economic relations, agreements which would encourage and permit the expansion of world trade and full use of our resources; (2) by pursuing fiscal and other policies which will create favourable conditions within which the initiative, experience and resourcefulness of private business can contribute to the expansion of business and employment; (3) by so managing its public investment expenditures and making it financially advantageous to provincial and municipal governments so to manage theirs, that they will contribute to the stability and not to the instability of employment; further, to direct these expenditures to the development and conservation of our natural resources, improving thereby the opportunities of the Canadian people and the financial position of the provincial governments who administer them; (4) by maintaining and stabilizing by a comprehensive system of old age security, incomes

which are largely spent on consumption and by contributing thereby to the health, welfare and productive capacity of the Canadian people and to their employment.⁷

Second, the federal government would have exclusive access to personal income taxes, corporate taxes and succession duties. The Minister of Finance put it in these terms:

The continuing expenditures arising out of the war will be heavy. National progress and the fulfillment of necessary international commitments both require the Dominion Government to undertake a large programme of national development and national welfare. It will clearly need to make full use of its power to impose national taxes on personal incomes, corporations and estates. Its revenue needs will be so great that the duplication of these taxes by other governments would seriously restrict enterprise and output and would jeopardize Canada's employment programme.⁸

Exclusive access to these tax fields was necessary, argued the Minister, not only because of the expected high levels of federal expenditures but also in the light of the demands of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. The Minister asserted:

All taxes affect the volume of spending, but income and corporation tax rates, and changes in these rates, also have a vital bearing upon the incentive to produce and to undertake capital expansion. It is therefore important that these taxes be levied exclusively by the Dominion Government. It is the only government which, because it can budget for the whole business cycle, is able to set rates in such a way as to contribute to a high and stable level of employment.⁹

Further, "Exclusive jurisdiction over taxes on incomes, corporations and estates is also necessary in order to protect Canadian interests abroad. With divided authority it is difficult to conclude reciprocal agreements with other countries which will prevent double taxation of Canadian incomes and estates."¹⁰

Third, the federal government would assume the initiative in the establishment of a comprehensive system of social security, including health insurance and income-maintenance plans for the aged and unemployed and family allowances. The Minister of National Health and Welfare summarized the justifications for these measures:

A nationally based and nation wide social security system can strengthen true Canadian unity. It is the practical expression of our common interest in protecting the individual against economic hazards beyond his control.

The Government believes that the social security proposals which it is putting before the Conference would make a threefold contribution. They would provide a network of protection for the Canadian people that justifies itself on social and humanitarian grounds. They would provide an important degree of protection to buttress the nation's economy as a whole in times of

stress and strain. Less tangible perhaps, but in some ways most important of all, they would make a vital contribution to the development of our concept of Canadian citizenship and to the forging of lasting bonds of Canadian unity.¹¹

Fourth, the federal government would assume more responsibility for ensuring the adequacy and stability of provincial revenues by annual per capita grants related to the level of the gross national product. By making the payment of these grants conditional on the provinces renting the personal income and corporation tax and succession duty fields, the federal authorities of necessity decided to forego measures of interprovincial equalization as recommended by the Rowell-Sirois Commission and embodied in the fiscal arrangements prevailing from 1957 onward. The federal government in 1945 and 1946 seems to have judged that the more prosperous provinces, particularly Ontario, would not have been willing to rent the income tax and succession duty fields if interprovincial equalization was undertaken.

The New National Policy assigned the provinces a subordinate role in the Canadian federal system. The rationale of the proposals was to mobilize the efforts of Canadians in the fulfilment of well-defined social and economic objectives and, as wartime experience seemed to demonstrate, this mobilization could come about only through the dominance of the federal authorities. Prime Minister King expressed the federal attitude in his opening speech to the Reconstruction Conference:

The lessons of war have taught us the vital importance of co-operation in an effort to reach a common goal. Without unity there is frustration. Now that we are coming face to face with the problems of the post-war years, the need for unity and co-operation is not less than it has been: From some points of view it is greater. The enemies we shall have to overcome will be on our own Canadian soil. They will make their presence known in the guise of sickness, unemployment and want. It is to plan for a unified campaign in Canada against these enemies of progress that we have come together at this time. . . .¹²

To realize these objectives it was proposed that the provinces go in to what the Prime Minister called a "partnership" with the Dominion. However, the terms of this new relationship and the design of the postwar future were to be formulated by the federal authorities. Although provincial representatives had participated in the Advisory Committee on Health Insurance and although there had been some consultation with the provinces by the House of Commons Committee on Reconstruction, the comprehensive and detailed Green Book proposals were accepted as federal policy with little involvement of the provincial administrations. These proposals were made available to the press some hours before the provincial leaders had seen them and the casual way in which the Prime Minister dealt with this inadvertent slight to the provinces reveals the dominant position the federal government assumed in defining the situation and designing the shape of the postwar future. Between the opening of the Conference and its

adjournment *sine die* nearly nine months later the federal government made concessions to the provinces by increasing per capita grants and by offering to withdraw from certain tax fields. However, the Green Book proposals were presented as a package, and at the end of the conference the federal authorities had proved unwilling to modify them in any important way.

The federal government believed that the New National Policy could be implemented without explicit constitutional changes. Exercise of the federal spending power would permit the federal authorities to assume the role of leadership and coordination concerning many matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction. It was believed possible that the federal government could obtain exclusive access to the personal income, corporation and succession duty tax fields through agreements with the provinces. There was confidence in the possibilities of constructive federal-provincial collaboration in matters as varied as the anti-cyclical timing of public works, vocational training and the marketing of agricultural products. Thus in the major pronouncements of the New National Policy there was an implicit denial of what was axiomatic among those who favoured reform in the previous decade—that reform required explicit constitutional changes enhancing the power of the federal government. In J. A. Corry's terms the postwar strategy was to "turn the flank of the constitutional issue,"¹³ the issue which had so preoccupied those concerned with Canadian federalism in the 1930s. In the policy statements of federal officials in 1944 and 1945 the constitutional issue was somewhat clouded. Under the British North America Act as judicially interpreted the federal government had the authority to exercise what were normally provincial powers in dealing with the economic and other dislocations resulting from the war after actual hostilities had ceased. It was clear that the government was determined to exercise these powers and to decide unilaterally the pace at which the peacetime delineation of legislative authority was to be restored.

There can be no doubt, however, that a basic assumption of the new version of Canadian federalism was that the dominance of the federal authorities could be perpetuated after the exercise of emergency powers had ended.

F. A Digression: Federal Policies towards Culture

The New National Policy as it emerged in 1944 and 1945 dealt almost exclusively with the social and economic shape of postwar Canada. In the early postwar years there also grew up a demand that the federal government assume leadership in cultural development. There had been federal involvement in these matters from time to time. The National Museum had its origins in the pre-Confederation period, the Public Archives were established in 1872 and the National Gallery in 1880. A 1932 enactment of Parliament provided for the establishment of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission with the dual responsibility

of providing a national broadcasting service and of supervising all broadcasting in Canada. In the same year the National Research Council opened its first scientific laboratories. The National Film Board was established in 1939 and in 1941 was given the responsibility for the production and distribution of films. In spite of these and other federal initiatives, there was nothing that could be called a coordinated federal policy concerning cultural development.

The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences under the chairmanship of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey was appointed in April 1949 with broad responsibilities to report on radio and television broadcasting, the work of the various cultural agencies of the federal government, Canadian participation in international cultural activities and relationships between the government of Canada and its agencies with national voluntary groups in the cultural field. The commission reported to the government in May 1951. Much of the spirit of the Report was contained in two sentences justifying federal involvement in what some persons had believed was the provincial field of education. "All civilized societies strive for a common good, including not only material but intellectual and moral elements. If the federal government is to renounce its right to associate itself with other social groups, public and private, in the general education of Canadian citizens, it denies its intellectual and moral purpose, the complete conception of the common good is lost, and Canada, as such, becomes a materialistic society."¹⁴ The commission recommended the creation by the federal government of a "Council for the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences" with responsibilities for Canadian cultural policy and for fostering Canada's cultural relations abroad through UNESCO and other international cultural agencies. It was proposed that the federal government vastly increase its support for various kinds of cultural activities. A national plan of undergraduate and graduate scholarships was also recommended along with annual federal contributions "to support the work of the universities on the basis of the population of each of the provinces of Canada."

Apart from the provision of university scholarships, most of the more important recommendations of what came to be called the "Massey Commission" have been implemented. Per capita grants of 50 cents to the universities were provided by Parliament in the 1951-52 fiscal year and this amount was progressively raised to the present level of \$5 per person in the provinces. The Canada Council with responsibilities very much like those envisaged by the commission was established in 1957 and was given a \$50 million permanent endowment fund and a \$50 million University Capital Grants Fund. More effective development of federal cultural policies was provided for in 1963 when all federal agencies concerned with cultural affairs were grouped under the Department of the Secretary of State.

G. *The New National Policy 1946-60*

The adjournment of the Conference on Reconstruction *sine die* on May 3, 1946 demonstrated the impossibility of federal-provincial agreement on the federal government's comprehensive and interrelated plans for creating a new pattern of financial and administrative relationships between the two levels. From the time the conference ended however, the federal authorities sought and in many cases obtained provincial agreement on particular elements of the New National Policy. By this process of piecemeal adjustment over the subsequent years many of the objectives formulated by the federal government during the last years of the war have been wholly or partially achieved.

1. *Fiscal arrangements*

After the Conference on Reconstruction federal strategy in fiscal matters was to go further than in the original proposals to design options meeting the needs of individual provinces in an attempt to persuade them to rent the three direct tax fields. This strategy was only partially successful. Also, interprovincial equalization through unconditional federal subsidies played an increasingly important role in federal-provincial financial relations.

2. *Public health*

In 1948 the federal government decided that the failure of the two levels to agree on a comprehensive reform of their financial and administrative relations should not be allowed to forestall federal leadership and financial assistance in improving particular public health activities within the jurisdiction of the provinces. The National Health Programme of that year provided for 10 separate but interrelated conditional grants, including one for hospital construction. As modified from time to time, these programmes have continued.

The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act enacted by Parliament in 1957 provided for federal financial assistance to approved provincial hospital insurance plans. By January 1, 1961 all provinces were participating in this programme.

3. *Social security*

Under the Old Age Security Act which came into effect on January 1, 1952, the federal government assumed the total financial and administrative responsibility for paying pensions of \$40 per month to all persons in Canada aged 70 or over who had resided in the country for at least 20 years. This amount was progressively raised to \$75 in 1965.

In the period after 1946 three "categorical" public assistance programmes were developed in which federal and provincial governments shared the costs of pensions to persons who were 65-69 years old,

blind, or permanently and totally disabled and who met the requirements of provincially-administered means tests.

Under the Unemployment Assistance Act of 1955 the federal government moved part of the way toward accepting responsibility for the relief of unemployed employables as recommended by the Green Book proposals. The Act provided that the federal authorities would reimburse the provinces for 50 per cent of the costs of general social assistance when the number of persons in receipt of such assistance exceeded 45 per cent of the provincial population. This threshold provision was removed by a 1957 amendment.

H. Natural Resources Development and Transportation

In the postwar years the federal government participated with the provinces in several ventures in the resource development and transportation fields. Some of the most important of these are discussed below.

1. The Canada Forestry Act of 1949 conferred on the governor-in-council the authority to enter into agreements with the provinces to assist them with various activities in the conservation and development of forest resources. Agreements were concluded concerning forest inventories, reforestation, forest fire protection and forest access roads. In 1962 these agreements for particular activities were replaced by a composite agreement covering wider forestry functions.

2. In 1958 the federal government inaugurated a programme of financial assistance to the provinces for construction of access roads to places where there were prospects for natural resource development.

3. Under the Trans-Canada Highway Act of 1949, as amended in 1956, the federal government contributed to the building of a paved two-lane highway from St. John's, Newfoundland to Victoria, B.C.

4. The Agricultural Rehabilitation and Rural Development Act of 1960-61 empowered the Minister of Agriculture to enter into agreements with the provinces to deal with the social and economic problems of unproductive agricultural areas.

As well as the general programmes mentioned above, the federal government in the postwar years participated in several schemes for the conservation and development of natural resources with particular provinces or groups of provinces—the Maritime Marshland Rehabilitation programme, the South Saskatchewan River Development Project, the St. Mary's Irrigation Project, agreements under the Atlantic Provinces Power Development Act and other ventures.

Although many of the major objectives of the New National Policy were successfully pursued in the 15 years after the Second World War, others were not. After the expiration of the Wartime Tax Agreements in 1947 the federal government at no time attained exclusive occupancy of the income tax and succession duty fields. No progress was

made in evolving procedures for coordinating the capital expenditures of federal, provincial and municipal governments for counter-cyclical reasons. The Green Book proposals for comprehensive prepaid health insurance were implemented only so far as care given in general hospitals was concerned. The federal government assumed only partial responsibility for social assistance to unemployed employables. In spite of these deficiencies, however, Canadian federalism developed in the postwar years in directions not entirely unlike those projected by the formulators of the New National Policy.

Between the latter half of the 1950s and the present time the vigour and purpose which led to the formulation and implementation of the New National Policy became weakened. Part of this can be explained in terms of the accomplishment of several objectives set forth by the federal government in 1944-45. Other developments contributing to the decrease of federal dominance have taken place, however, and in many important matters provincial rather than the federal authorities now hold the initiative. In other circumstances where previously the federal government had a wide range of freedom of action it now seeks the collaboration of the provinces. It is extraordinarily difficult to isolate the various factors influencing this shift and almost impossible to assess their relative importance in altering the roles of federal and provincial governments. This chapter attempts to explain the attenuation of federal dominance as a background to the subsequent analysis of how the Canadian federal system has adjusted to the new circumstances.

A. Deficiencies in Federal Economic Policies

The dominance of the federal government established during the war and the subsequent decade could endure only so long as it achieved results which met popular expectations. After the mid 1950s, the country encountered a set of economic circumstances which were not dealt with effectively. The following tables illustrate these deficiencies in terms of economic growth and unemployment.

Not only was the general performance of the Canadian economy satisfactory but the deficiencies had a different incidence on different segments of society. Particular industries remained depressed and pressures on prices in some sectors of the economy coexisted with unused capacity in others. The relative prosperity by-passed some groups entirely. As in the past, however, it was the differential

Table III.1

Index numbers of per capita product at constant prices (1958 = 100) for Canada and selected countries

Country	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962
Canada	98	104	101	100	101	101	102	106
Denmark	92	94	98	100	106	112	118	122
France	90	95	98	100	102	108	112	116
West Germany	89	94	98	100	106	114	118	122
United Kingdom	97	99	100	100	103	107	109	109
United States	103	103	103	100	105	106	106	111
Japan	88	93	101	100	117	132	152	161

Source: United Nations, Department of Social and Economic Affairs, Statistical Office, *Statistical Year Book, 1963* (New York, 1964), Table 170.

Table III.2

Unemployed in relation to total civilian labour force in Canada in selected years

Year	Unemployed (000s)	Total civil labour force (000s)	Unemployed as percentage of civilian labour force
1946	163	4,829	3.4
1948	114	4,988	2.3
1950	186	5,163	3.6
1952	155	5,324	2.9
1954	250	5,493	4.5
1956	197	5,782	3.4
1957	278	6,003	4.9
1958	432	6,127	7.1
1959	373	6,228	6.0
1960	448	6,403	7.0
1961	469	6,518	7.2
1962	391	6,608	6.0

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Canada Year Book, 1962 and 1963-64*.

regional impact of national policies which resulted in the most severe stresses on Canadian federalism. This aspect can best be illustrated by the regional rates of unemployment.

It is not within my competence to discuss why federal policies from 1957 onward were deficient. There are conflicting views given by professional economists.

Table III.3

Regional rates of unemployment, percentages

Region	1950-54 average	1955-59 average	1960
Atlantic provinces	5.8	8.8	10.6
Quebec	4.1	6.8	9.1
Ontario	2.4	3.8	5.4
Prairie provinces	2.0	3.1	4.2
British Columbia	4.2	5.3	8.7

Source: *Final Report of the Special Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment* (Ottawa, 1961), 11.

First, according to one explanation, the Keynesian economic analysis which in large measure provided the theoretical rationale for the New National Policy proceeded in terms of aggregates and policies based on such assumptions and tended to be insensitive to the incidence of governmental measures on particular industries and regions. Jacques Parizeau has thus evaluated federal economic policies as those developed from the perspectives of the White Paper on Employment and Income: "The framework of federal action upon the economy had to be quite general, or to put it differently, national in scope. The emphasis was on the variations in the total economic demand and large aggregates. Regional discrepancies in growth and structural bottlenecks were hardly considered and, in fact, at times federal authorities explicitly refused to consider them."¹ In somewhat similar vein, Maurice Lamontagne in his paper to the Study Conference on National Problems in 1960 looked back over the previous economic policies of the federal authorities and suggested new directions for the future:

Stagnation, inflation and unemployment have a very important regional and industrial incidence, especially in Canada. Certain regions or industries grow rapidly while others are depressed. Certain industries may enjoy rising prices while others, at the same time, suffer from relatively low prices. Some industries or regions may experience heavy unemployment while others suffer from a scarcity of labour. Our national aggregates, such as the gross national product, the cost of living index and the national percentage of unemployment, are frequently the result of conflicting tendencies prevailing in different industries and different regions. It is always unrealistic and dangerous to interpret these national aggregates without taking their regional and industrial components into account. It is even more dangerous to attempt to solve such economic problems as unemployment as if they had the same causes and intensity throughout the country and as if they could be effectively met by the same policies in all industries and all regions.²

Second, there is the explanation that the federal government did not pursue aggregative policies towards ensuring appropriate levels

of demand aggressively enough. In November, 1965 Scott Gordon made a root-and-branch attack on federal economic policies over the past two decades.³

Three decades have gone since Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was first published, and two since our own White Paper on policy, and it must be confessed that Keynesian economics has made virtually no impact on the Canadian public mind or on the business community. It has made little headway in advancing the analytical work in the bureaucracy that underlies the formulation of employment and other economic policies, and despite some brief period of favour, it does not appear to have won its way to any appreciable acceptance as a sound principle of fiscal policy.⁴

In general, Gordon's criticism based on an examination of the budgets of successive Ministers of Finance was that there had been a consistent failure to use expansionist fiscal policies.

The deficiencies in federal policies which became apparent in the latter half of the 1950s had two interrelated results. First, the provinces were propelled into a more interventionist role in economic matters. Second, more selective federal economic policies required more provincial collaboration than did the New National Policy of the immediate postwar years.

These various circumstances encouraged the provinces to engage in certain kinds of economic activities which they either had not undertaken before or had undertaken in a less aggressive way. Referring to the period after 1957, Jacques Parizeau asserted in 1964 that:

In so far as federal policies had been much too broad in scope to deal properly with structural and regional problems, it was logical in the face of these new developments for the provinces to get involved much more deeply than they had ever been in their own economic policies, particularly in those policies directly related to the rate of growth and industrial expansion. Indeed, a number of provinces still lack the personnel required for such responsibilities -- it would still be premature to think that all provincial politicians and civil servants are even roughly aware of these responsibilities. But a new approach has developed that is in remarkable contradiction to the centralist policies of the forties and early fifties. This new approach adopted by public authorities, who now have the means to carry out extensive programs, can have a very sizable impact on the economy.⁵

The circumstances prevailing since the late 1950s have also resulted in new kinds of federal economic measures which required a higher degree of provincial collaboration than did previous ones. In his paper quoted above Maurice Lamontagne called for the federal administration to develop more "selective policies" which would give "a regional and industrial formulation to our national policies."⁶ In concrete terms, this has meant that federal-provincial collaboration in expanding vocational training facilities has been required for

effective action when high rates of unemployment are attributed not only to deficiencies in aggregate demand but also to a relative lack of skill in the labour force. Under the present distribution of powers, measures to mitigate the social and economic problems of marginal farming areas can be undertaken only through some such programme of intergovernmental cooperation as that provided for by the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Rural Development Act of 1960-61. Federal-provincial collaboration is necessary if effective measures are to be taken to stimulate industrial development in chronically depressed areas, including parts of most provinces and the whole Atlantic region. When it was decided that the federal government should undertake programmes on behalf of those groups in society that had been by-passed by the general prosperity prevailing since the war, it was immediately evident that an effective war on poverty could be waged only with provincial cooperation. Both the differential impact of federal policies on regions, industries and occupational groups, and the increasing disposition of the provinces to implement their own measures for economic development and growth, made it almost inevitable that the more selective measures used by the federal authorities required a higher degree of provincial cooperation than had previous federal policies.

B. New Directions in Quebec

The election of the Liberal government in Quebec in June 1960 coincided in time with other influences challenging federal dominance. For the first time since Confederation the administration of a large province was committed to an explicit and comprehensive policy of social and economic reform through public action. Such a commitment in any of the three or four largest provinces would have offered a challenge to federal power. This challenge from the "new Quebec" was of course more direct than otherwise because of the cultural groups dominant in the Quebec and federal governments respectively. For the first time in Canadian history cultural and regional-economic cleavages were compounded.⁷

The Liberal Manifesto issued before the 1960 election in Quebec⁸ committed the party to several important reforms including the following:

- the immediate adoption of a provincial hospital insurance scheme;
- the development of a provincial master plan for highways;
- the development of planning programmes for industrial expansion and the exploitation of natural resources;
- the encouragement of heavy industry to establish in the province "with financial encouragement from the government if necessary";
- the ownership by Quebec Hydro, a public corporation, "of all undeveloped hydro-electric power where it is economically feasible to do so";

- the undertaking of measures to encourage the people of Quebec to invest in the development of the province's natural resources;
- the comprehensive reform of the educational system at all levels.

As well as substantive reforms, the manifesto also committed the party to major changes in the organization of the provincial government. An Economic Planning and Development Council would be established with representatives of labour, industry and the relevant professions to advise the provincial administration on long-range planning. The civil service would be reformed and an independent Civil Service Commission created. A Department of Natural Resources was to be established with wide powers. The existing Department of Industry and Commerce would be given broad authority "to provide industrial development on a regional basis according to an over-all plan." A Department of Cultural Affairs and a Department of Federal-Provincial Relations were to be established.

The pursuit by the Government of Quebec of the policies promised in the 1960 Manifesto and others developed later brought about very different circumstances in the relations between the Quebec and federal authorities, and less directly, between the federal administration and those of the other provinces. In many matters where previously the province of Quebec was inactive, the Lesage government had comprehensive and explicit policies—policies in respect to regional economic development, vocational training, the exploitation of natural resources, cultural affairs (including international cultural relations), the channelling of private savings into provincial economic development and so on. There were new initiatives concerning the establishment of a steel complex, immigration, housing and slum clearance and the creation of a public sector in the mining industry. The federal government was directly or indirectly involved in all these matters. Furthermore, the programme of reform to which the Quebec administration was committed was an extraordinarily costly one and fiscal relations with the federal government became more crucial than before. Thus for the first time the relations between the federal and Quebec governments were not in the traditional terms of centralization versus provincial autonomy. Instead they revolved about specific issues where the objectives of each were not wholly compatible with those of the other.

C. Provincial Economic Interventionism

Quebec was not the only province to begin in the 1960s to develop more comprehensive and aggressive policies concerning economic problems. The developments after the election of the Lesage administration were indeed dramatic, bringing to at least temporary dominance in Quebec those ideas and interests that saw the cultural integrity of French Canada being served by a bold programme of provincial interventionism in economic and other matters. In the other provinces there were, of course, no similar cultural factors at work and no

such spectacular break with the past. The new policies of these provinces were pragmatic responses to what their leaders more or less clearly perceived to be deficiencies in federal policies. The vigour and competence with which these new responsibilities for economic growth and development were assumed varied greatly from province to province. In some provinces interventionism is still at a somewhat embryonic stage. In all of the provinces, however, there was during the early 1960s an increase of governmental activity in respect to industrial and trade development and economic control.

The activities of the Government of Manitoba are an interesting example, although new economic responsibilities have been assumed in a more explicit way in Manitoba than in most of the provinces other than Quebec. In 1961, 42 citizens representing various interests in the province were constituted by the government as the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future. The major responsibility conferred on the committee by order-in-council was to undertake such investigations, studies and programmes of research as were required of the basic industries in the province and of the various physical, financial and social factors which determine the growth, expansion and employment potential of such basic industries.⁹ The order-in-council indicated in general terms how the provincial administration regarded its own responsibilities by stating that such a committee was necessary "to advise the government in the formulation of appropriate policies and measures in respect of the problems of future growth and development of the economy of the Province and of employment in the Province."¹⁰ The committee's report, presented to the government on March 6, 1963, analyzed comprehensively the possibilities of development in all sectors of the Manitoba economy in the following 15 years with a view to creating 75,000 new jobs. It also made specific recommendations as to how such growth could be secured. The committee's view of appropriate provincial action was this: "At the present stage in the Province's development, Government has a prime responsibility in giving incentive to economic activity by providing specialized aids and services that create the atmosphere in which industrialization can proceed. Establishing these conditions is the most important task of Government at the Provincial level in economic development."¹¹

Two months after the committee's report was presented the Manitoba Development Authority was established¹² with the general purpose of "the furthering of the economic development of the province with a view to increasing employment and employment opportunities and raising the standard of living of the people of Manitoba." In more specific terms, the Authority, composed of five cabinet ministers, was to define provincial economic objectives and to coordinate private and public activities in pursuit of these objectives, to design and implement measures for the "promotion of major economic development projects," to take measures to attract investment capital to the province and to work towards the coordination of Manitoba's economic policies with those of the federal government, the other provinces

and the municipalities. The Act also provided for the establishment of a Manitoba economic consultative board to advise the Authority. The board was to consist of a chairman and not more than 10 members, appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, and "representative of the leading members of the economic community." The board was also to include not more than four other members who would be deputy ministers or other officers of Crown agencies and who would serve in an *ex officio* capacity.

In 1962 and 1963 six other provinces appointed consultative bodies on economic policy somewhat along the lines of Manitoba—the Nova Scotia Voluntary Planning Board, the New Brunswick Research and Productivity Council, the Quebec Economic Advisory Council, the Ontario Economic Council, the Saskatchewan Economic Advisory Council and the Alberta Economic and Productivity Council. Most of these bodies were composed of representatives of the major economic interests of the respective provinces and in some cases of government as well. The major responsibility of these agencies was to advise the provincial administrations on ways to promote industrial development and external markets for provincial products.¹³

Provincial economic interventionism has the result of making provincial objectives more explicit concerning matters for which the federal government also assumes responsibility. There is no reason to believe that these objectives of the two levels of government will always or usually be in harmony. The substance of these federal-provincial conflicts is outlined in Chapter VII.

The increasing scope of provincial activity is closely related to the improved quality of the provincial public services. During the war years and well into the 1950s, the balance of bureaucratic competence ran heavily in favour of the federal government. In economic policy and other matters the federal Liberals worked in close harmony with civil servants skilled in the sophisticated formulation and implementation of comprehensive objectives. On the provincial level, there was much less expertise and provincial reactions to federal initiatives were often somewhat amateurish. In recent years, however, the situation has changed. Increasingly, the provinces have attracted the kind of civil servant who is trained in the social sciences and who has the will and the ability to play an active role in the formulation of public policy. This development has been most spectacular in Quebec but is occurring elsewhere as well. Thus in federal-provincial relations the federal government can no longer rely on the superior skill of its own officials vis-à-vis those of the provinces.

D. The Increasing Importance of Provincial Expenditures

Another element in the attenuation of federal dominance is that the proportion of total public expenditures made by provincial and municipal governments has shown a secular increase. It is likely that

Table III.4

Federal and combined provincial-municipal expenditures for selected years

Year	Federal as percentage of total	Provincial-municipal as percentage of total
1926	36.8	63.2
1930	32.0	68.0
1934	31.6	68.4
1938	33.0	67.0
1942	83.5	16.5
1946	72.4	27.6
1950	52.2	47.8
1952	63.4	36.6
1954	61.4	38.6
1956	55.7	44.3
1958	55.8	44.2
1960	51.2	48.8
1962	47.5	52.5
1964	47.4	52.6
1965	46.6	53.4

Source: Report of Federal-Provincial Tax Structure Committee (Ottawa, 1966), 6.

this trend will continue unless rapid increases occur in defence expenditures. Canadians have thus come to look to their provincial and local governments for public amenities that are most important in terms of public expenditures.

E. Summary and Conclusions

A conjuncture of circumstances after the middle of the 1950s destroyed the federal dominance which was established during the Second World War and perpetuated during the subsequent decade. In part, the weakening of federal power and purpose was the result of the deficiencies of federal policies in satisfying the needs of important sections of Canadian society. Federal power was challenged with increasing vigour and competence by provincial governments that became unwilling to play the relatively subordinate role in economic and other matters assigned to them by the New National Policy. The most spectacular aspect of this challenge was embodied in the policies of the leaders of the new Quebec who assumed that the welfare of French-Canada could be ensured only by aggressive provincial policies in social and economic matters. With great variations from province to province, the other provincial administrations also became increasingly interventionist in economic matters and defined their economic and other objectives with more skill and precision than in the past.

It can reasonably be argued that until the present decade Canadian federalism has been sustained because at every period either one level or the other has been relatively immobilist in respect to economic matters. This circumstance has now ceased to exist.

In Chapter I it was argued that a federal system must develop resources of adaptability if it is to survive. A broad distinction was made between "devices of adjustment," the processes by which the distribution of powers, resources and responsibilities are changed as new circumstances arise, and "devices of articulation," the procedures through which the activities of the central and regional governments are related to one another by their respective executives. This chapter analyzes the devices of adjustment in the context of the formal constitutional framework.¹ The devices of adjustment examined here are: constitutional amendment, judicial review, quasi-unitary features of the constitution, federal spending power, particularity of the position of the individual provinces, intergovernmental delegation of powers, and federal emergency and defence powers. The contracting-out procedure is such a unique contribution to the theory and practice of federalism that I thought it worthwhile to give it a chapter to itself.

A. The Confederation Settlement and the Distribution of Powers

The British North America Act of 1867 gave to the federal authorities what were then deemed to be the most important responsibilities of government and the access to the financial resources necessary to wield these powers effectively. Apart from establishing a new constitutional system to break the political deadlock of the United Canadas, the prime objective of the Fathers of Confederation was to create circumstances under which the military defence and economic integration of British North America might be undertaken effectively. So that the economic aims of Confederation might be pursued, the federal Parliament was given those legislative powers not conferred exclusively on the provinces, including powers over trade and commerce, navigation and shipping and various aspects of interprovincial transportation and communication, banking, interest and legal tender, and

copyrights and patents. By confining the provinces to direct taxation, Parliament was given exclusive access to the most lucrative sources of public revenue of the time. In order that the federal authorities might pursue effective developmental policies, the British North America Act provided that if federal and provincial legislation in the concurrent fields of agriculture and immigration should conflict the former would prevail. Section 145 directed that the immediate construction of the railway linking Canada and the Maritimes be undertaken by the federal government and Sections 147 and 148 outlined the circumstances under which the remaining British territories in the northern half of the continent might be admitted into the Dominion. Thus did the division of powers between the federal and provincial authorities contemplate the political and economic integration of British North America.

The highly centralized constitutional order established by the Confederation settlement stopped short of being a unitary state—in the language of the day "a legislative union"—since the B.N.A. Act gave the provinces exclusive jurisdiction over a group of matters of some importance. It is reasonable to assume that the French Canadian leaders were instrumental in securing a federal rather than a unitary constitution. These exclusive provincial powers can be viewed therefore as reflecting areas where differences between the two founding cultures were believed to be most crucial and thus must be wielded exclusively by the Quebec authorities. The most important of these areas related to education, the matters covered by the Civil Code adopted for Lower Canada in 1865, municipal affairs and health and welfare institutions. On the other hand, Quebec leaders of 1867 apparently believed that the sweeping economic powers conferred on the Dominion did not in any way constitute a challenge to the cultural interests of French Canada. Sir E. P. Taché in the Confederation Debates spoke of the resistance of Lower Canada to representation by population under the existing constitution because that would have placed Lower Canada at the mercy of Upper Canada. He argued that this would not occur under the proposed federal constitution:

It would not be so in a Federal Union, for all questions of a general nature would be reserved for the General Government, and those of a local character to the local governments, who would have the power to manage their domestic affairs as they deemed best. If a Federal Union were obtained it would be tantamount to a separation of the provinces, and Lower Canada would thereby preserve its autonomy together with all the institutions it held so dear, and over which they could exercise the watchfulness and surveillance necessary to preserve them unimpaired.²

Similarly, George Étienne Cartier asserted of the projected union: He did not entertain the slightest apprehension that Lower Canada's rights were in the least jeopardized by the provision that in the General Legislature the French Canadians of Lower Canada would have a smaller number of representatives than all the other origins combined. It would be seen by the resolutions that in the questions which would be submitted to the General

Parliament there could be no danger to the rights and privileges of either French Canadian, Scotchmen, Englishmen or Irishmen. Questions of commerce, of international communications and all matters of general interest, would be discussed and determined in the General Legislature; but in the exercise of the functions of the General Government, no one could apprehend that anything could be enacted which would harm or do injustice to persons of any nationality.³

For the English Canadian side, the expectations of both A. T. Galt⁴ and George Brown⁵ were much like those of Cartier and Taché. The broad division of governmental powers between the Dominion and the provinces would make easily compatible the effective economic integration of British North America and the cessation of cultural strife which had poisoned and paralyzed the constitutional system of the Province of Canada.

The British North America Act thus provided for a highly centralized union in two ways:

First, *what were then* the most important public responsibilities and the most important sources of public revenues were given to the Dominion rather than the provinces.

Second, the federal authorities were given quasi-unitary powers to intervene directly in matters otherwise within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the provinces—the powers of reservation and disallowance of provincial legislation and powers under Section 92 10 (c) to bring provincial "works" under federal jurisdiction and to protect the rights of certain denominational schools.

The original distribution of legislative powers, revenue resources and functional responsibilities, however, did not preclude the later development of a much less centralized federal system than the Fathers of Confederation considered appropriate. In some periods in the past century the most important public functions have been those within provincial rather than federal jurisdiction. The distribution of legislative powers and revenue sources set out in the B.N.A. Act was subject to judicial interpretation which could, and would, enhance the scope of activity of the provinces as against the Dominion. Finally, the quasi-unitary devices were to be used at the discretion of the federal authorities and the extent of their use depended entirely on the judgment of the federal executive and Parliament.

B. Constitutional Amendment

The most explicit kind of adjustment in a federal system is one altering the text of the constitution to reallocate particular legislative powers between the federal and regional governments. In Canada, as in most other established federations, this kind of adaptation has proved difficult to effect. Since 1867 there have been only three constitutional amendments altering the respective legislative powers

of Parliament and the provinces—that of 1940 giving the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over unemployment insurance and those of 1951 and 1964 conferring on Parliament concurrent jurisdiction with the provinces in the fields of old age pensions and of survivors' benefits in a proposed federal contributory pension programme respectively. All three amendments were effected only after the federal government had obtained the approval of all the provinces and each change involved the transfer to the federal authorities of costly responsibilities in the field of welfare. Barring a basic re-drafting of the existing constitution, it is unlikely that constitutional amendment will emerge as an important device of adjustment, with the possible exception of future transfers of legislative power to Parliament in respect to very expensive provincial functions.⁶

C. Judicial Review

In Canada, as in other federal systems, evolving patterns of judicial review have proved to be more important than constitutional amendment in changing the distribution of legislative powers. There is a vast literature of analysis and commentary on judicial review of the division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces under the British North America Act⁷ and it would be impossible in a study such as this to review even in outline this aspect of Canadian constitutional development. There is general agreement that from the late nineteenth century onward the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: 1) restricted the powers of Parliament by giving a restrictive interpretation of its authority to enact legislation in respect to the "Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada" and to "Trade and Commerce"; and 2) enlarged the scope of provincial activity to legislate exclusively in respect to "Property and Civil Rights" and to "Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province."⁸ In 1938 F. R. Scott made a summary of the additions to provincial and Dominion powers made by judicial interpretation. To a very large extent these accretions are still operative in the Canadian constitution.

Dominion Additions

1. Liquor control (in small part).
2. Sunday observance.
3. Interprovincial telephones.
4. Labour contracts on Dominion undertakings.
5. Radio broadcasting.
6. Aeronautics.
7. Criminal trade practices.
8. Dominion companies cannot have their capacity destroyed by provincial laws.
9. Customs dues leviable on the importation of provincial crown property.
10. Farmers-Creditors Arrangements.
11. Trade and Industry Commission.

Provincial Additions

1. Treaty legislation upon any subject belonging to the Provinces.
2. Regulation of intra-provincial trade.
3. Regulation of intra-provincial marketing.
4. Regulation of intra-provincial production.
5. Regulation of intra-provincial prices.
6. Wages control.
7. Hours of labour by day or by week.
8. Weekly day of rest.
9. Unemployment insurance.
10. Workmen's compensation.
11. Health regulations.
12. Trades Union laws.
13. Industrial disputes.
14. Liquor control (in large part).
15. Insurance laws.
16. Control of security sales: "blue sky" laws.
17. Right to create companies with power to act outside the Province.
18. Taxing power extended to taxes on consumption and sales.
19. Escheats.
20. Ownership of Indian lands and beds of navigable rivers.
21. "Property and Civil Rights" over-rides Dominion residuary clause except in extreme emergency.⁹

Since the end of the Second World War judicial review has assumed a much more limited role in determining the respective legislative powers of federal and provincial governments. There are many fewer judicial challenges than in the past to the validity of federal and provincial legislation.¹⁰ The most spectacular disputes between the federal and provincial governments have been resolved by means other than judicial interpretation, for example, the issue of fiscal powers between the Quebec and federal governments in 1954, Newfoundland's financial rights under the terms of union, and the long dispute between the federal and British Columbia administrations about hydro-electric development. Prime Minister Pearson on December 31, 1964 announced that the question of ownership of offshore mineral rights was being submitted to the Supreme Court of Canada for decision. This announcement came after several years of fruitless negotiation about the matter between the federal government and the provinces concerned. Even in taking this action, Prime Minister Pearson made it clear that a judicial decision did not lessen the necessity of subsequent federal-provincial negotiations about offshore rights. On the basis of the declining role of the judiciary in delimiting the powers of the two levels, J. A. Corry asserted in 1959 that "The courts are retiring, or being retired, from their posts as the supervisors of the (federal) balance."¹¹ Corry attributed this trend to developments outside the judiciary itself. According to his explanation, the tradition of judicial review of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, by restricting the powers of Parliament and enlarging those of the provinces, had caused those concerned with finding ways

of taking national action to meet national needs to try to "turn the flank of the constitutional obstacles." The new methods for accomplishing this lay in the exercise of the federal spending power and in the various forms of federal-provincial collaboration. Further, neither the provinces nor the big business interests seemed now disposed to support judicial challenges to the validity of federal legislation as they had done in the past.

It seems plausible that the failure to resolve federal-provincial disputes by resort to judicial interpretation has a cumulative quality, that the absence of such interpretation over the years leads to increasingly wider areas of uncertainty about what the courts would do if asked to rule on particular exercises of federal or provincial powers. In such circumstances individuals and governments may well be inhibited from resorting to the judicial process. At the end of the Federal-Provincial Conference of March 1964 Premier Lesage made a press statement that his government was prepared to seek its rights through the courts. This was widely interpreted as a direct challenge to Canadian federalism because it revealed the Quebec leader's extreme impatience with the workings of the procedures of intergovernmental consultation. It also gave the other governments involved cause for concern as it was reasonable to believe that many established arrangements were vulnerable to judicial challenge.

A combination of circumstances thus indicates that judicial review will probably play a relatively minor role in federal-provincial relations in the foreseeable future. Most of the major issues between the federal and provincial governments seem not to be susceptible to judicial resolution. Business interests are less disposed than in the past to support judicial challenges to federal power. The machinery of intergovernmental consultation is becoming increasingly institutionalized and legitimized. The other "devices of adjustment" analyzed in this chapter offer alternative possibilities for constitutional adaptation. Judicial review results in a delineation of federal and provincial powers where the perceived needs of the federal system are for a more effective articulation of these powers. In general, the prospects are remote that the the courts will resume a major role as keepers of the federal balance.

D. The Quasi-Unitary Features of the Constitution

The Confederation settlement gave the federal authorities powers to intervene unilaterally on matters otherwise within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the provinces.

1. Under Section 93 (applied later to Manitoba, Prince Edward Island, Alberta and Saskatchewan as these entered the Dominion as provinces) the federal authorities were given powers to protect the rights of denominational schools existing at the time of Confederation or subsequently established.

2. Under Section 95 both Parliament and the provinces might enact legislation in respect to agriculture and immigration but any provincial enactment in these fields was operative only so long as it was not "repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada."

3. Under Section 92, 10 (c) Parliament might declare any "work" wholly within a province to be "for the general advantage of Canada or for the advantage of two or more of the Provinces" and thus bring the "work" within federal jurisdiction.

4. Under Sections 55 and 90 the governor-in-council might disallow any provincial bill within a year after its enactment and the lieutenant-governors of the provinces might reserve provincial bills for the consideration of the cabinet with such reserved legislation being inoperative in the absence of positive action by that body.

What we have called the quasi-unitary features of the constitution have not in the past two decades been significant in the evolution of Canadian federalism.

1. The federal authorities have only once—in 1896—exercised their powers to protect the rights of denominational schools under the provisions of Section 93 and the resolution of the matter at hand was later made through an agreement between the Manitoba and the new federal administration. The provisions of Section 93 dealing with federal protection of denominational rights in education can thus be said to be a dead letter.

2. In only two important circumstances in the period since the Second World War has Section 92, 10 (c) been used to bring significant provincial matters within federal jurisdiction. This provision was employed in the Atomic Energy Control Act¹² of 1946 to bring under federal control the production and use of atomic energy and the production and refining of certain substances from which atomic energy was made as well as research into such matters. The National Capital Act¹³ of 1958 declared that all works of the Federal District Commission were to be for the general advantage of Canada. Apart from these two instances, this section has been used only in private bills to bring certain local railway companies and bridges under federal jurisdiction.

3. The last provincial statute disallowed by the federal Executive was a 1943 Alberta enactment prohibiting the sale of land in the province to Hutterites and enemy aliens for the duration of the war. The disallowance power appears to be in abeyance, at least temporarily.¹⁴ During the last two decades successive federal governments have been requested by influential groups to disallow such controversial legislation as the Saskatchewan Mineral Taxation Act of 1944, the Quebec Freedom of Worship Act of 1954 and enactments of Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and British Columbia restricting certain trade union activities. In explaining his government's refusal to disallow Newfoundland labour legislation enacted in 1959 Prime Minister Diefenbaker gave a narrow definition of the grounds upon which, according

to his understanding of the evolving conventions of the constitution, disallowance might appropriately be used: "Whatever one's feelings with respect to legislation passed by provincial legislatures may be, however much one may dislike it, the gradual development has been that the federal government, through the Governor-General in Council, does not exercise that power where there is on the face of it an apparent conformity with the legislative authority of the legislature which passes it."¹⁵

A somewhat less restrictive interpretation of the grounds for disallowance was contained in a federal order-in-council validating a Saskatchewan bill of 1960 which had been reserved by the Lieutenant-Governor of the province: "And whereas it is the established policy in these matters to consider first the question of whether the bill is within the competence of the legislature to enact and second the question of whether it is in conflict with national policy or interest, and if these two questions be resolved favourably, to recommend that assent be given unless the bill is otherwise objectionable."¹⁶

There are no legal limitations to the federal cabinet's authority to disallow provincial statutes, apart from the requirements that the federal veto must be exercised within one year after a bill's enactment by a province and that this power must be used against such enactment in its entirety. It is impossible to predict with any certainty the way in which this device may be employed in the future. The traditions which seem to be in the making, however, call into question the appropriateness of disallowance except under circumstances where an enactment is perceived by the federal cabinet to be clearly outside the legislative competence of a province or where some very fundamental federal objective is directly challenged. It seems also that the use of disallowance in any but the most unusual circumstances would almost inevitably inhibit the kinds of federal-provincial collaboration that are necessary if the federal system is to operate in a tolerably effective manner.

The evolving traditions in respect to reservation parallel those of disallowance. In the spring of 1961 the Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan, Frank L. Bastedo, reserved a provincial act relating to mineral contracts.¹⁷ Mr. Bastedo had not consulted with the federal cabinet prior to the action and later a federal order-in-council was enacted validating the provincial statute. The statements of Prime Minister Diefenbaker in the House of Commons made plain that the federal government believed that the Lieutenant-Governor had acted outside of the conventions of the constitution. The Prime Minister asserted that the government was considering authorizing instructions to the lieutenant-governors that provincial bills should be reserved only upon direction from the federal cabinet, although these instructions appear not to have been issued. As is the case with disallowance, reservation appears to be in abeyance, temporarily at least.

In summary, the quasi-unitary features of the British North America Act have not in the past two decades been extensively used to enhance

the position of the federal government at the expense of the provinces. The exercise of these powers in most cases involves direct challenges to the provincial administrations concerned. Although one cannot with assurance predict the circumstances under which these powers will be wielded, their exercise will almost inevitably inhibit what have come to be regarded as the necessary conditions of constructive federal-provincial relations.

E. The Federal Spending Power

In Canada as in other federations it has become increasingly common for the federal government to give financial support to activities within the legislative jurisdiction of the regional administrations. Characteristically, those who receive such payments—individuals, private associations, local authorities and state or provincial governments—must meet the conditions of eligibility determined by the federal authorities.¹⁸ The widespread use of this device has permitted the federal government to involve itself in a large number of matters otherwise outside its jurisdiction.

The limits of the federal spending power in the Canadian constitution have never been judicially determined with any precision. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in declaring invalid the federal Employment and Social Insurance Act of 1935 declared:

That the Dominion may impose taxation for the purpose of creating a fund for special purposes, and may apply that fund for making contributions in the public interest to individuals, corporations or public authorities, could not as a general proposition be denied. . . . But assuming that the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund, it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within Dominion competence.

It may still be legislation affecting the classes of subjects enumerated in Section 92, and, if so, would be ultra vires. In other words, Dominion legislation, even though it deals with Dominion property, may yet be so framed as to invade civil rights within the Province, or encroach upon the classes of subjects which are reserved to Provincial competence. It is not necessary that it should be a colourable device, or a pretence. If on the true view of the legislation it is found that in reality in pith and substance the legislation invades civil rights within the Province, or in respect of other classes of subjects otherwise encroaches upon the provincial field, the legislation will be invalid. To hold otherwise would afford the Dominion an easy passage into the provincial domain. . . .¹⁹

By upholding the "general proposition" that Parliament might tax and spend as it chose and at the same time qualifying the power with imprecisely worded restrictions, the 1937 decision did little to clarify the limits of the federal spending power. Federal policy-makers seem to have taken this decision to mean that federal authorities are

precluded from supporting activities within provincial jurisdiction wholly or partly from the proceeds of a levy made explicitly for these purposes. Thus in 1950, when the federal government decided to finance the projected Old Age Security pensions from three special taxes, a constitutional amendment was sought and secured to give Parliament concurrent jurisdiction with the provinces in that field. No amendment was believed necessary, however, in 1944 when provision was made for family allowances financed wholly from the general revenues of the Dominion.

In 1957 the Exchequer Court of Canada upheld the validity of the federal Family Allowance Act.²⁰ F. A. Angers had claimed deductions on his federal income tax as if his children did not qualify for family allowances although they were so eligible. The court refused to accept Angers' claim for such deductions. Professor Bora Laskin has said that this decision "... lends emphasis to the view that the courts have no concern with the disbursement of federal funds which have been validly raised."²¹

Commentators on the Canadian constitution have defended on two grounds the exercise of the federal spending power in respect to matters within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. First, it has been justified under Parliament's jurisdiction enumerated in Section 91 (1) of the B.N.A. Act to legislate in respect to "The Public Debt and Property."²² Second, it has been claimed that under British parliamentary traditions the prerogative power permits the Crown to disburse as it chooses subject only to prior parliamentary authorization.²³ However, there has been no definite determination of this matter by the courts. L. M. Gouin and Brooke Claxton undertook a detailed examination study of the spending power as part of their investigation for the Rowell-Sirois Commission²⁴ and their conclusions would lead one to doubt the constitutional validity of several existing programmes of federal expenditures on matters within provincial jurisdiction.

The exercise of the federal spending power has been the chief mechanism by which the influence of the federal government has been enhanced vis-à-vis the provinces in the past two decades. The nature and extent of such federal involvement through conditional grants to the provinces and local authorities will be analyzed in Chapter VI. Federal financial assistance has been made available to individuals and non-governmental associations in such diverse forms as family allowances, per capita grants to universities, and grants-in-aid of cultural and athletic activities. The federal power to spend is also interpreted as encompassing the federal power to lend to governments or to private individuals and groups or to guarantee loans made for purposes specified by the federal authorities. Since Canada's constitutional system has proven relatively resistant to change through amendment or evolving patterns of judicial review, important readjustments in the relative roles of the federal and provincial governments have come to be effected in two main ways—through the exercise of federal power to spend on objects within provincial legislative

jurisdiction and through the concomitant of this power, that the federal authorities may determine the conditions under which such financial benefits will be conferred.

The use of the spending power results in a situation where the sharing of the financial burdens and functional responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments is affected in many important matters by policy decisions of the federal authorities, acting either unilaterally or in collaboration with the provinces, without reference to the constitutional delineation of legislative powers under Sections 91-95 of the British North America Act. For the most part, the B.N.A. Act and its subsequent interpretation by the courts relate to the regulatory activities of government rather than to the provision of services. There is a large body of judicial decision defining the respective legislative powers of Parliament and the provinces in such spheres as the regulation of insurance, agricultural marketing, the incorporation of companies, the control over trade and transportation, and industrial relations. The courts have pronounced relatively little, however, about the limits of federal involvement in health, welfare and education either through (a) direct financial assistance to provinces, local authorities, private groups and individuals; or (b) the exercise of federal ancillary powers concerning such federal responsibilities as Indian affairs, immigration, defence and penitentiaries.

The distribution of legislative powers under the B.N.A. Act as judicially interpreted has, however, a significant effect on the way in which the federal power to spend is exercised. In general terms, federal control through financial assistance to an activity within provincial legislative jurisdiction proceeds through indirection. The federal authorities provide financial inducements for those eligible — provincial or local governments, private individuals or groups — to conform to federal conditions, but refusal to do so is not an offence under federal law. Further, in such matters, the federal authorities often accomplish their objectives through the collaboration of private groups, local authorities or provincial governments rather than by the direct action of their own administrative agencies.

The exercise of the federal spending power has been a device making for both stability and change in the Canadian constitutional system. This device has made a stable division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces compatible with evolving expectations about the appropriate roles of each. It is reasonable to believe that had the federal government been confined to matters within its legislative jurisdiction there would have been strong pressures in the period after the Second World War to effect major changes through constitutional amendment or delegation. The evolution of the contracting-out device to be used in combination with the spending power offers yet a new dimension to flexibility under the existing constitution.²⁵

A related question concerns the constitutional limits, if any, of the power of a province to expend funds on matters outside its legislative jurisdiction. There are no such limits according to the argument of F. R. Scott that "making a gift is not the same as making a law" and that the Crown may spend as it chooses after appropriate authorization by the legislature.²⁶ In the past, the government of Quebec has from time to time made grants for educational and cultural activities outside provincial boundaries and the establishment in 1963 of a Service du Canada français d'outre frontières in the Department of Cultural Affairs indicates that provincial policy is to increase this kind of assistance. Like federal spending power, this matter has not had definitive judicial interpretation.

F. The Particularity of the Position of the Individual Provinces

One of the more distinctive features of the law and practice of Canadian federalism is that the relations between the federal government and the individual provinces vary. This differentiation was defined in the British North America Act of 1867 and continued by the circumstances under which the later six provinces entered Confederation. With the exception of Alberta and Saskatchewan (which were established in 1905 under almost identical legislation) no province is, in a constitutional sense, precisely "comme les autres."²⁷ These particularities in law have been combined with the willingness of the federal authorities, since Confederation, to meet the special needs of particular provinces and groups of provinces. The resulting situation gives the federal system resources of flexibility it would not otherwise have.

Like other politicians in the British parliamentary tradition those responsible for the British North America Act of 1867 made no clear-cut distinction between fundamental constitutional law and other kinds of statutory provisions. The Act thus contained not only what one can reasonably regard as the constitution of the new Dominion, including the constitutions of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec which it created, but also a large number of transitional measures to effect the establishment of the new federation. The most characteristically federal features of the Act (Sections 91, 92, 93 and 95), conferring their respective legislative authority on Parliament and the provinces, applied equally to Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. However, five important provisions elsewhere in the Act gave recognition to the particularity of Quebec.

1. In Quebec alone of the provinces English and French had equal official status in the proceedings and records of the legislature and in the courts in the province established either by the Dominion or Quebec (Section 133).

2. It was provided that with the consent of the common-law provinces *i.e.* those other than Quebec, the Parliament of Canada might make provision for the uniformity of any or all laws related to

property and civil rights (Section 94). If this section had been implemented, as was apparently expected by the Fathers of Confederation, there would have resulted a significantly different distribution of legislative powers between the Quebec legislature and Parliament than prevailed in respect to the other provinces.

3. It was provided that Senators from Quebec should either hold the qualifications of \$4,000 in unencumbered real property within one of the 24 electoral divisions outlined in the Act and from which they were chosen or be a resident of such division (Section 23,6). Apart from Quebec it was provided only that a Senator be a resident of the province from which he was appointed.

4. It was provided that in 12 electoral divisions sending members to the legislative assembly of Quebec the boundaries could not be altered without the concurrence of a majority of the members of those districts specified in the Second Schedule of the Act (Section 80).

5. It was provided that judges of the courts of Quebec should be selected from the bar of that province (Section 98). There was no such provision in respect to the other provinces.

The complex financial settlement enacted in Sections 102 to 124 of the B.N.A. Act provided for varying patterns of financial relations between the original provinces and the Dominion.

The differentiated position was extended as new provinces entered Confederation.

1. Under Section 30 of the Manitoba Act of 1870, Section 21 of the Saskatchewan Act of 1905 and Section 21 of the Alberta Act of 1905, Crown lands of these provinces were to be administered by the Dominion. This situation lasted until 1930 when the Prairie provinces had these lands brought under their control.

2. Under the Schedule of the Imperial Order-in-Council admitting Prince Edward Island to the Dominion in 1873 the federal government accepted permanent responsibilities for

Efficient Steam Service for the conveyance of mails and passengers, to be established and maintained between the Island and the Mainland of the Dominion, Winter and Summer, thus placing the Island in continuous communication with the Intercolonial Railway and the railway system of the Dominion.

The maintenance of telegraphic communication between the Island and the Mainland of the Dominion; . . .²⁸

3. Section 17 of the Terms of Union with Newfoundland enacted as federal legislation in 1949 provided for the protection of denominational rights in the Newfoundland school system differently than did Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act applying to the other provinces. According to the 1949 provision the Legislature of Newfoundland was denied the authority to make laws "prejudicially affecting any right or privilege with respect to denominational schools, common (amalgamated) schools, or denominational colleges" existing at the time of Union.

These institutions are to receive funds voted by the legislature on a non-discriminatory basis. Although these denominational privileges are broader than those under Section 93, and the definition of prejudicial provincial action more specific, the Terms of Union did not give the federal executive and Parliament any powers to protect the rights of an aggrieved minority and such an appeal must thus be directed to the courts.

One of the major themes of the tangled history of federal-provincial financial relations has been the willingness of the federal government to accede to the needs and pressures of individual provinces or groups of provinces. The process was begun in 1869 when the federal authorities moved away from the financial provisions which were specified in the B.N.A. Act to be "in full Settlement of all future demands on Canada" to meet the exigencies of Nova Scotia.²⁹ Since that time the financial relationships between the federal government and the provinces have remained stubbornly resistant to any general rationale. On three occasions—in 1907, 1941 and 1945-46—federal governments have attempted to arrive at a stable financial settlement with the provinces. On the latter two occasions the suggested financial terms were related to comprehensive reallocations of functional responsibilities between the two levels. None of these attempts was successful and although since 1947 the general principle of equalization has been established the federal government has continued to respond positively on occasion to the needs of particular provinces. In the last 30 years also, successive federal administrations have taken measures to mitigate the particular difficulties of the Prairie and Atlantic provinces. Since the establishment of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Administration in 1935, the federal authorities have participated in a series of programmes with the Prairie provinces specifically designed to aid western agriculture, including various *ad hoc* measures such as those to move fodder into drought areas, the compensation of farmers for unharvested crops, and studies undertaken under the auspices of the Federal-Provincial Prairie Provinces Water Board. The difficulties of the Atlantic provinces have been recognized in such federal policies as those related to the Maritime Marshland Development Programme begun in 1948, the activities of the Atlantic Provinces Power Development Programme since 1958 and the unconditional subsidies paid since 1958-59 as Atlantic Provinces Adjustment Grants. Over the years also, the federal government has been willing to share with individual provinces the financial responsibilities for particular capital works including among many others the South Saskatchewan River Development project, the St. Mary's, Bow River and Eastern Irrigation projects in Alberta, the Metro Toronto Conservation Programme and Expo 1967. In general then, federal-provincial financial and administrative relations have been characterized from the first by a differentiation between the various provinces and groups of provinces.

Several other actual or projected procedures involve some recognition of the particularity of the provinces:

1. The delegation of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces both under the existing conditions and the terms of the so-called Fulton-Favreau formula provides possibilities for provincial differentiation.

2. The contracting-out device as it relates both to conditional grant programmes and to wholly federal programmes makes possible a different sharing of financial and administrative responsibilities between the federal government and those provinces that choose to participate and those that do not.

3. It is possible that in the future more explicit recognition will be given to the more populous provinces in the making of certain kinds of decisions.

- a) The federal enactment of 1965 setting up the Canada Pension Plan provides that any future federal enactment changing certain basic features of the Plan shall not be proclaimed to be in effect until after consent has been secured from the lieutenant-governor-in-council of at least two thirds of the included provinces having at least two thirds of the population of the included provinces.
- b) The Fulton-Favreau formula for constitutional amendment provides that certain amendments can be made only with the consent of Parliament and that of two thirds of the provinces having at least 50 per cent of the population of Canada. Those amendments relate in general to the structure and functioning of the federal executive and legislature.

In summary, the law and practice of the Canadian constitutional system provide for many kinds of differentiation between the positions of individual provinces and groups of provinces in their relations with the federal government. This tradition has provided a major resource of adaptability in the Canadian federal system.

G. The Intergovernmental Delegation of Powers

An alternative to the redistribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces through constitutional amendment or changing patterns of judicial review is the intergovernmental delegation of powers by the mutual consent of the governments concerned. Under the delegation procedure some or all provinces would confer certain powers on Parliament or agencies operating under federal legislation. Alternatively, federal powers might be wielded by provincial legislatures or provincial executive agencies. Many students of the Canadian constitution have believed delegation to be particularly appropriate to the regulatory activities of government where the constitutional division of legislative powers sometimes makes effective public control difficult or impossible and where the sharing of responsibilities through the grant-in-aid device is not feasible.

Section 94 of the British North America Act of 1867 contemplated the early assimilation of the body of legislation relating to "Property and Civil Rights" in the provinces other than Quebec. It was expected that, by provincial agreement, uniform federal law related to these matters would replace the enactments of the individual legislatures in provinces with a common law tradition. This section has never become operative although from time to time constitutional specialists have suggested that it be used to overcome what they regard as an impasse in the division of legislative powers.

The Rowell-Sirois Commission recommended that constitutional provision be made for the intergovernmental delegation of legislative powers as a device for

over-coming . . . the difficulties which arise from the division between the provinces and the Dominion of legislative powers over many complex economic activities. . . . Such a power of delegation would give the constitution a flexibility which might be very desirable. With the present degree of economic integration on a national scale it is extremely difficult for either the Dominion or a province to frame legislation which will deal separately and effectively with the local or with the inter-provincial aspects of business activity as the case may be.³⁰

The Commission suggested that delegation might be useful in respect to the marketing of agricultural products, the control of fisheries, industrial disputes and the regulation of insurance companies.³¹ However, it was recognized as very doubtful that such delegation might validly be effected under the existing constitution.³²

The postwar decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have clarified the present constitutional position of delegation.³³ Essentially this position is that neither Parliament nor a provincial legislature may delegate any of its legislative powers to the other but that either might so delegate to a body subordinate to the other.

At present delegation is used under two federal enactments to confer federal powers on provincial agencies:

1. Section 2 (1) of the Agricultural Products Marketing Act enacted in 1949 reads:

(1) The Governor-in-Council may by order grant authority to any board or agency authorized under the law of any province to exercise powers of regulation in relation to the marketing of any agricultural product locally within the province, to regulate the marketing of such agricultural product outside the province in interprovincial and export trade and for such purposes to exercise all or any powers like the powers exercisable by such board or agency in relation to the marketing of such agricultural product locally within the province.

(2) The Governor-in-Council may by order revoke any authority granted under subsection one.

At the end of 1964 the governor-in-council had delegated powers in extra-provincial trade to 36 marketing boards operating under

provincial legislation. In such actions the federal authorities do not attempt to influence boards in the various provinces to make their regulations uniform but simply act to give their regulations extra-provincial effect.

2. In 1954 Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicle Transport Act³⁴ to make the regulations of provincial motor transport boards operative in respect to extra-provincial traffic. In the case of *Winner v. S.M.T. (Eastern Ltd.) and A.-G.N.B.*,³⁵ decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1951, the validity of provincial regulation of such traffic was denied. After the decision the federal government apparently concluded that it was inappropriate to enact a system of extra-provincial motor transport regulation itself. At the end of 1964 the powers of extra-provincial regulation had been extended by order-in-council to the motor vehicle transport boards of all the provinces except Newfoundland. Although the power has never been exercised, Section 5 of the Act provides that "The Governor-in-Council may exempt any person or the whole or any part of an extra-provincial undertaking or any extra-provincial motor transport from any or all of the provisions of this Act."

The Fulton-Favreau formula provides a procedure which would permit the mutual inter-delegation between Parliament and the provinces of the authority to enact particular pieces of legislation within the other's competence. The relevant sections of the draft bill agreed upon by the federal and provincial governments in 1964 read as follows:

94A. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this or in any other Act, the Parliament of Canada may make laws in relation to any matters coming within the classes of subjects enumerated in classes (6), (10), (13) and (16) of Section 92 of this Act, but no statute enacted under the authority of this subsection shall have effect in any province unless the legislature of that province has consented to the operation of such a statute in that province.

(2) The Parliament of Canada shall not have authority to enact a statute under Subsection (1) of this section unless

(a) prior to the enactment thereof the legislatures of at least four of the provinces have consented to the operation of such a statute as provided in that subsection, or

(b) it is declared by the Parliament of Canada that the Government of Canada has consulted with the governments of all the provinces, and that the enactment of the statute is of concern to fewer than four of the provinces and the provinces so declared to be concerned have under the authority of their legislatures consented to the enactment of such a statute.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this or in any other Act, the legislature of a province may make laws in the province in relation to any matter coming within the legislative jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada.

(4) No statute enacted by a province under the authority of Subsection (3) of this section shall have effect unless

- (a) prior to the enactment thereof the Parliament of Canada has consented to the enactment of such a statute by the legislature of that province, and
- (b) a similar statute has under the authority of Subsection (3) of this section been enacted by the legislatures of at least three other provinces.

(5) The Parliament of Canada or the legislature of a province may make laws for imposition of punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for enforcing any law made by it under the authority of this section.

(6) A consent given under this section may at any time be revoked, and

- (a) if a consent given under Subsection (1) or (2) of this section is revoked, any law made by the Parliament of Canada to which such consent relates that is operative in the province in which the consent is revoked shall thereupon cease to have effect in that province, but the revocation of the consent does not affect the operation of that law in any other province, and

- (b) if a consent given under Subsection (4) of this section is revoked, any law made by the legislature of a province to which the consent relates shall thereupon cease to have effect.

(7) The Parliament of Canada may repeal any law made by it under the authority of this section, in so far as it is part of the law of one or more provinces, but if any repeal under the authority of this subsection does not relate to all the provinces in which that law is operative, the repeal does not affect the operation of that law in any province to which the repeal does not relate.

(8) The legislature of a province may repeal any law made by it under the authority of this section, but the repeal under the authority of this subsection of any law does not affect the operation in any other province of any law enacted by that province under the authority of this section.³⁶

The discussions on the amending procedure prior to federal-provincial agreement on the proposed formula in 1964 indicate that the delegation provisions are a means of getting around the relatively inflexible method of amending the constitution as it relates to the division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces. It is, however, impossible to predict the extent that the delegation procedure would be used if the projected amending formula became operative.

H. The Federal Emergency and Defence Powers

It is a truism of Canadian constitutional law that since the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the *Local*

Prohibition case of 1896 the courts have followed a restrictive interpretation of the general powers of Parliament to legislate in respect to the "Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada" in respect to all matters not assigned exclusively to the provinces. In the broadest of terms, the federal authorities have few opportunities, apart from circumstances related to international hostilities, to extend their jurisdiction to matters otherwise within provincial control on the justification that the subject in question has become of urgent and country-wide importance and thus within the general powers of Parliament under the opening sentence of Section 91. The validity of this statement is not in any significant way qualified by a contradictory trend of judicial decisions beginning with *Russell v. The Queen* in 1882 which would give a less restrictive interpretation to the federal residual power.

In Canada as in other federations the normal distribution of legislative powers between the federal and the regional governments does not operate when the country is engaged in full-scale international hostilities. The constitutional justification for this overriding of provincial powers has been the opening words of Section 91 allowing the federal Parliament to make laws in respect to the "Peace, Order and Good Government" of Canada. There is no incompatibility between the necessities of defence and the long-run survival of federal institutions if emergency powers are invoked only when the country is fully committed to international conflict and if the normal practices of federalism are restored within a short time after such hostilities end. More difficulties arise when emergency powers are exercised (a) after an international conflict is ended in fact, if not in law, to permit the federal government to deal with economic and other dislocations attributed to the war; (b) in periods of acute international tension short of full-scale hostilities. The continuing state of international crisis in which we all live and the nature of modern mobilization on either a partial or a total basis make the normal workings of federalism particularly vulnerable to international developments and the views of the federal authorities about whether such developments require an extension of federal legislative powers.

The War Measures Act enacted by Parliament in 1914 provided that "the Governor-in-Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existence of real or apprehended war, invasion or insurrection, deem necessary for the security, defence, peace, order, and welfare of Canada." Among the powers which might be exercised by Parliament and which were enumerated in the Act were those over "trading, exportation, production and manufacture" and "appropriation, control, forfeiture, and disposition of property or of the use thereof." The Act also provided that the issue of a proclamation by the Governor-in-Council should be conclusive evidence of the existence of a state of emergency.

Most of the orders and regulations made under the War Measures Act were repealed from January 1, 1920 under an order-in-council of

Décember 20, 1919. From this repeal were excluded, among other specific orders, those related to the control of paper which were to remain in force until the end of another session of Parliament. In *Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Ltd.*³⁷ the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1923 upheld the power of the federal government to continue the controls over paper after the actual hostilities had ceased but "while the effects of war conditions were still operative." The impact of this decision was to give constitutional justification to the federal government's actions in overriding provincial legislative powers to facilitate the transition to peacetime conditions after both the First and Second World Wars and to confer on the federal authorities a wide measure of discretion in determining when conditions were appropriate to the restoration of the normal workings of federal institutions.

The War Measures Act was never repealed and was proclaimed in effect on the outbreak of war in 1939. The sweeping powers conferred on the governor-in-council, enumerated in a sense by other wartime legislation such as the Department of Munitions and Supply Act and The National Resources Mobilization Act, provided the legal basis for federal action towards a more complete mobilization of resources than had been effected in the previous conflict. In the fall of 1945 the government introduced into Parliament the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act³⁸ which read in part:

. . . The Governor-in-Council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may, by reason of the continued existence of the national emergency arising out of the war against Germany and Japan, deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of . . .

(b) facilitating the readjustment of industry and commerce to the requirements of the community in time of peace;

(c) maintaining, controlling and regulating supplies and services, prices, transportation, use and occupation of property, rentals, employment, salaries and wages to ensure economic stability and an orderly transition to conditions of peace; . . .

(e) continuing or discontinuing in an orderly manner, as the emergency permits, measures adopted during and by reason of the war.

It was clear both by the government's sponsorship of this enactment and by policy statements made by its leaders at the end of the war that federal emergency powers would be used to effect an orderly transition to peacetime conditions and that the federal authorities would themselves determine the tempo of decontrol and the restoration of the normal division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces.

The government did not invoke the War Measures Act during the Korean conflict. However, certain federal emergency powers were wielded under the Essential Materials (Defence) Act of 1950 and the Emergency Powers and the Defence Production Acts of 1951. During the debate on the former legislation, the Minister of Justice defended

somewhat obliquely the overriding of provincial jurisdiction as an exercise of federal powers over trade and commerce and over defence.³⁹ The constitutional validity of these enactments was never tested in the courts. In the House of Commons in 1951 Stanley Knowles outlined concisely the ambiguities of the Canadian constitution as it related to emergency powers:

. . . at the risk of getting into paths where only lawyers should tread I should like to comment on the situation that seems to be developing with respect to the constitutional basis on which we are proceeding in this country. It seems to me that there are three different bases on which we operate. We have the normal situation, although heaven knows when we are going to get back to it, when our constitution is the British North America Act. Then we have the completely abnormal situation which wartime creates when our effective constitution becomes the War Measures Act. Then we have this third stage that comes in between, which is neither a normal time when we are governed by the British North America Act nor an abnormal time when the War Measures Act gives the federal government all powers. We have this in-between stage when Parliament declares an emergency and gives certain powers to the federal government, even though those powers may override the British North America Act.⁴⁰

A related uncertainty is that the courts have never authoritatively defined the limits of Section 91 (7) of the British North America Act which confers upon Parliament the exclusive authority to legislate in respect to "militia, military and naval service and defence." It is possible that this power might validly have been invoked to justify widespread federal intervention in matters normally within the jurisdiction of the provinces in support of what Bora Laskin has called "cold war federal policies in the economic field."⁴¹ In 1951, F. R. Scott suggested tentatively that in the prolonged and perhaps permanent state of international unrest, "It may be that the one word 'Defence' in Section 91 will grow to be a new residuary clause in the Constitution."⁴² This has not in fact happened but on the basis of previous judicial decisions relating to the exercise of the federal emergency powers it seems unlikely that the courts would, except under the most unusual circumstances, challenge the federal government's judgments that certain measures were necessary for the defence of Canada.

I. Summary and Conclusions

In this chapter we have used the term "devices of adjustment" to mean the procedures by which the constitutional division of powers, privileges and responsibilities between the federal and provincial governments has been progressively modified. Our attention has been mainly on the period since the Second World War. In broad terms, the rapid evolution of the federal aspects of the Canadian constitutional system in the past quarter-century has been through the public policy

actions of the federal and provincial governments, sometimes acting unilaterally and sometimes in collaboration, rather than through amendment or judicial review. Contrary to the experience in the decade of the Great Depression, the governments involved have for the most part not found the division of legislative powers as judicially interpreted an overwhelming barrier to their objectives. J. A. Corry has written perceptively of "... the political process replacing, or at any rate supplementing more extensively than in earlier years, the judicial process" in developed federal systems, and he has concluded:

The political processes have a flexibility and an easy adaptability to the dominant moods of the country that constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation both lack. There will continue to be regional aspirations which, even if they cannot have free play in a mature federalism, still have to be recognized and reckoned with. There will still be regional resistance by the people in the poorer areas against the tribute levied on them by the metropolitan areas. All these stresses and conflicts need to be negotiated and compromised in *ad hoc* arrangements. . . .

At any rate, we are likely to have to live for a long time with the equivocal structure called co-operative federalism. It has arisen because several separate governments share a divided responsibility for regulating a single economic and social structure. It is most unlikely that any constitution could be devised which would enable each to perform its specific functions adequately without impinging seriously on the others. So their activities are inevitably mingled, and co-operative arrangements must be worked out. In the result, formal powers are not co-terminous with operating responsibilities; the two levels of government as well as the several state and provincial governments interpenetrate one another in many places and ways. Under the heat and pressure generated by social and economic change in the twentieth century, the distinct strata of the older federalism have begun to melt and flow into one another.⁴³

There is of course no assurance that "political processes" will continue to displace amendments and judicial review as the chief procedures of constitutional evolution. It is at least possible that either the federal and some or all of the provincial governments will find that the existing division of legislative powers and the results of intergovernmental interactions are incompatible with their objectives and will seek explicit constitutional changes. Circumstances can be visualized where private interests would give greater support to judicial challenges to federal and provincial legislation. Influences may grow towards making the federal constitution a more effective symbol of what are perceived to be the essential aspects of the Canadian experience. In the meantime the legal-constitutional aspects of Canadian federalism show considerable resources of adaptability.

A conditional grant is a subsidy paid by one government to another with the requirement that the receiving jurisdiction will expend the funds in ways deemed appropriate by the authority making the payment. In a federal system the extent and nature of conditional grants are a useful indicator of the relative strength and vigour of the central and regional governments. When currents towards country-wide integration are running strongly we can expect grant-aided activities to proliferate and the federal authorities to be willing and able to enforce their own standards of appropriateness on the state or provincial administration. Conversely, when influences towards regional autonomy are strong we see resistance by these jurisdictions to the restrictions on their autonomy inherent in such procedures. So it has been in Canada. Between 1945 and 1960 the conditional grant device assumed a central importance in federal-provincial relations. Although provinces on occasion were dissatisfied with the way particular federal actions were taken, there was, apart from Quebec, little sustained provincial concern about the over-all impact of the device and little opposition to its extension to new matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction. In a sense, federal-provincial relations had become "factored." The failure of the 1945-46 Conference on Reconstruction to agree on a comprehensive redistribution of revenues, revenue sources and functional responsibilities gave rise to piecemeal collaboration on matters of more limited scope. However, by the early 1960s the magnitude of the grant payments, the policies of Quebec towards this procedure and the increasing vigour and administrative maturity of the provinces generally projected the conditional grant device into the forefront of federal-provincial controversy.

A. Circumstances Favouring Development of Conditional Grants

The development of conditional grant programmes in Canada has been traced elsewhere and does not need to be repeated here.¹ During the period from 1918 to the great Depression several programmes were

established. However, the federal Liberal party which was in power during most of this period had an ideological distaste for the procedure and failed to renew the arrangements when the agreements with the provinces expired. The one exception was the old age pension arrangements begun in 1927. During the 1930s very large sums were paid by the federal government to the provinces and municipalities to assist them with the desperate problems of the Depression but these arrangements were almost all of an *ad hoc* nature.² It was only after the Second World War that the grant-in-aid device assumed a place of central importance in federal-provincial relations.

In the years after the war, within the English Canadian context at least, there was a developing consensus favouring a more equalized range and more equalized standards of basic public services throughout Canada. It had become a widespread belief that wide interprovincial or interregional disparities in these services were indefensible and that the federal government had a moral if not a constitutional responsibility to mitigate these disparities. This point of view was usually associated with a belief that federal decisions in these matters were almost inherently better than those of the provinces and with a profound lack of concern that the functions concerned were within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. The federal government might, of course, have relied on unconditional subsidies based on some criteria of fiscal need to solve the problem of wide disparities in the abilities of the provinces to provide services. However, at least from a partisan-political point of view this would have been an inadequate response. Specific pressures were being placed on federal authorities to assist particular provincial functions and these pressures were being exerted against a background of growing public disposition to favour, or at least tolerate federal action to achieve countrywide equalization in basic services.

Successive federal governments had in the postwar period both the desire and the financial resources at their disposal to respond positively to the influences described above. The New National Policy called for both a high degree of fiscal centralization and aggressive federal leadership in a number of matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction. Although provincial agreement could not be secured on the comprehensive Green Book proposals, the general rationale of this plan was undoubtedly the frame of reference accepted by federal elected and appointed officials in the succeeding decade, and perhaps after. The conditional grant device was a useful expedient for the piecemeal accomplishment of some of the objectives of the New National Policy, particularly in the fields of public assistance and health services. The distribution of the tax sources between the two levels allowed the federal authorities to support an increasing range of provincial services within the limits of federal tax rates and budgetary surpluses or deficits believed appropriate. It also put pressures on the provinces to receive the subsidies and to meet required conditions of eligibility.

The growth of specialization and professionalization within the federal and provincial governments saw the growth of Canada-wide groups concerned with particular public functions, groups that pressed for greater expenditures on these functions and for minimum Canada-wide standards of service. J. A. Corry has spoken of the "nationalization" of sentiment among the Canadian elites and the disposition of these groups to pursue their objectives through federal action.³ So far as conditional grants were concerned, the most important of these elites were those whose working concerns were in particular public functions in such fields as health, public assistance, forestry and natural resource development. Within these particular professional and sub-professional groups there was considerable agreement about appropriate kinds of public action in these activities and of course about the necessity of having more public revenues spent on them. The actual workings of conditional grant agreements insulated those administering the programmes to some degree from normal cabinet and treasury control and almost completely from the grosser forms of partisan-political jobbery.⁴ The increasing influence of these specialized bureaucratic elites, normally with allies outside government, worked in conjunction with the influence of other federal administrative groups that were disposed to favour federal leadership in relations with the provinces. Together these groups encouraged and fostered the growing public disposition to favour Canada-wide standards in public services.

B. The Interaction of Federal and Provincial Purposes

It would be impossible without a detailed investigation of the establishment of each grant-in-aid to determine the specific objectives which the federal authorities were attempting to attain by such action. For purposes of analysis three kinds of federal aims can be distinguished, although these are not mutually exclusive and in the case of most programmes Ottawa was probably trying to pursue more than one of them.

First, the federal government may be primarily interested in securing a measure of Canada-wide uniformity in the range or standard of the public amenities which have come to be regarded as within the social minimum. This presumably was the kind of motivation which prevailed in respect to hospital insurance, pensions for the blind and for the permanently and totally disabled.

Second, the federal authorities may find it impossible to discharge certain of their own responsibilities in the absence of provincial action which is not expected unless federal financial inducements are offered. This consideration prevailed when in 1960 the government radically increased its levels of contribution for vocational training facilities after the Senate Report on Manpower and Employment had shown that the labour force was deficient in skills.

Third, the federal involvement may be almost entirely on the basis of cost-sharing in an expensive provincial activity. This seems to have been the primary motivation in the enactment of the federal Unemployment Assistance Act in 1956. The Act committed the federal government to pay 50 per cent of general social assistance cost incurred by the provinces and municipalities but did not set conditions about the procedures by which such assistance was paid.⁵

A federal-provincial conditional grant programme can influence a particular public function in three ways.

First, such an arrangement almost always encourages a higher total expenditure on the function than would have occurred in absence of the grant. However, the precise amount of the extra expenditure which is induced by the grant-in-aid cannot be accurately determined except in those circumstances where it is almost certain that the activity would not have been undertaken in the absence of federal involvement. It is probable that the more prosperous provinces would have provided the service, or one like it, anyway and that the proceeds of the grant are like a windfall. In the poorer jurisdictions, however, the federal inducement triggers commitments of provincial revenues which might in its absence have been spent on other provincial purposes.

Second, the grant-in-aid arrangement may encourage some or all of the receiving jurisdictions to undertake a function that would not otherwise have been carried on. In such cases conditional grants work towards a uniform countrywide *range* of services. For example, it is unlikely that all the provinces would now have universal hospital insurance schemes in the absence of federal financial assistance for this purpose.

Third, the programme can induce the provinces to carry out the aided function in a way they would not have otherwise chosen. Frequently discussions of conditional grants talk about national standards which are brought about by this device.⁶ This term connotes a precision which does not accurately describe the ways in which the federal authorities characteristically act to influence provincial and local action. It is quite unrealistic to believe that in most cases anything approaching uniformity in standards of service throughout Canada can be attained through federal grants-in-aid. In some circumstances federal influence is exerted by requiring prior federal approval of the physical plans for capital projects or the administrative structures for services. In other cases, as with the health grants, federal approval is required for the object on which federal moneys are to be spent. The federal government may also try to influence provincial action by defining certain kinds of costs as shareable and others as not or by providing a higher rate of contribution towards particular costs than for others. Federal influence may also take the form of indirection by efforts to encourage training and research in a particular field or the provision of consultative and advisory services.

There are several constraints on the ability of the federal authorities to influence the range and standard of provincial services through the conditional grant device. The federal government is after all seeking to pursue its own objective when it decides to embark on a shared-cost venture. It can be frustrated by the refusal of one or more of the provinces to participate. Experience has shown that this participation can never be taken for granted, particularly in the case of the larger and more prosperous provinces. In most circumstances the conditions under which federal moneys will be available are worked out in collaboration with the provincial officials who will implement the arrangements and federal officials are understandably concerned to secure the future cooperation of their provincial counterparts. Once a grant-in-aid programme is in operation it is ordinarily not feasible for the federal government to refuse to make payments to a province whose actions concerning the programme are not in harmony with federal procedures or objectives. Because of this kind of interplay of federal and provincial influences, grant-in-aid arrangements characteristically provide for a relatively wide range of variations among provinces concerning the aided programme. Growing provincial confidence and competence can be expected to increase provincial influence in conditional grant programmes as in other matters. In particular, the contracting-out device which will be analyzed in the next chapter may enhance provincial discretion respecting existing or projected programmes. This could occur where contracting-out with a fiscal equivalent is a real alternative to participation in a programme.

To come to definite conclusions about the impact of grants-in-aid on the provinces is impossible because to do so one would have to make judgements about what would have happened in the absence of grants. The following points can, however, be made:

First, in some matters—for example, civil defence, research in public health and occupational rehabilitation—federal inducements may well have resulted in the development of activities which the provinces would otherwise have had little predisposition to undertake. In respect to the Trans-Canada Highway, roads-to-resources and some aspects at least of vocational training, federal involvement probably has given rise to activities which in a relative sense the provinces would have neglected.

Second, federal participation has resulted in the standards of aided functions conforming more closely to prevailing standards in such professional fields as social work, forestry, public health and so on than would otherwise have been the case, even with equivalent provincial expenditures on these functions. In most grant-in-aid programmes federal approval must be given to the physical plans for a capital project or the proposed administrative arrangements for a new grant-aided activity. This means that such matters are scrutinized by federal programme officials whose frames of reference are those prevailing in these specialized fields. As we have seen, aided activities are to a degree insulated from the partisan-political and

other such influences to which provincial activities are sometimes subjected and federal and provincial programme officers usually co-operate to sustain this insulation. The devising and implementing of a grant-in-aid programme usually involves close and continuous collaboration between federal and provincial officials with a common professional background and gives rise to a pattern of formal and informal contacts on this professional axis.⁷ This kind of cooperation is perhaps most influential in respect to the standards of aided services in the smaller provinces where bureaucracies are relatively unspecialized and where administrative activity usually takes place under relatively close partisan-political supervision.

Third, federal grants-in-aid of hospital insurance and of general and categorical public assistance go a very long way in making it possible for Canadian residents to move freely among local jurisdictions within provinces and between provinces without prejudicing their access to these services. Left to itself, even the most liberally-minded provincial or local jurisdiction can be expected to impose residence requirements in respect to such services. The grant-in-aid programmes are effective in mitigating these restrictions. The Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act requires the participating provinces to make insured services available to residents on "uniform terms and conditions" (i.e. without local residence requirements) and under federal leadership the provinces have been able to achieve a high degree of interprovincial reciprocity. Statutory provisions for reciprocity are contained in the federal enactments relating to general public assistance and to pensions for the blind, the permanently and totally disabled and those persons between 65 and 69 years of age who meet the requirements of provincial means tests.

Fourth, in some provinces at least the enhancement of standards induced by federal involvement has probably taken place at the expense of functions for which no federal assistance was available.⁸ Because "fifty-cent dollars" are available for some kinds of activities the provincial governments are often under pressure to commit more provincially-raised revenues to these activities than they would otherwise do and consequently to deny resources to non-aided services. It is reasonable to suppose that these difficulties are more acute in the less prosperous provinces, where otherwise aided functions might not have been undertaken and where action to bring these activities up to the standards required for federal reimbursement results in the depression of standards in non-aided activities to levels further below Canada-wide averages than they would otherwise be. To take one striking example, elementary education in the Atlantic provinces may well have borne heavy disabilities because of federal grants-in-aid for other provincial programmes.

Fifth, the grant-in-aid procedure in some cases inhibits both the federal and provincial governments from realizing precise objectives and results in a more indiscriminate expenditure of public funds than if only one jurisdiction were involved. The obstructions in the path of the federal authorities in pursuing precise aims have already been

described and related to the need to secure the participation of the provinces. On the other hand, participation in a grant-in-aid programme requires the provinces both to alter their expenditure priorities and to carry out the aided function in a way they might otherwise not choose to do. These restrictions on provincial discretion may not be onerous if the province is not committed to either long-range budgetary or programme planning and such has in fact been the case in most provincial jurisdictions until recently. If the province has formulated its objectives in these terms fairly explicitly, however, subsequent federal inducements to participate in shared-cost arrangements almost inherently result in more restrictions on its autonomy. Unless there is greater articulation of federal and provincial objectives about comprehensive policy concerns, rather than about policies affecting particular programmes, we can expect that public revenues in Canada will continue to be allocated in a less discriminating way than if each level had exclusive responsibility for particular public activities and was engaged in long-term budgetary and programme planning.

C. Conditional Grants from 1960 Onwards

Apart from Quebec neither the provinces nor the federal government from the end of the Second World War to about 1960 gave systematic attention to the general rationale of the grant-in-aid device. Professor Eric Hanson asserted in 1953 that "the conditional grant lives healthily and lustily because we live in the short-run."⁹ Both levels apparently took up their positions concerning grants-in-aid almost exclusively in terms of short-run considerations relating to individual functions and projects. The major focus of attention in federal-provincial relations for senior elected and appointed officials was the negotiation of the tax agreements for each five-year period and these distributions of tax sources and public revenues seem to have been made without much explicit reference to grants-in-aid. At the federal level and in most if not all of the provinces the activities of programme agencies were not closely integrated with more comprehensive plans or objectives to which the governments as such were committed.

For the first time since the Second World War the rationale of the conditional grant procedure came into high-level discussion as the issue was raised by several of the premiers at the Federal-Provincial Conference of October 1960.¹⁰ The reasons for the voicing of these accumulated dissatisfactions at this particular time can only be conjectured. The relative importance of conditional grant payments in provincial budgets had rapidly increased as total grants rose from \$110,974,000 or 9.75 per cent of provincial expenditures on goods and services in 1956-57 to \$382,837,000 or 26.91 per cent in 1959-60.¹¹ The Federal-Provincial Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters had studied conditional grants since its establishment in 1955. Undoubtedly its members, the senior appointed financial

officers, provided their respective governments with evaluations of the grant-in-aid device which were less favourable than those of programme officials and less rooted in considerations related to particular services. The newly-elected government in Quebec took a different policy on shared-cost programmes than had its predecessors.

The premiers expressed their concern with grants-in-aid on several grounds. Manning of Alberta criticized this device because it transferred policy discussions from the provinces to Ottawa, created financial difficulties in requiring the provinces to raise additional revenues, enforced measures of uniformity "beyond the dictates of desirability" and increased the costs of services through centralization. He recommended that conditional grants be replaced progressively by unconditional subventions on a fiscal need basis.¹² The premiers of three of the less prosperous provinces—New Brunswick,¹³ Prince Edward Island¹⁴ and Manitoba¹⁵—criticized the grant-in-aid arrangements for not taking provincial fiscal capacity into account. Douglas of Saskatchewan spoke of the "rigidities" of these arrangements and suggested that they be carefully reviewed with a view to converting some of them to grants which would be unconditional within specific areas of governmental activity.¹⁶ Shaw of Prince Edward Island spoke somewhat similarly of the "budgetary inflexibility" resulting from these programmes.¹⁷ It was, however, the newly-elected premier of Quebec who introduced the most novel note into the discussions by announcing a radically new policy for his province in respect to grants-in-aid.¹⁸ The traditional viewpoint of Quebec governments had been opposition to conditional grants on dogmatic constitutional grounds, although the Duplessis government and its predecessors had participated in several shared-cost programmes.¹⁹ Premier Lesage announced that his government was taking the steps necessary to accept all the conditional grants it was not then receiving, in particular those relating to hospital insurance and the Trans-Canada Highway, "on a temporary basis and without prejudice to its full sovereignty."²⁰ He coupled this announcement with the request that the federal government cease its participation in well established programmes with fiscal compensation to the provinces. It is significant that the Quebec leader's opposition to conditional grants was not on ideological or constitutional grounds but rather that they did not sufficiently take local conditions into account and that they "raise administrative difficulties that are the cause of a loss of efficiency or duplication of effort and increased costs."

In the period since 1960 the major issue in the field of conditional grants has been the contracting out option which is discussed in the next chapter. Two other developments have occurred, both of which make the grant-in-aid device more palatable to the provinces.

First, there are some indications that in the future conditional grants will be made for broader and less specific purposes than in the past. The composite forestry agreements which were in effect from 1962-64 and renewed in modified form at their expiration are a step in this direction. Under the 1962 arrangements, former

agreements on forest inventories, reforestation, forest fire protection and forest access roads were consolidated, and a new programme of stand improvement added. The new agreements had the provision that a province must spend at least 40 per cent of its total federal allotment on forest access roads.²¹ Discussions have been taking place between the federal government and the provinces concerning the integration of the three grant-in-aid programmes of categorical public assistance with the agreements related to general public assistance. Such an integration of public assistance programmes would mean that, with the exception of certain groups of unemployed employables, the federal authorities would contribute to welfare costs without regard to the causes of the recipients' needs for such help. The Royal Commission on Health Services whose report has been under discussion by the federal and provincial authorities since the summer of 1964 recommended that:

. . . provision be made for terminating the present pattern of health grants to provinces for specific disease categories and client groups as each province begins to receive its Medical Services Grant. . . . The one exception should be the grant for Medical Rehabilitation and Crippled Children, which should be extended as an interim measure in order to implement our Recommendation . . . that services to crippled children be given priority.²²

There have been sporadic discussions in federal-provincial circles of the bloc grant alternative under which the provinces would receive subsidies on the sole condition that the federal funds be spent on broadly defined public functions such as vocational training, public health or the development of natural resources.²³ The forestry agreements and the projected arrangements related to public assistance adhere to this general pattern. Thus there are strong influences at work to make federal financial assistance available for more comprehensive provincial purposes than in the past.

Second, progress has been made in rationalizing the procedures by which the provinces are reimbursed by the federal government for expenditures on aided functions.²⁴ These procedures have in the past given rise to frictions between the two levels. Under the leadership of the Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters several of these difficulties have been eliminated.

The contracting-out procedure which is discussed in the next chapter casts some doubts over the long-term future of conditional grants in the Canadian federal system. As we shall see, provincial administrations, excepting Quebec, have shown no disposition to accept this alternative. On the other hand, it will undoubtedly require a very high degree of ingenuity on the part of federal officials to devise financial terms so that Quebec is satisfied that it is not being financially penalized for contracting out and so that the other provinces see no financial disadvantage in maintaining their participation in shared-cost arrangements.

The Tax Structure Committee established in the fall of 1964 has been given explicit responsibility for considering shared-cost programmes for the period 1967-72 in the broad contexts of expenditure-priorities for all governments and of comprehensive fiscal arrangements between the two levels. In the past grant-in-aid programmes have been established to meet the needs of provinces for particular functions with relatively little regard for the over-all distribution of tax sources and public revenues between the federal and provincial administrations. This phase appears to be ending.

D. The Medicare Proposal: Alternative to Conditional Grants?

The proposal for federal support of provincial medical care plans made by Prime Minister Pearson at the Federal-Provincial Conference of July 1965²⁵ contains a radically new departure by which the federal government may both pay part of the costs of a provincial service and influence certain standards of performance in respect to that service. The federal offer was to make a "fiscal contribution of pre-determined size" to provincial medicare programmes if they met the following four conditions.

First, "the scope of benefits should be, broadly speaking, all the services provided by physicians, both general practitioners and specialists."

Second, ". . . the plan should be universal. That is to say, it should cover all residents of the province on uniform terms and conditions."

Third, ". . . a federal contribution can properly be made available only to a plan which is publicly administered, either directly by the provincial government or by a provincial government agency."

Fourth, ". . . each provincial plan should . . . provide full transferability of benefits when people are absent from the Province or when they move their homes to another Province."

If a province would enter into a general agreement with the federal authorities to establish a plan according to these conditions and if provincial legislation were enacted to implement this agreement the federal contribution would be paid so long as these circumstances were in effect. Although the Prime Minister did not specify the federal scale of contributions in his preliminary speech, newspaper reports have spoken of a tentative federal contribution of \$14 per capita per year to participating provinces. This was about half the current costs of the Saskatchewan plan then in operation.

The federal proposal differs in several significant respects from existing grant-in-aid programmes. There is no provision for contracting-out and Mr. Lesage indicated at the conference that Quebec would establish a plan conforming in general to the federal conditions.²⁶ The projected arrangement would be simple to implement once

an agreement on general principles was reached and would involve none of the complexities in respect to the definition of shareable costs, reimbursement procedures and so on inherent in conditional grant programmes. Within the broad conditions of eligibility set by the federal authorities, the participating provinces would have complete freedom of action in determining the kinds and levels of services provided in their plans, the way in which provincial contributions would be raised and other matters.

Although I have not come across any serious discussion of the application of the principles in federal medical care proposals to other provincial services, it seems likely that the successful implementation of this procedure would result in it being regarded in some quarters as an alternative to the traditional grant-in-aid device.

One of the distinctive features of the Canadian constitutional system is the differentiated pattern of relations between the individual provinces and groups of provinces and the federal government. An analysis of this differentiation was made in the last chapter. More important as a device of adjustment is the contracting-out procedure. This device gives a new dimension to the resources of the federal system to adapt to the demands made upon it and, so far as I am aware, is unique to Canada.

Contracting-out has been used to describe two kinds of arrangements.

First, there is the situation where a province assumes the exclusive responsibility for financing and administering a programme which in some or all of the other provinces is carried on by the federal government and where there are compensating financial adjustments between the contracting-out province and the federal authorities to ensure that neither this province nor its residents are financially penalized because of this decision.

Second, there is the procedure by which a province receives some form of fiscal compensation in lieu of the federal contributions to a programme through a conditional grant arrangement.

A. The 1959 University Finance Agreement

The original contracting-out arrangement was concluded between the federal and Quebec governments in 1959 and related to university finance.¹

In its report to the Government of Canada in 1951 the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences recommended that the federal government provide annual and unconditional contributions to those institutions that were members of the National Conference of Canadian Universities. According to this proposal the

total sum available would be divided among the provinces in proportion to their respective populations, and within a province the allocation to individual universities would be in the proportion of their enrolments to the total provincial enrolment. The federal government responded promptly to this recommendation and in the 1951-52 fiscal year grants were provided at the rate of 50 cents per capita of total provincial population.

While the Quebec universities accepted the federal grants in 1951-52, Premier Duplessis in effect ordered them to refuse the second and subsequent annual payments on the grounds that these subventions were a federal encroachment on the exclusive responsibilities of the provinces for education. Mr. Duplessis soon thereafter announced that beginning in 1954 a provincial income tax would be levied at about 15 per cent of the federal rates. This tax was defended partly in terms of the financial needs of the Quebec universities which the Premier had insisted should not receive federal grants. This move by the Quebec government related university finance to the broader pattern of federal-provincial fiscal arrangements. Under these arrangements as they had existed since 1947 the residents of a province which levied a personal income tax were allowed a tax credit up to 5 per cent of the federal tax. Until the Quebec decision this provision had not been operative as no province had levied such a tax. Mr. Duplessis demanded that the federal abatement be increased to 15 per cent which would have of course absorbed the total increased burden of the Quebec tax so far as the residents of the province were concerned. The result of the ensuing controversy between the federal and Quebec governments was an increase of the federal tax abatement to 10 per cent.

In the period immediately after the increased federal abatement was established the 10 per cent tax credit more than compensated for the refusal of the Quebec universities to accept federal grants. The federal-provincial fiscal arrangements which came into effect in 1957, however, added new complications to the situation. These arrangements provided for stabilization and equalization payments to the provinces whether or not they levied individual and corporate income taxes and succession duties. Although this aspect of course favoured Quebec, which had remained out of the 1947-52 and 1952-57 tax agreements, that province could still complain that the new procedures did not in any way compensate for the burdens it had assumed in university finance and that the federal per capita grants had been increased to \$1.00 in 1957 and \$1.50 in 1958 without corresponding adjustments in the rates of abatement for residents of provinces levying provincial income taxes.

In 1957 the federal government made two moves which it was hoped would induce the Quebec administration to change its policies on federal subsidies to universities. The first designated the National Conference of Canadian Universities as an intermediate disbursing agent for the per capita grants. The second measure provided that those moneys not distributed by the conference, in effect the grants

refused by Quebec universities because of the province's policy, would be held in trust for these institutions until claimed. The Quebec government did not in any way modify its position in response to these overtures.

The "thaw" in federal-Quebec relations after the death of Mr. Duplessis, and perhaps the increasing impatience of the Quebec universities under the ban on the acceptance of federal subventions, led to an agreement with the federal authorities which took effect in 1960. According to this agreement, the federal government would withdraw from the corporate income tax field to the extent of one additional percentage point in Quebec and that province would continue to assume the entire public responsibility for the financial support of its universities. It was provided that if the amount of federal grants that would otherwise have been paid in any year exceeded the proceeds of the one per cent abatement the federal government would add this sum to the equalization grant to the province. Conversely, if the proceeds from the abatement exceeded the per capita calculation this amount would be deducted from the equalization grant. A provision of the agreement also released to the Quebec universities the moneys which had been accumulated in trust for them. This contracting-out option was in 1960 enacted in an amendment to the Federal-Provincial Tax Sharing Arrangements Act and continued in 1964 legislation. Under federal law all the provinces have the same option to contract out in respect to federal support of universities but none other than Quebec has shown any disposition to do so.

The 1959 agreement was an important precedent in Canadian federalism. For the first time the shares of an important tax field occupied by both the federal and provincial governments were related explicitly to their respective responsibilities for financing a particular activity. For the first time also, a province had gained the opportunity to refrain from participation in a particular federal initiative without being subjected to financial disabilities as a consequence of this choice. Most significantly perhaps, the agreement was a clear recognition that Quebec had a special position in the Canadian federation, a position which would lead her to resist federal encroachment in matters where such action was not perceived by the other provinces to affect their interests.

Despite the significance of the general principle established in 1959, the arrangements in respect to university finance were not directly applicable to later uses of the contracting-out device. From the time it was established in 1951 the federal per capita grant scheme was in the form of unconditional subventions to eligible institutions and the payment of these moneys was not related to the costs incurred by the universities, the maintenance of particular levels of provincial support or prescribed standards of university facilities. Thus the financial arrangements evolved for contracting-out could be made simple and their workings almost automatic. Also, too, the situation was such that the agreement with Quebec could be made in relative isolation from the other provinces. This was

impractical in later applications of the contracting-out device in respect of the Canada Pension Plan and the conditional grant programmes.²

B. Contracting-out of Conditional Grant Programmes

Up until this decade it has been taken for granted in Canada as in other federations that when a regional government chose not to participate in a federal shared-cost arrangement it would suffer the full financial penalties of this choice. The traditional Quebec position of hostility in principle to conditional grants as unwarranted federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction did not challenge this circumstance directly. The Quebec attack on this device was of the root-and-branch variety. The Tremblay report³ regarded conditional grants as an inherent element of what it called "the new federalism," an aspect rooted in what the report argued was the unwarranted assumption by the federal government of the power to tax and to spend as it chose. The implications of such a position were that unless the conditional grant system was completely dismantled the Quebec government had the unsatisfactory alternatives either of accepting the grants with the attached conditions and thus acceding in what were regarded as unconstitutional intrusions of the federal authorities or of foregoing the subventions which were available to the other provinces which had no such principled objections to accepting them.

Despite its ideological position, the Quebec administration in office from 1944 to 1960 participated with the federal authorities in several conditional grant programmes. In the 1959-60 fiscal year the province received \$46,339,000 in such grants and accepted payments in respect to public health activities (including hospital construction) and categorical and general public assistance, but refused grants related to the Trans-Canada Highway, hospital insurance, vocational training, forestry activities and civil defence.⁴ It is impossible to calculate precisely the amount that Quebec would have received if it had chosen to participate fully in the available grants. If the grants-in-aid to Quebec, however, had borne the same ratio to those received by Ontario in 1959-60 as Quebec grants did to Ontario grants in 1961-62 (when both provinces were participating in all major shared-cost programmes) then Quebec would have received in 1959-60 a further \$82,031,000 or \$15.60 per capita on the 1961 population.⁵

In 1961 the federal Liberal party committed itself to the contracting-out option in certain established conditional grant programmes. The party's policy was thus enunciated in its 1963 election manifesto:

If some provinces wish, they should be able to withdraw without financial loss from joint programs which involve regular expenditures by the federal government and which are well established. In such cases, Ottawa will compensate provinces for the federal

share of the cost by lowering its own direct taxes and increasing equalization payments. This will be done also if some provinces do not want to take part in new joint programs that may be desirable for the federal government to initiate with the provinces.⁶

Contracting-out was a major topic of discussion at the Federal-Provincial Conference held in Quebec City from March 31 to April 2, 1964. The communique issued at the end of the meeting stated "It was agreed that the federal government should immediately enter into detailed discussions with provincial governments concerning contracting-out arrangements for shared-cost programmes. Such negotiations would apply to programmes which are of a permanent nature and which involve fairly regular annual expenditures." In accord with this agreement and at the initiative of the government of Quebec, representatives of the federal and provincial administrations met in Ottawa early in June to discuss the proposed arrangements. Prime Minister Pearson in a letter to the provincial premiers on August 15, 1964⁷ outlined the understandings concluded at the June and subsequent meetings and a resolution to embody these into legislation was introduced in the House of Commons by the Minister of Finance on December 18, 1964. The major features of the Established Programs (Interim Arrangements) Act as enacted by Parliament in April 1965 can be summarized briefly.

1. *Applicability*

The bill divides the arrangements to which contracting-out is to apply into "standing programs" and "special programs." The first category includes:

- hospital insurance
- old age assistance, blind persons' allowances, disabled persons' allowances and the welfare portion of general public assistance
- health grants (excluding those for hospital construction)
- non-capital expenditures on vocational training.

"Special programs" include:

- agricultural lime assistance
- the composite forestry agreements concluded with all provinces and special forestry agreements with Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
- the hospital construction programme
- the camp grounds and picnic areas programme
- the roads-to-resources programme.

Excluded from contracting-out are:

- capital grants for vocational training
- certain "research and demonstration" projects
- the "unemployed portion" of general public assistance
- Centennial of Confederation projects
- municipal winter works
- emergency measures
- projects under the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act.

2. *The fiscal equivalent*

Provinces which contract out of "standing programs" receive an extra abatement on the federal personal income tax. The Act assigns each of these arrangements a unit value corresponding presumably to the estimated percentage yields of these abatements in Quebec. The actual fiscal equivalent received by a contracting-out province and consisting of abatements with cash adjustments paid by the federal authorities will, in the interim period, equal the actual audited expenditures made by the province on the service.

The fiscal equivalents for "standing programs" are to be cash payments by the federal government to the non-participating provinces. The amount of these payments is based on the amount that the relevant federal minister thinks the provinces would otherwise have received as conditional grants.

3. *The interim arrangements*

According to the Act, an agreement between the federal government and a province to terminate a standing programme had to be concluded on or before October 31, 1965. Contracting-out of special programmes had no time limitation and could be done at the beginning of any fiscal year within the period of 1965-68 for hospital construction, 1965 to the end of existing agreements for roads to resources, and 1965 to 1967 for other such programmes.

The agreements concluded between the federal and provincial governments in 1964 provided that during an interim period, specified for each arrangement to which contracting-out applied, the non-participating province would "maintain its present obligations" in respect to the functions or services and furnish the federal authorities with audited accounts of its expenditures on these matters. It was also agreed that "a contracting-out province would, during the interim period and subsequently, continue to participate in federal-provincial bodies and meetings established for the purposes of consultation and co-ordination in fields of activity where contracting-out would apply."⁸ For several programmes the interim period is to March 31, 1967, the date when the existing federal-provincial fiscal arrangements expire; the interim period extends for a longer period for other programmes, because of the exigencies of these particular programmes.

C. *Contracting-out of Exclusively Federal Programmes*

In three circumstances apart from university finance the contracting-out principle is applied to activities which are carried out by the federal authorities in participating provinces, without direct financial or administrative involvement of the provincial governments. All three such arrangements are based on initiatives to which the federal Liberal party committed itself before the 1963 general election.

1. The youth allowances programme

The federal Liberal programme of 1963 pledged the party to "extend family allowances beyond the age of sixteen for boys and girls who remain students." The new government moved soon after its election to provide for the paying of allowances at \$10 per month on behalf of 16- and 17-year-olds still in school or university. The Quebec government alone of the provinces had a similar programme and Premier Lesage soon made it clear that this would be continued, that his administration would find the simultaneous operation of the two arrangements unacceptable and that a fiscal equivalent should thus be paid.

The Youth Allowances Act enacted by Parliament in the summer of 1964 provides that \$10 monthly allowances be paid on behalf of dependent 16- and 17-year-olds continuing their education and of dependent youths in the same age group who because of "physical or mental infirmity" are precluded from doing so. The Act stated that such payments were not to be made on behalf of persons residing in a province which had enacted legislation providing for similar allowances prior to the coming into effect of the federal legislation. The Fiscal Revision Act 1964 enacted at the same time made available an extra 3 per cent abatement on the personal income tax for those provinces which had youth allowance programmes similar to the federal one. The usual provisions were made for cash adjustments between the federal government and the contracting-out provinces of discrepancies between the yield of the abatement and the amounts paid by the provinces for this. In the period prior to the federal enactment the Quebec administration proved willing to adjust its own programme in order to relate it to the period of the year in which the allowances would be paid and to include disabled youths so that the terms of the provincial and federal arrangements would be almost identical.

2. Student loans

The federal Liberal programme of 1963 stated that "All qualified university students will be able to borrow if necessary for genuine educational needs. The fund will be independently administered. Loans will be interest-free during the period of study and for the first year afterwards, and will then be repayable, plus interest, within a reasonable time." At the Federal-Provincial Conference held in Quebec City in the spring of 1964 Premier Lesage attacked the proposed plan as a federal intrusion on the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces over education and demanded that if it were implemented his province should receive a fiscal equivalent. As in the case of youth allowances, Quebec had its own system of university loans. The Canada Student Loans Act later enacted by Parliament provided that up to \$40 million in the first year be loaned to Canadian university students by the chartered banks, with the federal government guaranteeing the loans and paying the interest charges while the students were in university and for six months thereafter. The Act also provided that when any province which had a student loan plan of its own

informed the federal government of its desire to contract out, the federal authorities would pay to that province a cash equivalent. This cash equivalent would be related to federal contributions to banks in the participating provinces and to the proportion of persons in the 18-25-year-old population in that province as compared with the population in the same age group in the participating provinces. Only Quebec has used this option.

3. Contributory old age pensions and supplementary benefits

In its 1963 election manifesto the federal Liberal party committed itself to a national contributory plan of retirement pensions and supplementary benefits. The plan was to be financed from compulsory contributions on earnings up to \$5,000 per year with employers and employees contributing equally and self-employed persons participating if they wished. The proposed plan would also provide pensions for contributors who were disabled before age 65 and for the widows and orphans of contributors. The party pledged that if elected it would seek agreement with the provinces to make this constitutionally possible. The plan was not to be funded, *i.e.* it was to be so devised as not to accumulate funds for investment purposes during the period of coming to maturity.

The newly-elected federal government early in July 1963 introduced into the House of Commons a resolution for a national pension plan in general harmony with that promised in its election programme. Shortly thereafter, the Quebec government demanded that the proposed federal plan should not apply to residents of that province. Premier Jean Lesage enunciated his administration's policy at the Federal-Provincial Conference held in November of that year: ". . . we have elected to stick to the spirit of the contracting-out formula and we shall institute in Quebec a system which will be provincial, public, universal and based on actuarial hypotheses."

It is neither possible nor necessary to trace the federal-provincial negotiations about contributory pensions which went on during and after the summer of 1963. From the first, Quebec was determined to have a plan of its own which would not only provide cash benefits to those eligible but which would result in the accumulation of a large investment fund available to the province. On the other hand, in the subsequent negotiations the Quebec administration showed some willingness to modify the details of its own plan so that the provincial and federal schemes did not impose significant restrictions on the movement of people between Quebec and other parts of Canada. Also, the Quebec government was willing to give its approval to a proposed constitutional amendment enacted in 1964 making it possible for the federal plan to provide survivors' benefits and pensions to contributors disabled before retirement age. Because of the pressure from Quebec and the other provinces the federal government was persuaded to put its scheme on a partially funded basis so that a substantial fund would be accumulated for the purchase of provincial securities.

The federal legislation providing for the Canada Pension Plan was enacted early in 1965. The Act makes provision for its non-applicability, with minor exceptions, to residents of a province which within 30 days of the coming into force of the enactment had given the federal government notice that it intended to bring its own comparable plan into effect with contributions to begin in 1966. Only Quebec accepted this option.

D. A Partial Application of Contracting-out: The Federal-Municipal Loan Fund

The election manifesto of the federal Liberal party in the 1963 election promised the establishment of a "Municipal Development and Loan Fund . . . to provide capital for sound municipal improvements which provincial governments approve but for which financing is at present inadequate." A resolution to implement this pledge by providing a \$400 million fund was introduced in the House of Commons in June 1963. The reaction of the provinces to this federal initiative was for the most part hostile.⁹ Undoubtedly the federal government regarded the measure primarily as one to stimulate employment and to relieve municipalities of the high interest rates that some were forced to pay for funds to undertake necessary capital projects. Although there had been provisions in federal legislation for capital loans to municipalities from 1938 onward, the provinces were sensitive because, without prior consultation, the federal government was involving itself on a much more extensive scale than before in an area of direct provincial responsibility. Although the unfavourable provincial reactions were not confined to Quebec, that province understandably resisted the federal initiative with more vigour than did the others and on June 26, 1963 the legislative assembly unanimously passed a resolution declaring the federal bill to be "a serious infringement upon the exclusive jurisdiction and the autonomy of the province of Quebec." Mr. Lesage in transmitting this resolution to Prime Minister Pearson wrote, "I must add that I am sure I am expressing the unanimous feeling of the members of the Quebec Legislative Assembly when I say that they consider as a breach of your promise fully to respect provincial rights . . . the fact of proceeding unilaterally to establish a municipal loan fund, which, according to your program was to be instituted solely in co-operation with the provinces."¹⁰ A federal-provincial conference was convened on July 26-27¹¹ as a result of provincial opposition to the federal initiatives in respect to the municipal loan fund and to the contributory old age pension plan. At this meeting the federal government proved willing to modify its original scheme to enlarge the scope of projects for which money might be borrowed and to divide the total amount available for loans among the provinces according to their respective populations. It was also agreed that the provinces might enter into agreements with the federal government to administer themselves their portions of the fund rather than have this function

carried out by the federal agency created for the purpose. The provinces of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have accepted the contracting-out alternative.¹² The agreements resulting from the July meetings were enacted by Parliament in the Municipal Development and Loan Act which came into effect in September 1963.

E. The Significance of the Contracting-out Device

The various contracting-out arrangements are, taken together, a response by the federal authorities to the circumstance that Quebec demands a wider range of fiscal and administrative autonomy than the other provinces wish for themselves. These arrangements tend to create a situation where federal activity in Quebec is, with some exceptions, confined to matters within the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament, while in the rest of Canada the central government is involved in a great many matters which are the constitutional responsibility of the provinces. This situation, it can reasonably be argued, is an institutional recognition of the differences between the majority in Quebec and the majorities in the other provinces as to the appropriate role of the federal government.

Critics of the contracting-out procedure have charged that it makes less likely than otherwise the establishment and maintenance of minimum country-wide standards in certain basic public services. This argument is not compelling under the procedure as it has evolved up until the present. In every circumstance to which contracting-out is applied, Quebec is carrying on the function very much as is done elsewhere with federal involvement. In the negotiations surrounding the contributory pensions and youth allowance schemes the Quebec government proved itself willing to modify its own plans in detail at least to bring them into harmony with those projected for the rest of Canada. Further, as Stefan Dupré has pointed out, "... provincial electorates themselves can be depended upon to enforce a degree of program conformity, especially where services and payments to persons are involved,"¹³ and most of the matters to which contracting-out applies are of this nature. Also, it is reasonable to expect that Quebec will continue to participate in various federal-provincial and interprovincial consultative organizations concerned with grant-in-aid programmes and this participation helps maintain country-wide standards.

It has also been argued that the contracting-out device weakens the central government power to implement effective counter-cyclical fiscal policies in two ways—by reducing the federal share of income taxes, and by attenuating federal power to induce certain kinds of public expenditure. This appears not to be so, with the possible exception of the provisions relating to municipal loans. The various "standing programs" that make up most of the total fiscal equivalents concern the kinds of federal expenditures which would not be altered for counter-cyclical reasons except under the most unusual

circumstances. Under the various "special programs" non-participating provinces will apparently have to carry out the functions for which fiscal equivalents are claimed very much as is done in the other provinces. The contracting-out alternative is unavailable for most programmes where the levels of federal contributions can feasibly be varied for counter-cyclical reasons. Most of the capital assistance programmes are excluded — municipal winter works, the Trans-Canada Highway, assistance for the construction of hospitals and vocational training facilities and projects under the Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act. Neither is contracting-out applied to the "unemployment portions" of general public assistance where the levels of federal contributions can be expected to vary inversely with the prosperity of the respective provinces and municipalities. It is reasonable to argue, however, that the existing circumstances governing the Municipal Development and Loan Fund make this a less effective instrument of fiscal policy than was originally contemplated by the incumbent federal government. The federal power to influence income and employment may be somewhat attenuated by dividing the total fund available among the provinces according to their respective populations and by allowing the provinces to administer their own portions of the fund. It would, however, be almost impossible to estimate the degree of attenuation caused by the population rule and contracting-out, that is the extent to which each of these factors results in different loans being made or withheld than would have been the case under the original federal plan.

It seems unlikely that the provinces other than Quebec will avail themselves of the contracting-out option. In a speech to the National Industrial Conference Board on October 22, 1964 the Premier of Ontario expressed apprehension about the effect of this device on "national standards."¹⁴ Premier Duff Roblin of Manitoba in his budget speech to the legislature on March 4, 1965 said of contracting-out:

Manitoba views this new proposal with mixed feelings. We recognize particularly its threat to the continuing idea of a national standard of services and note its administrative difficulties. We shall probably not contract out ourselves and do not recommend it as a general proposition to the people of this Province. But it may, perhaps, be one practical way of easing areas of current federal-provincial friction and of reconciling the conflicting views on areas of concurrent interest and jurisdiction between the government at the center and the provinces. Through this idea of contracting-out, we may find ourselves able to meet the rather special requirements of a province like Quebec, through options open to all, even though most may have no wish or interest in invoking them. For this reason, I judge the experiment worth the very considerable risks that are attached to it and hope that it may perhaps be the seeds that will strengthen rather than weaken the bonds of Confederation.¹⁵

British Columbia has pressed for increased conditional grants on behalf of highways and natural resource development and for federal assistance for a programme of comprehensive health services.¹⁶ It thus seems probable that while federal legislation extends the contracting-out option to all the provinces, only Quebec will find it appropriate to accept. This circumstance, of course, makes less difficult than otherwise the negotiations surrounding the application of contracting-out to particular programmes and functions and in particular the calculation of the formulas by which fiscal equivalents are to be given. The availability in law of this option may of course strengthen the position of the provinces other than Quebec in their relations with the federal government concerning the functions to which it applies, although it is likely that it will become a convention of the Canadian constitution that contracting-out is a procedure which in fact if not in law applies only to the particular requirements of Quebec.

The term "cooperative federalism" has come to be used very frequently in Canadian political debate. Some persons employ the phrase in a very broad sense to emphasize the increasing importance of federal-provincial collaboration in contrast with the older "classical federalism" in which the two levels carried out their respective responsibilities as assigned by the constitution in relative isolation from one another.¹ Within the context of political debate in Quebec, cooperative federalism is defended, or attacked, as an alternative to separatism, the "associate states" alternative and other proposals for more radical and explicit changes in the political and constitutional relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada.² In yet another context, cooperative federalism is regarded as the successor to the centralized version of federalism which developed during and after the Second World War, to what the Honourable Maurice Lamontagne has called "tutelary federalism."³ Although there are significant differences in emphases among those who now use the term, most would probably agree that cooperative federalism embodies the following features.

First, the chief devices by which continuous redistribution of powers, responsibilities and resources between the two levels is effected are procedures of continuous interaction between the federal and provincial governments rather than constitutional amendment or changing patterns of judicial review. Some of the reasons for the relatively minor role that formal processes of constitutional change have come to play were suggested in Chapter IV. The Honourable Guy Favreau described the new circumstances thus: "Gone are the days when constant recourse to the courts was hurriedly made to obtain an interpretation that would finally resolve jurisdictional conflicts between the federal and provincial governments."⁴ Most of the basic conflicts between the two levels, particularly as these relate to the crucial matters of fiscal sharing, do not lend themselves to judicial determination. Formal constitutional change is almost always sporadic and such change usually works in the direction of delineating the

respective powers and privileges of the federal and provincial legislatures rather than articulating their activities. Under the prevailing attitudes it would be regarded as inappropriate by the governments concerned to submit a dispute of fundamental importance for judicial determination unless intergovernmental negotiations over a protracted period had failed to result in agreement. As the conflict between the federal and some of the provincial authorities about the ownership of offshore mineral rights demonstrates, even under such circumstances as these the judicial settlement of disputes may not be seen by all as legitimate.⁵

Second, cooperative federalism embodies consultations between the provinces and the federal government prior to the latter committing itself to policies directly affecting provincial interests. Unilateral federal actions in such matters were common in the decade after the Second World War. At the height of federal dominance in 1950 Premier T. C. Douglas of Saskatchewan presented the following list of complaints to the Federal-Provincial Constitutional Conference:

In the matter of marketing, the latest dominion legislation represents an abandonment by the federal government of its responsibilities with regard to international trade. Having failed to protect the Canadian producer in foreign markets, it has now thrust upon the provinces, without consultation, the responsibilities which it has failed to discharge.

Without consultation with the provinces, it is vacating the field of rental control, after permitting substantial rent increases, and thus thrusting upon the provinces the responsibility of meeting a social crisis.

Without consultation with the provinces, it has announced a comprehensive irrigation scheme, which we now learn must be supported by substantial provincial contributions.

Without consultation with the provinces, it has announced the construction of a trans-Canada highway, and it is later found that the provinces will not only have to stand fifty per cent of the cost of construction, but also the entire cost of the right of way.

Without consultation with the provinces, it has decided upon a housing program for which every province must contribute twenty-five per cent of the cost, without regard to its ability to pay.

By these unilateral decisions, the federal government has embarrassed the provinces in respect to their capital programs and has virtually dictated policies to which their consent has not been obtained.⁶

During the period of the dominance of the federal government, federal announcements of new grants-in-aid were sometimes made without prior provincial consultation. Such actions understandably disturbed the provinces which were often forced, by influences both inside and outside their own administrations, to alter their programmes and, usually more important, to undertake new financial commitments to take advantage of the federal largesse. The traditions of cooperative federalism as these are now evolving preclude such unilateral federal

initiatives. There is, however, no agreement about either the range of matters in respect to which consultation should take place or the circumstances of these discussions. Without altering the traditions of Canadian politics in a very fundamental way, cooperative federalism could not forestall a federal political party from committing itself to initiatives in matters directly affecting the provinces. But there is as yet no clear tradition as to whether it is more appropriate for a federal government to introduce into Parliament bills providing for activities in which the provinces are directly concerned, with the assumption of course that provincial consultation will occur before the final parliamentary enactment, or whether it is more appropriate for the government to ask Parliament to ratify agreements previously reached with the provinces. There is also no agreement as yet about the range of matters on which federal-provincial consultations are appropriate. As we shall see later in this chapter, the strategy which the Quebec government, elected in 1960, pursued with some success was to extend this range to include every important aspect of federal economic policies, including those which are constitutionally within the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the federal Parliament. Despite these unresolved differences, federal-provincial collaboration is now regarded as appropriate not only in such matters as the marketing of agricultural products and industrial standards, where under the constitution both levels have responsibilities, but also in respect to other policies where no such obvious sharing exists but where the actions of one government clearly affect the others. Premier Lesage of Quebec stated the new assumptions concisely at his opening statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference of July 1965:

Sound practice of federalism requires that each government respect the jurisdiction of the other legislative authorities. In an era when interdependence is as pronounced as it is today, however, respect of mutual (legislative) competence is not the only condition for harmony between governments. Thus, even when legislating in fields within its own jurisdiction, each government should be concerned with the repercussions of its decisions on the others' plans and on the orderly conduct of the country's affairs in general. In our opinion, a government may not do exactly as it pleases simply because it has legal authority in a given field. Instead, in the interest of administrative efficiency and the search for genuine solutions, it must see that its actions are compatible with those of the other legislative authorities, and do not infringe on their rights and privileges. In short, the legality of an act should not be the only criterion, it is also important to weigh its timeliness and repercussions.⁷

Under present circumstances consultation has seemed sometimes to be a one-way street. Although unilateral provincial initiatives can and do complicate federal responsibilities in certain situations, the federal government has not effectively asserted its right to be consulted by the provinces. However, in his opening statement to the July conference in 1965 Prime Minister Pearson did make such a claim:

We cannot work together if the federal government attempts to encroach on provincial rights. Equally we cannot work together if provincial policies are directed to the erosion of federal jurisdiction and power. We have to proceed by the methods of cooperative federalism, by consultation and cooperation in all matters of mutual concern. Cooperative federalism is not a doctrine that puts all the restraints on the federal government. It does not mean that the federal government should move only after consulting the Provinces while the Provinces accept no similar obligation on their side. Cooperative federalism does not mean that the burden of agreement rests only on the federal government while the Provinces make demands for the withdrawal of the federal government from established lines of action and responsibility.⁸

Third, cooperative federalism has come to involve interactions between the two levels in respect to the most fundamental aspects of public policy. Cooperative federalism as the term is commonly used in the United States refers to the interactions between the national and state governments through grants-in-aid. In Canada, however, both the norms and procedures of federal-provincial relations include not only collaboration in specialized public functions but also the attempted articulation of policies in fiscal matters and in policies for economic stability and growth.

Fourth, cooperative federalism envisages increasingly more institutionalized structures and processes of intergovernmental relations. Observers of Canadian federalism agree that until this decade federal and provincial governments were slow in developing effective procedures for articulating their respective activities. As we shall see in this chapter, there are fundamental differences among the governments concerned about appropriate institutions for effective federal-provincial relations and in particular about the necessity for radically new institutional machinery designed specifically for these purposes. However, there is basic agreement that such relations should provide for more continuous high-level interaction than in the past, particularly where basic fiscal and economic policies are involved.

A. Cooperative Federalism Prior to 1945

Because almost nothing has been written about the institutions and procedures of federal-provincial collaboration prior to the 1930s, it is tempting to suggest that widespread cooperation between the two levels of government is of relatively recent origin. Recent research in the United States has, however, revealed a very large amount of federal-state coordination in respect to particular matters from the earliest days of the union.⁹ It is possible that such investigations in Canada would show that in the earlier decades we developed a much more diluted variant of classical federalism than is commonly

supposed.¹⁰ The thought and practice of the 1930s, however, seem to indicate that prior to the Second World War the norms of Canadian federalism consisted of the federal and provincial governments carrying out their respective roles as delineated by the constitution in relative isolation from one another, with changes in these roles being effected either by constitutional amendment or changing patterns of judicial review. We have not been able to discover any serious consideration during the decade of the great Depression of the cooperative federalism alternative, the alternative of attempting, in J. A. Corry's words, "to turn the flank of constitutional obstacles" by devices of intergovernmental collaboration.

As the Depression wore on it became apparent that the institutions of Canadian federalism were inadequate to meet the demands facing the country. Almost unanimously, those who wished change saw the formal constitution as the "villain of the piece" and more particularly the tradition of judicial interpretation of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. There was a very great amount of debate about a procedure for constitutional amendment and, unlike the situation after 1945, those who supported a new procedure were clearly bent on important substantive changes in the B.N.A. Act to enhance the power of the federal government. The judgment of the judiciary that the Bennett "New Deal" legislation of 1935 was *ultra vires* convinced most reformers, if they needed convincing, that the traditional interpretation of the constitution failed to give the federal government power to deal effectively with the desperate circumstances of the times. The most elaborately formulated statement of this view was made by a report to the Senate by its parliamentary counsel in March 1939 with the conclusion that the B.N.A. Act had in 1896 been "repealed by judicial legislation" and the recommendation that a constitutional amendment be enacted which would in effect direct the Judicial Committee and the Canadian courts to construe the Act in future according to the accepted canons of Anglo-Saxon judicial interpretation.¹¹

The report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations presented to the Government of Canada in 1940 differed markedly from most of the other schemes for reform made during the previous decade in that it contemplated a solution within the existing division of legislative powers between the Dominion and the provinces. The Rowell-Sirois Commission was, however, critical of existing patterns of federal-provincial collaboration and made three major suggestions for avoiding collaborative activities between the two levels.

1. The federal government should assume exclusive responsibility for the relief of unemployed employables. It was in the field of public assistance more than any other that federal-provincial interactions had during the Depression been frequent, haphazard and unsatisfactory for all concerned.

2. There should be a redistribution of revenue sources, revenues and functions which would permit each province to provide services at average Canadian standards without subjecting its residents to

taxation above the Canadian average. This was the master solution of the report and its adoption was expected to forestall federal-provincial collaboration on provincial matters because some or all of the provinces lacked the financial resources to discharge their constitutional responsibilities.

3. There would be a procedure "by constitutional amendment if necessary" for the mutual inter-delegation of legislative powers between the Dominion and the provinces. This would permit the exclusive responsibility for particular functions to be discharged by one level or the other as an alternative to joint arrangements.

In its general distaste for cooperative federalism the Rowell-Sirois Commission appears to have been very much influenced by J. A. Corry's study "Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction" undertaken at its direction.¹² Corry studied several kinds of activity in which both the Dominion and the provinces were involved and came to the following conclusion: "... Canadian experience so far seems to indicate that administrative performance in these joint activities ... falls short of the standards of reasonably good administration."¹³ In the light of subsequent developments in the theory and practice of cooperative federalism, it is significant to see why he judged, on the basis of the efficiency criterion alone, that federal-provincial collaborative arrangements were almost inherently deficient:

1. Officials of different bureaucracies find both their desires to express themselves through their work and their career prospects frustrated by entering into constructive intergovernmental relations. The capable and ambitious official will try to "master the uncertainties which interfere with his control of the situation." These uncertainties include the actions of the officials of the other jurisdiction and the official will thus strive to extend his control to all aspects of the joint activity. Further, if the official shows himself to be relatively passive in his relations with the other government he may convey to his superiors, who control his career prospects, that he has lost his originality. Conflicts in joint activities cannot thus be attributed to the "perversity of civil servants" but rather to inherent factors in such situations. Such conflicts are more likely than otherwise to occur when able and zealous officials are involved.

2. It is characteristic of most joint activities that federal and provincial officials will disagree on the objectives of particular public policies and the appropriate means by which these may be pursued. In his analysis of conditional grants Corry asserted, "Hope for harmonious and efficient cooperation depends largely on the discovery of clear-cut objective criteria for measuring the activity — criteria which command agreement by their clarity. Such criteria are almost impossible to find."

3. When conflict between members of two independent bureaucracies occurs there is no hierarchical superior by whom the dispute can be expeditiously resolved. "The real advantage of unified administration

is that it provides a single authority which can break a deadlock and whose very existence is a deterrent to prolonged bickering."

Thus in the period prior to the Second World War there was little disposition to try systematically to overcome the disabilities of the Canadian constitutional structure by federal-provincial collaboration. The prevailing tradition of thought visualized what were regarded as desirable changes in the roles of the two levels being effected necessarily by amendment or changing patterns of judicial review or both. In harmony with its terms of reference, the Rowell-Sirois Commission was somewhat outside this framework of analysis but the Commission rejected cooperative federalism on the grounds that joint activities were almost inherently inefficient. The Green Book proposals presented by the federal government to the provinces at the Conference on Reconstruction in 1945 were the first coordinated set of recommendations for change in Canadian federalism which gave a central role to federal-provincial collaboration.

B. Postwar Canadian Federalism: The Dominance of Programme Collaboration

An exhaustive account of federal-provincial relations in contemporary Canada would include a description of the very large number of formal and informal collaborative arrangements dealing with specific policies and programmes and involving, on either a sporadic or continuous basis, officials from both levels of government and often representatives of local authorities and private specialists as well. At the more general level of policy, one might examine the activities of the Dominion Council of Health established by statute in 1919. This council consists of the most senior appointed health officials of the eleven governments. Over the years it has concerned itself with the most fundamental health matters. At the other end of the spectrum one could observe highly technical discussions between federal and provincial officials concerning the reporting of statistics of agricultural production or the control of forest fires. Many of these interactions take place within the framework of conditional grant arrangements which make almost inevitable the continuous collaboration of officials involved in particular functions.¹⁴ Most specialists in government and outside believe that much is to be gained by sharing knowledge and experiences with others in the same occupational group, quite apart from those with whom one works. Contemporary federal-provincial relations include a very great amount of this informal sharing.

The period immediately after the Second World War was particularly propitious for the development of widespread federal-provincial collaboration in respect to particular programmes and projects. For a variety of reasons, the federal government was more responsive than the provincial administrations to pressures for the extension of particular public activities within provincial legislative jurisdiction.

The distribution of tax sources and public revenues between the two levels and the relative prosperity of the times made it appear prudent to the federal authorities that they should assume heavy and continuing responsibilities for provincial matters. It had become a "given" fact that there was little prospect of constitutional adaptation through amendment or changing patterns of judicial review. The failure of the Dominion-Provincial Conferences of 1941 and 1945-46 seemed to demonstrate the impossibility of effecting a comprehensive redistribution of powers, functions and fiscal resources through agreement between the federal government and the provinces. There was little development of effective institutions and procedures for the coordination of basic federal and provincial policies either at the ministerial level or at the level of these appointed officials where concerns were broader than that of particular programmes. In such circumstances, the federal system could adjust to the demands made upon it only by piecemeal collaboration on specific and relatively narrowly-defined functions where cooperation was possible.

The growth of specialization and professionalism in the federal and provincial bureaucracies was an important element in both projecting the federal government into provincial matters and in providing a base for constructive intergovernmental collaboration. The federal civil service which emerged from the Second World War was both more competent and more activist than anything the country had seen before and its orientations were very much the same as those of the incumbent political leadership.¹⁵ Involvement in a particular public function not only puts officials in possession of a common body of techniques and knowledge but characteristically commits them to common policy preferences—the preferences of correctional officials for rehabilitative methods, of foresters for sustained-yield management, of social workers for general rather than categorical public assistance programmes, of professional economists for measures to maximize the gross national product. Such commitments are of course strengthened when all or most of the officials involved have a common pre-entry training and participate in common professional activities. Thus, within the limits set by the Canadian constitution and the policies of their respective governments, various communities of purpose developed concerning particular public activities. These groupings in health, public assistance, resource development, and so on have been of the greatest significance in aiding the federal system to adjust to the demands made upon it. What Seymour M. Lipset has said of bureaucracies generally is relevant to this kind of piecemeal adaptation, "Inherent in bureaucratic structures is a tendency to reduce conflicts to administrative decisions by experts, and thus over time bureaucratization facilitates the removing of objects from the political arena. Constant emphasis on the need for objective criteria as a basis for the settlement of conflicts enables bureaucracies to play a major mediating role."¹⁶ In its discussion of joint activities the Rowell-Sirois Commission, on the basis of previous Canadian experience, seriously underestimated the future possibilities of constructive federal-provincial collaboration. The commission argued that

except in a few circumstances, like those involving specialized health functions, it was unlikely that federal and provincial officials directly concerned could agree on criteria for action in such matters, and that because of this disagreement, the efficient administration of joint activities would be inhibited by conflicts which could be resolved only at the political level, if at all. This analysis almost completely disregarded the possibility of developing relatively autonomous communities of officials across jurisdictional lines, groups which would find it possible to agree and to collaborate effectively on matters involving broader considerations than purely technical ones. In the administration of conditional grant programmes particularly, the number of programme officials at the federal level concerned with the substantive aspects of jointly financed activities increased after the Second World War, and the attitudes and interests of these civil servants corresponded closely with those of their provincial collaborators directly responsible for the administration of these functions.

Although the week-to-week collaboration of federal and provincial officials concerned with relatively narrowly-defined activities remains an important element of the Canadian federal system, the trend in the past five years has been towards a structure of control which subsumes these activities under broader considerations. In some cases this development relates to specific policy areas. The discussions surrounding the Report of the Royal Commission on Health Services presented to the federal government in 1964 and the proposed Canada Assistance Act have given an impetus to overall coordination in these matters. Federal and provincial ministers of such functional departments as Labour, Welfare, Health and Agriculture now meet at fairly regular intervals where formerly collaboration took place mainly at the middle levels of the civil services. The contracting-out alternative has caused the grant-in-aid procedure to be considered in terms of more fundamental considerations than those directly related to individual aided activities. Conferences of the premiers and prime ministers and of groups of ministers have come increasingly to direct particular committees of officials to carry out specialized studies and to report their findings. Finally, the increasing importance of federal-provincial institutions in the field of fiscal collaboration makes it unlikely that in the foreseeable future federal-provincial relations in regard to specific functions will be as insulated from broad policy considerations as was the case in the previous decade.

It is impossible to make any accurate statistical statement of the increasing frequency and importance of federal-provincial and inter-provincial interactions. Edgar Gallant, director of the Federal-Provincial Relations Branch of the federal Department of Finance, in 1965 made an analysis of conferences and committees in seven categories.¹⁷

1. *Federal-provincial committees as such.* According to Gallant's classification there are about 100 of these committees and sub-

committees, with about 30 of them regional in nature and the others with members from the federal and all the provincial governments. In terms of hierarchical levels the following meetings were held in 1965:

Prime ministers and premiers	2
Ministers	13
Deputy ministers	14
Directors	27
Professional and technical	65

2. *Federal advisory councils.* These are committees constituted under federal statute or order-in-council to advise federal ministers. Such groups (e.g. the Dominion Council of Health and the National Council of Welfare) include representatives from the provincial administrations and sometimes from outside government.

3. *Quasi-independent associations.* These are bodies made up wholly or largely of ministers and civil servants and are supported by governments but are not federal-provincial bodies in the strict sense of the word (e.g. the Canadian Council of Resource Ministers and the Association of Canadian Fire Marshals).

4. *Interprovincial conferences.* Gallant reports that one compilation lists some 60 formally constituted interprovincial committees. In some cases federal observers attend these conferences.

5. *Provincial advisory committees.* In some provinces provincial committees have been set up with federal representation to advise on federal-provincial programmes in such fields as Indian Affairs and projects of ARDA (Agricultural and Rural Development Agency).

6. *Sub-committees.* These sub-committees, usually dealing with technical matters, have a direct reporting relation to some other committees. The Dominion Council of Health, for example, has set up several such groups.

7. *Non-governmental associations.* These organizations, such as the Institute of Public Administration of Canada and the Canadian Good Roads Association, are formally independent of government but are composed largely or wholly of public officials and are concerned with public policy matters.

C. The New Directions of Cooperative Federalism: Collaboration in General Policies

Federal-provincial collaboration in respect to specific programmes and projects can be distinguished from interactions related to more comprehensive public policies. The dominant participants in the former processes are members of programme agencies whose work is concerned with activities in such fields as public assistance, health and hospital insurance, vocational training and resource development. The latter kind of activity involves officials whose responsibilities are less particularistic—prime ministers and premiers and their

staff agencies, the federal and provincial Departments of Finance and Treasuries and public organizations concerned directly with economic planning and development. As we have seen, the period between the end of the Second World War and about 1960 was characterized by the dominance of programme collaboration in federal-provincial relations. The devising and implementing of these joint ventures were for the most part unrelated to each other, to broader federal and provincial objectives or to the division of tax sources and public revenues between the two levels. The working of the grant-in-aid device contributed to this particularism. The periodic negotiation of the tax agreements, it is true, was a procedure by which the more general directions of public policies could be resolved in what J. A. Corry has called "tolerable compromises."¹⁸ These interactions, however, at the non-technical levels of government at least, were of a somewhat sporadic nature and there was neither the will nor the institutional machinery to relate basic federal and provincial policies to each other on a continuing basis.

The development in the 1960s of new agencies and procedures for federal-provincial collaboration at the level of fundamental policy-making has been a response by the governments concerned to the following circumstances.

First, the fiscal problem has become more acute for both levels. These new urgencies will be dealt with later in this chapter.

Second, the interventionist policies in economic matters of both the federal and provincial governments have resulted in an increasing number of situations where the absence of collaboration can result in serious frustrations of the objectives of all the governments concerned. Cooperative federalism as it is evolving is a series of responses to this kind of basic interdependence.

Third, there has been a deepening awareness that the Canadian federal system is in crisis. So long as responsible elected and senior appointed officials could reasonably take the continuing existence of the federation for granted, it was possible for them to regard federal-provincial relations as a relatively technical field which did not merit their sustained concern. This circumstance has now passed.

The last six months of 1963 could be described as a watershed in the development of federal-provincial policy collaboration. The situation as it evolved was essentially this. The programme of the federal Liberal party in the 1963 general election included several promises about matters related directly or indirectly to provincial responsibilities—promises of a contributory old age pension plan, a municipal development and loan fund, a federal-provincial medical care programme, tax concessions for industries in depressed areas, and the establishment of an Economic Council, a Department of Industry and an Area Development Authority. It can reasonably be claimed that the Liberal programme was an extension of the New National Policy which emerged from the Second World War. Resolutions to implement several of the new government's election commitments were

introduced into the House of Commons at the session which began in May 1963. The subsequent objections of some of the provinces to federal initiatives in respect to the proposed contributory pensions and municipal loan fund plans were so vigorous that the federal and provincial governments met at Ottawa on July 26-27. At this meeting the federal authorities quickly agreed under provincial pressure to basic changes in the municipal loan scheme. The communiqué issued at the end of the conference expressed the agreement of the participants that meetings of the prime ministers and premiers should be held more regularly than in the past and that it was desirable "to establish more adequate machinery for maintaining federal-provincial contacts between such meetings." The actions of the federal authorities during and after the conference indicate that they had been convinced in a somewhat dramatic way that the former practice of unilateral initiatives in matters about which the provinces felt a vital concern should be replaced by prior federal-provincial consultations and that more effective procedures of continuing intergovernmental consultation were urgently needed.

At the Federal-Provincial Conference on November 26-29, 1963 the topic of "continuing federal-provincial liaison arrangements" was on the agenda. Unlike the practice at previous such meetings, it was agreed that this conference was to be the first of a series of gatherings and it was decided to reconvene early in the next year. The conference also agreed that the following joint investigations should be undertaken:

1. A joint study at the official level was to be made of fiscal arrangements and shared-cost programmes and the relations between the two.
2. The federal and provincial Ministers of Agriculture were to examine "proposals to permit the Canada-wide operation of agricultural marketing boards."
3. Discussions on contributory old age pensions were to continue.
4. There was to be an early meeting of the Ministers of Health to discuss hospital costs and other health matters.
5. A federal-provincial working group was to examine the joint operation of welfare programmes prior to further discussions by the relevant ministers.
6. There was to be a conference at the ministerial level to discuss Indian affairs in May 1964.

The two conferences of 1963 thus were a reflection of the new circumstances of cooperative federalism in which the prime ministers and premiers were more deeply and continuously involved in federal-provincial relations than before, and in which these leaders would meet at relatively short intervals to review matters of mutual concern and to charge more specialized groups at the ministerial and official levels with inquiring into and reporting on particular policies and

programmes. It had become apparent at the highest political levels in Ottawa and in most if not all of the provincial capitals that such relations were of crucial importance to the effective governing of these jurisdictions and even to the continued existence of the Canadian federation itself.

The policies of the federal government in the period after the crucial events of the latter months of 1963 illustrate the directions in which cooperative federalism had moved.

1. After some initial disputes, the federal government has consulted with the provinces in designating areas of low employment where new industries are given tax concessions and grants.
2. The federal statute of 1963 establishing the Economic Council of Canada required that body in carrying out its responsibilities to "seek full and regular consultations with appropriate agencies of the governments of the several Provinces."
3. In respect to a matter where there had been several unilateral federal initiatives in the past, Prime Minister Pearson offered at the conference of November 1963 to increase the maximum payments in which the federal authorities would share in the three categorical public assistance programmes and the maximum incomes of pensioners, if the provinces would agree to these measures.
4. The federal contributory retirement pension programme was under continuous discussion with the provinces until its provisions were enacted by Parliament in March 1965.
5. The federal government sponsored a meeting at the ministerial level with the provinces a month after the Royal Commission on Health Services presented its report in the summer of 1964.
6. Early in 1964 the federal Minister of Trade and Commerce convened a meeting of provincial ministers to invite them to give their views on trade policies and to discuss measures for the coordination of federal and provincial policies in these matters.
7. Detailed discussions regarding contracting-out took place in the spring and summer of 1964 and led to an agreement on this procedure.
8. In the summer of 1965 the provinces were consulted in advance on the Prime Minister's appeal for a slow-down in construction because of inflationary pressures.
9. In January 1966 the federal government accepted the principle that it should to a greater extent than in the past consult the provinces prior to signing conventions of the International Labour Organization.

The Speech from the Throne read to Parliament on April 5, 1965 contained several references to new federal initiatives in economic and social policy to be undertaken in collaboration with the provinces.¹⁹ After further consultations with the provinces a Canada assistance plan was to be implemented. It would provide for federal sharing in

the costs of comprehensive provincial programmes based on needs, regardless of the circumstances which occasioned such needs. The government committed itself to a programme "for the full utilization of our human resources and the elimination of poverty among our people" and announced its intention to convene a federal-provincial conference in this connection. The federal area development programme was to be expanded after consultation with the provinces. There were to be more aggressive federal policies to assist workers displaced by automation, measures to be taken in collaboration with labour and management and "where appropriate in conjunction with the provinces." Further federal-provincial meetings were to be held for the purpose of evolving measures so that all Canadians would receive the health services they needed regardless of their individual ability to pay. The Speech from the Throne also suggested new federal policies concerning major agricultural products to be evolved in cooperation with the provinces. The general direction of federal action in social and economic policies was thus towards a more precise definition of objectives than in the past, a definition which would assist those individuals, areas and groups that had been to a greater or lesser degree bypassed in the general circumstances of prosperity which prevailed since the Second World War. This more selective approach inevitably involved a very high degree of federal-provincial collaboration if the federal objectives were to be successfully pursued.

D. Procedures and Institutions of Federal-Provincial Collaboration

During the past few years the federal government and several provincial governments have developed new agencies for dealing with federal-provincial relations at the level of basic policy. These changes are a manifestation of the increasingly important roles of the prime ministers and premiers and their staff agencies and of the elected and senior appointed financial officials in interaction between federal and provincial administrations. Although ever since the 1930s students of Canadian federalism have recommended more institutionalized machinery for federal-provincial relations, the governments concerned showed little disposition to move in this direction until the 1960s. As we have seen, these relations were for the most part dominated by isolated patterns of collaboration in particular programmes and functions and by the periodic renegotiation of the five-year fiscal agreements. The new developments represent the prevailing conviction in government circles that federal-provincial relations are too important to be left to technicians. A brief account of the development of institutional machinery in the federal and the Quebec and Ontario governments demonstrates the organizational response to the new circumstances.

1. Federal government

A small Federal-Provincial Relations Division was established in the Department of Finance in 1954. The division became responsible

for the implementation of the fiscal agreements with the provinces, acted as a secretariat for the Federal-Provincial Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters after the latter body was established in 1955 and was given several other operating responsibilities in the same field.

In the past three years much more elaborate institutional machinery has been developed. Early in 1964 a small Federal-Provincial Secretariat was established in the Privy Council office under the direct supervision of the Clerk of the Privy Council. This agency provides secretariat services for federal-provincial conferences of prime ministers and premiers, for cabinet, and for other interdepartmental committees dealing with such matters. It is also directed to "keep in touch with, review and bring to the attention of the Prime Minister, ministers or departments any aspects or implications of present or proposed government policies which would be of interest or concern to the governments of the provinces."²⁰ The secretariat is also charged with providing for the provinces "a central point of contact with the federal government at the official level."

In the summer of 1964 the Deputy Provincial Treasurer of Saskatchewan resigned to become Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance with his major responsibilities in the field of federal-provincial fiscal relations and a strategic role as the secretary of the Tax Structure Committee. The federal "war on poverty" secretariat under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister has had important coordinating responsibilities in a great many fields of public activities where the provinces have legislative jurisdiction. The federal machinery is in process of rapid evolution. There is now a Cabinet Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations. At the official level there is a committee of senior appointed officials with representatives from the offices of the Prime Minister and the Privy Council, the Department of Finance and from other departments when matters concerning them are under discussion.

Two other federally-appointed groups concerned with basic fiscal and economic policies have also engaged in consultative relations with counterpart provincial agencies—the Economic Council of Canada has under its statutory terms of reference consulted with corresponding bodies responsible for advising provincial administrations in the field of economic planning and development; the federal Royal Commission on Taxation has been in close touch with counterpart fiscal commissions established by most of the provinces.

2. *Quebec*

A Department of Federal-Provincial Affairs was established in 1961. Premier Jean Lesage was Minister of the Department from its creation until he left office in 1966 when Premier Daniel Johnson assumed the portfolio. Lesage's deputy, Claude Morin, has played a strategic role in policy relations with the federal government and in inter-governmental groups dealing with various aspects of federal-provincial matters.

3. Ontario

A small research group, the Intergovernmental Relations Branch, was a part of the Department of Economics and Development established by statute in 1956. In 1956 this branch was transferred to the Treasury Department and came to be known as the Research and Statistics Branch with responsibilities in respect to federal-provincial and provincial-municipal financial relations and the preparation of the government's annual budget statement. A major change was made in 1965 with the appointment of Ian Macdonald as chief economist of the Department of Economics and Development with major responsibilities for coordinating research in federal-provincial relations and as a senior policy adviser to the government of Ontario in this field.

E. Institutions and Procedures for Coordinating Federal and Provincial Fiscal Policies

The fiscal problem in Canadian federalism has had several interrelated elements:

1. The sharing of tax fields between the federal and provincial governments;
2. The rates of federal and provincial taxation in tax fields which both occupy;
3. The distribution of federal revenues beyond those needed for functions with the legislative jurisdiction of Parliament among the provinces and local government authorities;
4. The coordination of the taxation and expenditure policies of all governments in the interests of economic stability and growth.

Besides these elements the current efforts in federal-provincial fiscal relations are directed toward attempts to secure agreement on priorities for major expenditures for the period 1967-72.

In this decade the fiscal relations of governments in Canada have become more crucial than ever before for the continuing stability, if not the existence, of Canadian federalism. The constantly increasing proportion of public expenditures made and of the public debt held by provincial and local governments has made federal fiscal and monetary policies less effective than before in ensuring economic stability and growth, unless the other levels pursue complementary policies. The reforms undertaken by the government of Quebec are very expensive and its demands for fiscal autonomy are insistent. The demands for higher public expenditures on such matters as education, medical services, welfare, roads, urban renewal and resources development are of such dimensions that even in a prosperous economy they cannot be met without increases in the rates of taxation. In such circumstances pressures on one level are almost immediately transmitted to demands on one or both of the others. Because of these forces at work, it is reasonable to suppose that the country will pay a very heavy price in

terms of economic growth and stability and that conflicts among governments will become intolerably severe unless more effective means are found to ensure at least minimum measures of intergovernmental fiscal collaboration.

Little progress was made in establishing effective machinery for federal-provincial fiscal collaboration in the decade after the Second World War. At the Federal-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, Premier Drew of Ontario pressed for a continuing "Dominion-Provincial Economic Board" of technical advisers appointed by both levels with major responsibilities in the fiscal field.²¹ In succeeding years both the Ontario government and those of some other provinces made similar proposals. The federal government remained cool to such suggestions and may have been under the kind of apprehension about a "super-cabinet" voiced by Prime Minister King in 1935. The continuing prosperity of the nation and the sporadic nature of the renegotiation of the tax agreements every few years made the need for federal-provincial coordination in fiscal matters less urgent than it later became.

The Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters was established by action of the Federal-Provincial Conference of 1955. There appear to have been two influences working towards the creation of such a body. The disadvantages of inadequate preparatory staff work for the intermittent meetings of ministers had become recognized. Furthermore, there was need for more institutionalized channels for transmitting opinions and information between the two levels. The press communiqué issued by the conference described the continuing committee's role in the following terms:

By general agreement the Conference established a committee of federal and provincial officials to meet from time to time to exchange information and examine technical problems in the field of federal-provincial fiscal and economic relations. Representation on this committee will be designated by the Prime Minister or Premier of each government respectively and the chairman will be designated by the Prime Minister of Canada. The Committee will not take collective action but each of its members will report to his own government on the subjects discussed.²²

The committee has generally met twice a year. It is usually chaired by the federal Deputy Minister of Finance and the provincial representatives are the Deputy Provincial Treasurers or their counterparts. Secretariat services are provided by the Federal-Provincial Relations Division of the federal Department of Finance. A former member of the latter agency has thus described the committee:

Much of the Committee's work is concentrated in the areas of concurrent or overlapping jurisdiction and administration. Since the members are at the deputy minister level they are concerned with "top level administration, which is sometimes almost indistinguishable from policy questions. . . ." The committee members agree on facts, clarify problems, discuss memoranda submitted by members, but make no independent decisions, take no votes, exercise

no executive powers as a committee, do not lobby as a body and do not bind their principals in any way. They do however pursue a consensus of views, and a collective judgement, indulge in co-operative studies, and participate in the fiscal discussions that constitute the bulk of their daily responsibilities.²³

On at least two occasions the committee has been charged with special studies—in 1959 it was asked to report on the rationalization of the accounting and reimbursement procedures related to shared-cost programmes; and in 1964 it was charged with working out the general directions of studies to be undertaken by the newly-created Tax Structure Committee and the methods and assumptions governing the preparation of these studies. As well as its responsibilities in the field of fiscal relations, the Continuing Committee has been a useful channel for sharing information and opinions about economic circumstances and economic policies and at each meeting members report on the economic situations in their respective jurisdictions. Most important of all, the activities of the committee have brought the senior appointed financial officials to the point where they know each other and appreciate each other's problems.

A Committee of Provincial Treasurers and Ministers of Finance was constituted in 1959. This group met twice in that year but not again until the fall of 1963. On the latter occasion it was constituted as a sub-committee of the Federal-Provincial Conference to discuss the fiscal and economic outlook for the coming year. It was similarly convened in the next two years. Apparently in the last meeting the ministers discussed the perspectives and policies of their respective governments with a greater degree of frankness than ever before.

The establishment of the Tax Structure Committee at the Federal-Provincial Conference of October 1964 was a new departure in the evolution of fiscal coordination. The committee was to be chaired by the federal Minister of Finance and was to include two other federal ministers and the provincial treasurers or ministers of finance. The committee was charged with reporting early in 1966 to the conference which established it on the following matters.

1. Trends to be expected during 1967-72 by the federal government, the provinces and the municipalities, taking into account the broad priorities likely to be accorded by governments to expenditures on major programmes that will compete for available funds;
2. The problems involved in financing these expenditures and their relationship to the economic circumstances to be expected, the probable levels of costs of public services and facilities, and the prospective levels of government debt;
3. The general policy to be followed in respect of shared-cost programmes during the period 1967-72;
4. The tax fields that should be used exclusively by the federal government and by the provinces and municipalities, and the fields in which joint occupancy is desirable;
5. The arrangements to be made in respect of jointly occupied tax fields;

6. The relation of equalization grants to the fiscal requirements and fiscal capacities of the provinces, and the best equalization arrangements for the period 1967-72;

7. Future intergovernmental liaison on fiscal and economic matters;

8. Other related matters.

The Tax Structure Committee is unique in the development of federal-provincial fiscal relations in several ways.

First, it has been given collective responsibility for recommending policies of crucial importance to the federal-provincial conferences. It was explicitly asserted in the terms of reference of the Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters that this body would have no such corporate role and that the individual members would report to their respective governments.

Second, the committee is charged with the task of devising a fiscal and economic settlement much broader in scope than previous fiscal agreements concluded since 1942. These agreements related only to a limited field of tax sources and did not explicitly take into account shared-cost programmes or the expenditure priorities of the various governments.

Third, the committee has proceeded by much more sophisticated staff work than has accompanied federal-provincial relations in the past. Each government has made expenditure and revenue projections until 1972 according to common techniques so that these figures for all jurisdictions will be comparable. The committee, as opposed to previous such bodies, has a working instead of a recording secretary and has a small technical secretariat working in Ottawa under its direction.

It is impossible to make any evaluation of how the Tax Structure Committee will discharge the responsibilities assigned to it. Those involved in its work hope that the agreements already reached on basic economic assumptions and the availability of comparable revenue and expenditure projections will tend to limit conflicts between the federal and provincial governments. All the governments are aware of the serious consequences of failure to agree on some very fundamental matters. The senior appointed officials are involved in a process of sustained collaboration and have come to know each other and each other's problems very well. On the other hand, the terms of reference of the committee charge it with finding agreement on matters of the most basic political choice for all 11 governments, particularly as these relate to expenditure priorities. It can be expected that the objectives of the governments about such matters will not be easy to reconcile. It can be expected also that these governments will be somewhat reluctant to surrender their freedom of action.

F. Policy Conflicts in Federal-Provincial Relations

The federal system, if it is to survive, must evolve procedures for bringing about tolerable compromises in matters where there are conflicts of interest between the federal authorities and those of one or more of the provinces. The most intractable of these conflicts are *real* in the sense that they are usually imposed by the differing responsibilities that federal and provincial officials have assumed and cannot be wished away by incantations against the alleged irrationalities or perversities of individuals. More than at any time since Confederation, the federal government and the provinces now confront each other in areas of public activity where each has explicitly formulated policies. Each is now able to frustrate the other more than at any time in the past. On the basis of past events and current developments federal-provincial disagreement may be expected in respect to such matters as those listed below.

1. Policies of the federal government and the provinces may differ about the appropriate degree of the mobility of labour and capital within Canada and about public policies encouraging or limiting such mobility.

2. In some cases provinces may desire closer integration with contiguous areas of the United States than is compatible with the economic objectives of the federal government.

3. Some of the provinces and the federal government may put different priorities on economic development as against price stability.

4. With respect to certain kinds of capital expenditures the primary concern of the federal government may be the impact on employment and income, while the provinces are chiefly concerned with the need for roads, schools, hospitals and other amenities and, in some cases, with the continuing financial stability of the local authorities that borrow to make such expenditures.

5. Some of the provinces may work toward the development of more autonomous provincial or regional economies than are deemed consistent with federal objectives.

6. The federal government and the provinces may differ about the degree of interprovincial or interregional equalization that it is possible or desirable to effect and about appropriate federal measures to be implemented to this end.

7. The federal government and the provinces may differ about particular federal measures which benefit some areas but which either do not help other areas or adversely affect them.

8. Provinces may wish to enter into patterns of trade, investment and other relations with foreign nations inconsistent with economic or non-economic objectives of the federal government.

9. Federal policies for economic development in areas where income and employment are low may conflict with provincial regional development plans.

G. Interprovincial Cooperation

There has been little systematic study of interprovincial relations in Canada.²⁴ There are it seems many instances of interprovincial cooperation for limited purposes and undoubtedly the increasingly frequent interactions of provincial officials in the federal-provincial context facilitate such collaboration. It is only since the beginning of the annual premiers' conferences in 1960, however, that the provincial leaders have had a forum in which to discuss problems of common interest.

In his opening statement to the 1960 Federal-Provincial Conference, Premier Lesage asserted that "the provinces share with one another an increasing number of common problems that they could profitably study together and also, we hope, solve together."²⁵ Because of this, the Quebec government would extend an early invitation to the premiers to convene to study these problems and to decide whether it would be appropriate to "establish inter-provincial relations on a permanent basis." The Quebec hope was that this invitation would be accepted and that in the future "the provinces will be able to prepare, at first in collaboration with one another and then in collaboration with the Federal Government, long term solutions which, while effectively settling problems, will also maintain the balance in our federation."²⁶ The first interprovincial conference in recent years met on December 1-2, 1960, and in succeeding years meetings have been held at the invitation of different provinces each August. Prime Minister Diefenbaker was invited to attend the first conference but declined to do so and the communiqué at the end of the meeting expressed the hope that in the future a federal cabinet minister might come. This has not happened but the federal government has sent appointed officials as observers. Until 1963 it sent the head of the Federal-Provincial Relations Division of the Department of Finance, and in 1964 and 1965 the Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance whose chief responsibilities are with fiscal relations and the head of the Federal-Provincial Secretariat in the Privy Council Office.

The premiers' conferences are held in private and it is possible to discover the topics under discussion only through newspaper reports and the brief communiqués issued at the end of each meeting. Some of the matters under review have been the financing of schools and hospitals, the coordination of retail sales tax collections, projects for the Centennial of Canada celebration, provincial policies of giving preferences to provincial firms in bidding for government contracts, Indian affairs, off-shore mineral rights, uniform regulations for motor vehicle insurance and the reciprocal recognition of truck licences, and the coordination of educational standards and curricula. Two collaborative projects of considerable significance have resulted from the premiers' conferences.

First, at the 1963 meeting in Halifax the provincial leaders approved in principle a proposal for the interprovincial exchange of civil servants. This proposal originated with the Institute of

Public Administration of Canada and is to be implemented in cooperation with that organization.

Second, in January 1965 representatives of all the provinces except Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick met with federal officials in Toronto to discuss the possibilities of uniform and reciprocal legislation relating to private pensions plans. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting stated that "general technical agreement" had been reached among the provinces in attendance in respect to their future pensions legislation. These matters related to the solvency of private pensions funds, provisions for vesting and locking-in employer contributions, and reciprocal agreements so that the registration, inspection and audit of each private plan need be carried on by only one province.

The premiers' meetings are very informal. In contrast with the federal-provincial conferences of heads of government, the provincial leaders generally attend with not more than two advisers each.²⁷ Despite what seems to have been the original hopes of the government of Quebec, most if not all of the other provinces have been most reluctant to try to agree on matters of federal-provincial concern before discussion of these matters with federal authorities. There has not been any support either for the establishment of more formal inter-provincial machinery. The premiers' meetings have undoubtedly provided a useful forum for the discussion of common problems and to a limited degree have been a vehicle for reaching agreement on specific matters of mutual concern. It is unlikely, however, that in the foreseeable future the major decisions facing Canadian federalism will be removed from the context of federal-provincial relations.

In both the Atlantic and Prairie provinces progress has been made towards interprovincial cooperation in dealing with regional problems.

First, there is a well-established tradition of collaboration in the Atlantic region at the official level and also through private associations that work in close collaboration with the governments involved.²⁸ The Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, a private body, prepares research studies, makes representations to the federal government on behalf of the region, organizes trade fairs and trade missions and publishes the *Atlantic Provinces Statistical Review*. The premiers of the four provinces have met annually since 1956 and have made progress towards finding agreement on a common regional viewpoint in their dealings with the federal authorities. The economic difficulties of the region and the small size of each of its provinces have resulted in a more extensive pattern of interprovincial cooperation both in governmental institutions and other organizations than prevails elsewhere in Canada.

Second, in October 1965 the Prairie Economic Council was established by the premiers of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The council is to meet at least every six months and is to consist of the premiers assisted in each case by another cabinet minister. Among the matters dealt with at the first meeting were the following:

1. An agreement to abolish provincial preferences on public purchases and contracts;
2. Certain studies of the Saskatchewan-Nelson Basin;
3. Measures towards the expansion and greater utilization of the Port of Churchill;
4. Agreements toward coordination in higher education, particularly as this bore on "newly developing fields and disciplines";
5. Measures toward eliminating discriminatory practices affecting interprovincial trucking;
6. Measures relating to regional tourist development; an inventory of provincial policies in the industrial and natural resource fields; and the wider use of certain specialized health facilities in Winnipeg.

It thus seems that in its initial aspects at least interprovincial cooperation on the prairies will be less oriented towards presenting a common regional front to the federal government than has been the case in the Atlantic provinces.²⁹

H. Cooperative Federalism and the Lesage Administration

The directions taken by the Lesage administration which came to power in Quebec in 1960 were of crucial importance in developing federal institutions in Canada. In order to understand the objectives and strategies in federal-provincial relations of this political leadership it is useful to say something about the previous Quebec administration.

The Duplessis government waged a stubborn battle for provincial autonomy. It opposed the centralized plan for domestic reform presented to the Federal-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction; it refused to cooperate in several federal grant-in-aid programmes; it forbade Quebec universities to accept federal per capita grants from 1952 onward; it opposed unilateral amendments to the constitution such as those effected by the federal authorities in 1943, 1946 and 1949; and it consistently challenged the appropriateness in peacetime at least of federal income taxes and succession duties. Provincial autonomy was one of the most influential elements in the electoral appeal of the Union Nationale.³⁰ On the other hand, this strategy did not produce the result of restricting the growth of federal influence, apart from the partial victory of Mr. Duplessis in 1954 when after a prolonged struggle with the federal authorities the permissible rebate on the federal personal income tax for residents of a province with its own tax was raised from 5 to 10 per cent. The reasons for this failure are complex. Fundamentally, however, the defect in the provincial strategy was that the government of Quebec opposed centralization on dogmatic constitutional grounds and failed to use the effective range of provincial autonomy for positive purposes. The

extension of federal power was not effectively challenged precisely because in this period the federal government was more responsive than the province in meeting urgently-felt social and economic needs.

In contrast, the Lesage administration was more aggressively interventionist than any provincial government has ever been in Canadian history. It proceeded on the assumption that the French Canadian community could thrive only by coordinated and sophisticated provincial activity concerning a wide range of social and economic matters. This circumstance imposed demands on Canadian federal institutions to which they had never before been subjected and raised a new set of issues in the political relations between the two cultural communities.³¹ The defence of provincial autonomy has very different consequences in Quebec or elsewhere when a province pursues interventionist policies over a broad range of social, cultural and economic matters than when the scope of provincial action is narrower.

There were pressures for provincial autonomy in four directions supported by the Lesage administration.

First, there was the demand that the federal authorities cease their involvement in matters within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces as defined by the constitution. Mr. Lesage gave this rationale at the Federal-Provincial Conference of November 1963:

. . . we must exercise constant vigilance. Nobody in Quebec believes that a given measure — aid to municipalities, the contributory pensions programme, or federal assistance to technical education, for example — can, in itself, lead French-Canada to assimilation by the English-speaking majority. Nor does anyone believe that any of these measures, taken simply, is of a nature to threaten our entire cultural heritage. However, we must be systematically opposed to any federal move, whatever it may be, that reduces, in fact, or attacks the field of provincial jurisdiction. We absolutely cannot, even if it concerns a question which appears to be only a secondary one, remain passive in the face of federal initiatives which we judge to be detrimental to the exercise of powers entrusted to the provinces. In fact, it is the whole of these measures that must be considered, and it is against each of the items comprising the whole that we must be opposed, because each item is a threat to the autonomy of the provinces, a threat which constitutes a precedent which is later on invoked to justify further threats of increasingly detrimental effect.³²

The contracting-out procedure which was analyzed in Chapter V went some distance in meeting this dimension of Quebec's demands for autonomy. In the six months before it left office the Lesage government had adopted the position that it had the right to contract out of any future federal initiatives in matters within provincial jurisdiction without incurring any obligation to expend the proceeds of the fiscal equivalent of the service in question or to conform to country-wide standards in providing it.

Second, Quebec pressed both for an increased share of the direct tax fields and for higher unconditional grants. The programme of reform to which the province was committed was very expensive. Between 1955 and 1965 Quebec expenditures increased by 270 per cent, more than those of any other province, and between 1954 and 1963 the direct provincial debt increased by 120 per cent.³³ The argument often used by the Quebec government was that the centralized system of access to tax sources which still prevailed was a legacy from the war and immediate postwar period when the most important public needs were met by the federal authorities. It argued further that under the existing circumstances those matters dealt with by the provinces were of higher social priority than federal activities.

Third, the Quebec government demanded that it be consulted in respect to important federal economic policies. At the Federal-Provincial Conference of November 1963 Mr. Lesage asserted:

. . . the provinces should always be consulted by the federal government each time the latter wishes to effect policies which could have a repercussion on the economy of the provinces. Actually, there are few economic problems which are exclusively federal in their bearing. Economic policy measures almost always influence the provinces. Consequently, the provinces can no longer be satisfied with a passive role in such matters, nor can they resign themselves to suffer the consequences of unexpected, arbitrary federal decisions in which they have had no voice.³⁴

Mr. Lesage more specifically demanded that the provinces "should have their voice in determining tariff structures, transportation and even the monetary policies of Canada" and this should come through participation in "permanent Federal-Provincial organisms instituted for this purpose." The increasing involvement of the Quebec government in economic direction and control brought about many situations in which provincial objectives could be frustrated by inappropriate policies or actions of the federal government. Out of this circumstance came the Quebec demand to be consulted by the federal authorities about a very broad range of matters.

Fourth, the Quebec government asserted the right to participate directly and without federal control in international relations where these relations concerned matters within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. Under the Canadian constitution as judicially interpreted the power to enact legislation implementing treaties or other international agreements follows the normal lines of delineation contained in Sections 91, 92, 93 and 95 of the British North America Act, *i.e.* Parliament cannot extend its jurisdiction to include what would otherwise be provincial matters on the basis of a claim that the projected legislation relates to some international arrangement. The position of the Lesage government respecting this aspect of the constitution was articulated by the Honourable Paul G  rin-Lajoie in April 1965 " . . . there is no reason why the right to implement an international agreement should be dissociated from the right to conclude this agreement. This is a case of two essential

steps in the one, single operation."³⁵ The practical consequences of this point of view were that the federal authorities should cease to "exert a kind of supervision and adventitious control over Quebec's international relations" and that Quebec should participate directly in international bodies — presumably like UNESCO and WHO — dealing with matters under the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. The justification for the assertion of the "personnalité internationale" of Quebec was given succinctly by Mr. Gérin-Lajoie in an interview with *Le Devoir* printed in the edition of May 1, 1965:

. . . le gouvernement fédéral du Canada s'est montré incapable d'établir un contact étroit entre l'étranger et la communauté canadienne-française. Pour des raisons démographiques et historiques, le gouvernement fédéral représente une entité plus anglophone que francophone. La situation géographique de notre pays, les liens économiques étroits qui l'unissent à son puissant voisin du sud, sa participation soutenue aux activités du Commonwealth contribuent à orienter son action plus naturellement en fonction des préoccupations du monde anglo-saxon. Aussi est-ce surtout par le seul gouvernement francophone d'Amérique continentale, celui du Québec, que l'on peut établir un contact réel et fécond avec la collectivité qu'il représente.

J'ajouterai que le gouvernement fédéral, dans sa politique extérieure, s'est montré moins respectueux de la dualité canadienne que dans sa politique intérieure, ce qui n'est pas peu dire.

The Quebec government elected in 1960 pursued its substantive objectives in federal-provincial relations with sophistication and a very high degree of success. The essential strategy of the government was to attempt to extend its range of effective discretion by political and administrative means rather than to oppose the federal authorities on dogmatic constitutional grounds. In a revealing speech in the Legislative Assembly of Quebec on February 11, 1966 Premier Lesage spoke in these terms of the alternative strategies:

. . . le réalisme est une condition de succès dans les relations fédérales-provinciales. Mais d'abord quelles sont les attitudes en présence. À ce sujet, on peut chez nous distinguer en gros deux attitudes. L'attitude formaliste qui met l'accent sur les cadres juridiques qui doivent déterminer les relations entre le Québec et le reste du Canada.

L'attitude pratique, ou si l'on veut fonctionnelle, qui met l'accent sur les moyens de tout genre grâce auxquels le Québec pourra s'affirmer pleinement.

En vertu de la première attitude, on oriente exclusivement ses efforts vers l'action constitutionnelle et on accorde une importance exagérée à des questions juridiques. Ainsi, on décide a priori que pour s'épanouir vraiment, le Québec doit ou bien être séparé du reste du pays, ou bien être un État associé, ou bien jouir d'un statut particulier par rapport aux autres provinces. Et cela décidé, a priori, on utilise la plus grande partie de son énergie à définir des mots et à discuter de concepts théoriques.

C'est là, à mon sens, une attitude idéaliste qui satisfait ou qui peut satisfaire l'esprit, mais qui ne peut pas être efficace, car elle risque constamment de perdre de vue la réalité.

L'attitude pratique de son côté est fondée sur le point de vue que le Québec peut s'affirmer par une action économique, sociale, politique, administrative et constitutionnelle. Selon les circonstances, l'accent est mis sur l'un ou l'autre type d'action. Aucune n'exclut les autres ou ne leur est a priori supérieure. La vie en société est trop complexe pour qu'il existe une seule solution à tous les problèmes. Ceux qui ne pensent qu'à un type d'action (constitutionnelle, sociale, économique, administrative) peuvent être amenés à négliger les autres. De cette façon alors, ils rendent plus aléatoire le succès de leurs efforts. Il faut donc toucher à tous les aspects et ne pas s'attacher théoriquement à des concepts dans un cadre ou dans un champ donné. . . .

Le gouvernement actuel du Québec a choisi l'attitude pratique.³⁶

The decision of the Government of Quebec that the Fulton-Favreau formula for constitutional amendment should not be submitted to the legislature of the province for approval could reasonably be interpreted as a conviction on the part of the administration that for the immediate future at least Quebec could advance its interests effectively within the existing constitutional framework. The previous Quebec defence of the formula had been partly on the grounds that it would facilitate substantive amendments to the constitution desired by the province. If it is assumed that the absence of a new amending procedure will make such amendments less likely than otherwise, the Quebec position could be viewed as one which did not regard explicit constitutional changes as being urgent.

The Lesage government acted on the assumption that its objectives in its relations with the federal authorities and those of the other provinces could best be pursued through the development of new institutions of intergovernmental collaboration. Three kinds of organization were at one time or another proposed by the Quebec government.

First, at the Federal-Provincial Conference of 1960 and subsequently the government suggested that there be established a federal-provincial secretariat financed and controlled by the participating governments.

Second, the Lesage administration at the 1960 conference recommended regular meetings of provincial leaders and in general more permanent and institutionalized machinery for interprovincial cooperation.

Third, at the Federal-Provincial Conference of 1963 Premier Lesage requested that there be established machinery by which the provinces might participate in the framing of federal transportation, tariff and "even" monetary policies. The Quebec government had a pronounced predilection in intergovernmental relations for "cooperation at the summit." There appeared to be a pronounced suspicion of functional relations between the two levels outside a framework of articulation

on basic policy matters. In speaking of economic coordination at the 1963 conference Mr. Lesage asserted, "The present policy of making decisions behind hermetically closed doors in the different sectors of the government is no longer at all acceptable."³⁷ Professor F.-A. Angers in his comments on the establishment of the Quebec Department of Federal-Provincial Relations in 1961 asserted what appeared to have been the view of the government of the province in respect to functional interactions between the two levels:

The coming into being of such a Department will, without doubt, give an altogether new character to relations between the Quebec Government and the government at Ottawa and of the other provinces. Up to now, it was on the technical level, that cooperation was established out of necessity between the different provinces and the central government. Within the limits of a more or less clearly defined policy according to each case, the superior officers and expert technicians of the various departments concerned correspond among themselves and meet in conference to determine standards or establish rules to coordinate efforts, whenever such steps are deemed necessary. In many instances, when a well-defined policy is not dictated by the governments themselves, it is these officers and technicians who, for all practical purposes, frame policy. In these circumstances there is always the risk of the policy being drawn up to meet urgent needs or to satisfy purely administrative or technical requirements. Lacking more precise ideas, the Minister automatically ratifies the decisions taken by his officers.

From now on, a Minister and a qualified staff will examine the policy-making aspects of intergovernment relations in Canada. . . . They will have to see that problems are faced as a consequence of principles or rules of policy. They will have technicians implementing provincial policy rather than abandoning policy to technical exigencies.³⁸

The department of which Professor Angers was speaking was an institutional recognition of the Quebec distrust of piecemeal functional relations between governments outside a basic policy framework and a predilection for conducting intergovernmental affairs in a quasi-diplomatic fashion. Premier Lesage was Minister of Federal-Provincial Relations after the establishment of the department, as well as being Minister of Finance. His Deputy, Claude Morin, and the small but highly-trained staff of officials in the department have no precise counterparts in the federal or the other provincial administrations. The "style" of federal-provincial relations as carried on by the Lesage government was thus significantly different from that between the other provinces and Ottawa. In both the federal and the other provincial governments there is a tradition, never so firmly established in Quebec, that federal-provincial relations at the level of basic policy are mainly the concern of treasury and finance departments. Functional relationships between specialized Quebec agencies and their provincial counterparts have in many cases been less close than is the case in the other provinces and some further attenuation

of these relations may come as new contracting-out arrangements are implemented. Most important perhaps, the government of Quebec, alone of the provincial administrations, pursued provincial autonomy for cultural and ideological reasons.

The institutions and procedures we described in the last chapter are evolving rapidly. Cooperative federalism is in essence a series of pragmatic and piecemeal responses by the federal and provincial governments to the circumstances of their mutual interdependence. We will try in this chapter to evaluate this evolving system of relations in answer to three kinds of general questions.

First, what are the general preconditions of success in cooperative federalism?

Second, what are the relative possibilities of cooperative federalism and explicit constitutional reform in meeting the demands for change in the Canadian federal system?

Third, what are the possibilities of the ongoing procedures of cooperative federalism in meeting the demands of English and French Canadians and of securing the survival of the Canadian federal union?

A. Circumstances of Success

1. Public policy effectiveness

There can be little disagreement with the general proposition that if liberal-democratic institutions are to survive they must somehow find ways of dealing with the very great number of varied and often contradictory demands made upon them, and that only by demonstrating such effectiveness can enough support be generated among the politically influential elements of democratic communities to ensure the long-run continuance of these institutions. In federal systems the individual jurisdictions must not only learn to respond effectively to demands upon them but must also evolve adequate means of central-regional articulation to cope with the circumstances of the interdependence of the two levels. Such articulation can take two forms, coordination and consultation.

Coordination is the process by which a complex of public activities is ordered according to some set of goals or priorities. Coordination relates both to the ranking itself and the subsequent actions to implement these decisions.

Consultation is the process by which officials and public agencies, with some significant degree of both independent discretion and mutual interdependence, communicate to each other their respective perceptions of situations and their judgements of the appropriate way of dealing with these situations. Coordination will be facilitated by effective procedures of consultation but does not always result from them.

Coordination and consultation in respect to public policy are of course easier to achieve when only one jurisdiction is involved and when, in principle at least, activities can be ordered through one hierarchical structure of authority than when, as in a federal system, the participants have legal and political safeguards for their independent positions. Within a hierarchical system authorized channels of communication are usually provided, although other patterns grow up through deliberate design or otherwise. Hierarchy also provides formal procedures by which solutions may be imposed in the absence of agreement and, as J. A. Corry pointed out many years ago, the very existence of these procedures may inhibit "bickering."¹ The relations between the federal and provincial governments cannot of course proceed within a pattern of hierarchical authority. On the surface, it would seem that the processes of joint decision-making which characterize cooperative federalism must lead almost inevitably to delays and frustrations in the framing and implementation of public policy.

Despite the inherent difficulties in working the institutions of cooperative federalism, it is significant that in the past two years a very large volume of public policy has resulted from the collaborative procedures. Agreements of fundamental importance have been reached in respect to contracting-out, public contributory pension plans and important aspects of economic direction and control. Important changes appear to be coming in the fields of medical insurance and public assistance. The agreement to set up the Tax Structure Committee was a major achievement in this direction and one can be reasonably optimistic that this committee will have some measure of success in attaining the ambitious objectives set out in its terms of reference. I am not here stating that these actual and anticipated policies resulting from the processes of cooperative federalism were the appropriate responses of the governments concerned to the demands upon them. Rather, I would argue that the record indicates that these procedures of joint decision-making have not in the recent past imposed insuperable barriers to the formulation and implementation of public policies of fundamental importance.

Consultative procedures leading to federal-provincial policy coordination are extraordinarily subtle and one cannot predict with any

assurance the form which the most effective of these procedures will take. What seems reasonably certain, however, is that the establishment of administrative machinery, even though ingenious, will not of itself bring about constructive relations. The following general points can be made:

1. Consultation leading to effective coordination will be facilitated when the participants can speak authoritatively for their respective governments. This does not mean that the officials involved have received explicit "instructions" from their governments on every matter under discussion; such a formal requirement would inhibit effective consultation. What is necessary is that the participants perceive each other as persons closely in touch with the perspectives of their respective administrations and with some degree of influence in determining these perspectives. There is also the requirement, that is probably not completely fulfilled in any of the governments, that effective procedures of cabinet and treasury control be maintained so that programme agencies and programme goals are subordinated to more comprehensive goals. As we saw in Chapter VII, a complex pattern of functional relations has developed between counterpart agencies of the two levels and in some circumstances those involved in these relations may resist attempts to subsume their activities under less particularistic goals. Although the effective articulation of federal and provincial objectives involves these functional interactions being sustained and in some cases strengthened, effective relations concerning more comprehensive kinds of public policies require greater measures of overhead control than have been developed in some jurisdictions.

2. Consultation and coordination will be facilitated when the participants come to share as much of a common frame of reference as is compatible with their continuing loyalty to their respective governments. Federal-provincial collaboration in respect to a very large number of specific programmes and projects has been possible largely because those involved were members of the same professions or sub-professions. Such membership characteristically means not only the common possession of specialized knowledge and techniques but also commitment to certain public-policy preferences. When matters of more fundamental political and economic choice are at issue it is unreasonable to expect that federal-provincial agreement can be reached in terms of such professional criteria, although agreement on matters of economic policy is more likely than otherwise if the elected and appointed officials involved are relatively sophisticated in the ways of contemporary economic analysis. However, a prolonged period of constructive relationships between the elected and appointed officials of the federal and provincial governments can be expected to result in a kind of community being developed, a community with its own characteristic perspectives and procedures and with its own subtle ways of distributing status and influence among its members. This development will of course be encouraged if the membership in such a group becomes relatively stable and if there is some movement of

personnel among the governments involved. It is obvious that the growth of community is dependent upon the politicians of the federal and provincial governments continuing to support such kinds of collaborative behaviour.

3. Consultation and minimum levels of coordination will be facilitated if the participants are more committed to the substantive results of particular policies than to enhancing the influence of their respective governments. Cooperative federalism requires a high degree of pragmatism, even opportunism, among those officials involved in federal-provincial relations as to what functions each level should perform. Thus any assumption by federal officials that decisions by the central government are somehow inherently "better" or more legitimate than those of the provinces is clearly incompatible with effective federal-provincial collaboration. Conversely, if some or all of the provinces carry out a persistent policy of attempting to extend their range of discretion at the expense of the federal authorities, the prerequisites of cooperative federalism are challenged in the most fundamental way. Any effective system of federal-provincial relations must of course deal with circumstances in which there are conflicts between the interests of the governments involved. It is only realistic to recognize that these differences characteristically arise from the divergent responsibilities these jurisdictions have assumed rather than from the perversity of the authorities of one level or the other. However, no government can be a constructive collaborator in the enterprise if its overriding objective is to decrease its dependence on the others regardless of the consequences of such actions for the substantive results of public policy.

4. Effective consultation leading to at least limited measures of coordination will be facilitated if the participating governments are predisposed to include the objectives of the others within their own priorities. Let us take a simple example. Assume federal-provincial discussions about a proposed measure where the result would be to increase municipal borrowing for capital purposes. Assume further that the primary objectives of the federal authorities relate to the income and employment aspects of these expenditures and that the first aim of the provinces is to safeguard the financial solvency of the municipalities. If each government presses its primary aim to the exclusion of the concerns of the other it is likely that these will prove incompatible, to a greater or lesser degree. But let us make more optimistic assumptions that either before or as a result of intergovernmental consultations (a) the provinces recognize both that the increase in aggregate demand expected to result from the measure is desirable and that the federal authorities have a legitimate interest in ensuring full employment, (b) the federal government shows a genuine interest in the continuing financial stability of the municipalities and a sympathetic appreciation of provincial concern for this objective. Under such circumstances effective consultation can lead to a solution which includes both federal and provincial aims,

a solution agreed upon against a background of mutual respect among the governments concerned for the constitutional responsibilities of each other.

5. Consultation will be facilitated when for the most part it takes place within a framework of confidentiality and when both formally and informally the governments come to share with each other information about situations and their appreciation of these situations which are not available to the public. It does not seem necessary to argue that the processes of federal-provincial collaboration and consultation about fundamentals cannot be successful unless to some considerable degree they can take place without publicity until agreements are reached. The sharing of information and views among the officials must be continuous and it is impossible to defend the situation which existed in the past where the federal authorities were prepared to share these more freely with friendly foreign governments than with provincial administrations. In the present context of federal-provincial relations, however, the federal government appears more sensitive to provincial responsibilities which may have significant implications for federal policies than at least some of the provinces.

In general, the relative success of cooperative federalism in recent years in harmonizing to some tolerable degree the objectives of the federal and provincial governments has depended much more on the attitudes of the officials involved and on the restraints they have placed on their own behaviour than on the development of more institutionalized procedures of intergovernmental collaboration. The existing structures are extraordinarily complex and work as well as they do largely because the individuals involved, including both elected and appointed officials, have come to know and respect each other in their increasingly frequent contacts. Whether or not this somewhat personalized fabric of cooperation could survive the dislocation of a rapid displacement of the present personnel is a matter of conjecture.

2. Political competition and articulation

The preceding chapters of this study have analyzed cooperative federalism exclusively as it relates to interactions between the federal and provincial executives. It would, however, be unrealistic in such an evaluation to ignore completely the political context within which these relations take place, to ignore the fact that the overriding decisions in federal-provincial relations are made by successful politicians who must periodically fight campaigns for re-election and who must continually defend their public conduct both in their respective legislatures and outside. There are two difficulties of a broadly political nature in the contemporary variant of cooperative federalism.

First, federal-provincial relations have dealt increasingly with policy matters of the most fundamental kind, matters which a

democratic community has a disposition to settle by the processes of free and open debate and political competition. Yet the success of the governments concerned in reaching tolerable settlements requires a considerable degree of insulation from publicity and from certain varieties of partisan political pressures.

Second, the interdependence of federal and provincial officials in their policy-making and policy-executing roles exercises strong influences towards collaborative behaviour. There are, however, fewer such influences on elected officials in their partisan political capacities.

The situation involving the so-called Fulton-Favreau formula illustrates one of the kinds of political difficulties which cooperative federalism may face. From the time that federal-provincial discussions on an amending procedure were reactivated by the Minister of Justice in 1961, until the publication of the draft formula upon which all the governments had agreed in the summer of 1964, there was little public debate on the issue even among specialists in constitutional matters and it was impossible for those outside government to know, except in a general way, what was going on.² Between the time the draft formula was agreed upon and the spring of 1965 the projected amendment was approved by the legislatures of all the provinces except Quebec without causing the incumbent provincial administrations significant political difficulties. By this time, however, considerable opposition to the Fulton-Favreau formula had been aroused—opposition from members of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties in the House of Commons, from the Union Nationale and several influential private groups in Quebec and both from French- and English-speaking specialists in constitutional matters. The federal and Quebec governments thus faced a difficult situation. They had been precluded because of the relative confidentiality of the discussions preceding the agreement from cultivating public support for the new procedure. The matter at hand was a complex one and the draft formula was the result of a complicated compromise among the governments involved. Yet many of its critics put their arguments in terms of broad and easily understandable considerations quite unrelated to the acceptability of their proposals to the 11 governments. Despite these difficulties, the failure of either or both of the administrations to press the issue to legislative approval would place on them the onus for delaying the enactment of a Canadian amending procedure which had been under discussion for nearly 40 years. Such a failure might also complicate their relations with administrations which had secured the assent of their legislatures. It is likely that similar situations will arise in the future. Fundamental policy discussions will be carried on in confidence between the federal and provincial governments and will culminate in an agreement which becomes the subject of vigorous debate largely precluded until that time. Neither the members of the opposition parties nor the other members of politically influential publics have apparently fully accepted as legitimate the fact that high policy may

be made by federal-provincial agreement. Because of this, policies devised by these procedures may be subjected to more severe criticism than if they were made by a single jurisdiction, and criticism somewhat harder for their supporters to answer.

The relationships between federal and provincial political parties and the impact of these relations on the stands on public issues that these parties take are extraordinarily complex and have never been systematically examined.³ In some cases the electoral success of a federal or provincial party is significantly aided or frustrated by actions of the party of the same name at the other level; in other circumstances there may be little interdependence. Partisan political interactions between members of Parliament and members of the same parties in the provincial legislatures are conditioned by this kind of factor, by financial and other relationships between federal and provincial party organizations, by antagonisms and friendships growing out of previous political experience and by other influences. In most cases, however, it would appear that successful federal and provincial parties have resources of funds, organizations and popular support independent of party fortunes at the other level. It seems that usually only very weak parties are effectively subordinated to their electorally more successful federal or provincial counterparts. In circumstances where the federal government and that of a province bear the same party label there is thus no assurance that their relations will be harmonious, and Canadian political history has many contrary examples. On the other hand, where federal and provincial parties in power are of different complexions there are no overriding partisan political inhibitions imposed on collaboration in policy matters. In general, however, the influences on the federal and provincial administrations to collaborate because of their mutual interdependence in policy matters have little counterpart in the partisan political system.

3. The legitimization of cooperative federalism

If cooperative federalism is in the long run to survive, the politically influential publics in Canada must be persuaded that this is a legitimate way of making crucial public decisions. Such persuasion will be extraordinarily difficult in the face of alternative proposals for reforming our federal institutions, proposals which are on the surface simpler and more conceptually consistent. These difficulties inherent in the complexities of the existing procedures and institutions are compounded by the incompatibility between cooperative federalism and at least three influential systems of ideas about how government in Canada should be carried on.

First, cooperative federalism is difficult to defend in terms of British parliamentary traditions. The underlying assumption of this tradition is that the legislature is sovereign—in the United Kingdom over all matters and in federal countries over all those matters conferred on it by the constitution. This assumption is challenged when

the actual locus of decision-making is transferred from the cabinet, which is collectively responsible to the elected chamber, to inter-governmental bodies. Cooperative federalism has been called "government by diplomacy" by one student of the Canadian constitution. Contemporary democratic theory and practice, both where British parliamentary traditions prevail and elsewhere, have found it extraordinarily difficult to deal with situations involving the external relations of governments.

Second, cooperative federalism in its symbolic aspects gives Quebec no special status in the Canadian federal system. Daniel Johnson has said of this system:

Au lieu d'une véritable constitution, nous avons un régime mouvant, qui est constamment en mutation et qui est le produit des accords formels ou tacites entre Ottawa et la majorité des provinces. *L'autorité suprême du pays . . . c'est une institution qui n'est même pas mentionnée dans l'Acte de l'Amérique britannique du Nord.* C'est le forum des conférences fédérales-provinciales. Et là, le Québec n'a pas plus de droits que Terre-Neuve.⁴

The Honourable Jean-Luc Pepin in the most systematic defence of cooperative federalism that has ever been made⁵ has argued that this alternative recognizes both "cette réalité socio-politique du binationalisme" and "un statut particulier" for Quebec in the Canadian federal system. However, in the formal aspects of federal-provincial relations and in the strict adherence to the rule that the various contracting-out options are available to all the provinces, the symbol, if not the substance, of the equality of the provinces is upheld.

Third, cooperative federalism to be successful requires a degree of secrecy in decision-making which is believed by many to be incompatible with the requirements of democracy. Members of the working press have become increasingly restive with the confidential nature of these processes and many have suggested that conferences of prime ministers and premiers be held in public. The necessity for secrecy until the results of federal-provincial negotiations are concluded can be expected to inhibit the legitimation of cooperative federalism.

B. Cooperative Federalism and Constitutional Change

Those who wish changes in the Canadian federal system can be divided into two groups—those who press for such reforms to come through the processes of federal-provincial collaboration and those bent on explicit alterations in the text of the existing constitution. The debate between them is not easily joined. Persons who are convinced that a substantial rewriting of the constitution is necessary often appear to place a high value on clarity and explicitness in our governmental arrangements and on the symbolic significance of a constitution as embodying the fundamental moral and political principles on which the regime is founded. By these tests, cooperative federalism

is of course deficient. On the other hand, supporters of a new constitution have not, so far as I am able to discover, made a careful study of the traditions and institutions of Canadian federalism as they have evolved in the past five years, or of the possibilities that some or most of the objectives they seek could be attained through the processes of federal-provincial interaction. But proponents of cooperative federalism have not investigated in any detail the incidence of formal constitutional arrangements on these institutions or the constraints that these arrangements impose on the attainment of particular substantive objectives.

Our evaluation of the relative appropriateness of the two broad alternatives as procedures of constitutional evolution will proceed in terms of answers to three questions.

First, if we assume that changes will require the agreement of the federal government and those of most if not all of the provinces, is it more likely that agreement will be secured for explicit constitutional change or for adaptation through federal collaboration on particular public policy matters?

Second, can the relations between the federal and provincial governments be more appropriately regulated through interactions between federal and provincial executives than through other procedures?

Third, is it appropriate to amend the constitution to provide explicitly for the institutions and procedures of federal-provincial relations?

1. The necessity for federal-provincial agreement

So far as I am able to discover, those who wish the Canadian constitution to be rewritten have never seriously considered whether or not it is likely that politically influential elements in the country could be brought to agreement on this matter. This applies to supporters in Quebec of the associated states solution, to Peter J. T. O'Hearn⁶ and to Marcel Faribault and Robert M. Fowler⁷ who have presented detailed draft constitutions and to those persons who have called for a new constitution without suggesting what they believe its nature should be. It appears unlikely that the required measure of agreement could be secured in the near future. The political relations between the "two founding races" are in a critical and fluid state. The institutions and procedures of federal-provincial relations are evolving rapidly. I would therefore agree with one scholar who remarked "to try to redraft the Canadian constitution now would be the same as trying to write a peace treaty while a war was still on." It is possible, however, to foresee limited changes in the constitution. One could imagine agreement to drop its obsolete sections and improve its literary qualities. Perhaps progress could be made toward a constitutional bill of rights binding on all governments and not subject to unilateral amendment by any. It may be possible to find agreement on more adequate protection for French-speaking and English-speaking cultural minorities. On the other

hand, any attempt to rewrite the constitution to change in a fundamental way the division of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces would require simultaneous federal-provincial agreement on a very wide range of basic political issues. It seems to me unlikely that such an agreement will emerge in the immediate future.

The processes of cooperative federalism allow politicians and civil servants to search for agreement where it can be found. I argued in the last chapter that the current circumstances of federal-provincial interdependence make necessary effective measures of intergovernmental collaboration in respect to fairly fundamental policy alternatives. On the other hand, a federal-provincial conference, unlike a constitutional convention, deals with specific proposals for action and does not have to strive for agreement on matters of abstract definition or on how to deal with hypothetical situations which may arise in the future. In the crucial area of the direction and control of the Canadian economy Jacques Parizeau has advanced a persuasive argument which is applicable to an even broader range of problems facing the Canadian federal system:

[can we] conclude . . . that changes in the constitution are likely to help the organization of adequate and co-ordinated economic policies? Personally, I doubt this very much. On the contrary, the constitution as it stands now has helped to narrow the areas of conflict. To attempt, in present circumstances, a full revision or redrafting of the constitution means really that the whole front will be ablaze; any rational solution to urgent problems of economic policies might have to be postponed for a long time. It would seem much more fruitful to find first an empirical equilibrium between the governments and then draft it into a legal text.⁸

2. *"Executive" federalism and other alternatives for regulating federal-provincial relations*

There are two alternatives to cooperative federalism in regulating the relations between the federal and provincial governments. The first is that the judiciary should assume a more active role in delineating the respective powers, privileges and responsibilities of the two levels. This appears to be unrealistic in the light of recent experience in Canada and in other developed federations. Judicial interpretation of the constitution is almost inevitably sporadic and the predilection of the courts is to emphasize the exclusive jurisdiction of central and regional governments rather than the articulation of their activities. Furthermore, in Canada at least, many of the more important problems of federal-provincial relations, particularly as these concern fiscal matters and the direction and control of the economy, do not seem appropriate for judicial determination. The second alternative is to vest in some group or groups other than the courts the tasks of making some of the most important decisions in Canadian federalism. Such a group or groups would require some degree of independence of both levels of government. The

Rowell-Sirois Report recommended "the establishment of a permanent and independent Commission to advise the federal government on the payment of National Adjustment Grants to the provinces and to reappraise each five years the criteria according to which such subsidies were paid." This recommendation received little support at the time it was made and has since been regarded as one of the commission's less constructive suggestions. In his recent book proposing a new Canadian constitution Peter J. T. O'Hearn suggests a "Federal Council" which, according to his draft constitution:

shall consist of Delegates of the Government in Canada. Each Provincial Government shall appoint one Delegate and the Government of Canada shall appoint Delegates not exceeding in number the Provincial Delegates. The Chairman shall be elected from the Delegates of the Government of Canada and the Council shall meet at the Call of the Chairman or any Five Delegates. The Council may make a binding Allocation between the Government of Canada, on the one Hand, and the Governments of the Provinces, on the other Hand, for any Period not exceeding Ten Years, of the Powers to tax and borrow, and may determine the limits of Rates or Amounts that shall apply to the Allocation; but to do so a Majority of the Delegates of the Provincial Governments representing a Majority of the Population of Canada, according to the latest general Census, must concur.⁹

It is significant that O'Hearn's proposal would permit such a "binding Allocation" of taxation and borrowing powers to be imposed on any or all of the provinces without their consent provided that the federal government and the requisite number of other provinces agreed. This condition alone would appear to make the proposal unrealistic. In general, the past history and present circumstances of Canadian federalism make it very unlikely that the federal government and the provinces will choose to have their relations regulated in fundamental ways either by the courts or by independent executive agencies explicitly charged with these responsibilities; nor, in my opinion would they gain any important advantages by doing so.

3. The constitutional recognition of cooperative federalism

Is it appropriate to redraft the constitution to provide for the institutions and procedures of cooperative federalism? The draft constitution suggested by Marcel Faribault and Robert M. Fowler provides for three federal-provincial agencies—an economic development bank, a fiscal commission and an economic and social council.¹⁰ Under the proposed constitution each of these bodies would be composed of four members appointed by the federal government and two each appointed by Quebec, Ontario, the four western provinces and the Atlantic provinces. The economic and social council would be an information-gathering agency to transmit to all jurisdictions materials on "the general trend of the Canadian economy, its medium and long-term prospects, its productivity, and the rate of growth, as well as on the comparative growth of the several Canadian provinces, the

improvement of the standard of living in their several regions and the general betterment of social relations in Canada." The economic development bank was to aid in the development of depressed regions, to remedy serious and unforeseen economic disturbances in particular provinces and to "aid in the execution" of important interprovincial projects. The major task assigned to the fiscal commission was to advise the governments concerned on their taxing and spending policies. The "statutes, regulations and by-laws" of the latter two groups were to be determined, according to the draft constitution, by "protocol between the federal government and the provinces by a three-fourth majority of the latter."

Faribault and Fowler nowhere demonstrate that the institutions and procedures they suggest would be preferable to the ones which are now in process of evolution. There is no evidence given, for example, that the proposed social and economic council would proceed more effectively than the present Economic Council of Canada in its rapidly developing pattern of relations with counterpart agencies in the provinces. Would the "fiscal commission" be more adequate in the devising or implementing of rational taxation and spending policies than the institutions which are now developing? Would the proposed federal-provincial bodies work under the direction of the increasingly frequent meetings of premiers and prime ministers? Such matters appear to have been ignored. Serious proposals for reform in federal-provincial relations must of necessity be based on a careful assessment of the adequacy of existing patterns of interaction. There is no evidence that Faribault and Fowler have done this.

It would seem prudent to try to rewrite the Canadian constitution only after the limits of adjustment possible through the procedures and institutions of cooperative federalism have clearly been reached. As we shall see in the last pages of this study there was some evidence early in 1966 that these limits were being approached.

C. Cooperative Federalism: The Limits of Adjustment

In its legal-constitutional, political and administrative dimensions Canadian federalism has since 1867 demonstrated great resources of adaptability. The major procedures of adaptation in the postwar period have become the processes of federal-provincial executive interaction rather than constitutional amendment or changing patterns of judicial review. In the past 10 years through these interactions the dominance of the federal government established during the Second World War has been attenuated by the effective reassertion of provincial vigour and purpose. Is there then the danger that the influence of the federal government in part or all of the country will be so weakened by piecemeal attrition that Canadian federalism in any recognizable form will cease to exist? For the reasons presented in the concluding pages of this study, I believe this danger to be "clear and present."

The first kind of danger to the Canadian federal system in cooperative federalism is that provincial pressures for autonomy will so weaken the federal government that it will be unable to discharge its responsibilities for the integration and development of the Canadian economy, for economic stabilization and growth and for interregional and interpersonal equalization. There are strong forces towards the enhanced power of the provinces. The proportion of total public expenditures made by the provinces and local authorities is likely to continue to increase, barring rapid increases in defence spending. The new and more specific kinds of social and economic policies which now seem to be necessary make less feasible than before certain kinds of federal control over these matters. The provinces are likely to continue to attract able and purposeful people to their public services. In the House of Commons elected in November 1965, the underrepresentation of certain provinces in the government party and cabinet may work to make the governments of these provinces the most effective outlet for their distinctive sentiments and interests. Despite these influences, there are strong countervailing forces at work to restrain the further weakening of federal power, at least in the governments of the provinces other than Quebec if not the general public in English Canada. Several premiers have expressed their anxiety about this trend very explicitly and the government of Ontario has been particularly sensitive to these considerations. None of the other provinces has shown any desire to take advantage of the contracting-out option and none has been willing to cooperate with Quebec on a permanent basis to weaken federal influence. It appears too that all of these provinces are actively seeking increased federal financial assistance for particular functions, specifically for higher education and health services. It seems likely that the support of other provincial administrations for federal power will increase as the pressures of the Quebec government for autonomy are pressed more aggressively and as the implications of the *statut particulier* alternative become more apparent.

The second kind of danger, and the one I believe more immediate, is that cooperative federalism will result in a situation in which the political and constitutional relationships between the people of Quebec and those of the other provinces will be so tenuous and so fragmentary—and so much mediated through the government of Quebec rather than being carried on within the institutions of the federal government—that a constitutional revolution destroying Canadian federalism will have been effected. The Lesage administration when it came to power and for some time afterward asserted the traditional Quebec position that it was demanding for itself only what under the constitution belonged equally to all the provinces; Mr. Lesage's defence of the Fulton-Favreau formula was largely on the grounds that any procedure for amendment acceptable to Quebec must provide for unanimous provincial consent in respect to changes in the most fundamental aspects of the constitution. The existing constitutional system, however, makes possible a very considerable amount of *de facto*

differentiation between the position of Quebec and that of the other provinces. The Lesage government exploited these possibilities in a sophisticated and successful way. In its last months in power the official position of the Lesage administration apparently reversed the traditional position of the equality of all the provinces and embraced the doctrine of the *statut particulier*. The Honourable Paul Gérin-Lajoie at his convocation address to Carleton University in April 1965, gave advance notice of the new position by questioning in somewhat hypothetical terms the traditional viewpoint that in a constitutional sense Quebec was a province "comme les autres."¹¹ In his speech to the Ste-Foy Chamber of Commerce on December 14, 1965, Premier Lesage committed his government to the *statut particulier* alternative in the most explicit way.¹²

The claims for a special status for Quebec made by the Lesage government in its last year in office were more than a *post hoc* justification of the contracting-out arrangements which had already been implemented. These arrangements, so far as Quebec was concerned, confined the federal authorities, with several important exceptions, to matters within federal legislative jurisdiction. The attainment of such an objective did not satisfy the requirements of the Lesage government for a wider range of provincial autonomy or for an enhanced provincial influence over federal policy-making. In his Labour Day address in 1965, the Premier asserted that as his administration came to formulate more far-reaching and explicit plans in respect to manpower and employment it would press for modifications of federal activities in these fields, particularly those of the National Employment Service.¹³ The new social security policy whose outlines were announced by the Honourable René Levesque in November 1965, included a system of family allowances based on very different principles than the federal scheme¹⁴ and the same kind of considerations would logically have justified an attempt to replace the federal Old Age Security programme with a provincial one. As Quebec plans for regional development became more explicitly formulated it became reasonable to expect more aggressive efforts to bring federal developmental policies through the Department of Industry, ARDA and other agencies into harmony with provincial requirements. The assertion of the "personnalité internationale" of Quebec was leading to increasingly insistent demands that, without federal supervision or control, the province should be able to enter into direct relations with foreign nations in regard to matters within provincial legislative jurisdiction. The objectives of the Lesage government in the projected steel complex, the newly-created public sector of the mining industry, new plans for rationalizing agriculture and so on could be expected to result in new pressures to influence federal policies closely connected with these objectives. In December 1965, Mr. Lesage announced the creation of a committee under the chairmanship of Jacques Parizeau to study and report by the end of 1966 on the activities of certain classes of financial institutions and appropriate provincial legislation which might be enacted to regulate them. Eric Kierans is reported to have informed the federal-

provincial conference the same month that Quebec would find contracting-out applied to new federal programmes unacceptable and would demand fiscal equivalents without undertaking any commitments about the service or facility in question.¹⁵ Thus the pressures of the Lesage government in respect to specific fields of policy-making were working steadily towards a situation in which Quebec had a significantly larger scope of *de facto* autonomy than that possessed by the other provinces.

The creation of a special status for Quebec has implications of the most fundamental kind for the workings of the institutions of the federal government. If the present trends continue, Parliament will deal increasingly with matters for which Quebec has assumed exclusive responsibility within that province. Increasingly, important federal agencies which deal with matters of crucial concern elsewhere in Canada will have only a tangential relationship to the people and government of Quebec. Increasingly, federal elections will revolve about matters which have a direct relevance only outside Quebec. Such a situation will likely create new tensions between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and it seems unlikely that English Canada will accede simultaneously to pressures for both a special status for Quebec and a more influential role for French-speaking citizens from Quebec in the institutions of the federal government.

One might argue that there are changes which might be made in the structure and workings of federal institutions to accommodate the situation of a *statut particulier*. Paul Sauriol, editorialist with *Le Devoir*, envisaged a group of reforms in which the normal traditions of parliamentary government would prevail concerning matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal authorities, while in "les domaines mixtes" the responsibilities would be assumed either by a reconstituted Senate or some federal-provincial body to which each level would delegate its powers in these affairs.¹⁶ It seems unlikely, however, that such a solution could harmonize the differing conceptions of Quebec and the rest of the country on the appropriate role of the federal government.

The establishment of a *statut particulier* for Quebec within the Canadian constitutional system has important implications for the organizational relations between English- and French-speaking Canadians outside the governmental sphere. The theory and practice of the constitutional *statut particulier* mean that the most important political relations between the two cultural communities are conducted by their respective leaders "at the summit." This pattern of political relations would have to sustain and be sustained by corresponding kinds of interactions among private and quasi-public associations, particularly those primarily concerned with public policy matters. In general terms, a special status for Quebec makes less possible the establishment of effective bicultural organizations on a country-wide basis than does a situation in which all the provinces assume broadly the same responsibilities. During a period when the division of functions between the two levels of government is a

matter of controversy, organizations including important elements from the two cultural communities are subjected to severe internal strains when French Canadians from Quebec wish their province to have the exclusive powers to deal with affairs which other Canadians see as appropriate objectives of federal action. As particular aspects of the *statut particulier* are implemented, associations dealing with such vital concerns of public policy as higher education, welfare and health services, the exploitation and conservation of natural resources, municipal government, manpower and collective bargaining and so on can be expected to organize themselves into autonomous or semi-autonomous Quebec and non-Quebec elements. It is possible and even probable that the organizations will carry on some kind of formal relationships but these relations will be almost of necessity of a "fraternal" variety, precisely because their major focuses of attention are on different governments. It is to be expected also that these associations will be almost exclusively unicultural in both form and spirit. English-speaking Canadians from Quebec and French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec will find these associations inadequate vehicles for expressing their particular sentiments and interests.

The situation as it is evolving thus contains these elements.

First, so far as the provinces other than Quebec are concerned, the pressures towards autonomy which began in the late 1950s seem for the time being to have run their course. Among these administrations there is apprehension about the further weakening of federal power.

Second, the province of Quebec continues to press her demands both for a wider range of autonomy and for an enhanced degree of influence in matters within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal authorities.

Third, as the *de facto* differentiation between the position of Quebec and that of the other provinces increases, deep incompatibilities are revealed between federalism and the normal workings of federal parliamentary institutions, and between the *statut particulier* situation and the increased influence of French-speaking Canadians in the institutions of the federal government.

Can the continuing procedures of federal-provincial interaction enable the Canadian constitutional system to adapt to the new and contradictory demands now being made upon it? This seems unlikely. The directions in which the system is now being taken involve a constitutional revolution. There is nothing in the Confederation settlement as it was planned in 1864-67 or as it subsequently evolved which provides for a *statut particulier* in the form and dimensions clearly contemplated by the two successive governments of Quebec. It seems improbable that change of such a fundamental nature can be effected through piecemeal federal-provincial negotiation. Because Quebec has now charted its course in such explicit terms it is likely that in the future the federal government and the other provincial governments will evaluate Quebec demands within the framework of broader

considerations than they have done in the recent past. The institutions and procedures of cooperative federalism have shown some capacity to deal with questions of ever-increasing generality. Federal-provincial relations in the period after the Second World War were dominated by considerations relating to specific programmes and facilities. More recently progress has been made concerning broader functions of government. The Tax Structure Committee has been charged with questions related to the most fundamental aspects of federal and provincial policies and more particularly with attempting to find agreement on broad expenditure-priorities. There may be continued success in these directions. It seems improbable, however, that federal and provincial executives could by agreement effect a revolution that would change the constitutional ties between Quebec and the rest of Canada to a quasi-diplomatic rather than a federal variety.

In spite of the analysis given above, I believe that it would be imprudent to take a deterministic view of the current crisis in the Canadian federal system.

On the one hand, it is unreasonable to take comfort in the "pendulum theory of federal and provincial powers," which asserts that there are somehow inherent forces at work which will as in the past prevent the attenuation of the powers of one level or the other to the extent that federalism is destroyed. There are of course conceivable circumstances which would lead to the effective reassertion of federal power so far as the government and people of Quebec are concerned. The partial or complete mobilization of the country in response to a deteriorating international situation would bring this about. It is possible to imagine a situation where politically influential groups throughout Canada come to believe that decentralization of power was costing too much in terms of economic stability and growth. Some new federal political leadership might emerge which would successfully commit the country to a bold and popular programme of reform, even in the face of the opposition of the government of Quebec and perhaps the governments of some other provinces. It is impossible to predict the likelihood of these circumstances occurring. It is unreasonable, however, to believe that any or all of them are inevitable.

On the other hand, it seems that Canadian federalism has not yet passed the point of no return. It is possible that the Quebec leadership will press its demands towards the *statut particulier* less aggressively than a reading of recent official pronouncements would lead one to believe. Fortunately, viable political arrangements do not need to conform to standards of logical consistency. It is possible that Canadians may be able to agree on a set of devices which allow each of the contradictory demands on the Canadian constitutional system to be met in part. Perhaps some new distribution of revenues, revenue sources and functional responsibilities can be effected which would provide both for the dominance of the federal government in economic matters and exclusive provincial responsibility, without

the existing extent of federal involvement, in matters of provincial concern. Such a development would help to ensure the historic role of the federal government in economic matters and would also mitigate the difficulties inherent in a special status for Quebec within the Canadian federal system. Perhaps too the demands of the government of Quebec concerning particular matters will be discussed in the future within a framework which considers the cumulative impact of these demands on the survival of Canadian federalism. It is this last alternative rather than the piecemeal adjustments of cooperative federalism which gives best hope for the immediate future.

Two major changes between the spring of 1966 when the foregoing study was completed and the summer of 1967 have so altered the circumstances of Canadian federalism that at least a preliminary account and assessment of them is necessary. These developments are:

1. The new fiscal policies announced by the federal authorities in September and October 1966.
2. The evolving political relations between the federal and provincial authorities which appear to be leading to some sort of confrontation in which the fundamental nature of the Canadian constitutional system will be at issue.

A. The New Fiscal Regime

The policies concerning federal-provincial fiscal relations announced by the federal authorities in the fall of 1966 constitute very new departures. The essential features of these new directions announced by the government to the Tax Structure Committee in September 1966 and to a federal-provincial meeting called for the next month specifically to deal with the financing of higher education¹ were as follows:

1. *Equalization grants to the provinces on a new basis.* These were to be paid according to a radically new formula. This formula took into account the provincial yield from all tax sources rather than, as under the old formula, the yields from income taxes and succession duties and natural resources levies. Equalization was to be paid according to the national average yield from the new base. According to calculations of federal officials, the new method would have paid the provinces \$491.5 millions in unconditional equalization in the fiscal year 1966-67 compared with \$352.8 millions under the scheme then in effect.² The four Atlantic provinces and Quebec were to be the beneficiaries of the new plan. Ontario, Alberta and

British Columbia remained as "have" provinces not receiving equalization. Saskatchewan was redefined as a "have" province, with a transitional payment declining to zero during the next five-year period, and Manitoba was to receive a slight annual increase of \$1.6 millions.

2. *A gradual termination of the major shared-cost programmes in health and welfare.* The government announced its decision to terminate three major grant-in-aid programmes related to hospital insurance, grants for various health purposes and welfare payments when the agreements related to these respective schemes expired. Fiscal compensation to the provinces was to be on an equalized basis with certain fiscal incentives so that individuals and families would not be disadvantaged in receiving such services when they moved from one province to another. In general, the federal authorities proposed to end their participation in the major grant-in-aid schemes in which contracting-out had been permitted by the Established Programmes (Interim Arrangements) Act of 1964. The federal policy was based on a clear distinction between shared-cost programmes in respect to "social matters" and joint programmes in the field of economic development. The government asserted both its right and its intention to continue to participate in the latter, although three of these (forestry agreements, agricultural line assistance and roads-to-resources) were to be discontinued at the expiration of the agreements then in effect.

3. *Federal withdrawal from direct aid on behalf of institutions providing post-secondary education.* The federal government announced that it would end its \$5 per capita annual grants on behalf of universities and its programmes of aid both for capital and operating expenses of vocational training. Certain capital grants for vocational training would, however, continue in the transitional period. The provisions for compensation of the provinces would be (a) a reduction of federal income tax of 4 per cent and of corporate income tax of one per cent, with the yield from these taxes being equalized to the national average under the general equalization formula; (b) augmentation of (a) by unconditional grants to bring the total compensation in each province up to 50 per cent of the operating costs of its post-secondary institutions. Federal officials estimated that in 1967-68 the new arrangements would provide a fiscal transfer to the provinces of \$467.2 millions compared with \$270.0 millions in the previous fiscal year under the old provisions.³ The federal government offered to assume complete financial responsibility for adult retraining. At the same time, the Prime Minister asserted the right of the central authorities to participate in cultural activities, to sponsor any research they chose and to provide scholarships and bursaries for post-graduate and other specialized study.

The federal proposals taken together represent an attempt to reverse some of the trends in the Canadian federal system during the past two decades.

1. The government appears determined to liquidate the *de facto* special status that Quebec had assumed in the 1960s. The norm accepted by the central authorities is a relatively uniform scope of federal activity and of federal tax rates throughout Canada. This uniformity is to be attained by reducing federal involvement in all the provinces to roughly the same level as federal involvement in Quebec when the new policies were announced.

2. The proposals are an attempt to disentangle federal and provincial relations so that the provinces are able to finance their rapidly growing responsibilities by independent use of their taxing powers along with, in the case of the "have not" provinces, federal equalization grants at higher levels than ever before. Thus the central authorities hope to end the situation in which demands of the provincial and local electorates for increased expenditures are almost instantly translated into pressures on the federal government for financial concessions.

3. There is to be a more discriminating exercise of the federal power to spend on matters generally considered to be within the legislative jurisdiction of the provinces. In the 1945-60 period the federal authorities were prepared to assist almost any activity that seemed in need of financial support, and there was little hesitation in imposing financial penalties on provincial and local governments, individuals or private groups that chose not to participate in such ventures. The federal spending power is now to be exercised in a more discriminating fashion.

It is significant that the new fiscal policies were evolved unilaterally by the federal authorities and were not the result of federal-provincial negotiation. Thus the high hopes that some observers of Canadian federalism had for the Tax Structure Committee when it was established have been proved unfounded.

The implementation of the federal fiscal policies will result in a partial return to "classical federalism" in which each level of government discharges its constitutional responsibilities in relative independence of the other. However, it would be unrealistic to believe that this variant of federalism will be attained. Although the federal government is to exercise its spending powers in a more discriminatory way than before, the federal authorities have asserted their right to be involved in several kinds of activities where the jurisdiction of Parliament is not clear.

1. There is declared to be a national interest in the "portability" of provincial social assistance and hospital insurance schemes and the federal government will make grants to the provinces to further this objective.

2. In its proposals on post-secondary education the federal government drew a sharp line between education and occupational retraining and, because of its interests in productivity and full employment, offered to assume complete financial responsibility for such retraining.

3. Because of its "over-riding responsibility for employment, economic stability and economic development in Canada" the federal government has declared its intention to participate with the provinces in shared-cost programmes concerning specific economic projects.

4. The federal authorities have asserted their right to involve themselves in cultural activities and research and to pay scholarships and bursaries to individuals.

5. The federal government has remained determined to make contributions to provincial medical insurance plans only if these schemes conformed to the four conditions outlined by Prime Minister Pearson in his proposal to the Federal-Provincial Conference of July 1965.

Apart from these specific exceptions, however, the new fiscal regime contemplates the federal authorities limiting their financial and administrative involvement for the most part to subjects within the explicit legislative jurisdiction of Parliament. On the other hand, the circumstances of the 1960s have led to the creation of several *zones grises* in relation to matters where formerly the federal authorities were regarded as having exclusive or at least overriding responsibilities. These new areas of divided responsibility are related to international affairs, the control of lending institutions, broadcasting, the promotion of scientific and cultural activities, immigration and fiscal policies toward economic stability and growth. The major fields of jurisdictional conflict have thus shifted rather dramatically in this decade to those formerly within federal control.

B. Evolving Political Relations

The directions that federal-provincial relations, and in particular Ottawa-Quebec relations have taken in the year since the accession of the Union Nationale to power in June 1966 can be analyzed usefully only against the background of interactions between the Pearson and Lesage governments in the preceding period. The strategy of the Lesage administration was to extend the range of Quebec discretion by initiatives related to particular spheres of public activity. The Pearson government was basically sympathetic to Quebec's redefinition of its role by such piecemeal and pragmatic initiatives and acceded to many of the province's requests. The Prime Minister and his cabinet colleagues from Quebec — in particular Guy Favreau, Maurice Lamontagne and Jean-Luc Pepin — evolved a rationale for the new circumstances of federal-provincial relations in the name of "cooperative federalism."

The Union Nationale administration, unlike the government it displaced, is committed both to the complete withdrawal of the federal authorities from the income tax and succession duty fields and to explicit constitutional reform towards some kind of bi-national union. Since it came to power in 1966 the Johnson government has posed direct challenges to Ottawa in respect to fiscal matters, the

international role of Quebec, the federal old age security and family allowance programmes and the insurance of deposits in certain lending institutions.

At the federal level, there has been since the general election of 1965 a stiffening in the attitudes of Quebec Liberals towards autonomist pressures coming from the province. At the Founding Convention of the Quebec Liberal Federation held in March 1966 there appears to have been a profound disposition to proceed in terms of federalist solutions in marked contrast to the autonomist directions then being taken by the Lesage government.⁴ Since the accession to power of the Union Nationale, leading Quebec Liberals in the House of Commons have opposed provincial pressures for an increased scope of Quebec autonomy and for constitutional change towards some form of *statut particulier*. Although the Honourable Jean Marchand has not, so far as I can discover, addressed himself directly to the constitutional issue since his accession to the cabinet the general tenor of his public speeches indicates that he believes concrete social and economic problems to be of more immediate importance than the national question. The Honourable Maurice Sauvé has outlined in more detail than any other prominent Quebec politician a series of measures to enhance the position of the French language and the French culture on a Canada-wide basis.⁵ The Honourable Jean Chrétien has opposed a *statut particulier* solution⁶ and has argued that the excesses of nationalism in Quebec have discouraged private investment in the province and contributed to its economic difficulties.⁷ In an article written for a supplement to *Le Devoir* published on June 30, 1967, Gérard Pelletier, Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, deplored the current Quebec preoccupation with constitutional matters — "la monomanie constitutionnelle" — and although he did not reject the *statut particulier* explicitly he was critical of the New Democratic Party which had accepted this alternative as official party policy. Perhaps the most significant single development in the stiffening resistance of the federal government to Quebec autonomism was the appointment of Pierre Elliott Trudeau as Minister of Justice in the spring of 1967. Trudeau has been for more than a decade a forthright conservative in constitutional matters in his defence of the distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the provinces as contained in the British North America Act.⁸ In the 1950s his most severe strictures were against the federal authorities for involving themselves in provincial matters through the exercise of the spending power. During this decade many of Trudeau's constitutional polemics have been directed against what he regards as the excesses of Quebec nationalism and in the past 18 months against any form of *statut particulier*. As Minister of Justice he will obviously play a crucial role in future constitutional discussions with the provinces and it is reasonable to suppose that he would not have been appointed to that portfolio unless the Prime Minister was basically in sympathy with Trudeau's well known views on constitutional matters.

A critical element in Quebec-Ottawa relations in the near future may well be the directions taken by the provincial Liberal party. In an interview given to Gilles Gariépy of *Le Devoir* on June 26, 1967, Paul Gérin-Lajoie indicated that the party had opted for an autonomist rather than a federalist alternative, although the interview as published does not make clear whether the stand taken by the former Minister of Education had been adopted officially by the Quebec Liberals. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie asserted that the Lesage government had acted with "un certain empirisme" in constitutional matters and had chosen, in the fluid situation which then prevailed, to assert the rights of Quebec in particular matters rather than to work towards a comprehensive constitutional settlement with Ottawa. However, in his judgement, changes in federal policies in the past year had made such a piecemeal strategy inappropriate for Quebec. The new federal attitudes, it was asserted, had been made clear by the statements of several cabinet ministers opposing the *statut particulier*, in Ottawa's opposition to Quebec's demands for an international status and by the termination of contracting out. In these new circumstances it was thus necessary that Quebec should provoke "un affrontement constitutionnel" with Ottawa in which a new constitutional regime would be established within two years. Mr. Gérin-Lajoie explicitly asserted that the relatively weak political position of the Union Nationale government resulting from the June 1966 election should not be a handicap in such negotiations because "les deux grands partis québécois sont substantiellement d'accord quand il s'agit du réaménagement constitutionnel."

The resolution calling for a Confederation conference passed by the legislature of Ontario on May 23, 1967 indicates that yet another government now wishes some form of debate in which the problems of Canadian federalism will be discussed at a fundamental level. In speaking to the resolution recommending that such a conference be convened by Ontario, Premier Robarts outlined how "through federal initiative and federal-provincial conferences" Canada had moved from centralization to a set of circumstances where the individual provinces could define their relations with Ottawa differently to the present "general decentralization."⁹ He commented on this pattern of change:

I would suggest to you that these very fundamental questions of where our country was going were not in fact discussed. Those [changes] were the off-shoots of the various courses of action that come about in developing particular shared-cost programmes and in meeting the events of specific days and specific times as they occurred.

At no time were the real, fundamental questions debated per se. The questions of change came about almost as a byproduct. These questions have always been below the surface and have never been consciously rationalized. Until we do come to grips with some of these questions, I am convinced that we will continue to drift in this country, on what might be termed an uncharted course. . . .¹⁰

The dominant political forces in Ottawa and the two largest provinces thus appear to have lost their former confidence that the continuing processes of federal-provincial interaction in respect to particular issues are in themselves enough to enable the Canadian federal system to adapt to the changing circumstances that confront it. The events of the last year reinforce the general conclusion reached in Chapter VIII of this study that the devices of cooperative federalism had become inadequate to contain the conflicting forces at work in Canadian federalism.

In the past few years many recommendations for new institutions and procedures of federal-provincial articulation have been made. Some of these recommendations have been discussed in Chapter VII. This appendix summarizes the various proposals which have been brought forward.

A. Proposal for a Federal-Provincial Secretariat

At the 1960 Dominion-Provincial Conference the Premier of Quebec proposed that "a permanent Secretariat for federal-provincial conferences be established and that it be financed and administered jointly by the Federal and Provincial Governments." This request was reiterated by Mr. Lesage at the conference held in November 1963 and he said of this proposed agency and a "permanent Council of Provinces" that "Such institutions have become indispensable. They are probably the only concrete means of avoiding that the provinces be faced with 'faits accomplis' or with unilaterally dictated measures without previous consultation between and among themselves and with the central authority."

The Quebec leader went on to outline several unilateral initiatives which had been taken by the federal government in the previous few months, including the municipal loan fund, the projected contributory pension and the designation of depressed areas for federal economic assistance. According to Mr. Lesage's argument, such federal decisions had led to "immense confusion" and an understandable "spine-stiffening by the provinces." In such a situation there was the need for "concrete instruments of action" for permanent federal-provincial consultation and coordination. The government of Quebec pressed its request again at the conference held in July 1965 and reiterated that the proposed machinery "should not be limited to this or that aspect of federal-provincial relations, but should be concerned with overall policy." On this latter occasion, however, the government

expressed its willingness to wait on the findings of the Tax Structure Committee as this matter fell within the committee's terms of reference.

B. Proposals for New Federal-Provincial Agencies in Economic Policies

At the conference of November 1963 Premier Lesage recommended that there be provincial participation in "determining tariff structures, transportation and even the monetary policies of Canada" through "permanent Federal-Provincial organisms instituted for this purpose." Professor Jacques Parizeau has made more detailed suggestions along the same line:

1. The composition of the Board of Governors of the Bank of Canada be changed so that it would be "a group of official appointees of the federal government and the provinces." In Parizeau's terms this would make it easier for the Bank to "consult the two levels of government and to have monetary policies understood by the provincial authorities." He also suggested that such a device might aid in more effective debt management by the bank in the circumstances where an increasing proportion of the total public debt is held by the junior governments. Although the bank has the authority under this law to deal in provincial bonds it has refrained from doing so and although there have been pressures for it to change this policy the bank might under the existing structure "lose a good part of its moral authority if it decided unilaterally where help is most wanted and which province should be helped." A reconstituted Board of Governors would help to overcome this difficulty.

2. A federal-provincial committee on commercial policy might be constituted "possibly alongside the Tariff Board." This committee might "at least in the first stages" perform "a purely consultative role, but where clearing of federal intentions and regional constraints could proceed on an *ad hoc* basis." Parizeau pointed out that in his previous (1964) budget speech the federal Minister of Finance had stated that whenever international commercial negotiations adversely affected the interests of one region, Canadian officials would see to it that compensating advantages for the same region would also be negotiated. Parizeau argued, however, that this was a less effective way of providing an outlet for regional interests than federal-provincial machinery specially charged with responsibilities in commercial matters.

C. Saskatchewan's Proposals for Federal-Provincial Coordination in Fiscal Policy

The Saskatchewan government at the 1955, 1957 and 1960 Federal-Provincial conferences recommended more institutionalized intergovernmental machinery for research, consultation and planning in respect

to fiscal policy. In its brief to the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in March 1962 the government recommended that "a permanent committee of Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers be established, to meet at least once annually for the purpose of reviewing the needs of the economy and the financial policies suggested by economic trends." This body would gather early in December of each year at about the time when the governments were making their major budgetary decisions and would review the current economic situation and consider the impact on this situation of actual and projected public expenditures. Such meetings would not only influence the federal and provincial governments in their financial policies but would result in joint "federal-provincial counter-cyclical programs and projects" for which the federal authorities would provide financial assistance.

D. Professor Savourin's Proposal for a Federal-Provincial Agency in External Affairs

In a paper to the annual conference of the Canadian Bar Association in September 1965 Professor Louis Sabourin of the University of Ottawa proposed that "a permanent office" be set up to coordinate the policies of the federal and provincial governments in international affairs. This agency would have the following roles.

Firstly, it would be a clearing-house dealing with all sorts of international information useful to the provinces. It could facilitate the implementation in Canada of many multilateral conventions which Canada has not signed because these treaties were and are within the constitutional jurisdiction of the provinces. Secondly, it would coordinate the actions of both the federal and provincial governments, giving to both of them some sort of "droit de regard" on each others actions on the international scene, where it is a matter which is constitutionally given to the provinces. Naturally the provinces cannot pretend to any "droit de regard" on the federal government when Ottawa is operating within its own field of jurisdiction.

E. The Porter Commission's Proposal for Fiscal Coordination

The Royal Commission on Banking and Finance which reported to the Government of Canada in 1964 proposed reviving the continuing Committee of Ministers of Finance and Provincial Treasurers and an extension of the terms of reference of this group to include coordination of the fiscal policies of the federal, provincial and local governments. This recommendation was based on the following judgement of the commission: "In recent years, when credit conditions have altered significantly, the capital expenditures of provinces and municipalities have not been influenced enough to give us any confidence that monetary and debt policies provide an effective means of

adjusting the capital expenditure programs of the provinces and municipalities to the needs of economic stabilization. What is needed is a more direct and more effective method of coordination" (p. 520). The commission's viewpoint was that in such coordination federal influence would most appropriately be used to influence the timing and amount of provincial and municipal capital expenditure programmes rather than their direction.

F. The O'Hearn Proposal for a Fiscal Council

In his proposed draft constitution Peter J. T. O'Hearn proposed a body under the following terms:

5. The Federal Council shall consist of Delegates of the Governments in Canada. Each Provincial Government shall appoint one Delegate and the Government of Canada shall appoint Delegates not exceeding in Number the Provincial Delegates. The Chairman shall be elected from the Delegates of the Government of Canada and the Council shall meet at the Call of the Chairman or of any Five Delegates. The Council may make a binding Allocation between the Government of Canada on the one Hand, and the Governments of the Provinces, on the other Hand, for any period not exceeding Ten Years, of the Powers to tax and borrow and may determine the Limits of Rates or Amounts that shall apply to the Allocation; but to do so a Majority of the Delegates of the Government of Canada and a Majority of the Delegates of the Provincial Governments, representing a Majority of the Population of Canada according to the latest general Census, must concur.¹

G. The Faribault-Fowler Proposals

In their 1965 book *Ten to One: The Confederation Wager* Marcel Faribault and Robert M. Fowler proposed a draft constitution for Canada which called for three federal-provincial organizations each directed by a body of twelve persons — four appointed by the federal government and two each by the following provinces or groups of provinces: the four Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario and the four western provinces.

1. The fiscal commission would have the following responsibilities (pp. 144-5):

(a) To make recommendations to the federal and provincial governments regarding the best means of making taxation as equal as possible across Canada while allotting to each such government the proceeds of taxation more closely connected with its legislative authority and required for the discharge of its responsibility;

(b) To promote efficiency and economy in the levying, collecting, and allotment of taxes across Canada, notably by the avoidance

of duplication, the simplification of taxpayer's returns and the improvement of accounting, remitting, and controlling procedures;
(c) To recommend all measures of reciprocity with other countries in fiscal matters;

(d) To act as an autonomous agency to the Canadian governments on such matters as they may entrust to it.

Further "the statute, regulations and by-laws of the commission are determined by protocol between the federal government and the provinces by a three-fourth majority of the latter."

2. The Economic Development Bank would have the following purposes (147):

(a) to aid in the economic development of such regions of Canada where the standard of living is abnormally low and where there exists serious underemployment;

(b) to remedy a serious disturbance of the economy of any one province, whether by reason of a natural calamity or other extraordinary and unforeseen events;

(c) to aid in the execution of important projects common to two or more provinces and which, by reason of their size, location, or nature, cannot be entirely or equitably financed by the various means available in the said provinces.

3. The Economic and Social Council would be responsible for (147-8):

the gathering, study, and transmission to all Canadian governments and other concerned bodies of the information available at any time on the general trend of the Canadian economy, its medium and long term prospects, its productivity, and the rate of its growth, as well as on the comparative growth of the several Canadian provinces, the improvement of the standard of living in their several regions and the general betterment of social relationships in Canada.

Faribault and Fowler also wrote into their draft constitution changes in the existing workings of the Bank of Canada. The bank would be charged with conducting "regular consultations with the competent services of both the federal government and the provinces." It would also be empowered to act as fiscal agent of provinces that so requested and to "grant provinces short-term advances or loans, discount or purchase their treasury bills, purchase and discount their bonds." The powers of the bank to "sustain the market of securities issued or guaranteed by such provinces" would be exercised with the assent of the federal Minister of Finance.

Chapter I

1. K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government* (4th ed., London, 1963), Chap. II.
2. *Ibid.*, 20.
3. C. J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), 594-5.
4. M. J. C. Vile, *The Structure of American Federalism* (Oxford, 1961), 199.
5. Maurice Lamontagne, *Le fédéralisme canadien* (Québec, 1954), 245.
6. E. W. Weidner, "Decision-Making in a Federal System," in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), *Federalism, Mature and Emergent* (New York, 1955), 363.
7. D. V. Smiley, *Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism* (Canadian Tax Foundation, Canadian Tax Paper no. 32, Toronto, 1963), 37-42.
8. One of the most distinguished efforts in this direction is the Little, Brown series in Comparative Politics under the editorship of Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman and Lucien W. Pope. See particularly G. A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963) and the abridgement under the same name in the Little, Brown series (Boston, 1965).
9. W. S. Livingston, *Federalism and Constitutional Change* (Oxford, 1956), 2.
10. W. S. Stokes, "The Centralized Federal Republics of Latin America," in G. C. S. Benson *et al.*, *Essays on Federalism* (Institute for Studies in Federalism, Claremont, California, 1961), 93.
11. Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, *Report* (Winnipeg, 1963), III.

12. Professors Vincent Lemieux and John Meisel have undertaken a study of the bicultural aspects of certain non-governmental associations in Canada for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.
13. J. A. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," in A. R. M. Lower *et al.*, *Evolving Canadian Federalism* (Durham, N.C., 1958), 141.
14. See, for example, Herbert Agar, *The Price of Union* (Boston, 1950) for a presentation of this hypothesis as it relates to the United States. In Canada, Frank Underhill has been the most persuasive apologist for the bi-national parties. See *In Search of Canadian Liberalism* (Toronto, 1960) and *The Image of Confederation: The Massey Lectures, 1963* (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto, 1964).
15. W. H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* (Boston, 1964), particularly 135-6.
16. *Ibid.*, 136.
17. *Ibid.*, 129.
18. For one of the few systematic efforts in this direction see E. R. Black, "Federal Strains within a Canadian Party," *Dalhousie Review*, XLV (1965), 306-23. More recently Khayyam Paltiel has made a provocative analysis of the relation between party finances and the maintenance of Canadian federalism, "Federalism and Party Finance: A Preliminary Sounding," in Committee on Election Expenses, *Studies in Canadian Party Finance* (Ottawa, 1966), 1-21.

Chapter II

1. For the best available account of the development of Canadian federalism up to the Second World War see Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Commission), *Report* (Ottawa, 1940), Bk. I. An abridgement of this analysis has appeared — D. V. Smiley (ed.), *The Rowell-Sirois Report, Book I* (The Carleton Library No. 5, Toronto, 1963).
2. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, I, 1944, 2.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Canada, Department of Reconstruction, *Employment and Income with Special Reference to the Initial Period of Reconstruction* (Ottawa, 1945).
5. *Ibid.*, 23.
6. *Dominion and Provincial Submissions and Plenary Conference Discussions, Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1945* (Ottawa, 1946).
7. *Ibid.*, 118.

8. *Ibid.*, 113.
9. *Ibid.*, 114.
10. *Ibid.*, 114.
11. *Ibid.*, 85.
12. *Ibid.*, 7.
13. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 113.
14. Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences (Massey Commission), *Report* (Ottawa, 1951), 8.

Chapter III

1. Jacques Parizeau, "Federal-Provincial Fiscal Developments" in Canadian Tax Foundation, *Report of the 1964 Conference* (Toronto, 1965), 223.
2. Maurice Lamontagne, "Growth, Price Stability and the Problem of Unemployment" (paper presented to the Study Conference on National Problems, Kingston, 1960, mimeo.), 5.
3. Scott Gordon, "A Twenty-Year Perspective: Some Reflections on the Keynesian Revolution in Canada," in S. F. Kaluki (ed.), *Canadian Economic Policy since the War* (Canadian Trade Committee, Ottawa, 1966), 23-46.
4. *Ibid.*, 46.
5. Parizeau, "Federal-Provincial Fiscal Developments," 223-4.
6. Lamontagne, "Growth, Price Stability and the Problem of Unemployment," 6.
7. D. V. Smiley, "The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXI (1965), 80-97.
8. The Manifesto is reprinted in Herbert Quinn, *The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto, 1963), 225-35.
9. Reprinted in the Report of the Committee on Manitoba's Economic Future, *Manitoba 1926-1975* (Winnipeg, 1963), Appendix, Pt. IV, 3.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, II, 16-17.
12. S. M. 1963, c. 23.
13. There is as yet little analytical material on these provincial agencies. See, however, two articles in *Canadian Public Administration*, VIII (1965): J. R. Mills, "Voluntary Economic Planning in Nova Scotia," 160-5, and Roland Parenteau, "The Quebec Economic Advisory Council," 166-71.

Chapter IV

1. Although this chapter deals with the formal constitution, I wish to reiterate the inextricable relation between this aspect of federalism and the ways in which the federal and provincial governments choose to wield their respective powers.
2. *Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces* (Quebec, 1865), 9.
3. *Ibid.*, 55.
4. *Ibid.*, 62.
5. *Ibid.*, 96.
6. The way in which Quebec's consent was obtained to the 1964 amendment giving Parliament concurrent jurisdiction with the provinces in respect to survivors' benefits under the proposed Canada Pension Plan is significant. This consent was secured as part of a complex agreement between the federal and Quebec administrations involving their respective proposals for contributory pensions programmes negotiated in the aftermath of the Federal-Provincial Conference of March 31 and April 1, 1964. See the account of these events in Peter Newman, "Pension Deal Saved Confederation," *Vancouver Sun*, Nov. 13, 1964.
7. See the standard text, Bora Laskin, *Canadian Constitutional Law* (4th ed., Toronto, 1966). For surveys of postwar trends of judicial review see Peter H. Russell, "The Court's Interpretation of the Constitution since 1949" in Paul Fox (ed.), *Politics: Canada* (Toronto, 1962), 64-80; V. C. Macdonald, *Legislative Power and the Supreme Court in the Fifties* (Toronto, 1961); and issues of the *Canadian Bar Review*.
8. For the most exhaustive analysis of the pattern of judicial interpretation along these lines see Canada, Senate, *Report Pursuant to the Resolution of the Senate to the Honourable the Speaker by the Parliamentary Counsel Relating to the Enactment of the British North America Act* (Ottawa, 1939; reprinted 1961).
9. *University of Toronto Quarterly*, VII (1938), 144.
10. *The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution* (Ottawa, 1969), a study undertaken for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism by Professor Peter Russell of the University of Toronto examines the nature and extent of judicial review of the constitution since 1949.
11. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 115.
12. R. S. C. 1952, c. 11.
13. S. C. 1958, 5-6 Eliz. II, c. 37.

14. For a comprehensive examination of these matters see G. V. La Forest, *Disallowance and Reservation of Provincial Legislation* (Ottawa, 1955).
15. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, VII, 1960, 7934.
16. *Ibid.*, IV, 1960-61, 4397.
17. For an analysis of this incident see J. R. Mallory, "The Lieutenant-Governor's Discretionary Powers: The Reservation of Bill 56," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXVII (1961), 518-22.
18. For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of the spending power see Smiley, *Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism*, Chap. II.
19. *Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario* [1937] A. C. 355 at 366.
20. *Angers v. Minister of National Revenue* (1957), Ex. Cr. 83.
21. Bora Laskin, *Canadian Constitutional Law* (2nd ed., Toronto, 1960), 655.
22. L. M. Gouin and Brooke Claxton, *Legislative Expedients and Devices Adopted by the Dominion and the Provinces: A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Ottawa, 1939), 18.
23. F. R. Scott, "The Constitutional Background of the Taxation Agreements," *McGill Law Journal*, II (1955), 6.
24. Gouin and Claxton, *Legislative Expedients*, 22.
25. See Chapter VI.
26. Scott, "The Constitutional Background of the Taxation Agreements."
27. For a useful compilation of what one might reasonably call "constitutional statutes" see Maurice Ollivier (ed.), *British North America Acts and Selected Statutes 1867-1962* (Ottawa, n.d.).
28. S. C. 1873, 36 Vic., c. 26. At the 1960 Federal-Provincial Conference, Premier Walter B. Shaw of Prince Edward Island argued for a causeway connecting his province with the mainland on the basis of this pledge of 1873, *Proceedings*, 78.
29. For an account of this incident and its future ramifications see J. A. Maxwell, "A Flexible Portion of the British North America Act," *Canadian Bar Review*, XVI (1933), 148-57.
30. Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report* (Ottawa, 1940) Bk. I, 251.
31. *Ibid.*, 251-2.
32. *Ibid.*, 251.

33. *A.-G. N. S. v. A. G. Can. and Lord Nelson Hotel Company Limited* [1951] S. C. R. 31 and *P. E. I. Potato Marketing Board v. H. B. Willis Inc. and A. G. Can.* [1952] 4 D. L. R. 146.
34. S. C. 1953-54, 1-2 Eliz. II, c. 59.
35. *Winner v. S. M. T. (Eastern Ltd.) and A.-G. N. B.* [1951] 4 D. L. R. 529.
36. The draft bill is reprinted in Guy Favreau, *The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada* (Ottawa, 1965), App. 3.
37. *Fort Frances Pulp and Power Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Ltd.* [1923] A. C. 695.
38. National Emergency Powers Act, 1945, 9-10 George VI, c. 25.
39. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates* (2nd Session) 1950, 555.
40. *Ibid.*, I, 1951, 648-9.
41. Laskin, *Canadian Constitutional Law*, 242.
42. F. R. Scott, "Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Bar Review*, XXIX (1951), 1124.
43. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 121-2.

Chapter V

1. For the period prior to the Second World War see Luella Gettys, *The Administration of Canadian Conditional Grants* (New York, 1938). For the later period see D. V. Smiley, *Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism* (Canadian Tax Foundation, Canadian Tax Paper no. 32, Toronto, 1963) and Canada, Department of Finance, *Federal-Provincial Conditional Grant and Shared-Cost Programmes, 1962* (Ottawa, 1962). See also Canadian Council of Resource Ministers, *An Inventory of Joint Programs and Agreements Affecting Canada's Renewable Resources* (Montreal, 1964).
2. See the two studies prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations — J. A. Corry, *Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction* and A. E. Grauer, *Public Assistance and Social Insurance* (Ottawa, 1939).
3. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 109-14.
4. Smiley, *Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism*, 37-42.
5. Federal grants for training and research in the welfare field came later but these were not directly related to federal contributions towards unemployment insurance.
6. In only a few circumstances, such as those relating to the Trans-Canada Highway, do federal officials actually inspect the facility or service for which federal funds are given. The characteristic procedure is for these moneys to be paid on the basis of provincial documentation.

7. For some of the factors working towards programme collaboration see D. V. Smiley, "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Public Administration*, VII (1964), 378-9.
8. In this respect see the complaints of the premiers of New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island at the 1960 Federal-Provincial Conference (*Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1961), 49 and 75).
9. Institute of Public Administration of Canada, *Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference* (Toronto, 1963), 376.
10. Federal-Provincial Conference, 1960, *Proceedings*.
11. Figures from Canadian Tax Foundation and Canada, Department of Finance, *Federal-Provincial Conditional Grant and Shared-Cost Programmes*, 1962.
12. Federal-Provincial Conference, 1960, *Proceedings*, 91.
13. *Ibid.*, 49.
14. *Ibid.*, 75.
15. *Ibid.*, 54-5.
16. *Ibid.*, 85.
17. *Ibid.*, 74.
18. *Ibid.*, 129-30.
19. In 1959-60, the last fiscal year before the new policy came into effect, Quebec received grants-in-aid in respect of the major programmes of health grants (including hospital construction) and categorical and general public assistance but did not participate in schemes related to vocational training, roads-to-resources, hospital insurance, and the Trans-Canada Highway.
20. Federal-Provincial Conference, 1960, *Proceedings*, 130.
21. *Federal-Provincial Conditional Grant and Shared-Cost Programmes*, 1962, 45-6; and Canadian Council of Resource Ministers, *An Inventory of Joint Programs and Agreements Affecting Canada's Renewable Resources*, 161-6.
22. Royal Commission on Health Services, *Report* (Ottawa, 1964), 90.
23. The Government of Ontario has shown some interest in this alternative. See Mr. Roberts' statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference, November, 1963 (*Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1964) 26). For an analysis of this device see D. V. Smiley, "Federal Block Grants to the Provinces: A Realistic Alternative?" Canadian Tax Foundation, *Report of the 1964 Conference* (Toronto, 1965), 218-22.
24. See the statement of Prime Minister Diefenbaker to the 1960 Federal-Provincial Conference (*Proceedings*, 13).
25. Prime Minister Pearson, "Opening Statement to the Federal-Provincial Conference of July, 1965," 21-7 (mimeo.).

26. *Ibid.*, 22-5. Mr. Lesage spoke of the federal contributions to provincial plans being in the form of a "fiscal abatement," presumably in the personal income tax. Assuming that provincial plans conform to the four federal conditions, there seems no vital principle involved in having this compensation paid in this form or in cash subsidies or in a combination of the two.

Chapter VI

1. J. Stefan Dupré has made a detailed analysis of the 1959 agreement and the nature and significance of contracting-out generally, "Contracting-Out: A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Centennial," in the Canadian Tax Foundation, *Report of the 1964 Conference* (Toronto, 1965), 209-18.
2. The 1960 agreement provided for abatements in the corporate income tax, a tax with a variable and unpredictable yield. Future abatements were related to the personal income tax.
3. Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, *Report* (Quebec, 1956), Book IV, Fourth Part, Chap. VI.
4. *Federal-Provincial Conditional Grant and Shared-Cost Programmes*, 1962.
5. Calculations made from figures in *ibid.*
6. Election Manifesto of the Liberal party (Ottawa, 1963), 7-8. The New Democratic Party at its founding convention in the summer of 1961 gave endorsement to contracting-out on a limited basis. The federal programme of the party stated, "Unconditional (equalization) grants must be used more frequently and should eventually replace conditional grants. . . . In areas affecting education, language and similar rights now in the British North America Act, where a province does not participate in a joint program it will not forego its right to equivalent funds."
7. Reprinted in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, XII 1964-65, 12500-3.
8. Prime Minister Pearson's letter to the premiers, *ibid.*, 12503.
9. J. T. Saywell, "Federal-Provincial Relations," in *Canadian Annual Review*, 1963 (Toronto, 1964), 65-6.
10. *Ibid.*, 66.
11. For an account of this conference see *ibid.*, 66-8.
12. Municipal Development and Loan Board, *First Annual Report* (Ottawa, 1964), 3.
13. *Ibid.*, 217.
14. John Robarts, Unpublished Address to the National Industrial Conference Board, October 22, 1964, Toronto, 6 (mimeo.).

15. Duff Roblin, *Budget Speech to the Legislature* (Winnipeg, 1965), 24-5.
16. Brief presented to the plenary session of the Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, July 19, 1965, 2-5.

Chapter VII

1. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 92-125; and J. R. Mallory, "The Five Faces of Federalism" in P.-A. Cr  peau and C. B. Macpherson (eds.), *The Future of Canadian Federalism* (Toronto, Montreal, 1965), 3-15 and particularly 9-11.
2. The Hon. Jean-Luc Pepin has given the most systematic analysis from this point of view. See his speech "Le f  d  ralisme coop  ratif" in *Le Canada face    l'avenir* (Montreal, 1964), 113-24.
3. Various speeches delivered by the Hon. Maurice Lamontagne and the Hon. Guy Favreau emphasized this theme. Two former Progressive-Conservative ministers have claimed credit for their party in initiating these procedures with special reference to the Council of Resource Ministers. See the speech of the Hon. Walter Dinsdale in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, III, 1964, 2878-81 and the speech by the Hon. Alvin Hamilton at Provencher, Manitoba, October 21, 1963 (mimeo.).
4. Hon. Guy Favreau, "Rebirth through Reason: Cooperative Federalism," speech given on February 7, 1965, to the Chamber of Commerce, Matane, Quebec (mimeo. trans.), 8.
5. For the background of this dispute see E. R. Black, "Oil Offshore Troubles the Waters," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXXII (1966), 590-603.
6. T. C. Douglas, Constitutional Conference of Federal and Provincial Governments, 1950, *Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1950), 39.
7. Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, 1965, Statement (mimeo.), 26.
8. Lester B. Pearson, Federal-Provincial Conference, 1965, Statement (mimeo.), 3.
9. Daniel J. Elazar, *The American Partnership: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Nineteenth Century United States* (Chicago, 1962).
10. The Dominion Council of Health has been meeting regularly since it was established in 1919 and the Canadian Association of Administrators of Labour Legislation since 1938.
11. Canada, Senate, *Report Pursuant to the Resolution of the Senate to the Honourable the Speaker by the Parliamentary Counsel Relating to the Enactment of the British North America Act* (Ottawa, 1939; repr. 1961), particularly 7-14.

12. J. A. Corry, *Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction: A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Ottawa, 1940).
13. *Ibid.*, 8.
14. See D. V. Smiley, *Conditional Grants and Canadian Federalism*, Canadian Tax Foundation, Canadian Tax Paper no. 32 (Toronto, 1963), Chap. III.
15. See J. G. Hodgetts, "Liberal and Bureaucrat," *Queen's Quarterly*, LXII (1955), 182, and also John Meisel, "The Formulation of Liberal and Conservative Programmes in the 1957 Canadian General Election," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXVI (November, 1960).
16. Robert K. Merton *et al.* (eds.), *Sociology Today* (New York, 1959), 102.
17. Edgar Gallant, "The Machinery of Federal-Provincial Relations," *Canadian Public Administration*, VIII (1959), 515-26.
18. Corry, "Constitutional Trends and Federalism," 120.
19. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, I, 1965, 1-3.
20. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, III, 1964, 3205.
21. George Drew, 1945 Federal-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction, *Proceedings*, 239.
22. See A. R. Kear, "Cooperative Federalism: A Study of the Federal-Provincial Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters," *Canadian Public Administration*, VI (1963), 48.
23. *Ibid.*, 50.
24. See, however, Richard Leach, "Inter-provincial Cooperation," *Canadian Public Administration*, II (1959), 83-91 and J. H. Aitchison, "Inter-provincial Cooperation" in J. H. Aitchison (ed.), *Political Process in Canada: Essays in Honour of R. Macgregor Dawson* (Toronto, 1963), 153-70.
25. Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, 1960, *Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1961), 126.
26. *Ibid.*, 126-7.
27. Premier Smallwood of Newfoundland gave as his reason for not attending the 1965 Conference in Winnipeg that the meetings should be held by the government leaders without their advisers.
28. See Guy Henson, "Voluntary and Official Cooperation in the Atlantic Provinces," in *The Idea of Maritime Union* (Report of a Conference sponsored by the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs and Mount Allison University, February, 1965), 57-66.

29. *Ibid.*, 63. Henson suggests that the extent of interprovincial cooperation is significantly higher in the Atlantic region than in the Canadian prairie provinces.
30. See Herbert F. Quinn, *The Union Nationale: A Study in Quebec Nationalism* (Toronto, 1963).
31. See D. V. Smiley, "The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXXI (1965), 80-95.
32. Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, 1963, *Proceedings* (Ottawa, 1964), 40.
33. Canadian Tax Foundation, *The Provincial Finances 1965* (Toronto, 1966), 178.
34. Jean Lesage, Federal-Provincial Conference, 1963, *Proceedings*, 45.
35. Address to members of the Montreal Consular Corps, April 12, 1965 (Quebec, Department of Education, Information Service), 9.
36. Québec, Législature, *Débats*, 1966, 586.
37. Federal-Provincial Conference, 1963, *Proceedings*, 45.
38. F.-A. Angers, *Quebec Statistical Yearbook, 1961* (Quebec, 1961), 62.

Chapter VIII

1. J. A. Corry, *Difficulties of Divided Jurisdiction: A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations* (Ottawa, 1940), 10.
2. Mr. Fulton did, however, submit the draft proposals to a selected group of university law teachers for their comments.
3. For one of the few systematic attempts in this direction see Edwin R. Black, "Federal Strains within a Canadian Party," *Dalhousie Review*, XLV (1965), 307-23.
4. Daniel Johnson, *Égalité ou indépendance* (Montréal, 1965), 73.
5. Hon. Jean-Luc Pepin, "Le fédéralisme coopératif" in Conférence annuelle de l'Institut canadien des affaires publiques, *Le Canada face à l'avenir* (Montréal, 1964), 113-24.
6. Peter J. T. O'Hearn, *Peace, Order and Good Government* (Toronto, 1964).
7. Marcel Faribault and Robert M. Fowler, *Ten to One: The Confederation Wager* (Toronto, 1965).
8. Jacques Parizeau, "Prospects for Economic Policy in a Federal Canada" in Crépeau and Macpherson (eds.), *The Future of Canadian Federalism*, 57.

9. *Ibid.*, 45.
10. *Ibid.*, 145-8.
11. Hon. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, "Convocation Address to Carleton University, April, 1965" (Quebec, Department of Education, Information Service, mimeo.). "Up to the present, Quebec has asked nothing for itself which it would be unwilling to recognize for the other provinces. But one may wonder if this is the correct attitude to take!" (p. 5) and "What objection or difficulty would there be if Canada were to adopt a constitutional regime which would take account of the existence of two 'nations' or 'societies' within one Canada?" (p. 7).
12. Reprinted in *Le Devoir*, 23 et 24 décembre, 1965.
13. *Le Devoir*, 3 septembre, 1965.
14. Interview in *ibid.*, 20 novembre, 1965.
15. *Ibid.*, 14 décembre, 1965.
16. Editorial, *ibid.*, 17 décembre, 1965.

Appendix A

1. Federal-Provincial Tax Structure Committee, *Proceedings, September 14-15, 1966* (Ottawa, 1966), 11-30; and Lester B. Pearson, "Statement to the Federal-Provincial Meeting, October 24, 1966" (Prime Minister's Office, mimeo.).
2. Federal-Provincial Tax Structure Committee, *Proceedings*, 17.
3. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, XIII, 1967, 13718-9.
4. Quebec Liberal Federation, *Proceedings of the Founding Convention* (Quebec, 1966), mimeo.
5. Maurice Sauvé, "Speech to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce," reproduced in part in *Le Devoir*, 3 novembre, 1966.
6. Jean Chrétien, "Speech to the Toronto Chapter of the American Marketing Assoc., May 30, 1967" (Mr. Chrétien's Office, mimeo.).
7. Chrétien, "Speech to the Chicoutimi Lions Club, December 6, 1966" (Mr. Chrétien's Office, mimeo.).
8. Mr. Trudeau has several times declared his support for a linguistic bill of rights which would secure the rights of French and English languages on a Canada-wide basis.
9. Legislature of Ontario, *Debates*, 1967, 3566-8.
10. *Ibid.*, 3568.

Appendix B

1. O'Hearn, *Peace, Order and Good Government: A New Constitution for Canada*, 45.

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